Small War on Basilan (catch all)

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan,

Yes, it was huge... but again, there was real support for reform from a large part of the populace, including a large part of the populace outside the group that was being discriminated against. That supported a good deal of the moral courage. You don't see Christian Filipinos in Manila demanding fair treatment for their Muslim brothers in Mindanao. The attitude is more on the "kill 'em all" side. There's virtually no constituency supporting moral courage, and a huge constituency opposing it.

You hit upon an important element of social change, first there must be a shift in what is accepted as conventional wisdom, and once that shift takes place, structural changes will adapt to the new conventonal wisdom. Bob's repeated reference to our Civil Rights Movement is a great example.

I'm not convinced that corruption and prejudice towards Filipino Muslims is as indelible as you assume. The same opinions offered about racism in the U.S. in the 60s would have sounded like wise counsel, but in hindsight it apparent changes in popular social values are possible, as they have been throughout history. It is a human trait to assume that perceived reality today will be the same tomorrow.

I think you’re correct that we can’t accomplish much more with our advise and assist mission, but before one simply pulls the plug they really need to assess the risks at multiple levels, and none of those levels has anything to do with AQ, but rather regional stability, economic, social and political repercussions, and another failed mission because we failed to focus our efforts on the right focus areas. Of course if the conflict elevates into a major slug fest again with high casualties and massive IDP flows it will create an opportunity for regional extremists to leverage.

We all want to run to the sounds of the gunfire, but as you have stated previously the real problem is in Manila, and if the USG isn’t working with the Filipinos (not just the government, but whole of society) to help negotiate solutions we’re not going to accomplish anything enduring. Our approach shouldn’t be one of war (in this situation), but rather an approach to achieving peace using all the hard lessons learned by the West and the UN in tens of peace operations around the world. That would be an entirely different approach than the one being pursued now, although a peace settlement is being discussed on the side. The Peace Effort should be the main effort and all efforts supporting. That wouldn’t prevent the security forces from going after terrorists, but it would put the operation in a different context.

A whole of society approach is something that we have given lip service to, but rarely pursued it as seriously as I think we should have. In the Philippines we have already seen the power of using text messaging as a means to mobilize the populace to oust powerful actors. Could it be that most people are good, but don’t know how act good, or have little hope that one voice will be able to make a change; however, if they sense the potential to make real change they’re much more apt to act?

The younger Filipinos who are being exposed to new ideas due to the information revolution will be able to start a new national social consciousness that will take time to shatter the old, but the U.S. could help with this (primarily with information), and I argue in some cases should help. We’re not advocating a violent uprising, but a new conversation that challenges the old paradigms.

Peace Groups (NGOs) are already facilitating discussions between Muslim youth in the south and Christian youth in the north. These discussions if not overly controlled will allow for some frank discussions and help shatter misperceptions and create a demand for justice over time.
When one works in the developing world for years on end it is easy to get jaded (based on realistic assessments), but we can’t afford to give up all hope. If we do, then I agree why we even try to help.

[Bob's World]

What Bill just said.

The realization that I have come to over the years is that much of good "COIN" is in many ways counter-intuitive. Governments are, by definition, the legal actor. Insurgents, by definition, are the illegal actor. When the populace, regardless of how morally just their cause may be, decides that acting out through illegal actions and violence is their only option it is natural for the state to respond through the application of greater security. All the more so if one is armed with a COIN doctrine that tells you that "insurgency and COIN are forms of complex war and warfare."

Bottom up approaches can do good things, but are not likely to produce enduring effects in such top down problems.

Focused security efforts, even focused capture/kill operations, are often justified and can be a critical component of an effective campaign (if executed by the host nation and not some foreign power that is working its own agenda for its own interests and who is more apt to miss the nuance of "purpose for action" that distinguishes a "transnational terrorist" from a "nationalist insurgent."). But such efforts must be in a clearly subordinate and supporting role to efforts to evovle and address the aspects of governance that are at the causal roots of such conflicts.

My sense is that the Philippines is not ready to reform itself yet. Such reforms will likely come in time, but our pushing to make it happen on our timeline IAW our parameters is not likely to produce anything that will be best for that nation. We American's buy too quickly into our own PSYOP, and lack strategic patience. That can be a bad combination that results in dangerously aggressive acts of "do gooderism."

I don't believe that the US has much to fear coming out of the Philippines, or really anywhere in South East Asia. Sure, some small group may come from, or stage from that area, but that is equally true of virtually any place on Earth. This is not about Muslims, this is about Muslims who are held in bad political situations that they perceive are both beyond their control, and that they equally perceive are kept beyond their control due to the actions of some manipulative foreign power. Most of the South East Asian nations worked through these issues on nationalism and sovereignty in the post WWII social upheaval. This is always a roller coaster journey, as cultures as well as governments must evolve in fits and starts toward what works for them. This is a journey that can be guided or encouraged, and perhaps facilitated in some degree. Our problem is that we are so enamored over what works for us is that we forget that our own populace had to evolve in the isolation of the Colonies for a couple hundred years first, and then had to work through another couple hundred years of trial and error democratic experimentation to get to the "masterpiece" we enjoy to day (tongue firmly in cheek).

I hope we never lose our genuine spirit of to do good and to share the fruits of our labors. But I do wish we would develop the strategic patience that more mature nation's seem to possess, (and that we would learn to look at insurgency in a more holistic fashion than our military doctrine-based approaches; or State/Aid democracy/development-based approaches tend to lend themselves to.)

Cheers!

Bob

[Dayuhan]

The realization that I have come to over the years is that much of good "COIN" is in many ways counter-intuitive. Governments are, by definition, the legal actor. Insurgents, by definition, are the illegal actor. When the populace, regardless of how morally just their cause may be, decides that acting out through illegal actions and violence is their only option it is natural for the state to respond through the application of greater security. All the more so if one is armed with a COIN doctrine that tells you that "insurgency and COIN are forms of complex war and warfare."

One of the great dangers of doctrines and models is that once we adopt them we become enamored of them, and when reality doesn't fit the doctrine or model, we try to modify reality instead of changing our perceptions.

In the southern Philippines the core conflict, the conflict that kicked off the violence in the early 70s and sustains it today, is not between "the government" and "the populace". It's between two portions of the populace, both of which consider themselves aggrieved. One of the great failures of governance in this conflict was the decision of government to take the side of one portion of the populace against the other. One of the major causes of the failure of the recent US-supported "peace agreement" was that it treated the problem as a dispute between government and insurgents, and excluded one of the contesting populaces from the process. The task of government is not to reach a peace agreement with the insurgents, but to broker a peace agreement between two portions of its own populace that have irreconcilably different demands, neither of which trusts the government or each other. Not easy even for a functional government with some popular support for a peace process. For a largely dysfunctional government with a populace clamoring for a hard-line approach... beyond not easy.

I don't believe that the US has much to fear coming out of the Philippines, or really anywhere in South East Asia.

There we agree.

This is not about Muslims, this is about Muslims who are held in bad political situations that they perceive are both beyond their control, and that they equally perceive are kept beyond their control due to the actions of some manipulative foreign power.

The perception of "kept beyond their control due to the actions of some manipulative foreign power" doesn't really exist here. The bulk of the Muslim populace here has a reasonably positive perception of US involvement, which they see as a controlling factor on the Philippine government. There's probably more distrust of US motives on the settler side. One of the odd quirks of all this is a widespread belief among Mindanao settlers that the US has cut a devious deal with the MILF to support a breakaway in return for access to "the oil" and base rights. There's no hard evidence that there is any oil or that the US wants a base in Mindanao, but that never stopped anyone from believing!

Most of the South East Asian nations worked through these issues on nationalism and sovereignty in the post WWII social upheaval. This is always a roller coaster journey, as cultures as well as governments must evolve in fits and starts toward what works for them.

Thailand has an intractable problem with Muslims in the south, Indonesia has all kinds of simmering ethnic issues and separatist sentiments, Vietnam and Laos have issues with their ethnic minorities... it's still being worked through all over SE Asia.

This is a journey that can be guided or encouraged, and perhaps facilitated in some degree.

I'd be very, very hesitant about trying to assert a US role in that effort. It's possible that we could help; it's also possible - and I think rather more probable - that we can make things worse. We don't understand these issues as well as we think we do, and we often seem reluctant to listen to those who do understand them. Subtlety is needed, and that's not traditionally a US strong point.

Our problem is that we are so enamored over what works for us is that we forget that our own populace had to evolve in the isolation of the Colonies for a couple hundred years first, and then had to work through another couple hundred years of trial and error democratic experimentation to get to the "masterpiece" we enjoy to day (tongue firmly in cheek).

Yes... not to mention a civil war of positively African proportions, one of history's great genocides, and various other digressions. Europe was even worse: it took them centuries of almost continuous war to arrive (assisted by exhaustion) at the current level of peace and stability. In much of the world that process was frozen by the colonial imposition of order at the expense of stability. Now it's thawed out. No real reason why we should expect it to be any prettier for them than it was for us.

[Bob's World]

Well, we all know that the friction between Muslim south and Catholic north did not begin in the 1970s. Conditions of insurgency ebb and flow within every populace, but are poorly understood if only measured from when the first and last shots are fired. That is like saying a volcano exists only when it is erupting....

And in the Philippines I agree that it is doubtful that many blame the government there on the US; certainly some probably do, as this is a matter of perception far more than fact. Other places more so.

As to the many small issues between governments of SEA and minorities, yes, racism is a powerful force in Asia, and other factors as well contribute to such issues, but I was speaking in larger terms. Shortly after 9/11 there was great emphasis on Indonesia in particular "largest Muslim nation on Earth" and Malaysia as well. That because they had large Muslim populaces they would automatically become hotbeds of AQ influence. This is when Ideology was widely proclaimed as the Center of Gravity of this conflict as well.

But insurgency is political, not ideological; and Nations like Indonesia and Malaysia while very Muslim have already thrown off Western influence over their governments and have governments of their own that, as you note, they are continuing to refine. This is not the case in the greater Middle East where AQ finds many populaces who have not yet stepped out from under this manipulative external influence. Arab Spring is doing more to reduce the likelihood of transnational terrorism coming out of the Middle East and being directed at the West than any of our efforts in Iraq or Afghanistan. Yes, those countries will have long, generational journeys to "good governance," but so long as they don't blame the bad governance they will certainly experience along the way on us they will not have much motivation to attack us.

Like Iran, who has bad governance in spades, but it is not one they blame the West for. Same with the Philippines. The ideological fear mongering that has made these conflicts all about "clashing civilizations" or Islam vs. Christian have done us all a disservice as these positions are based on very flawed understandings of insurgency. I guess it is easier to say that Muslims hate us than it is to say that our foreign policy has unduly disrupted the governance of others for reasons that placed US interests over those of the affected populace.

[Dayuhan]

Well, we all know that the friction between Muslim south and Catholic north did not begin in the 1970s.

It didn't begin in the 70s, that was the point where it tipped into large-scale violence. More important, though, it wasn't "friction between Muslim south and Catholic north", it was friction between indigenous populations and settlers, both in the south. In many ways it's better to speak of conflict between settler and indigenous populaces and remove the religious aspect altogether, because ultimately the conflict isn't about religion, it's a fight over land and political power between indigenous and migrant populaces.

The first great mistake the government made was to try to alleviate agrarian unrest in the north by opening the south to sponsored settlement, without considering the potential impact on the south. That mistake is essentially irreversible: the settlers aren't leaving. The indigenous populace - now a numerical minority in many areas they traditionally controlled - wants the future to be decided by them: they see the majority as an imposed condition that should not be allowed to dictate terms. The settlers - many in their 3rd and 4th generations, some more - don't agree.

The second great mistake the government made was when the violence between settler and indigenous militias broke out, they took the side of the settlers instead of trying to act as a neutral mediator and law enforcer. That might theoretically be reversible, but realistically it will take generations: trust is easier to break than to make, and the Philippine government has little credibility as a neutral mediator.

The third great mistake came after the fighting reached a stalemate and government bought a window of peace by buying off key insurgent leaders with lucrative government posts. That offered a window of opportunity for government to step in and govern, but the window was not exploited: government preferred to offer unlimited license to steal and abuse to anyone who could keep the peace and deliver the votes in a given territory.

There have been others, including the disastrous failed "peace agreement" that we saw recently. I don't see the fight/talk/fight cycle changing any time soon. I am definitely curious over what form the next incarnation of Yakan/Tausug insurgency will take... there will be one, almost certainly.

This is not the case in the greater Middle East where AQ finds many populaces who have not yet stepped out from under this manipulative external influence. Arab Spring is doing more to reduce the likelihood of transnational terrorism coming out of the Middle East and being directed at the West than any of our efforts in Iraq or Afghanistan. Yes, those countries will have long, generational journeys to "good governance," but so long as they don't blame the bad governance they will certainly experience along the way on us they will not have much motivation to attack us.

OT here, but again I think you're drastically oversimplifying the sources of AQ influence, and perhaps adjusting them a bit to fit them into your model.

Like Iran, who has bad governance in spades, but it is not one they blame the West for. Same with the Philippines.

Many Filipinos do blame the US for their situation, with some reason, but it's more a left narrative than a Muslim narrative. Every place is different.

In Indonesia and the Philippines jihadi movements have drawn their support not from the global AQ narrative, but from local sectarian conflict. They've done this with limited success. Support in Indonesia has been sporadic, limited, and closely linked to outbreaks of sectarian violence. There's little evidence that the jihadi narrative has ever had much pull in the Philippines: the ASG never drew popular support until the KFR business started drawing in money, and the JI connection is primarily opportunistic, not ideological.

[Bob's World]

Once again, your violent agreement is noted.

Yes, the indigenous population and those "settlers", who came from where and represented who? And of course Magsaysay's program to help reduce the Huk problem in the north by forcing massive resettlement to the south. But at the end of the day, who does the populace go to for resolution of such problems?? The Government. If they find no justice, no equity there, if they really don't feel that government to be their government, what do they turn to next? This is the essence of insurgency.

Careful readers will note that i too recognize that many Filipinos do blame the US for their situation. Insurgency is all about perception, and facts and truth are distant cousins at best.

As to AQ everywhere. AQ does not create insurgency. AQ ideology does not create insurgents. AQ is an opportunist, non-state actor that targets Muslim populaces with actionable grievances and conducts UW to attempt to incite local insurgency to action, and to recruit individuals to conduct AQ specific operations as well. The governance-populace dynamic in SEA shook off Western manipulation in the 40s-70s and is on their own messy journey of self-determination, so AQ is not needed and has little influence there. In the Middle East the path to self determination began with the Turkish and Iranian revolutions over 100 years ago, but was quickly quashed by European and US efforts to secure their own interests in the region. It began moving again post-cold war, and even blind men could see this as "Arab Spring" took these movements to the next level. AQ has set up franchised UW shops around the region to leverage this popular energy. They do not cause it, they support it. (We do not support it, we help suppress it or stand neutral. We are in a quandary of the principles we profess, the values we peddle as "universal," and the fears over economic and security interests that drive us to decisions that no one can figure out).

No, I do not fight to force things into my model, I merrily tweak and revise my model whenever new insights come to the surface. You, my brother, do fight to embrace the model. That is fine. I feel that your instincts tell you that there it great validity in it, but that you have a very fact-reliant component to your thinking, that makes you resist. Like Thomas, you must see and touch the holes. Facts are important, but so is faith and instinct, because sometimes the facts lie; and certainly that narrow set of facts that gets entered into evidence (captured in history) will always tell the story that the storyteller wants to tell.

As I gently goaded Gian last week in response to his comments on a "failure of generalship," I can see many things our generals do that I disagree with, but I see them acting IAW their training, doctrine and experience. What really kills us is a "failure of historian-ship."

[Dayuhan]

Yes, the indigenous population and those "settlers", who came from where and represented who? And of course Magsaysay's program to help reduce the Huk problem in the north by forcing massive resettlement to the south.

The settlers didn't and don't represent anyone, except themselves. Settlement was encouraged by government but it wasn't really organized for the most part, people pretty much just went, on their own. Magsaysay's resettlement of people from the Huk areas had little visible impact in Mindanao: the Huk areas are Tagalog speaking, and the settlers in the areas where there's conflict with the Muslims are overwhelmingly Ilonggo speakers fro Negros and Iloilo, where the Huks never got established.

But at the end of the day, who does the populace go to for resolution of such problems??The Government. If they find no justice, no equity there, if they really don't feel that government to be their government, what do they turn to next? This is the essence of insurgency.

The point that needs to be remembered in this case is that people didn't go to the government for resolution. They just started fighting each other. At that stage it wasn't insurgency at all, it was sectarian conflict, though the conflict was actually driven less by religious issues than by conflict over land and political control. It didn't become "insurgency" until the government took sides.

The point of all this is simply that this is not a fight between "the insurgents" and "the government", and it can't be resolved by trying to broker a peace between the insurgents and government. That flawed interpretation has already led to one disastrously failed attempt at peacemaking, and it will lead to others if it isn't changed. You can't resolve the "insurgency" without addressing the underlying sectarian conflict, and that's populace vs populace, not populace vs government.

Careful readers will note that i too recognize that many Filipinos do blame the US for their situation. Insurgency is all about perception, and facts and truth are distant cousins at best.

Returning to the point, I'll just repeat that the perception that the US is to blame for their situation really isn't much of a factor in the conflict in the southern Philippines.

AQ is an opportunist, non-state actor that targets Muslim populaces with actionable grievances and conducts UW to attempt to incite local insurgency to action, and to recruit individuals to conduct AQ specific operations as well. The governance-populace dynamic in SEA shook off Western manipulation in the 40s-70s and is on their own messy journey of self-determination, so AQ is not needed and has little influence there.

Again I think this is an wildly oversimplified rendition that omits many of the forces driving support for AQ and overemphasizes what has in actual fact been AQ's least successful narrative. The conclusion re Indonesia and the Philippines is I think incorrect. AQ's lack of appeal in these places hasn't come about because AQ isn't needed, but because AQ's attempts at organizing here have stressed global narratives that have minimal resonance for populaces focused on local issues.

In the Middle East the path to self determination began with the Turkish and Iranian revolutions over 100 years ago, but was quickly quashed by European and US efforts to secure their own interests in the region. It began moving again post-cold war, and even blind men could see this as "Arab Spring" took these movements to the next level. AQ has set up franchised UW shops around the region to leverage this popular energy. They do not cause it, they support it. (We do not support it, we help suppress it or stand neutral. We are in a quandary of the principles we profess, the values we peddle as "universal," and the fears over economic and security interests that drive us to decisions that no one can figure out).

What I think you don't want to see here is that the energy that AQ has successfully tapped is the generic resentment toward the west and toward military intervention in Muslim lands. AQ's attempts at leveraging resentment toward Muslim leaders have generally failed rather miserably, which doesn't necessarily mean those populaces like their governments, but does suggest that they don't care to be ruled by AQ. AQ gets all kinds of support when they are fighting foreigners somewhere far away, but the support dries up when they try to start revolution at home.

The Arab Spring movements have succeeded where AQ failed, and they did it without help from AQ. They did it by holding out hope that AQ didn't and tapping popular support that AQ can't draw. I don't see anything to suggest that AQ has an inside track in the Arab Spring movements, in fact those movements have left them out in the cold in many ways

[Dayuhan]

You hit upon an important element of social change, first there must be a shift in what is accepted as conventional wisdom, and once that shift takes place, structural changes will adapt to the new conventonal wisdom. Bob's repeated reference to our Civil Rights Movement is a great example.

I'm not convinced that corruption and prejudice towards Filipino Muslims is as indelible as you assume. The same opinions offered about racism in the U.S. in the 60s would have sounded like wise counsel, but in hindsight it apparent changes in popular social values are possible, as they have been throughout history. It is a human trait to assume that perceived reality today will be the same tomorrow.

I wouldn't say prejudice toward Philippine Muslims is necessarily indelible, but it's deeply entrenched and I see no sign at all that it's changing. If anything it looks like it's getting worse. It's really quite striking, and it prevails even among many who on other issues seem quite progressive. I don't think it can't change, but I don't see that it's changing.

Corruption is another story. It's a major issue and there's a lot of resentment, but the focus is invariably on national-level corruption. That's partly because the media are Manila-centric, and partly because it's safer. Political violence in the Philippines is overwhelmingly on the local level. Media can run all the exposes they want and complain all they want about national politicians, but those who do the same at the local level often encounter bullets. These killings are almost never solved and they are generally ignored by police, who know perfectly well what's going on.

I think you’re correct that we can’t accomplish much more with our advise and assist mission, but before one simply pulls the plug they really need to assess the risks at multiple levels, and none of those levels has anything to do with AQ, but rather regional stability, economic, social and political repercussions, and another failed mission because we failed to focus our efforts on the right focus areas. Of course if the conflict elevates into a major slug fest again with high casualties and massive IDP flows it will create an opportunity for regional extremists to leverage.

All true, but again I don't think "we" have much of a role to play.

We all want to run to the sounds of the gunfire, but as you have stated previously the real problem is in Manila, and if the USG isn’t working with the Filipinos (not just the government, but whole of society) to help negotiate solutions we’re not going to accomplish anything enduring. Our approach shouldn’t be one of war (in this situation), but rather an approach to achieving peace using all the hard lessons learned by the West and the UN in tens of peace operations around the world. That would be an entirely different approach than the one being pursued now, although a peace settlement is being discussed on the side. The Peace Effort should be the main effort and all efforts supporting. That wouldn’t prevent the security forces from going after terrorists, but it would put the operation in a different context.

We actually tried throwing pressure behind a "peace agreement", with USIP taking the lead role and substantial if fairly quiet pressure on the diplomatic level. That turned out to be an unmitigated disaster. The agreement was fatally flawed from the start - I recall nominating it for a "peace agreement least likely to produce peace" award - and was inevitably shot down. The US pressure was deeply resented by much of the populace and gave rise to all sorts of bizarre rumours that the US had cut a deal with the MILF to back the agreement in exchange for economic concessions and base rights. Nothing was accomplished and a fair bit of damage was done.

A whole of society approach is something that we have given lip service to, but rarely pursued it as seriously as I think we should have. In the Philippines we have already seen the power of using text messaging as a means to mobilize the populace to oust powerful actors. Could it be that most people are good, but don’t know how act good, or have little hope that one voice will be able to make a change; however, if they sense the potential to make real change they’re much more apt to act?

The younger Filipinos who are being exposed to new ideas due to the information revolution will be able to start a new national social consciousness that will take time to shatter the old, but the U.S. could help with this (primarily with information), and I argue in some cases should help. We’re not advocating a violent uprising, but a new conversation that challenges the old paradigms.

Information technology, social media etc can spread hate and prejudice as easily as expanded consciousness. Much of the world (including much of the US) uses the internet for affirmation, not information; they construct closed networks of sites and individuals who tell them what they want to hear and feed their prejudices. Again, I agree that it's possible that change will happen, but it's also possible that it won't, or that the mutual antipathy could get worse... and either way, I don't think anything the US does is going to help, and doing the wrong thing could easily hurt.

Peace Groups (NGOs) are already facilitating discussions between Muslim youth in the south and Christian youth in the north. These discussions if not overly controlled will allow for some frank discussions and help shatter misperceptions and create a demand for justice over time.

This is not a bad thing, but it's not a new thing either. I hope it works, but I've little optimism, based on observation of both sides.

When one works in the developing world for years on end it is easy to get jaded (based on realistic assessments), but we can’t afford to give up all hope. If we do, then I agree why we even try to help.

There's a difference between losing hope and understanding that not everything is about us and there are often limited possibilities for us to act productively. There may be times when we can be useful, but they're few and far between and opportunities have to be taken with a great deal of subtlety and a lot more understanding of the situation than we've demonstrated so far. A clumsy and ill advised effort to help is likely to do more harm than doing nothing at all.

[Dayuhan]

From this morning's news...

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/10...l-barka-fiasco

P4M bounty led to Al-Barka fiasco?

Military admits 'lapses' in Basilan incident

MANILA, Philippines - The P2-million bounty each on the heads of an Abu Sayyaf terrorist leader and a fugitive Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) commander may have caused the haphazard mission that led to the deaths of 19 soldiers in Al-Barka, Basilan last week, sources alleged.

The Special Forces mission that went awry sought to capture the Abu Sayyaf's Long Malat Solaiman and MILF commander Dan Laksaw Asnawi, who were behind the beheading of Marines in the same town in 2007.

The military on Tuesday admitted lapses in the failed Special Forces operation that also left more than a dozen other soldiers injured.