Green on Blue: causes and responses (merged thread)

[tequila]

Maybe it's not a purely cultural clash at all:

Afgan security forces worry about fratricidal brothers-in-arms

While NATO soldiers worry whether an Afghan partner might turn from an ally to a lethal foe, Afghan soldier Sayed Rahim says he's afraid his own comrades at a small outpost in eastern Paktika province will kill him.

"There are some soldiers who have Taliban war songs on their cellphones," Rahim said. "Do we do our duty, or should we watch out for these guys who will kill us one day?"

While successive attacks by rogue Afghan security forces against NATO allies worry Western commanders, less-known incidents of Afghan-on-Afghan violence within the security forces point to Taliban infiltration nearer to home.

...

Personal grievances, battle stress, and domestic problems are behind more attacks than Taliban sympathies, according to NATO forces, who put the number of incidents by Islamic militant infiltrators this year in single digits.
The NATO coalition says a similar number of Afghan troops and police have died at the hands of their own compatriots.

"I can't really sleep. Soldiers don't trust one another very much. When I go to sleep I fear someone will shoot me dead," said Rahmatullah, a comrade of Rahim's near the Pakistan border, through which insurgents cross with reinforcements and material.

"We are also very fearful of food and night guards but what can we do? We are soldiers and have to do the job," the 24-year-old said in a province where an Afghan policeman this month drugged nine colleagues and shot them dead as they slept ...

[JMA]

Maybe it's not a purely cultural clash at all:

Afgan security forces worry about fratricidal brothers-in-arms

What's up with the Afghan counter-intelligence?

It appears they need so many recruits they will take anyone with two arms, two legs and two eyes... OK maybe one eye is good enough.

Look at the Afghan national characteristics. Treachery comes first. I predict whole ANA units will change sides when the crunch comes.

IMHO it is unacceptable that soldiers should be placed at this risk. There should be consequences for those who failed to see this risk.

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[Dayuhan]

Look at the Afghan national characteristics. Treachery comes first. I predict whole ANA units will change sides when the crunch comes.

I wouldn't be surprised if they did change sides... but is that "treachery", or is it simply us misreading their actual loyalties? After all, what reason do Afghans have to be loyal to us and our interests?

I'm reminded, somehow, of the wounded outrage that Americans in the Philippines expressed during WW2 when the same Filipino elites that had collaborated with Spanish and American invaders proceeded to collaborate in turn with Japanese invaders.

Why would we expect Afghans to be loyal to anything but their own perception of their own interests? Of course they'll put on a show of "loyalty" as long as that advances their own perception of their own interests, but as soon as the interests change, so will the loyalty. That's human nature, not an Afghan national characteristic.

[jcustis]

IMHO it is unacceptable that soldiers should be placed at this risk. There should be consequences for those who failed to see this risk.

You don't have to look for scapegoats. The risks are known, and yes, even junior troops are taught to acertain then. How far they go after being taught is a different matter, but at some point you cannot guard against all possible green-on-blue opportunities ... every moment. Nothing would get done.

It's totally acceptable that there are occupational hazards.

There is a mission with inherent risks to it, thus part of the nature of war.

[JMA]

You don't have to look for scapegoats. The risks are known, and yes, even junior troops are taught to acertain then. How far they go after being taught is a different matter, but at some point you cannot guard against all possible green-on-blue opportunities ... every moment. Nothing would get done.

It's totally acceptable that there are occupational hazards.

There is a mission with inherent risks to it, thus part of the nature of war.

There are acceptable risks, unacceptable risks and pure gambles.

Looking at the stats for this years and noting that NATO halts routine joint patrols with Afghan forces that more than just me believes it has reached the "unacceptable risk" level.

It is also as much about the causes than just the actual risk itself.

You can teach "junior troops" as much as you like but - to be brutally honest - how many of them - as opposed to officers and SNCOs - are capable of diplomacy/courtesy/discretion/and all those good things when interacting with the ANA?

Is this not where the friction point is?

[carl]

The sheer volume of training they are attempting probably means that anything vaguely approaching decent training is quite impossible when it appears some of the participating ISAF countries have training problems of their own.

You can teach "junior troops" as much as you like but - to be brutally honest - how many of them - as opposed to officers and SNCOs - are capable of diplomacy/courtesy/discretion/and all those good things when interacting with the ANA?

Is this not where the friction point is?

So we have people like Stephen Green and members of the "Kill Team" doing training. And who have been doing it for months and months. We have dug a pretty deep hole.

[jcustis]

There are acceptable risks, unacceptable risks and pure gambles.

Looking at the stats for this years and noting that NATO halts routine joint patrols with Afghan forces that more than just me believes it has reached the "unacceptable risk" level.

It is also as much about the causes than just the actual risk itself.

You can teach "junior troops" as much as you like but - to be brutally honest - how many of them - as opposed to officers and SNCOs - are capable of diplomacy/courtesy/discretion/and all those good things when interacting with the ANA?

Is this not where the friction point is?

They are all capable, and that is statistical fact. Being a decent, restrained person is not the sole domain of the SNCO or officer.

Across the hundreds and thousands of patrols conducted, the number of troops killed is significant relative to the beholder. I do not think we have reached any unacceptable level, but it would seem some handlers somewhere believe so, and that is risk-averse IMO.

Shrinking away from the issue is not the answer, not in 2005 or 2012. It merely seems so due to the decent interval we have chosen to pursue.

[carl]

They are all capable, and that is statistical fact. Being a decent, restrained person is not the sole domain of the SNCO or officer.

Across the hundreds and thousands of patrols conducted, the number of troops killed is significant relative to the beholder. I do not think we have reached any unacceptable level, but it would seem some handlers somewhere believe so, and that is risk-averse IMO.

Shrinking away from the issue is not the answer, not in 2005 or 2012. It merely seems so due to the decent interval we have chosen to pursue.

I am not trying to be argumentative but your comment prompts two questions.

Even if statistically the risk of being killed by an ANSF person is low, how much would these killings raise the level of suspicion and would that level of suspicion hinder good training and cooperation? You know guys there. Has this had an effect?

Also having the right temperment (sic) and character is not solely confined to officers and SNCOs, but are the units doing the training picking and choosing who will do the training depending on who is suited for it? Again you know people who would know.

[JMA]

They are all capable, and that is statistical fact. Being a decent, restrained person is not the sole domain of the SNCO or officer.

I know a lot of officers and SNCOs who would not have been suited to mentoring and cross-cultural military training. Then lower down the scale I would suggest that the limitation would be in finding junior soldiers who are course qualified for such training and from tat group those who have the disposition to cooperate across cultural/religious/ethnic/racial lines in the stress of combat while operating effectively.

Across the hundreds and thousands of patrols conducted, the number of troops killed is significant relative to the beholder. I do not think we have reached any unacceptable level, but it would seem some handlers somewhere believe so, and that is risk-averse IMO.

As an officer you would need to decide on - and live with the consequences of - what IYO constitutes an acceptable and what an unacceptable risk to your troops. This may involve a career affecting act of moral courage to just say no. I also suggest that it is fair for senior commanders to assist those operating at the coal face in terms of making such decisions and not leave them hanging out there on their own.

Shrinking away from the issue is not the answer, not in 2005 or 2012. It merely seems so due to the decent interval we have chosen to pursue.

Maybe this matter has been allowed to slip and as such it needs a major correction right now.

.

[JMA]

I wouldn't be surprised if they did change sides... but is that "treachery", or is it simply us misreading their actual loyalties? After all, what reason do Afghans have to be loyal to us and our interests?

Yes, depends on from which angle you look at it.

It would be treachery if a battalion of ANA switches sides and shoots/beheads the US mentoring/training team with them.

If that were to happen on whose doorstep would you lay the blame?

[Dayuhan]

It would be treachery if a battalion of ANA switches sides and shoots/beheads the US mentoring/training team with them.

If that were to happen on whose doorstep would you lay the blame?

If you want to lay blame, you have to lay it on whoever did the killing. Whether that makes it treachery or betrayal is another question altogether.

Going beyond immediate blame, though, I'd want to look at the assumptions behind so much of what goes on in Afghanistan. We want to conjure up a national government and a national military, structured along western lines, in a place where loyalty is not to nation but to clan or tribe. We assume that once someone joins an army they are then "loyal" to the government and the nominal chain of command, and if they act on any other loyalty we speak of treachery and betrayal.

Our idea of a national army and a national government stem from our idea of a nation, and I'm not sure that concept has much meaning in Afghanistan. If it doesn't, and if our purposes are incompatible with the perceived interests of large numbers of Afghans, the idea of creating an army (let alone a nation) from scratch - hard enough in the best circumstances - is going to be pretty unrealistic and is likely to involve all kinds of obstacles and hazards.

Is it rally possible to develop an effective strategy and to implement an effective campaign to achieve that strategy if the policy goal the strategy is meant to advance is fundamentally flawed and unrealistic?

Saw this elsewhere on the site; pessimistic but I suspect not entirely inaccurate:

http://nation.time.com/2012/09/19/af...n-do-is-leave/

[JMA]

If you want to lay blame, you have to lay it on whoever did the killing.

Beyond those who do the killing - who should be the target of multiple precision (or as near as damn-it) air strikes - for those who should have foreseen the problem and built in contingencies and/or acted timeously there should be consequences.

Whether that makes it treachery or betrayal is another question altogether.

One assumes that the ISAF forces doing the mentoring and the training are acting in good faith on the basis that the trainees are loyal to the Karzai government.

So if you have a new and interesting definition of "treachery" I'm all ears.

Now if you want to understand more about the risks and the permutations go read Alistair Horne's book about Algeria 1954-1962:

A Savage War of Peace

Go for an el-cheapo 2nd hand copy, you won't regret it. You will get a perspective of what can and probably will happen as melt-down approaches.

Better still try to find something covering the time of the Soviet withdrawal as that may be more accurate in respect of the Afghan specifics. (Anyone recommend something on this?)

[Dayuhan]

Beyond those who do the killing - who should be the target of multiple precision (or as near as damn-it) air strikes - for those who should have foreseen the problem and built in contingencies and/or acted timeously there should be consequences.

Not sure who you mean by this... who should be accountable, those who failed to anticipate these events in any given incident or those responsible for the overall policy of trying to build an army?

One assumes that the ISAF forces doing the mentoring and the training are acting in good faith on the basis that the trainees are loyal to the Karzai government.

Why would one assume that trainees are loyal to the Karzai Government?

Now if you want to understand more about the risks and the permutations go read Alistair Horne's book about Algeria 1954-1962:

A Savage War of Peace

Go for an el-cheapo 2nd hand copy, you won't regret it. You will get a perspective of what can and probably will happen as melt-down approaches.

Better still try to find something covering the time of the Soviet withdrawal as that may be more accurate in respect of the Afghan specifics. (Anyone recommend something on this?)

Having been through a full meltdown and a partial meltdown I have some idea of the risks and permutations, though of course those are different in every individual meltdown. The question to me is less what the particular risks and permutations of this impending meltdown are that why we should be involved in it at all.

Not sure who thought up the idea about joint patrols in the first place. Its a really dumb idea other than for - low risk of contact - presence patrols as the last thing you want is to get into a contact with the enemy with these ANA clowns - with different training and approach to warfare - as a wild card in your midst.

In terms of achieving the goals of any given patrol I'm sure you're right, the joint patrol is a liability. If the overall policy goal is to build a functioning army, though, I don't know how you get around those situations... of course it will be easier and the short-term goal is more likely to be achieved if you do it yourself, but that doesn't move you toward the "build an army" goal. I don't approve of that policy (obviously), but once the policy is laid down from above I don't know how much latitude the commanders in the field have in executing it. I'm sure they're well aware of the risks and liabilities intrinsic to the policies of trying to build nations, armies, and governments, but they don't have the option of changing the policy. How do you "build an army" in that kind of environment without sending trainers out into positions where they're at risk of being killed by those they train, or without accompanying trainees on missions where they are likely to be a liability?

[JMA]

Saw this elsewhere on the site; pessimistic but I suspect not entirely inaccurate:

http://nation.time.com/2012/09/19/af...n-do-is-leave/

David posted reference to Ben Anderson's documentary a week ago: here

Beyond the book there is a YouTube video which captures the interaction clearly.

Panorama : The Battle for Bomb Alley (Afghanistan War) 1/2 in two parts.

Little wonder the "local" Afghans find it all somewhat confusing... with some positively freaking out to the point of killing.

Not sure who thought up the idea about joint patrols in the first place. Its a really dumb idea other than for - low risk of contact - presence patrols as the last thing you want is to get into a contact with the enemy with these ANA clowns - with different training and approach to warfare - as a wild card in your midst.

Moderator's Note

Thread created for a Q&A interview with Ben Anderson:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=16590

[davidbfpo]

The author of this commentary is:

.. the British Army adviser to Brigadier Shirin Shah, Commander of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in central Helmand...Lt Col Charlie Maconochie is the Commanding Officer of 3/215 Brigade Advisory Group and 3rd Battalion The Rifles..

Much of the article will be familiar to readers, this paragraph with my emphasis is of note:

The catalyst for the majority of insider attacks appears to be a mix of personal grievances, cultural disparities and psychological distress. The largely unreported number of attacks by Afghan soldiers on their own forces bears this out. Insurgent involvement in some attacks should be seen as a desperate act by an enemy that is under growing pressure from increasingly confident and capable Afghan security forces. There is simply no evidence of any widespread insurgent infiltration of the Afghan forces.

He ends with the official mantra:

Our campaign plan is on track, but we still have much work to do as advisers. At this vital stage, we must not let anything knock us off course.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html

[Surferbeetle]

Not sure who thought up the idea about joint patrols in the first place. Its a really dumb idea other than for - low risk of contact - presence patrols as the last thing you want is to get into a contact with the enemy with these ANA clowns - with different training and approach to warfare - as a wild card in your midst.

As your post reflects, not everybody is cut out for being outside the wire/away from the big px for statistically significant portions of their lives.

Big FOB's, small minded TCN policies, lack of language & culture skills, fortress embassies, all lead to a certain constrained viewpoint which leads to where our self-selected/self-imposed azimuth has taken us.

No easy cookie-cutter fixes are available to us that I am aware of, just lots of hard work ahead over the next few decades.

[Madhu]

Maybe it's not a purely cultural clash at all:

Looking at the numbers, is the rate any different or is the total number of these incidents increased because of more contact between trainer and trainee in a volatile and idiosyncratic environment, depending on the particular situation?

What I mean to say is that I know the numerator of these incidents. What's the denominator? Anyway, the overall rate being the same may not matter in the war-of-narratives, where everyone is probably correct in one way or another. We have a mix of things going on, I'd bet, but I'd only be betting. I have no idea.

BTW, how does one grade such an incident? Is the Taliban ringtone incidental, is this purely a personal matter, how does one determine a metric based on the story told in Tequila's linked article?

This is an interesting link, too (from 2010):

The Taliban have infiltrated the Afghan army and police, a recently-retired United Nations official has warned.

Dr Antonio Maria Costa, former head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, said Taliban sleeper cells had been set up inside the security forces.

They had already carried out a number of attacks and were planning further attacks on Nato-led troops, he said.

A spokesman for the coalition forces said infiltration was a rare problem and most Afghan troops were loyal.

Dr Costa's comments come as the coalition is preparing to hand over control of the country's security to Afghan forces by 2014, the BBC's Gerry Northam reports.

Meeting the handover target in four years requires 141,000 new recruits to be found within a year - more than the current size of the Afghan army.

There are fears that the Taliban are taking the opportunity to enlist insurgents into the ranks.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11464175

The standard Western punditry argues a lot about timelines and endates. I see less punditry about others reacting to our signaled plans to build up the Afghan security forces. For every signal we send to stay, we get local and, shall we say, regional, signals to go. I think. Well, I don't know. Thinking aloud here....

1. Did we go too big, too fast?
2. Is our signaling to stay, instead of keeping mum on our plans and having some element of surprise and initiative, the real problem,and not our signaling to go?
3. How do lone wolf incidents play into the Taliban narrative - and how do they relate to what we do? What should be considered a lone wolf incident?
4. How does one tell a lone wolf incident from a personal and individual "culture" clash between two individuals?
5. Are we interpreting a certain level of local violence as something new and different and relating to "us", when it's simply the environment and our place in it?
6. What does "infiltration" mean, and what constitutes infiltration in an environment such as Afghanistan?

And so on....

Does JMA have a point? These incidents were bound to happen? Even if we predicted it, could we realistically have done things differently, like slowing recruitment, educating the larger public, better counterintelligence? I don't know. Wonder what you all think.