Green on Blue: causes and responses (merged thread)

[davidbfpo]

A short article by an Afghan journalist, who blogs whilst in the USA on:http://www.afghanlord.org/

I am pretty sure this is the first Afghan comment on the issue I've seen; excluding the Taliban and officialdom.

Taken from his article:

The basic cultural characteristics of Afghans are based on a hierarchy of respect and care for family, clan and tribe. Considering this simple fact, it is very easy to understand why Afghan police soldiers would become rogue and turn their guns against NATO troops. Most of those rogue soldiers became lethal enemies after losing a member of their families through NATO airstrikes. If someone is killed as a result of an accidental NATO bombing, it is likely that he or she has family left behind. The family’s pride is wounded and someone in the family must bring the pride back....

Another reason motivating some members of the Afghan police forces to turn against NATO troops is the continuation of night raids....According to ISAF Data, night raids have killed over 1,500 Afghan civilians in less than 10 months in 2010 and early 2011.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensec...n-blue-attacks

[davidbfpo]

i rarely cut & paste from SWJ responses, but the comment by 'RantCorp' has three "gems" from historical, Western experiences. First and I admit this didn't feature in my looking back at history:

The Indian Mutiny of 1857 being the mother of all green on blue attacks in this neighborhood. However what is often overlooked is that the Mutiny was mercilessly put down by forces which were comprised 80% native troops.

In Vietnam 'blue on blue':

In VN after records started being kept from 1969 the incidence of ‘fragging’ ran up to 500 a year with 10% being fatal. This record was only concerned with attacks using fragmentation grenades. One can only speculate how many ‘wild’ bursts or ‘negligent’ discharges which resulted in fratricide were done with varying degrees of malice.

In WW2 with US paratroopers 'blue on blue':

What surprised him on D-Day and still startled him 40 years later as he recounted the events was some individuals didn't even hit the ground before they were shot dead by their comrades.

Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/vsoalp

[davidbfpo]

On SWJ now awhile ago Gautam Das contributed 'The Afghan National Army in 2014', which is worth reading and has some pointers for this thread IMHO. His bio (shortened) states:

The author was in the Indian Army from 1968 to 1991, an officer of the infantry..he has helped train Afghan Army officers of an earlier Afghan Army

He starts with:

It took the British in India a full century of trial-and-error (1757 – 1857) to finally come up with the organisation of a native army with which India could be kept stabilised for their needs. The first instance of a serious shock actually caused the local army that they were most satisfied with, the East India Company’s Bengal Army, to completely dissolve in the Mutiny of 1857.

By contrast, the US believes that in the mere 10 to 11 years since its entry into (or invasion of) Afghanistan in October 2001, it has hit upon the best possible model for a new Afghan National Army (ANA) to turn the security of the country over to by the end of 2014

The ANA is now about 43 percent Pathan (Pashtun), 32 percent Tajik, 12 percent Hazara and 10 percent Uzbek, with the rest made up of smaller ethnic groups, which is approximately the percentages of these communities in the Afghan population. Any spirit of camaraderie among different ethnic groups of new recruits within the ANA is very new...

(Much later).....most worryingly, can an ANA of near-illiterates (the rank-&-file has 86 percent illiteracy), of various often antagonistic ethnic groups be turned into a cohesive modern army after a mere 15 weeks of recruit training? This is about one-half or less of the time the Pakistan Army takes to turn an educated young recruit, from the same or similar human communities, into a disciplined professional soldier in an army based on the ethnicity-based regimental system.

Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...l-army-in-2014

[davidbfpo]

A NYT article based on interviews, including contact with the ANA soldier who in May 2012 killed a US soldier in Kunar Province:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/wo...pagewanted=all

Not seen this before:

many senior coalition and Afghan officials are now concluding that after nearly 12 years of war, the view of foreigners held by many Afghans has come to mirror that of the Taliban. Hope has turned into hatred, and some will find a reason to act on those feelings.

[davidbfpo]

A very interesting article, that ends with an optimistic passage:

"We have a pretty good relationship [with the cops] around here," explained one of the US soldiers afterward. "We don't have many problems."

First Lieutenant Cummings.....echoed the assessment: "For the most part, it's easy to work with [Afghans], you just walk in and they're happy to see you, happy to talk with you...[But the Afghan cops are] usually hesitant to go on patrol with you, unless you have a really good relationship with them, and that just comes with time ... if you go in there and sit down and have a conversation with them every day."

Link:http://www.longwarjournal.org/archiv...y_of_green.php

[Bob's World]

A key fact that ISAF leadership always downplays is that Green on Blue attacks track along with all other forms of enemy attack in Afghanistan, peaking as fighting season peaks and fading as fighting season fades.

I would think that personal quarrals rooted in cultural misunderstanding would stay fairly constant throughout the year.

[davidbfpo]

Scattered reports of deaths within Kabul ANA Officer Academy (aka 'Sandhurst in the sand'), apparently after an argument between an ANA soldier and others. With a senior German officer injured and a US soldier killed.

Links:http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/wo...tack.html?_r=0

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28659874