Small War on Basilan (catch all)

[Ken White]

Yes, I was imprecise with the words... I should have wondered whether US advice and assistance had done anything to address these issues. Of course I already knew the answer was no, which raises the next question: what exactly has all the advice and assistance done?
...
If "we" means the US, I don't think anything "we" do is going to make any difference at all in the Philippines.

All that is sadly correct. Why?

Why can't we use our own rules instead of trying to play by those of others. Why do we play on the turf of others, turf about which we remain almost willfully and stubbornly ignorant. Why don't we play to our strengths; have a few people that know a lot about specific areas and we listen to those people instead of egoistically (a term used due to its absolute appropriateness in these matters...) and arrogantly rejecting their knowledge...

As our interventional failures are known and proven all over the world and not just in the Philippines, why do we keep doing it so badly? Our poor methodology provides little to no success at great cost.

[Steve Blair]

As our interventional failures are known and proven all over the world and not just in the Philippines, why do we keep doing it so badly? Our poor methodology provides little to no success at great cost.

I would posit that one of the reasons is that our interventions are often motivated by emotion and not necessarily long-term calculation. Combine that with a deliberately unstable political system and a military that tends to reject learning and lessons, and you get a bad mix.

[Ken White]

I would posit that one of the reasons is that our interventions are often motivated by emotion and not necessarily long-term calculation. Combine that with a deliberately unstable political system and a military that tends to reject learning and lessons, and you get a bad mix.

a Master of Understatement...

[ganulv]

I would posit that one of the reasons is that our interventions are often motivated by emotion and not necessarily long-term calculation.

Are you suggesting that concentrating on what is urgent rather than what is important is the American Way? Hmmm, that would explain why the Man of Steel is always getting run so ragged…

[Steve Blair]

Are you suggesting that concentrating on what is urgent rather than what is important is the American Way? Hmmm, that would explain why the Man of Steel is always getting run so ragged…

Not so much urgent (as many of Wilson's interventions weren't urgent per se), although we do have a massive addition to instant gratification.... I would say that we tend to react to things that are emotional triggers and not necessarily products of calculation or long-term policy/planning. TR, for example, did avoid some interventions that he may have been emotionally or philosophically attracted to but determined that in long-term policy terms they weren't good ideas.

[ganulv]

Not so much urgent (as many of Wilson's interventions weren't urgent per se), although we do have a massive addition to instant gratification....

I’ve seen so much management by urgency that I am convinced a lot of people are confused about the concept. When I hear the word I think careening bus or CPR rather than the kind of institutional financial issue that I have been told is so urgent that I really should be good enough to postpone my reimbursement for six months. By my definition that issue can’t be urgent. But maybe there’s a reason I don’t get paid the big bucks like middle management.

[Bill Moore]

Bob,

I don't disagree with your drum beat, I can dance to it, but too often you hijack forums that are focused on different issues. Despite the flawed strategy approach and other issues I won't address here, the one issue that we may be able to address is improving our security force assistance system.

Dayuhan, advise and assist authorities only gets you so far, so I think there needs to be some expectation management/strategic communications to clarify the limits of our support.

I don't think our time there was wasted, but agree we certainly didn't maximize our return on investment.

As for good governance, and Bob knows this, the JSOTF has actually done quite a bit to assist with good governance at the local level, and they improved helped improve the relationship between the populace and the military in many areas, but obviously southern Basilan is not one of those areas.

It frustrates the hell out me that whether it is in Afghanistan, the Philippines, or elsewhere we can't accomplish relatively simple objectives like developing effective security forces due to a number of factors, but most prevalent is a failed SC/SA system.

I have no hope of improving our overall strategy.

[Dayuhan]

As for good governance, and Bob knows this, the JSOTF has actually done quite a bit to assist with good governance at the local level, and they improved helped improve the relationship between the populace and the military in many areas, but obviously southern Basilan is not one of those areas.

This is optimistic, I think. I don't think there's been any real lasting impact on local governance. People on Basilan realize that the American presence has brought additional resources and that the military and civilian leaders behave better when Americans are watching, and they appreciate that. They also know that the same people are in charge, there's been no effort to impose accountability on previous acts of corruption, collusion, and abuse, and that as soon as the Americans leave the status quo ante will return.

Realistically, I don't see any way that advice and assistance from the US military is going to have any real impact on the black hole of local governance and civil-military relations on Basilan or Jolo. It's too much to expect. On the other hand, I can see how US military advice and assistance could help the Philippine military use its existing resources more effectively, improve their small unit tactics, and develop practices that would help prevent incidents like this. That wouldn't address the root causes of the war, but realistically nothing the US does is going to address the root causes of the war.

Obviously these incidents can't be counted as failure of the US "advise and assist" mission: you can't make anyone follow advice. It does raise the question of whether maintaining the mission in the form it's taken over the last decade is going to achieve significant incremental gains. My own feeling is that we've accomplished most of what we can, and that it wouldn't be a bad idea to start packing up. I also think it would be a good idea to state, bluntly and publicly, that in our opinion we've done all we can, and that ultimately this insurgency is driven not by AQ or international extremism, but by governance issues that can only resolved by the Philippine government.

If it were up to me I'd have the local CIA station draw up a detailed report on collusion, corruption, and abuse and how they sustain the insurgency and cripple the COIN effort, naming names and giving specifics. The end recommendation would be that the US needs to withdraw, because until the Philippine government gets serious about bringing its own people within the rule of law there's nothing meaningful we can accomplish. I'd have them e-mail the thing back to the home office with a direct cc to Wikileaks.

These issues need to be addressed by the Philippine government, but as long as they can keep the issues in the shadows, the Philippine government will avoid addressing them, because they are very uncomfortable issues. The US can't address or resolve the issues, but we can put a spotlight on them and help get them out of the shadows, which I think in the long run will help a lot more than trying to paper over the cracks and pretend the system just needs a minor bit of tuning up.

Of course it's not up to me and never will be, which I admit might be a good thing