Small War on Basilan (catch all)

[Dayuhan]

here were some ties to AQ (very loose) previously, and of JI played a role due to their regional ambitions.

There were ties between AQ and the ASG, but borrowing a leaf from the gospel according to Robert C Jones I'd point out that the insurgency existed long before the ASG and will probably exist long after it. The ASG is probably best understood as a failed attempt by AQ to leverage the conditions supporting insurgency and to fill the leadership void left when the MNLF leadership reached various accommodations with the government. Both AQ and JI have tried to use the pre-existing conditions to their advantage, with varying levels of success, but they're not driving the insurgency, they're riding on it.

I have to disagree with your comments that the JSOTF didn't impact good governance at the local level. By no means am I implying that corruption doesn't exist, but the relationship between the security forces and the locals have a much better relationship in many locations. That isn't true in Southern Basilan and at least one other location in the Sulu Archipelago, but it is true for many regions. Having watched that unfold over the years to me it is self evident, to others it may not be. You can argue correctly that alone isn't enough and you would be correct, but while uneven much progress has been made. I suspect we can't make much more progress with our current approach, and it is up to the Filipinos, or sadly it ups to the Government of the Philippines.

Good governance and relations between security forces and the populace are two different things. In terms of governance, the dominant clans are still very much in control, and those leopards have not changed their spots. They may be adopting a somewhat less egregious pattern of corruption and abuse for the time being but they are still in it for themselves and they will still do what's required to keep themselves in power and in the money. I don't think there's been any change that will be sustained for any length of time.

Relations between security forces and the populace have improved to some extent. They could hardly have gotten worse. By 2001/2002 the security forces were in the awkward position of being mistrusted and resented by both sides. The Christian population was up in arms at the universally held perception that the security forces were colluding with the ASG, sharing ransoms and other profits. The Muslim populace knew, as they've known all along, that the government was the enemy. I think they still know that. They may not think it's the right time to take the enemy on, except in the rare times and places when they have the advantage, but the knowledge is still there.

Things are quieter, but these cycles have come and gone before. Whether or not this will last will only be known after we leave. I'm not at all optimistic. I don't see any evidence that there's been any fundamental or lasting changes in the aims or methods of any of the players.

I still think the Tausug/Yakan insurgency is primed to take off again. The only question is what sort of identity it will take... an MILF that learns to bridge the gap between the Maguindanao/Maranao leadership and the Tausug/Yakan populace, or a renewed, back-to-basics offshoot of the ASG, or an MNLF revival, or something completely different. Time will tell.