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  1. #1
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    Default A symptom?

    This quote comes to mind:

    "We don't have twelve years experience in Vietnam. We have one year's experience twelve times over." - John Paul Vann

    'Cultural incompatibility'?

    No I don't believe so... more like the ISAF forces are not committed to the theatre long enough to understand the cultural dynamics of the area.

    Because they are there for a short tour there is no incentive for ISAF troops down to troopie level to make the effort to learn and understand the people and their languages.

    This short termism as displayed by cultural arrogance is welcomed by the Taliban, sullenly tolerated by the locals... and understandably met with seething anger by Afghans - police and army - who find themselves on the same side as the ISAF forces who treat them with disrespect and disdain.

    I mentioned it before somewhere that the mentoring is in the wrong direction. On arrival in theatre fresh units should (in the obvious absence of own forces with the prerequisite experience) receive Afghan mentors to not only guide them culturally but to teach them how the Taliban thinks and acts so that the Taliban can effectively be found, fixed and then killed.

    Without the cultural understanding - which includes knowing the enemy - ISAF forces are literally operating in a bubble. Not a smart approach by guys who believe they are smart.

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    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    I mentioned it before somewhere that the mentoring is in the wrong direction. On arrival in theatre fresh units should (in the obvious absence of own forces with the prerequisite experience) receive Afghan mentors to not only guide them culturally but to teach them how the Taliban thinks and acts so that the Taliban can effectively be found, fixed and then killed.
    That is a very good idea. Select individuals could sort of embed into a unit and stay with them throughout their deployment. When I was in Africa our drivers fulfilled the same kind of role. You listened to the drivers if you knew what was good for you and we would have been completely lost without them.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Without the cultural understanding - which includes knowing the enemy - ISAF forces are literally operating in a bubble. Not a smart approach by guys who believe they are smart.
    Guys who believe they are smart and don't often doubt that, aren't. Our powers that be never doubt that they are smart.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
    That is a very good idea. Select individuals could sort of embed into a unit and stay with them throughout their deployment. When I was in Africa our drivers fulfilled the same kind of role. You listened to the drivers if you knew what was good for you and we would have been completely lost without them.

    Guys who believe they are smart and don't often doubt that, aren't. Our powers that be never doubt that they are smart.
    Our guys are not being attacked by various members of GIROA because they do not understand Afghanistan (though certainly it is true that in general we do not understand much of that place and the people who live there).

    Our guys are being attacked because they represent the forces dedicated to the continued exclusion of the significant populace group that was excluded from full participation in Afghan society when we acted to elevate and sustain the Northern Alliance into power and drive the Taliban into exile.

    These attacks are a metric of the unsustainable nature of our strategic approach to Afghanistan, not a metric of our lack of cultural awareness at the tactical level.

    Consider this current article:
    Arizona Daily Star (Tucson) (azstarnet.com) May 14, 2012

    Exclusive: Moderate Taliban Speaks Of Divisions By Associated Press

    One of the most powerful men on the Taliban council, Agha Jan Motasim, nearly lost his life in a hail of bullets for advocating a negotiated settlement that would bring a broad-based government to his beleaguered homeland of Afghanistan.

    In an exclusive and rare interview by a member of the so-called Quetta Shura, Motasim told The Associated Press Sunday that a majority of Taliban wants a peace settlement and that there are only "a few" hard-liners in the movement.

    "There are two kinds of Taliban. The one type of Taliban who believes that the foreigners want to solve the problem but there is another group and they don't believe, and they are thinking that the foreigners only want to fight," he said by telephone. "I can tell you, though, that the majority of the Taliban and the Taliban leadership want a broad-based government for all Afghan people and an Islamic system like other Islamic countries."

    But Motasim chastised the West, singling out the United States and Britain, for failing to bolster the moderates within the fundamentalist Islamic movement by refusing to recognize the Taliban as a political identity and backtracking on promises--all of which he said strengthens the hard-liners and weakens moderates like himself.

    He lamented Sunday's assassination in Kabul of Arsala Rahmani, a member of the Afghan government-appointed peace council who was active in trying to set up formal talks with insurgents. Rahmani served as deputy minister of higher education in the former Taliban regime but later reconciled with the current Afghan government.

    "He was a nationalist. We respected him," Motasim said.

    Motasim used his own stature to press for talks nearly three years before the United States began making overtures to the Taliban in late 2010. At the time, he was also chief of the Taliban political committee, a powerful position that he held until he was shot last August. He is still a member of the Taliban leadership council, the Quetta Shura, named after the Pakistani city of the same name.

    His voice softened and he paused often as he reflected on the brutal shooting in the port city of Karachi, Pakistan, where he lived, while moving regularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan in areas that he refused to identify.

    Several bullets shattered his body and he was hospitalized for many weeks. In the first days after the shooting, he wasn't expected to survive.

    The AP spoke to Motasim from Turkey where he had gone for additional treatment. When speaking of his attackers, he referred to them as brothers and colleagues, saying they may have been Taliban hard-liners who opposed his moderate positions.

    "My idea was I wanted a broad-based government, all political parties together and maybe some hard-liners among the Taliban in Afghanistan and in Pakistan didn't like to hear this and so they attacked me," he said. Some of the gunmen may have come from Afghanistan and some may have been from Pakistan's North Waziristan where militant groups have found sanctuary, Motasim said.

    In the early minutes of the telephone conversation, Motasim was reluctant to talk politics, saying he had been told by his friends and colleagues to stay silent.

    "I am not involved in any talks. I am only here for my treatment," he said.

    But he gradually opened up, saying the Taliban have three main demands: They want all Afghan prisoners released from U.S.-run detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay and near Bagram Air Field north of the Afghan capital; the names of all Taliban currently on the United Nations sanctions blacklist removed; and recognition of the Taliban as a political party.

    He said talks in Qatar ended earlier this year after the United States reneged on a promise to release five prisoners from Guantanamo Bay. "But those are just the famous ones," he said. "There are thousands more being held in Bagram and they are being held under the name of Taliban but they are innocent people, farmers and clerics."

    The prisoner exchange issue is rife with sensitivity as the United States has sought to exchange American Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, captured by the Taliban in 2009, for Afghan Taliban held in Guantanamo. It appears the prisoner exchange fell through after the Afghan authorities demanded the five prisoners be repatriated to Afghanistan, according to an Afghan official who asked not to be named because he was not authorized to brief the media. The five prisoners have demanded they be allowed to go to Qatar with their families.

    Motasim said he wasn't told why the prisoners were not released but when they weren't the hard-liners among the Taliban took it as a sign that the United States was disingenuous, said Motasim, who acknowledged that the Taliban have set up an office in Qatar.

    He said the office has no official recognition as a political headquarters of the Taliban, rather it has been veiled in secrecy and the American interlocutors are engaging with them as insurgents not political representatives of at least some Afghans. Motasim said most of the Taliban who were negotiating with the Americans are on the U.N. sanctions list.

    The U.N. Security Council imposed sanctions against the Taliban in November 1999 for refusing to send Osama bin Laden to the United States or a third country for trial on terrorism charges in connection with the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The sanctions--a travel ban, arms embargo and assets freeze--were later extended to al-Qaida. In July 2005, the council extended the sanctions again to cover affiliates and splinter groups of al-Qaida and the Taliban.

    "They (the U.S.) have to give political independence to the Taliban," he said.

    Looking ahead to next week's NATO summit in Chicago, Motasim said he had a message for participants.

    "The decisions of NATO should be for the good of Afghanistan and should not call for more violence. It should call for an end to the fighting, an end to the raids and killings," he said. "Afghanistan is destroyed, the people are displaced, refugees, poor people are dying in their homes and also foreigners are dying here. It should end."
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 05-14-2012 at 06:04 PM. Reason: Citation in quotes
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Bob:

    You are wrong. At least according to the report cited by Jed you are wrong. Besides your contention just doesn't make sense. It doesn't make sense that a Tajik or Uzbek or anti-Taliban Pashtun shoots an American soldier because of intellectual dissatisfaction with the current constitution. It makes much more sense that they murder because they are angered by they and theirs being dissed in way after way year after year.

    The article you cited didn't mention ANSF murdering ISAF. Nor did it mention that perhaps the Pak Army/ISI might oppose a settlement that cuts them out, making it dangerous for anybody who sought to do so.
    Last edited by carl; 05-14-2012 at 05:21 PM.
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    It's because Afghans live there and everone else is an outsider. It's the same way people in Mississippi felt about soldiers and administrators from Massachusetts circa 1865.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Pete View Post
    It's because Afghans live there and everone else is an outsider. It's the same way people in Mississippi felt about soldiers and administrators from Massachusetts circa 1865.
    I don't see how that fits ANSF killing ISAF. And this is a problem that seems to be worsening as the years go by, not staying the same.
    Last edited by carl; 05-14-2012 at 05:47 PM.
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    Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
    That is a very good idea. Select individuals could sort of embed into a unit and stay with them throughout their deployment. When I was in Africa our drivers fulfilled the same kind of role. You listened to the drivers if you knew what was good for you and we would have been completely lost without them.
    Saw some footage on Afghan training by the Brits the other night on TV news (in the wake of the latest killings).

    After all these years in training people from other countries/cultures/races they have forgotten the simple method... and that is to train the trainers.

    Watching some young Brit NCO trying to teach Afghans to shoot through sign language was at the same time hilarious and pathetic. Could not adopt the prone position properly, were not holding the weapon properly in the aim and could see shots striking the ground in front of the target at 25m.

    Can't teach the shooting fundamentals of holding, aiming, breathing, squeezing by sign language. Who is kidding who.

    Anyone listening out there? Train the - Afghan - trainers first.

    Then... been on about this before. Brit troops (and probably the yanks too) should have in theatre 'battle camp' training before deploying operationally. This allows for acclimatisation and should cover 'know your enemy', local culture, locally developed and theatre specific minor tactics, advanced medical training for all, locally specific fieldcraft exercises and the like. Yes by now - ten years on - they should have identified and trained up suitable Afghans to assist with this preparation process and later mentoring on deployment. It is a damning indictment that they have not.

    Clearly very little to be gained by sending a battalion to Kenya to prepare for an Afghan tour under battalion officers and NCOs (who know less about the Afghan situation). If they can be away from home for a month in Kenya then they can rather add that extra month on the front end of their Afghan tour?

    Sadly although the Brits aimed at redeeming themselves in Afghanistan after the Basra debacle all they have really achieved is to slide deeper into the hole. Very sad.
    Last edited by JMA; 05-15-2012 at 07:06 AM.

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    There two very different, but very powerful forces of insurgency at work in Afghanistan. The first force is the revolutionary energy between the two broad camps of those who associate with "the Taliban" and those who associate with the "Northern Alliance." All we did was tip the balance of power, not resolve the "all in or all out" nature of Afghan patronage that goes along with being on the team in power. Bonn in 2002 was a well-intended disaster. The Constitution of 2003 likewise. Same with the Election of 2004. At that point it was game on for the revolutionary insurgency to grow as all legal options to compete had been effectively denied by well-intended Western Diplomats and Politicians who could not fully appreciate that the very processes and tools that we see as platforms of democracy in the West, where controlled by the populace, become platforms of oppression when controlled by a small group of men dedicated to sustaining a monopoly of power and influence.

    The second source our insurgent power in Afghanistan is that of Resistance. It is human nature to resist when one feels that some inappropriate ("illegitimate") influence is shaping ones life though the shaping of the governance over them. Legitimate government can grow illegitimate over time as a populace evolves and a government grows static (consider the US experience and the growth of discontent with British governance), or this can happen all at once following an invasion when the invader stays and begins to shape government to what it sees as appropriate. Sending in more and more security forces (and development forces, etc, etc) can kill/buy ones way to a temporary suppression of the problem at great cost, but drives the roots of the problem deeper into the soil of the affected society at the same time.

    As the strength of the political revolution grew following our manipulations of Afghan governance, our response was to send in ever increasing effort to stem the same; thereby feeding an expanding resistance across the largely apolitical populaces of Afghanistan forced into contact with ISAF and Northern Alliance security forces.

    Who knows how many of the ANSF have deep-seated grievances, of family members and friends killed by ISAF, homes destroyed, fortunes and influence lost through shifts of patronage caused by our actions, or just patriotic deep-felt resentment over having such a massive, overt external presence dominating their country for so long??

    Revolution and Resistance. Its that simple and that complex all at once. We dedicate ourselves to control an outcome that is not ours to control, and throughout the history of mankind this is the inevitable result. Good intentions may ease the conscience on the home front, but does little to mitigate the effect on the other end among the populaces affected by this situation.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Who knows how many of the ANSF have deep-seated grievances, of family members and friends killed by ISAF, homes destroyed, fortunes and influence lost through shifts of patronage caused by our actions, or just patriotic deep-felt resentment over having such a massive, overt external presence dominating their country for so long??
    This suggests to me that you may not have read the report. It was done in an attempt to understand why ANSF, who are probably inclined at least a little to be anti-Taliban, are murdering ISAF. The finding is that the murders are probably motivated by the personal and not the political. Have you read the report?
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
    This suggests to me that you may not have read the report. It was done in an attempt to understand why ANSF, who are probably inclined at least a little to be anti-Taliban, are murdering ISAF. The finding is that the murders are probably motivated by the personal and not the political. Have you read the report?
    Did you read my response? Half the causation I listed is "personal."

    I find most "reports" are highly biased, and that typically are written by people with little understanding of the fundamental nature of insurgency. I offer you a rationale based in a broad understanding of insurgency and my own personal experience, education and training. The facts of each of these attacks are unique. Some may well have been a deeply personal attack to avenge some real or perceived matter of honor; most appear to be against symbols of ISAF in general.

    In reading the report in post #2 above, I find the report to actually be quite consistent with my understanding of the situation and consistent with my posts above as well. A mix of resistance insurgency and personal honor, much as I suspected.
    Last edited by Bob's World; 05-15-2012 at 02:59 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Whilst the this thread's topic is "green on blue" as one observer remarked I do wonder how many ANSF on ANSF deaths or violent incidents there have been?
    Given the multi-ethnic composition of the ANSF, surely some of the causation we have all remarked upon applies within too.

    I have checked two of my books on the Imperial era on the North-West Frontier, for the experience of the British officered 'Scouts' and found a 1985 review by the late General William Jackson of 'The Frontier Scouts' (my standard text on the Scouts).

    Mutual respect and trust...They were all poachers turned gamekeepers: Pathans recruited to keep the peace amongst Pathans....the Pathan's loyalty transcended his tribal affiliations. But loyalty between different races and creeds rests upon the knife edge of suspicion... (there were) so few defections and mutinies occurred in the ruthless atmosphere of the frontier.
    davidbfpo

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    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    Bob:

    Yes I did read your response. The acknowledgment of personal reasons for the murders was half of a sentence in the fourth paragraph after two long paragraphs and one short one explicating the broad political situation in Afghanistan as you see it, followed by a fifth paragraph continuing the explication of the big picture. So it was hard to tell if you gave the personal reasons much importance.

    True enough that reports are biased, but the so are opinions of the reports. i got a different take out of it than you did. These are personal beefs, with the individual behavior or perceived group offenses against cultural norms and against things like errant air strikes. There isn't much politics behind the murders at least in the sense that you seem to mean. ANSF guys get mad because of the way the ISAF and people in the ISAF act, not because the ISAF is there or because they are dissatisfied that Mullah Omar isn't leading a block of representatives in the government. That makes more sense to me in that murders that aren't committed in the course of other crimes are generally done because the killers has been personally offended by something and big picture politics aren't generally one of those somethings, or so I've read.

    I guess you did read the report.
    Last edited by carl; 05-15-2012 at 04:09 PM.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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