<continued>
Putin is a creation of Andropov. In his bones, he believes in the need
for a close economic relationship with the West. But his motives are not
those of the oligarchs, and certainly not those of the West. His goal,
like that of the KGB, is the preservation and reconstruction of the
Russian state. For Putin, perestroika and glasnost were tactical
necessities that caused a strategic disaster. He came into office with
the intention of reversing that disaster. He continued to believe in the
need for openness and restructuring, but only as a means toward the end
of Russian power, not as an end in itself.
For Putin, the only solution to Russian chaos was the reassertion of
Russian value. The state was the center of Russian society, and the
intelligence apparatus was the center of the Russian state. Thus, Putin
embarked on a new, slowly implemented policy. First, bring the oligarchs
under control; don't necessarily destroy them, but compel them to work
in parallel with the state. Second, increase Moscow's control over the
outlying regions. Third, recreate a Russian sphere of influence in the
former Soviet Union. Fourth, use the intelligence services internally to
achieve these ends and externally to reassert Russian global authority.
None of these goals could be accomplished if a former intelligence
officer could betray the organs of the state and sit in London hurling
insults at Putin, the FSB and Russia. For a KGB man trained by Andropov,
this would show how far Russia had fallen. Something would have to be
done about it. Litvinenko's death, seen from this standpoint, was a
necessary and inevitable step if Putin's new strategy to save the
Russian state is to have meaning.
Anomaly
That, at least, is the logic. It makes sense that Litvinenko would have
been killed by the FSB. But there is an oddity: The KGB/FSB have tended
to use poison mostly in cases where they wanted someone dead, but wanted
to leave it unclear how he died and who killed him. Poison traditionally
has been used when someone wants to leave a corpse in a way that would
not incur an autopsy or, if a normal autopsy is conducted, the real
cause of death would not be discovered (as the poisons used would
rapidly degrade or leave the body). When the KGB/FSB wanted someone
dead, and wanted the world to know why he had been killed -- or by whom
-- they would use two bullets to the brain. A professional hit leaves no
ambiguity.
The use of polonium-210 in this case, then, is very odd. First, it took
a long time to kill Litvinenko -- giving him plenty of time to give
interviews to the press and level charges against the Kremlin. Second,
there was no way to rationalize his death as a heart attack or brain
aneurysm. Radiation poisoning doesn't look like anything but what it is.
Third, polonium-210 is not widely available. It is not something you
pick up at your local pharmacy. The average homicidal maniac would not
be able to get hold of it or use it.
So, we have a poisoning that was unmistakably deliberate. Litvinenko was
killed slowly, leaving him plenty of time to confirm that he thought
Putin did it. And the poison would be very difficult to obtain by anyone
other than a state agency. Whether it was delivered from Russia --
something the Russians have denied -- or stolen and deployed in the
United Kingdom, this is not something to be tried at home, kids. So,
there was a killing, designed to look like what it was -- a
sophisticated hit.
This certainly raises questions among conspiracy theorists and others.
The linkage back to the Russian state appears so direct that some might
argue it points to other actors or factions out to stir up trouble for
Putin, rather than to Putin himself. Others might say that Litvinenko
was killed slowly, yet with an obvious poisoning signature, so that he
in effect could help broadcast the Kremlin's message -- and cause other
dissidents to think seriously about their actions.
We know only what everyone else knows about this case, and we are
working deductively. For all we know, Litvinenko had a very angry former
girlfriend who worked in a nuclear lab. But while that's possible, one
cannot dismiss the fact that his death -- in so public a manner -- fits
in directly with the logic of today's Russia and the interests of
Vladimir Putin and his group. It is not that we know or necessarily
believe Putin personally ordered a killing, but we do know that, in the
vast apparatus of the FSB, giving such an order would not have been
contrary to the current inclinations of the leadership.
And whatever the public's impression of the case might be, the KGB/FSB
has not suddenly returned to the scene. In fact, it never left. Putin
has been getting the system back under control for years. The
free-for-all over economic matters has ended, and Putin has been
restructuring the Russian economy for several years to increase state
control, without totally reversing openness. This process, however,
requires the existence of a highly disciplined FSB -- and that is not
compatible with someone like a Litvinenko publicly criticizing the
Kremlin from London. Litvinenko's death would certainly make that point
very clear.
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