Green on Blue: causes and responses (merged thread)

[Dayuhan]

Beyond those who do the killing - who should be the target of multiple precision (or as near as damn-it) air strikes - for those who should have foreseen the problem and built in contingencies and/or acted timeously there should be consequences.

Not sure who you mean by this... who should be accountable, those who failed to anticipate these events in any given incident or those responsible for the overall policy of trying to build an army?

One assumes that the ISAF forces doing the mentoring and the training are acting in good faith on the basis that the trainees are loyal to the Karzai government.

Why would one assume that trainees are loyal to the Karzai Government?

Now if you want to understand more about the risks and the permutations go read Alistair Horne's book about Algeria 1954-1962:

A Savage War of Peace

Go for an el-cheapo 2nd hand copy, you won't regret it. You will get a perspective of what can and probably will happen as melt-down approaches.

Better still try to find something covering the time of the Soviet withdrawal as that may be more accurate in respect of the Afghan specifics. (Anyone recommend something on this?)

Having been through a full meltdown and a partial meltdown I have some idea of the risks and permutations, though of course those are different in every individual meltdown. The question to me is less what the particular risks and permutations of this impending meltdown are that why we should be involved in it at all.

Not sure who thought up the idea about joint patrols in the first place. Its a really dumb idea other than for - low risk of contact - presence patrols as the last thing you want is to get into a contact with the enemy with these ANA clowns - with different training and approach to warfare - as a wild card in your midst.

In terms of achieving the goals of any given patrol I'm sure you're right, the joint patrol is a liability. If the overall policy goal is to build a functioning army, though, I don't know how you get around those situations... of course it will be easier and the short-term goal is more likely to be achieved if you do it yourself, but that doesn't move you toward the "build an army" goal. I don't approve of that policy (obviously), but once the policy is laid down from above I don't know how much latitude the commanders in the field have in executing it. I'm sure they're well aware of the risks and liabilities intrinsic to the policies of trying to build nations, armies, and governments, but they don't have the option of changing the policy. How do you "build an army" in that kind of environment without sending trainers out into positions where they're at risk of being killed by those they train, or without accompanying trainees on missions where they are likely to be a liability?