Green on Blue: causes and responses (merged thread)

[TheCurmudgeon]

Don't know if this has been covered before, but on a long plane ride back from Europe I was thinking about green-on-blue attacks and how many of these attacks appear to be personal retribution. A recent quote from a Marine (those guys are pretty clever) says it best.

Terry Walker, a former Marine trainer in Helmand Province, told Fox News that most of these incidents are due to personal and cultural conflicts. He said Afghans simply have a different way of dealing with their problems.

"You have a strong influence that's tribal," Walker said. "Afghans can't be insulted and they have no conflict resolution capability. The smallest thing can set them off."

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012...#ixzz23uK9VjYd

This reminded me of the problems we had in Iraq understanding why their supply systems did not work the way we expected them to. It was because their tribal culture, built on respect for those above them, did not allow underlings to make decisions on their own and that everything had to be cleared.

Curious if our lack of understanding of the intricacies of tribal culture, particularly their need to maintain face in front of the other members of their tribe and their "inferiors" is killing us? If so, what are we doing about it?

Was looking for others thoughts on the matter. I apologize if the topic has already been covered.

[ganulv]

You might be interested in reading this one.

[carl]

Curmudgeon:

Here is an item and some replies from the blog about this subject.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/nat...fficers-killed

And here is a link to a study of green on blue murders and why they occur.

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/09/2...-cultural.html

The conclusion of the paper is that the murders are almost all the result of individuals getting angry and getting some back, as you suggest.

I think it is too late to do much about this, especially if Taliban & Co. decide to exploit in a big way what is already a worsening pattern of behavior. I seek others opinion on this. Do you think that if Taliban & Co try hard they can exacerbate this so much that we will get chased out of there much more quickly than we have planned? And, since we plan after 2014 to keep a small force in the country to keep doing the night raid stuff, which the Afghans really really hate, will that be possible if green on blue murders continue and/or get worse?

[TheCurmudgeon]

Carl:

... here is a link to a study of green on blue murders and why they occur.

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/09/2...-cultural.html

The conclusion of the paper is that the murders are almost all the result of individuals getting angry and getting some back, as you suggest.

I think it is too late to do much about this ...

Good report. I thought one was out there but could not find it.

Was not encouraged by the recommendations. A couple of things stand out, like GPF should not be partnering/training ASFs. Seems like they don't have the training to deal with the vast cultural differences. You are correct that it is probably too late to fix this but it is a bit of a self correcting problem if they are out by 2014.

The continuing problem will be the people that remain after 2014. If we do not find a way to defuse these problems as they occur they will fester.

[Ray]

The whole issue hinges on the culture and mindset!

[Bob's World]

You might be interested in reading this one.

One 'small thing' that sets them off was our overthrow of one system of govenrance and power to replace it with those who did not have the wherewithal to rise to power on their own.

Another 'small thing' was our occupation that increased in both size and violence as we increased our efforts from about 2005 forward to attempt to put down the revolution that kicked into high gear once we solidified that power change with the monopoly preserving constitution we helped the Northern Alliance push through. Our efforts against the revolution then sparked the growth of the resistance among the more apolitical elements of Afghan society that simply want to be left alone and for us to go home.

Certainly there are personal reasons that produce Green on Blue events; but those pale compared to the larger strategic ones.

[carl]

One 'small thing' that sets them off was our overthrow of one system of govenrance and power to replace it with those who did not have the wherewithal to rise to power on their own.

Another 'small thing' was our occupation that increased in both size and violence as we increased our efforts from about 2005 forward to attempt to put down the revolution that kicked into high gear once we solidified that power change with the monopoly preserving constitution we helped the Northern Alliance push through. Our efforts against the revolution then sparked the growth of the resistance among the more apolitical elements of Afghan society that simply want to be left alone and for us to go home.

Certainly there are personal reasons that produce Green on Blue events; but those pale compared to the larger strategic ones.

Great speech, but, not true. At least according to the study referenced, and according to common sense.

The reason you cited is political, Taliban noble resistance and all of that. These are murders. Murders are personal. You were a DA. You know that. People have things that they resent and those build up until they decide they have been dissed enough then they murder. There may be some merging there, resentment at the latest air strike gone awry or last night's raid that killed the wrong people (again) but those are still things that get to the murderer on a personal level. Not many commit a deeply personal act like murder because they don't like the way the constitution is written.

But all that doesn't really matter too much. The murders are happening. Do you think Taliban & Co can use this pattern or exacerbate it and direct it?

[Bob's World]

Great speech, but, not true. At least according to the study referenced, and according to common sense.

The reason you cited is political, Taliban noble resistance and all of that. These are murders. Murders are personal. You were a DA. You know that. People have things that they resent and those build up until they decide they have been dissed enough then they murder. There may be some merging there, resentment at the latest air strike gone awry or last night's raid that killed the wrong people (again) but those are still things that get to the murderer on a personal level. Not many commit a deeply personal act like murder because they don't like the way the constitution is written.

But all that doesn't really matter too much. The murders are happening. Do you think Taliban & Co can use this pattern or exacerbate it and direct it?

What is "murder" in an insurgency?

Is it murder when we shoot a kid off his motorcycle for failing to slow down when we flash a light at him?

Is it murder when a head of household rushes to see who is invading his home with an old Russian single-shot shotgun in hand, only to be cut in half by the lead man of a team looking for some HVT?

Is it murder when an IED blows up non-combatants of any ilk?

Comfortable civilian peacetime constructs of law and justice do not readily apply. To write off even most of these Green on Blue events as murders of individual and personal purpose and intent is, IMO, naive at best, and intentionally disingenuous at worst.

They should be considered as yet another powerful metric of the inappropriate nature of our actions and the unlikelihood that current approaches and polices can produce the results we hope for.

[carl]

Bob:

Nice stump speechifying. You know what we are all talking about even if you don't approve and want to steer things in another direction.

[carl]

Fuchs:

I have another question. Some of the displaced persons that my Mom knew and worked with here in the US in the 10 years or so after WWII said German troops were much better behaved than American troops. (This is not counting reprisals and thing like that.) They said that in the normal course of events they preferred having German troops in the area. I think I read that elsewhere also but can't remember where.

Do you know if that is true? If it is, did specific training cover that or was it just a part of the overall system of discipline and training?

[Bob's World]

Bob:

Nice stump speechifying. You know what we are all talking about even if you don't approve and want to steer things in another direction.

Carl,

I am not "stumping," rather I am stumped at how you think the current rash of killings are not related to the very similar factors driving the larger insurgency.

There is both Revolution and Resistance in Afghanistan, and what we wage against most internal to Afghanistan is the resistance. This resistance is not ideological and it is largely apolitical. It is a natural human response to perceptions that some foreign presence is unnatural, inappropriate, and must go.

We have pressed our units into their lands and populaces and waged COIN against insurgents with little regard for how those tactical efforts strategically affect the larger insurgency. In recent years we have forced greater integration between Afghan soldiers and Western members of the Coalition. We tell our men that they will keep coming back until the Afghans are prepared to take over. No pressure.

Do personal conflicts occur? Of course. But resistance insurgency is personal. It matters little if the trigger event is an attack helicopter shooting up your little brother while he was repairing a culvert, or if the trigger event is some E4 frustrated with your inability or lack of motivation to do something in a particular manner or degree of priority he thinks you should have leveling some grievous insult upon you. Respect is a major causal factor in resistance, just as revenge is.

Even if our guys were a bunch of cultural geniuses these events would still be going on because it is also the latest tactic from the Revolutionary aspect of the insurgency. Join the security forces, get close, attack the foreigners. Target the trust necessary for this coalition to work effectively.

To attempt to rationalize these events off in personal or ideological terms is a dangerous bit of self-delusion.

[davidbfpo]

Carl raises a good point on the details of ISAF deaths; are the non-Western ISAF contributors, like Turkey (1300 men currently, there since 2003) and the very separate, now gone, Indian contingent suffering too?

Wiki shows fourteen Turkish deaths, none from "green on blue", in fact none from hostilities:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coaliti...in_Afghanistan and http://icasualties.org/OEF/Index.aspx

Neither show "green on blue" deaths separately alas.

It appears the para-military Indian contingent had two deaths - when guarding the Kabul Embassy and none from the two deployed companies:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Tibetan_Border_Police

[davidbfpo]

Carl,

You asked:

Do you think that if Taliban & Co try hard they can exacerbate this so much that we will get chased out of there much more quickly than we have planned? And, since we plan after 2014 to keep a small force in the country to keep doing the night raid stuff, which the Afghans really really hate, will that be possible if green on blue murders continue and/or get worse?

I have long thought these killings real impact is "back home" and not in-country. It is very easy for a newspaper or other outlet to ask "Why are we bothering? Even the ANSF kill us". Note the French decision to end a combat role a year early after an incident. One cannot help but wonder if other national contingents stay in "Fobistan" to reduce casualties from the Taliban and the ANSF.

Perhaps the US public will tolerate "green on blue" after 2014? What opinions do American members hold on that?

[TheCurmudgeon]

Perhaps the US public will tolerate "green on blue" after 2014? What opinions do American members hold on that?

Personally, I don't think it will matter. It probably won't even make the news unless it is a slow news day.

In the US, the military has almost reached the level of the French Foreign Legion.

[carl]

Curmudgeon:

Very interesting comment ref the French Foreign Legion. I don't know if I would go that far. I think the American public has always been far more casualty tolerant that the elites are (if things are perceived as intelligently prosecuted) so I would attribute it maybe more to that, but a very interesting comment. I'll have to think on that.

David:

The US public will tolerate a lot, far more than the elites will. The question is what the elites will tolerate. In these cases maybe the elites are quite willing to tolerate them because it isn't their children being murdered. The victims are the Imperial Legionaires, like Curmudgeon talked about (I've been thinking fast). Also to expand upon my comment about the American public being casualty tolerant, another thing that may be happening is the public has just given up on anything being done to change things. I believe a lot of people on the Council don't much bother with Afghanistan anymore because nothing changes-ever. It and we just keep proceeding the same way. I think there is a possibility that the American public feels the same, nothing will ever change. Why bother thinking about it?

I don't know about this so much, the guys who are actually there will know. How will this affect the actions of the guys in the field, not the officially promulgated policies, but what people actually do?

[carl]

One cannot help but wonder if other national contingents stay in "Fobistan" to reduce casualties from the Taliban and the ANSF.

I wonder about that too. I wonder if this may be something that will help to bring about a situation whereby after 2014, we are just holed up in fortified camps almost under siege and occasionally making nocturnal sallies via our rotary winged sally ports-sallies that would do nothing but enrage the locals, tighten the siege and enhance the careers of 4 stars and spec ops types.

That would be something wouldn't it, the ultimate culmination of career-centric coin.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I wonder about that too. I wonder if this may be something that will help to bring about a situation whereby after 2014, we are just holed up in fortified camps almost under siege and occasionally making nocturnal sallies via our rotary winged sally ports-sallies that would do nothing but enrage the locals, tighten the siege and enhance the careers of 4 stars and spec ops types.

That would be something wouldn't it, the ultimate culmination of career-centric coin.

That I could see ... although, to be honest, I think that we have been involved in a career-centric fight for some time..

[sean bastle]

Carl,
One cannot help but wonder if other national contingents stay in "Fobistan" to reduce casualties from the Taliban and the ANSF.

Most of these incidents occur on the FOBs where the Coalition\ANSF are training together, and the coalition members killed are the ones doing the training.

[TheCurmudgeon]

The place of honor (at the collective and individual levels) tends to be read- ily identified within cultures in general, Arab culture in particular (Dodd, 1973), and Arab dispute resolution traditions such as Sulha (Kressel, 1992; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008). The Palestinian Human Rights Monitor (Aug. 2002, p. 2) writes this about the place of honor in Arab society: “The focus on the value of honor has great importance in Arab society.” Barakat (1993) places honor as one of the core values of Arab societies. He writes: “While values of honor, shame, and dignity, are adopted in this Arab vil- lage in Israel, nevertheless they are core values of contemporary social sys- tems in the Arab world, whether in an urban, village or Bedouin community” (p. 44).
The most vivid (and unfortunate) demonstration of the centrality of honor in Arab culture, indeed, at the core of the Arab family, which is the center of Arab society, can be seen in “honor killing.” These are tragic sit- uations where fathers, brothers, and other agnatic male kin murder their own female flesh and blood (daughter, sister, mother) to restore the honor- able status of the family when they perceive a female relative is violating it. There cannot be a more poignant demonstration of the centrality of honor than perceiving of a person willing—indeed, desiring—to kill his own daughter or mother or sister in order to restore perceived lost honor.

Pely, D. (2010). Honor: The Sulha's main dispute resolution tool. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 28(1), 67-81. doi:10.1002/crq.20013

Also looking into this from a management point of view. Two studies come to mind. They are business studies designed to examine what management style best motivated employees in different cultures. The first was research done on IBM employees worldwide that was turned into the book Culture's Consequences. The second was the GLOBE study. Not sure how much is applicable.

[TheCurmudgeon]

One 'small thing' that sets them off was our overthrow of one system of govenrance and power to replace it with those who did not have the wherewithal to rise to power on their own.

Another 'small thing' was our occupation that increased in both size and violence as we increased our efforts from about 2005 forward to attempt to put down the revolution that kicked into high gear once we solidified that power change with the monopoly preserving constitution we helped the Northern Alliance push through. Our efforts against the revolution then sparked the growth of the resistance among the more apolitical elements of Afghan society that simply want to be left alone and for us to go home.

Two points. First (and again), you can't have it both ways: You can't say the population doesn't care and just want to be left alone AND that they are upset with the occupation and therefore are fighting us. If they wanted to fight us they would join the insurgency. I am not a believer in the idea that the Taliban has been working to place moles in the Afghan security forces just to kill one or two people while in fits of rage. You project your beliefs onto another culture in order to satisfy your own narrative.

Second, it is irrelevant to the question asked as I will explain below.

Certainly there are personal reasons that produce Green on Blue events; but those pale compared to the larger strategic ones.

Even if ten percent of the murders were caused by our misunderstanding of a cultural difference then they are worth studying for that reason alone. It is also arrogant to believe that this is just an Afghan problem. If, in fact, it is the result of our ignorance to understand a tribal culture then it is likely to be reproduced in any other similar culture under similar circumstances.