On the avoidance of small wars

[JMA]

You were factually wrong about Germany's military, you were factually wrong about Germany's diplomatic options, you were factually wrong about "Europe"'s ability to wage war without the U.S., the whole idea that you could add time needed to master certain levels is wrong as well, junior officers questioning war has been totally common and also occurred prior to the 1940 France campaign (in fact, even many Generals questioned war and campaign plan) and small wars/interventions have in great part a bad rep because they're so marginally useful no matter how successful.

You were basically wrong about everything and it's not about simplify vs. complicate. It's about you having an utterly incomplete look at those things.

LOL... OK the German military could take Liechtenstein and Luxemborg and who else. Fuchs you are living in the past. Today the German army is amateur hour. As such it is best to hide behind the excuse that one should only get involved in 'big' wars of existential nature. The martial nature of Germans has been bred out of the national military genetics. Its over, gone, finished and you are probably right that it is only an existential war that will wake the German public up (which is not going to happen). So analyze it. Why do people join the German army? A steady, secure, safe job (with good conditions or service and an early retirement)? To dress in 'cool' uniforms and march behind brass bands? To get to play with expensive toys (like jet aircraft, tanks and assorted military ships) which they could otherwise not afford to and at virtually no safety risk (like from a war or something ridiculous like that) other than from their own negligence?

So what may I ask does Germany have to use as diplomatic leverage? A strong economy?

What the Libyan exercise proved beyond doubt is that only the US has the ability to sustain any such action at a meaningful tempo (as Libya would be classed as a minor intervention).

Correction... small wars have a bad reputation because they are generally micro managed (by politicians and senior commanders) to the extent of being unable to accomplish the mission (or achieve the aim - whatever you prefer).

Remember this clown?

War is too serious a business to be left to the generals. - Georges Clemenceau

... this is the very same clown who was one of the major voices behind the Treaty of Versailles 1919 ... and we all know what that 'masterpiece' led to.

[Fuchs]

You're living in the past, for you don't seem to see that there's no Red Army any more.

The combined European NATO military forces are superior to the combined military forces of their periphery. This relative strength is what counts for whether you can fight your way out of a wet bag or even withstand an all-out assault of all neighbours.

And you shouldn't imply that in other countries military forces are not first and foremost employers, for that's what they are. There's no Sparta or Templar Order anywhere these days.


You also read too much into genetic and/or cultural effects regarding Germany and the military. The military is a tool, not an object of patriotic passion. Just a tool for the national policy.
Your idea of a martial culture back before '45 is quite mislead as well. There's not a single photo of people cheering the war in 1939, unlike 1914. The war was deeply unpopular till Paris fell.

It wasn't some martial spirit that turned workers and farmers into NCOs who lead assaults after all nearby officers fell; it was a combination of factors in German society and military that's still very much alive.
# great dissatisfaction with poor results
# a strong belief in organising things thoroughly to address issues
# a good basic education
# a strong belief in the importance of education and training
# a strong belief that it's important to take precautions in case things go wrong
# institutional memory about what's important
# the fostering of Kameradschaft in the army


Again; I diagnose that you simplify things way too much.
"Martial spirit" may please you as an explanation, but it's a primitive concept that doesn't fit well to actual history.


We produce good cars for about the same reasons why our grandparent and grand-grandparent generations left such a strong marks in military history.

[Dayuhan]

"Martial spirit" may please you as an explanation, but it's a primitive concept that doesn't fit well to actual history.

The notion of "German martial spirit" is as poorly founded as the equally lazy notion of "American bellicosity".

We produce good cars for about the same reasons why our grandparent and grand-grandparent generations left such a strong marks in military history.

Good, yes, but too expensive to be worth it. The Japanese generate a better price/performance ratio IMO, though anyone's assessment of "better" is going to be subjective.

I may be biased. My Toyota 4x4 pickup is over 250k km, much of it on absolutely heinous terrain, and still in it. OT, but it wasn't me who brought up cars

[Dayuhan]

So what may I ask does Germany have to use as diplomatic leverage? A strong economy?

What the Libyan exercise proved beyond doubt is that only the US has the ability to sustain any such action at a meaningful tempo (as Libya would be classed as a minor intervention).

One might well ask what form of military leverage Germany needs... and the answer would probably be not much, beyond defense of the homeland. Why would the Germans want to project armed force around the world?

Remember this clown?

War is too serious a business to be left to the generals. - Georges Clemenceau

... this is the very same clown who was one of the major voices behind the Treaty of Versailles 1919 ... and we all know what that 'masterpiece' led to.

I'd say allowing Generals to decide when to make war is every bit as foolish as telling Generals how to make war. Determining policy objectives is not the competence or the business of the military.

I'd agree with Fuchs that the great majority of American small wars since WW2 have been pointless and counterproductive from the start, evidence of policy failure, not miitary failure, and most would have been better avoided.

How to stop doing that is another question. Clear, sensible assessments of interests, choice of practical, realistic, achievable goals, more awareness of potential for unintended consequences... that stuff helps, but it's like saying the antidote to stupidity is smartness. How to get some smartness into place is a bit of an issue. It's usually there, but it's all too often ignored.

[JMA]

One might well ask what form of military leverage Germany needs... and the answer would probably be not much, beyond defense of the homeland. Why would the Germans want to project armed force around the world?

I generally avoid responding to you (for good reason) but in this case I will.

Your point is invalid.

The bottom line is that Germany has no military leverage (the reason for which is immaterial).

I'd say allowing Generals to decide when to make war is every bit as foolish as telling Generals how to make war.

Did I say that the generals should decide when to make war?

No I didn't.

But I do agree that once the Grand Strategy has been decided then the generals should be allowed to get on with it.

Once example of how ludicrous the situation has become is explained in the appointment of civilian oversight (political) of target selection in the recent Libyan debacle. Tell me if you will (or if you can) what qualifications these civilians had for this duty that trumps the 20-30 years experience of the military commanders on that operation?

The final wake up call should have come when a strategic raid (OBL) was micro managed by the White House and then hailed as the making of the presidency. (The US military is not in the clear on this however as there is a common thread running through US raids of this nature and that is helicopter crashes and other failures.)

It should dawn on you that at battalion level and below the US military continues to render outstanding service to their nation in time of need. Above that I'm not sure there is a kind word to be said.

Determining policy objectives is not the competence or the business of the military.

Agreed. Good to see you know this.

The question is that given that you know this the US voter continues to elect Commanders-in-Chief who are barely competent to manage their personal bodily functions let alone to determine policy objectives.

Take Obama for example. He seems to have surrounded himself with all the village idiots. Some retired general staff too who are either not being listened to or are giving bad advice. There is more care (mostly) in selecting CEOs of major corporations than there is in selection a President of the US. Frightening.

I'd agree with Fuchs that the great majority of American small wars since WW2 have been pointless and counterproductive from the start, evidence of policy failure, not miitary failure, and most would have been better avoided.

Better avoided... or conceived and conducted more competently? The Fuchs approach seems to be to do nothing (which is fine if you have been living under the protective umbrella of the US for all this time).

How to stop doing that is another question. Clear, sensible assessments of interests, choice of practical, realistic, achievable goals, more awareness of potential for unintended consequences... that stuff helps, but it's like saying the antidote to stupidity is smartness. How to get some smartness into place is a bit of an issue. It's usually there, but it's all too often ignored.

Give the military the war aims and let them get on with it (watching out for McArthur and Patton type personalities which need to be 'managed'.

Smartness in the White House and in most of the worlds capitals is in short supply. It gets worse when the president surrounds himself with 'yes-men'. Anyone got an idea how sleeping in the White House for eight years qualifies one to be Secretary of State?

[Dayuhan]

I generally avoid responding to you (for good reason) but in this case I will.

I apologize insincerely for having caused you discomfort.

The bottom line is that Germany has no military leverage (the reason for which is immaterial).

They have as much military leverage as they think they need. They may or may not be correct, but that's for them to determine, and not anyone else's business. If they see their military purely as a device to protect the homeland, so be it. Their call.

But I do agree that once the Grand Strategy has been decided then the generals should be allowed to get on with it.

Once example of how ludicrous the situation has become is explained in the appointment of civilian oversight (political) of target selection in the recent Libyan debacle.

We agree on something, unusual. I also think the politicians should stay out of it, once they've laid down the basic guidelines... including, in this case, the specific provisions that the UK and France should lead to the greatest possible extent, no US ground forces should be committed, and US force should not remove MG. Those are all policy decisions, made for good reasons.

It should dawn on you that at battalion level and below the US military continues to render outstanding service to their nation in time of need. Above that I'm not sure there is a kind word to be said.

I've never said otherwise. Bad policy is a serious problem, has been for a long time.

Better avoided... or conceived and conducted more competently? The Fuchs approach seems to be to do nothing (which is fine if you have been living under the protective umbrella of the US for all this time).

If there's no compelling need to be involved, and no clear, practical objective that's achievable with the time and resources you're willing to commit, why be involved at all? Both of those qualities have been rather lacking from American involvements for some time.

Seems to me that the default choice when it comes to interfering in messy affairs in faraway countries should be exactly what Fuchs suggests: don't. That default would reasonably be overridden if there's a sufficiently compelling interest, but it would need to be very compelling indeed to be sufficient, IMO.

Give the military the war aims and let them get on with it (watching out for McArthur and Patton type personalities which need to be 'managed'.

MacArthur and Patton type personalities should certainly never be allowed to make policy... if that's "management", then it's called for. MacArthur was able to make policy for a very short while in the country where I live, and made a serious hash of it.

Smartness in the White House and in most of the worlds capitals is in short supply.

Agreed.

[JMA]

I apologize insincerely for having caused you discomfort.

No discomfort... just mild annoyance.

They have as much military leverage as they think they need. They may or may not be correct, but that's for them to determine, and not anyone else's business. If they see their military purely as a device to protect the homeland, so be it. Their call.

... but what they think they need does not translate into any military deterent whatsoever.

We agree on something, unusual. I also think the politicians should stay out of it, once they've laid down the basic guidelines... including, in this case, the specific provisions that the UK and France should lead to the greatest possible extent, no US ground forces should be committed, and US force should not remove MG. Those are all policy decisions, made for good reasons.

Progress

little snip

Seems to me that the default choice when it comes to interfering in messy affairs in faraway countries should be exactly what Fuchs suggests: don't. That default would reasonably be overridden if there's a sufficiently compelling interest, but it would need to be very compelling indeed to be sufficient, IMO.

OK so you and Fuchs may agree on this. I disagree.

"when it comes to interfering in messy affairs in faraway countries" it should be done properly. You can't take the military option off the table because the political direction and the military execution have been poor. Fix the problem.

MacArthur and Patton type personalities should certainly never be allowed to make policy... if that's "management", then it's called for. MacArthur was able to make policy for a very short while in the country where I live, and made a serious hash of it.

Yes keep them focussed on the war and don't let their egotism run wild.

Agreed.

More progress

[Fuchs]

JMA, keep in mind I am educated in economics. This means I have spent almost five years at a university and was indoctrinated with a huge aversion against wasteful behaviour AND the tools to do the analysis which option is more or less wasteful than the other.
I suspect this is the huge difference between us. You appear to be more guided by sentiments than cost/benefit consideration.

"when it comes to interfering in messy affairs in faraway countries" it should be done properly. You can't take the military option off the table because the political direction and the military execution have been poor. Fix the problem.

(1) The advantages offered by a widely recognised and respected international law system are so strong - especially for the smaller countries - that nuisances far away do not justify damaging the IL system.
An intervention should thus only happen if
a) it's legal in IL (= allowed by UNSC or due to formal alliance obligations)
or
b) morally necessary (intervention against well-proved genocide; ethnic cleansing does not suffice)

(2) The decision pro or contra once (1) is met should be guided by national interest.
This means that the nation should be better off with the intervention (in math speak: I mean the expectation value) than without.

This is extremely difficult, for even the best philosophers have no real clue how to determine a exchange rates between a citizen's (soldier's) life, money, reputation and a foreigner's life. It's thus impossible to sum up costs and benefits.

This should not keep us from understanding (and applying) that intervention has to be better than non-intervention to be justified.

After all, military action means a lot harm - which is undesirable by default and requires a specific justification.


About "being on the table": I don't subscribe to it as totally excluded or as being only a tool of last resort. I have (as mentioned) my reasoning for its use or non-use.


edit: Notice the difference between war and intervention when I write. I attempt to stay clear and conscious in my choice of these words.

[JMA]

JMA, keep in mind I am educated in economics.

I concede the point that the German military budget is and has been constrained by the intelligent application of sound economic principles.

That said, however, the end result is that for this and other reasons the German military is merely a token force.

So yes lack of threat to homeland, economic realities etc etc all all good reasons for this but lets not for one moment consider the German military capable of anything other parades and demonstrations. This is sad but true.

[JMA]

JMA, keep in mind I am educated in economics. This means I have spent almost five years at a university and was indoctrinated with a huge aversion against wasteful behaviour AND the tools to do the analysis which option is more or less wasteful than the other.
I suspect this is the huge difference between us. You appear to be more guided by sentiments than cost/benefit consideration.

Obviously if there is no means to wage and sustain a war no matter how small it would be folly to allow oneself to become embroiled in one. To bankrupt your country through fighting a war in a remote area of the world for dubious advantage is clearly insane.

You blog entry On national defence speaks to this.

Your following point is well made:

What we're (Europe) lacking is not the capability to defend ourselves, it's the capability to launch punitive strikes and expeditions in U.S. fashion.

About "being on the table": I don't subscribe to it as totally excluded or as being only a tool of last resort. I have (as mentioned) my reasoning for its use or non-use.

edit: Notice the difference between war and intervention when I write. I attempt to stay clear and conscious in my choice of these words.

Having been in a war I would tend to believe (and agree with you) that to start a war must surely only be an option of last resort or as you state:

Violence is justified if it's the least terrible choice.

... to act in defence of your sovereign territory is another matter of course (which offers no choice).

However all the above said and done I do believe that the capacity of the US and Britain to project (and indeed use) military violence all across the globe is a valuable option to have and use to contain by deterrent or action those countries which threaten the world trade routes, remote trading partners and oil sources. (here I speak of intervention rather than war)

Countries which are unable to project military force to protect their means of survival are vulnerable to been cut off. To ignore the risk of this on the basis that free trade will prevail is quite frankly irresponsible.

[Dayuhan]

... but what they think they need does not translate into any military deterent whatsoever.

They've little enough to fear from the Dutch, the Belgians, the French and the Poles. Apparently they see no reason to develop the ability to project power overseas, and they may fear (with some justification) that if they have that ability somebody might be tempted to use it.

"when it comes to interfering in messy affairs in faraway countries" it should be done properly. You can't take the military option off the table because the political direction and the military execution have been poor. Fix the problem.

I said nothing about taking military options off the table. I said they shouldn't be used unless absolutely necessary. One of the reasons that so many interventions have been so badly handled is that there was no really compelling reason to be in them in the first place, a situation that tends to produce weak public support and all manner of political restrictions and interference. It's difficult to muster the commitment to do things right if there's no real reason to be doing them at all. As Ken often points out, Americans don't tend to take things seriously or really commit to them unless there's some perceived existential threat in place. If you're not going to be fully in it, better not to be in it at all.

There's no point in even talking about doing something right if we can't start with a clear and compelling national interest and defined, practical, achievable goals. How can you doi something right if you don't even know what you're doing, or why you're doing it?

[JMA]

They've little enough to fear from the Dutch, the Belgians, the French and the Poles. Apparently they see no reason to develop the ability to project power overseas, and they may fear (with some justification) that if they have that ability somebody might be tempted to use it.

Whatever. The bottom line is, for whatever reason the Germans have no military deterrent. If you don't have it you can't use it so hence the tendency to play down the need for one and/or the additional options such a deterrent provides a nation.

[JMA]

There's no point in even talking about doing something right if we can't start with a clear and compelling national interest and defined, practical, achievable goals. How can you doi something right if you don't even know what you're doing, or why you're doing it?

We are back to this national interest thing again (which is really boring). If the elected President of the US believes something is in the national interest then your differing personal opinion is irrelevant.