The expansion of this activity in 2011 does not match the rather steady expansion of general incidents over the last years.
It should be possible to identify something that changed in 2011 or 2010 as an important influence on the problem.
The expansion of this activity in 2011 does not match the rather steady expansion of general incidents over the last years.
It should be possible to identify something that changed in 2011 or 2010 as an important influence on the problem.
Maybe this? Obama announces Afghanistan troop withdrawal plan June 22, 2011.Originally Posted by Fuchs
They know we are leaving so they don't have to pretend that they like us anymore. Vast oversimplification, but you never know...
"I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."
Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
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Endgame strategy?
Nato curbs Afghan joint patrols over 'insider' attacksNato says it is restricting operations with Afghan troops following a string of deadly attacks on its personnel by rogue Afghan security forces.
Only large operations will now be conducted jointly, with joint patrols evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Doesn't really address the inside-the-wire threat.
"I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."
Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
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Really? They think they won so they double their efforts to kill, including kill themselves?
Must be some non-European logic, for sure.
I'd have to look up the details, but I think it was 2011 when the mentoring mission increased substantially. So, there were a lot more ISAF troops embedded with and training a lot more Afghans.
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
Does 'European' logic matter?
The problem is how many members of ISAF understand Afghan logic?
I intentionally gave you guys the line about logic as a trigger, waiting for the inevitable Pavlov' reaction to follow.
You are utterly predictable.
It's still in fashion to talk up cultural differences, and the pattern of reasoning at SWC is under extreme influence of this fashion.
In short: Yes, European logic does matter, for it's still logic.
I can think of at least two ways how it's logical even for a European to increase attacks and risks when victory is already accepted as a soon-to-come certainty. Didn't want to play devil's advocate to myself, and I guess you guys won't come up with such an explanation.
There's actually something to be learnt from it, that is, if the information is correct and the seemingly paradox logic does apply.
Feel free to explain mysteries with the universal explanation of "culture" and you won't ever reach that insight.
Think for yourself:
How can it be rational to increase attacks after victory is believed to be certain?
(Assuming for a moment that the public withdrawal intentions did prompt the increased attack activity, which I still consider very unlikely.)
Maybe it's not a purely cultural clash at all:
Afgan security forces worry about fratricidal brothers-in-arms
While NATO soldiers worry whether an Afghan partner might turn from an ally to a lethal foe, Afghan soldier Sayed Rahim says he's afraid his own comrades at a small outpost in eastern Paktika province will kill him.
"There are some soldiers who have Taliban war songs on their cellphones," Rahim said. "Do we do our duty, or should we watch out for these guys who will kill us one day?"
While successive attacks by rogue Afghan security forces against NATO allies worry Western commanders, less-known incidents of Afghan-on-Afghan violence within the security forces point to Taliban infiltration nearer to home.
...
Personal grievances, battle stress, and domestic problems are behind more attacks than Taliban sympathies, according to NATO forces, who put the number of incidents by Islamic militant infiltrators this year in single digits.
The NATO coalition says a similar number of Afghan troops and police have died at the hands of their own compatriots.
"I can't really sleep. Soldiers don't trust one another very much. When I go to sleep I fear someone will shoot me dead," said Rahmatullah, a comrade of Rahim's near the Pakistan border, through which insurgents cross with reinforcements and material.
"We are also very fearful of food and night guards but what can we do? We are soldiers and have to do the job," the 24-year-old said in a province where an Afghan policeman this month drugged nine colleagues and shot them dead as they slept ...
What's up with the Afghan counter-intelligence?
It appears they need so many recruits they will take anyone with two arms, two legs and two eyes... OK maybe one eye is good enough.
Look at the Afghan national characteristics. Treachery comes first. I predict whole ANA units will change sides when the crunch comes.
IMHO it is unacceptable that soldiers should be placed at this risk. There should be consequences for those who failed to see this risk.
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Last edited by JMA; 09-19-2012 at 09:42 AM.
Tequila's link is interesting
Looking at the numbers, is the rate any different or is the total number of these incidents increased because of more contact between trainer and trainee in a volatile and idiosyncratic environment, depending on the particular situation?
What I mean to say is that I know the numerator of these incidents. What's the denominator? Anyway, the overall rate being the same may not matter in the war-of-narratives, where everyone is probably correct in one way or another. We have a mix of things going on, I'd bet, but I'd only be betting. I have no idea.
BTW, how does one grade such an incident? Is the Taliban ringtone incidental, is this purely a personal matter, how does one determine a metric based on the story told in Tequila's linked article?
This is an interesting link, too (from 2010):
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11464175The Taliban have infiltrated the Afghan army and police, a recently-retired United Nations official has warned.
Dr Antonio Maria Costa, former head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, said Taliban sleeper cells had been set up inside the security forces.
They had already carried out a number of attacks and were planning further attacks on Nato-led troops, he said.
A spokesman for the coalition forces said infiltration was a rare problem and most Afghan troops were loyal.
Dr Costa's comments come as the coalition is preparing to hand over control of the country's security to Afghan forces by 2014, the BBC's Gerry Northam reports.
Meeting the handover target in four years requires 141,000 new recruits to be found within a year - more than the current size of the Afghan army.
There are fears that the Taliban are taking the opportunity to enlist insurgents into the ranks.
The standard Western punditry argues a lot about timelines and endates. I see less punditry about others reacting to our signaled plans to build up the Afghan security forces. For every signal we send to stay, we get local and, shall we say, regional, signals to go. I think. Well, I don't know. Thinking aloud here....
1. Did we go too big, too fast?
2. Is our signaling to stay, instead of keeping mum on our plans and having some element of surprise and initiative, the real problem,and not our signaling to go?
3. How do lone wolf incidents play into the Taliban narrative - and how do they relate to what we do? What should be considered a lone wolf incident?
4. How does one tell a lone wolf incident from a personal and individual "culture" clash between two individuals?
5. Are we interpreting a certain level of local violence as something new and different and relating to "us", when it's simply the environment and our place in it?
6. What does "infiltration" mean, and what constitutes infiltration in an environment such as Afghanistan?
And so on....
Does JMA have a point? These incidents were bound to happen? Even if we predicted it, could we realistically have done things differently, like slowing recruitment, educating the larger public, better counterintelligence? I don't know. Wonder what you all think.
Last edited by Madhu; 09-19-2012 at 04:19 PM. Reason: Added more to the comment
I have to agree with JMA on the logic thing. The way we think does not matter.
But I also doubt that the announced withdrawal was an important factor. The increase in forces and in mission is probably the largest single factor. If it was, then nothing really changed. The increase is simply mathematical. Increase the number of trainers and Afghans being trained and you increase the number killed.
It seems pretty clear to me that this is the beginning of the end in Afghanistan. Once the election is over, expect the timetable to be moved up to next year.
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
Definitely. Strong hints the British drawdown with be far more rapid than previously stated. Soon enough it will be like rats fleeing a sinking ship.
Perhaps this belongs someplace else, but here I place it for now.
What if Taliban & Co. and the Pak Army/ISI continue to push this? The object of that would not be simply ejecting us from Afghanistan but ejecting us ignominiously. That would serve the greater purposes of humiliating the west, furthering the Islamo-fascist agenda and stoking the megalomania of the Pak Army/ISI. They could impose upon us conditions in return for not placing us in a position whereby we would be besieged in our big bases, have to run a gauntlet to get out and still end up leaving a lot of materiel.
I say this because as others have noted, the rate at which these attacks have occurred has increased very substantially in recent months. With that in mind, I don't think it beyond imagination that Taliban & Co may be behind that. If so, they could stop it. Even if not, they still could put a big damper on them by saying they would not take in the killers. But we would have to give something to them and their Pak Army/ISI masters.
The recent killing of 4 and wounding of 2 SF guys makes me think this may be progressing beyond pissed off ANSF guys getting some back. Apparently 6 ANP officers were involved somehow in a fight with the SF. One died and the others fled and haven't been found. If it was group attack that is very significant and makes me think Taliban & Co are starting maybe to direct things.
So to me, the US has been backed into a corner and some very decisive things will have to be done. We can't just meander along and pretend that things are going ok enough because 'look how well the spec ops night raids are going' (facetiousness alert, but only partly). We will have to do some actual things. Some things that come to my fevered mind are-basically surrender to Taliban & Co and the Pak Army/ISI, or permanently cut the Karachi supply line and publicly recognize Pak Army/ISI as the enemy and take things from there, or find and bump off Mullah Omar, or publicly partner with India or just turn the whole thing over to them, or a combination, or ten things I haven't thought of.
The point is muddling along won't do anymore. If I was Taliban & Co and Pak Army/ISI I would push this for everything I could get out of it which will force us to act.
Last edited by carl; 09-18-2012 at 03:02 PM.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
I wonder how many officers and NCOs studied this prior to deploying to Afghanistan?:
Passing It On: Fighting the Pushtun on Afghanistan’s Frontier By General Sir Andrew Skeen (1932)
I have watched YouTube videos of some training. I note that ISAF personnel are being used to train and mentor Afghans who are of an age and rank who probably would not be allowed to train own forces at that level. I would suggest that the tension would begin to build up right there. The Golden Rule for training troops outside your language/cultural/ethnic/racial milieu should be on the basis of Train-the-Trainer. We just don't seem to learn.And that brings me to the tribesman’s patience. These folks have nothing to do but to watch for an opportunity. If it doesn’t come one day, it is bound to come the next or the next, or, at any rate often enough to make it worth their while to watch for it. And if, when it comes, it looks like being too costly, they are perfectly ready to put it off till a better chance comes. Remember, they have had no work to do, no camp to get to, they have range upon range of hill to screen them for as long as they choose, and night has no terrors for them. They will return to the job day after day without anyone having an inkling of their presence, and then when the real chance comes they seize it like lightning. – page 12
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That is a very good observation, one of those human factors things that are so important and so often overlooked. I never thought of it of course.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
The sheer volume of training they are attempting probably means that anything vaguely approaching decent training is quite impossible when it appears some of the participating ISAF countries have training problems of their own.
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I imagine this might have something to do with it:
Since 2009, the army has grown more than 56 percent, Hill said. In the past year, it's grown by about 50,000 soldiers, more than 23,000 of them are in training, and the army consistently meets its recruiting goals, he added.
It's tough to imagine any army growing that fast without loosening vetting standards or adopting a simple "push 'em out" style of training. And that's just the ANA - I can't imagine standards in the ANP, much less the Afghan Local Police.
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