Green on Blue: causes and responses (merged thread)

[Ken White]

I continue to be amused that there are little or no offers of how greater operational continuity could be achieved given the imposed limitations or what improved system could be sold to the idiots in your congress (that would have some chance of success).

Been answered dozens of times, you just refuse to accept reality. There would be no chance of such success.

"" In both nations, the domestic political desirability will always outweigh the military optimum unless there is an existential issue. In Afghanistan (and Iraq) there was no such issue.""

""That excuses neither Army for not doing a better job of training or placing rotations to maximize the capability attainable. Both could have done a far better job at that but Gurkha's comment about "inflated opinions" allied with super egos interfered...""

Many of us continue to be amused at your deliberate 'incomprehension.' As Jon said, you could probably stop Trolling, it's unseemly.

[JMA]

Been answered dozens of times, you just refuse to accept reality. There would be no chance of such success.

"" In both nations, the domestic political desirability will always outweigh the military optimum unless there is an existential issue. In Afghanistan (and Iraq) there was no such issue.""

""That excuses neither Army for not doing a better job of training or placing rotations to maximize the capability attainable. Both could have done a far better job at that but Gurkha's comment about "inflated opinions" allied with super egos interfered...""

Many of us continue to be amused at your deliberate 'incomprehension.' As Jon said, you could probably stop Trolling, it's unseemly.

Ken, I can understand your frustration at not being able to operate anywhere near the optimum but it is unseemly... no maybe just not the most intelligent choice to just block out the factor and pretend it does not exist.

It took the Brits on the ground in Helmand years and years of repeatedly drawing attention to the shortage of helicopters to support their operations there. Finally the penny dropped... and now - while the problem is not solved - there is general acceptance among the politicians and general staff that this is indeed a problem.

In this regard - the lack of operational continuity through short tours - one aspect of the Brit problem is covered in the General Sir Richard Dannatt and diplomat Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles spat.

Two other arguments relate to concern about the effect on the marriages of soldiers on long tours together with the anticipated increase in PTSD within a smaller cohort with greater combat exposure.

Not sure anyone has done the calculations on how the PTSD plays out among long tours in a smaller cohort as compared with short tours among a larger cohort.

This is the sort of problem that should be given to staff courses and SNCOs to figure out as to what would be the ideal. It would be an exercise in applied intelligence and the results should be thrown in to the faces of the politicians - like the Brits did over their helicopter shortage - until the penny drops.

There is a principle here... and that should be fought for. It is quite unacceptable that officers accept circumstances that lead to largely preventable deaths of the men over whom they have aq duty of care.

I know only of Maj Sebastian Morley (of the SAS) who resigned in disgust over the use of Snatch LandRovers saying such continued use in the era of the IED was 'cavalier at best, criminal at worst'. Appears moral courage is not the strong suit out there. Perhaps this is why some get so irritated when they are reminded that their silence is a failure in the duty of care to their men.

[Surferbeetle]

There is a principle here... and that should be fought for. It is quite unacceptable that officers accept circumstances that lead to largely preventable deaths of the men over whom they have aq duty of care.

I know only of Maj Sebastian Morley (of the SAS) who resigned in disgust over the use of Snatch LandRovers saying such continued use in the era of the IED was 'cavalier at best, criminal at worst'. Appears moral courage is not the strong suit out there. Perhaps this is why some get so irritated when they are reminded that their silence is a failure in the duty of care to their men.

Small unit tactics seem to be your strong suit, while you are often wide of the mark in other areas.

We have conducted GWOT for over a decade; FOB's, MRAP's, helicopters, and incredible supply chains are a few physical examples of what you miss in your argument as quoted above. For those who consistently work outside of these physical manifestations of concern, we have our training, teamwork, and a wide variety of skills which allow us to operate globally 24/7.

In terms of your attempt to (mis)characterize our concern for our soldiers you have not served with us, and it shows in your posts.

[JMA]

Small unit tactics seem to be your strong suit, while you are often wide of the mark in other areas.

You forgot to add... "in my opinion".

We have conducted GWOT for over a decade; FOB's, MRAP's, helicopters, and incredible supply chains are a few physical examples of what you miss in your argument as quoted above.

There is a sound basis for criticism that as technology has increasingly become available at platoon level in modern armies many of the basics of soldiering have become neglected.

(For those with a professional interest in soldiering it would be worthwhile to compare infantry training courses going back in ten year intervals to establish what has been added to and what has dropped out of training. I suggest there will be interesting findings.)

BTW... FOBs (aka "Beau Geste" forts) are a significant part of the problem.


Will pass on the rest because its Sunday

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[Surferbeetle]

You forgot to add... "in my opinion".

Always...let's assume that is the case for both you and I

There is a sound basis for criticism that as technology has increasingly become available at platoon level in modern armies many of the basics of soldiering have become neglected.

True

BTW... FOBs (aka "Beau Geste" forts) are a significant part of the problem.

True...they can also be viewed as soundproof opaque cages in many instances...

Will pass on the rest because its Sunday .

Works...

[carl]

(...the Generals) never admit error.

This seems to have become something that is writ in stone. It is to me, a critical failing that bodes disaster in the future because I think it human nature that if one can never admit error, eventually one's ability to perceive error is affected and one who can't perceive error is doomed. It wouldn't be so bad if just the generals were doomed but they will take a lot of others with them.

It seems to me too that lower down on the rank scale, people will see error quite clearly and will admit it and come up will all sorts of ways to fix it. But higher up on the scale, that disappears. So the problem isn't the people as a whole, just the ones who make high rank, mostly.

Ken, I ask your opinion on something, and I ask it of others too. Can anything be done to change that, by the military itself I mean?

[Dayuhan]

History will judge the West harshly over the Afghanistan debacle.

G.B. Shaw's version of General Burgoyne commented, on the verge of his own defeat by insurgents: "History, sir, will tell lies, as usual".

I suspect that history will treat the current Afghanistan "debacle" largely as a footnote. In 2027 the inmates on SWJ will doubtless be discussing it with great vigor, but for students of history in the broader sense it will be a niche specialty. I'd also expect the primary focus of history to be on the odd politics of the decision to try to build a nation, rather than the mode of execution.

One can certainly argue over whether any given set of different tactics might have made a difference, but we'll never know where the road not take would have led, and ultimately it seems to me that the whole venture would have been rendered unsustainable in any event by the unrealistic goals imposed by mission creep. we can argue over whether the wrong thing was done wrong or right, but it's still the wrong thing.

[Ken White]

Ken, I ask your opinion on something, and I ask it of others too. Can anything be done to change that, by the military itself I mean?

You took that out of context. What I wrote was:

""... the US milieu virtually demands that the Generals accede to anything, no matter how stupid, the Politicians want and that those Politicians (and by both affinity and direction, the Generals) never admit error. Dumb way to do business but we've managed to live with it for a couple of centuries...""

Note that I wrote the "US milieu" meaning the public, the media and the Politicians. The allegation was directed at the Politicians, the Generals were merely a parenthetical add-on, thus a minor part of the problem. Note also that I wrote that the Generals were a minor part due to both affinity [nearness to the Political aspect of military effort] AND direction -- the Politicians will just fire them if they don't behave. See MacArthur, D; Denfield L.; Singlaub, J.; Dugan, M; McChrystal S.. As I also wrote, it's been that way for us for a couple of centuries (See Lee, C.; Taylor Z.; McClellan G.).

The FlagOs all know that so the pressure for them to conform is tremendous. Note also that this by you:

I think it human nature that if one can never admit error, eventually one's ability to perceive error is affected and one who can't perceive error is doomed.

assumes that the Politicians (and to an extent, the Generals) cannot admit error -- they can admit it but to do so in the US milieu is effectively political suicide. So they just don't admit them publicly because it is considered harmful to their cause -- very different thing. The Army's really very good about identifying and admitting error of and within itself, it just doesn't like to acknowledge them publicly.

It's not a US failing, it exists worldwide. Nor is it a military failing, it affects other professions as well; the military in the US is just more visible AND moire directly tied to the political machinery.

It's a human failing. It could possibly be changed if you can (a) change human nature; and (b) insure that those changes stick, i.e. that the selected 'honest' LT ort other person lower down the rank scale does not change to become more 'accommodating' as he grows older.

I'd say the prognosis for changing that is quite dim. FWIW, the problem has affected all Armies about whom I've read and with whom I have served or trained -- been around for Centuries so it's probably not going away. Some will say that in WW II, people got relieved for such behavior. True, some people did but others like MacArthur, Bradley, Clark and many more did not. People aren't perfect, never have been and likely never will be; certainly not in our lifetimes.

It is a problem but it is a minor problem. You want to fix things, get Congress to back off insisting that military selection processes be 'fair' and 'objective' and using their budget power to affect procurements (and behavior...) Those factors each cause ten to twenty times more damage -- and kill more people -- than FlagOs acceding to the demands of Politicians

[carl]

Ken:

I realized what your context was and I tried to change it, not because I wanted to misrepresent you but because I wanted to limit the scope of your answer. I wanted to limit the scope not for any nefarious reason but because changing the civilian political climate is something the military can influence but not all that much. So what I wanted to know is what the military can do for itself. Sorry I was unclear.

All of your points are good and I realize that this tendency is a human failing. But human failings can be, if not eliminated, minimized. What can the military do, do you think, by itself and for itself to minimize this? For example, there were two examples in the early 2000s of the military just flat out lying-about Mr. Tillman and Ms. Lynch-for no good reason at all. Congress didn't cause this, it was I think the military flat out lying for its own purposes and people in Congress were a bit upset about this. But there were no severe penalties paid by the people responsible for the lies. Another example is the platoon leader of the 'kill team' getting his promotion. I hope it is within the power of the military to severely punish flat out liars and keep lousy officers from getting promoted. What can the military do do you think to help improve, not cure, improve, the situation?

I think people start out seeing error and not admitting it. But I think also that as that pattern persists over years and decades, the pattern changes from seeing but not saying to not seeing at all. It eliminates a step and soothes minds that would be troubled by the stress of seeing but not saying. There is less stress if the organization learns not to see at all. That may be a little vaporous but it is something I have seen in my life. It is sort of defining deviance down like Mr. Moynihan said. After a while, you don't even see it anymore because it is the new norm.

[carl]

Ken:

Maybe this won't help but I'll try to give an example of the kind of thing military may be able to do for itself by using the US airline business to illustrate.

In the last 40 years or so the accident rate for US sked airlines has fallen dramatically so that it is now approaching zero, someplace it will never reach but it is pretty darn good. That dramatic increase in the safety of operations came about from the industry and all of its components basically reforming itself. The FAA, NTSB, the airlines, the training establishments and the associated researchers first identified specific problem areas and developed specific practices to remedy them. This was helped considerably of course by some tech innovations but training and procedural changes were as, if not more important. Congress, to my knowledge, didn't have a whole lot to do with this besides saying 'Go get 'em boys'. The industry, as a whole, did this and the results were quite impressive.

So what can the military do to reform itself to the extent possible?

[JMA]

Many of us continue to be amused at your deliberate 'incomprehension.' As Jon said, you could probably stop Trolling, it's unseemly.

There is of course an opposite to that.

My incomprehension is not in, as you assure me, that attempting to raise and address the obvious weakness in operational continuity would be pointless.

My incomprehension is that the US military in general and the General Staff in particular just accepts this war losing limitation without so much as a whimper.

Do you read your own history?

“I remember the day I was ready to go over to the Oval Office and give my four stars to the President and tell him, ‘You have refused to tell the country they cannot fight a war without mobilization; you have required me to send men into battle with little hope of their ultimate victory; and you have forced us in the military to violate almost every one of the principles of war in Vietnam. Therefore, I resign and will hold a press conference after I walk out of your door.’ I made the typical mistake of believing I could do more for the country and the Army if I stayed in than if I got out. I am now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage on my back.”

General Harold K. Johnson, quoted in Lewis Sorely, ‘To Change a War’,
Parameters, Spring 1998.

You see Ken, just about everyone can rationalize whimping out when confronted by the choice between a display of moral courage and a secure full pension. At least Gen Johnson admits his frailty and expresses regret.

In the meantime shoot the messenger if he makes you feel uncomfortable

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[Dayuhan]

You see Ken, just about everyone can rationalize whimping out when confronted by the choice between a display of moral courage and a secure full pension.

Point of information, for those in a position to know: if a senior officer did resign in protest against policies deemed impossible to work with, would that officer's pension be at risk?

[Ken White]

Carl:

So what can the military do to reform itself to the extent possible?

IMO the problem is individual human failing, societally supported and systemic and the degree of applicability of each factor will vary from situation to situation. In any event, my belief is that little can or will be done barring major systemic changes which are unlikely. Political Correctness in all aspects is very much a societal factor and that changes but slowly; the PC factor is partly responsible for the refusal to acknowledge mistakes. The American public is both tolerant (of wrongdoing) and superficially vengeful (of perceived slights and failures) so the message is mixed. The systemic problems are, simply, that a failure in this regard really has very little practical effect on the institution (as opposed to some persons within the institutions) so there is no impetus for the change.

JMA's 'example' of Howard K. Johnson is proof of that. Had the General done what he is quoted as thinking, it would not have affected the debacle that was Viet Nam one iota.

All that said, incremental improvement can be achieved however and there have been many such improvements over my lifetime -- not enough but there is change, it is improvement and it is constant -- albeit far too slow...

JMA:

In the meantime shoot the messenger if he makes you feel uncomfortable.

Pointless and ill informed scolding is not a message. I'm not at all uncomfortable or frustrated. Nor do I block out the problem and pretend it doesn't exist. I learned to live with the reality a great many years ago in the Land of the Morning Calm, so I'm quite comfortable -- you seem to be the one with undue concerns and frustrations relative to a situation upon which you will have absolutely zero effect.

It is fun to watch you fruitlessly gnash your teeth, though.

Dayuhan:

if a senior officer did resign in protest against policies deemed impossible to work with, would that officer's pension be at risk?

Essentially, so-called Military Retirement Pay in the US is actually retainer pay and is legally deferred compensation, thus it is earned and can be rejected only by the individual in rare circumstances. i.e., the 'system' forces one to take it (yet another point where the system is part -- not all -- of the problem). All the folks I cited above since WW II received their retirement even though fired, I know of two General Officers who 'resigned' in protest -- one over the belief that the Army had gone astray with respect to training and education, the other concerned about the Army's political inclinations -- and both took their retainer pay, one under protest but the Treasury simply paid into his checking account regardless.

Thus, a 'resignation in protest' has none of the martyr effect that makes the idea so popular and somewhat prevalent in other nations with different laws.

The foregoing applies to anyone with over 20 years service (occasionally and / or in view of some medical conditions with fewer years). Those with less service than required for retirement can and do resign for cause or on principle.

In either case, the practical effect of such resignations or departures is almost nothing -- the system just replaces the dearly departed with another body -- often more compliant but if not, he or she too can be replaced. When one of the 80 or so Canadian FlagOs resigns in protest as some have (did they get their Retirement checks???) people notice; if one of the almost a thousand US FlagOs were to resign, few would notice -- the system would not even hiccup. The US tradition of not resigning but trying to work within the system for change is pretty firmly embedded for that reason.

[JMA]

Point of information, for those in a position to know: if a senior officer did resign in protest against policies deemed impossible to work with, would that officer's pension be at risk?

From Understanding Military Retirement Pay:

The military retirement pay system used to be easy to understand: You put in 20 years, and you got 50 percent of your base pay immediately upon retirement. You put in more than 20 years and you got 2.5 percent more for each year of active duty after 20 years (up to 75 percent).

If the above is correct then if you are looking at a 30 year career and resign at 21 years you stand to lose about 22.5% of your base pay as pension.

But don't be distracted, focus on the issue of moral courage... or the lack thereof.

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[Dayuhan]

If the above is correct then if you are looking at a 30 year career and resign at 21 years you stand to lose about 22.5% of your base pay as pension.

If we're talking about senior officers they're close to the top of that food chain already, no?

In any event my understanding is that the US has problems retaining its mid to senior officers, largely because their employment opportunities outside the military pay much better. Given that the financial incentives toward getting out exceed those for staying in, it's difficult to postulate a craven financial motive for submitting to the eccentricities of civilian supremacy.

But don't be distracted

I didn't realize you'd raised the issue in an attempt to distract.

focus on the issue of moral courage... or the lack thereof.

Are you suggesting that US military officers lack the moral courage to act on your opinions?

It is possible that they have been so thoroughly trained in the principle of civilian supremacy that they accept it as the lesser of multiple evils, and submit to it.

It is also possible that those who are actually familiar with the goals and constraints in place do not share your opinion of universal incompetence.

Instead of assuming that they haven't the "moral courage" to act on your opinions, why not consider the possibility that they don't share your opinions?

Of course it's possible that you know something they don't. It's also possible that they know things you don't.

[carl]

Carl:IMO the problem is individual human failing, societally supported and systemic and the degree of applicability of each factor will vary from situation to situation. In any event, my belief is that little can or will be done barring major systemic changes which are unlikely. Political Correctness in all aspects is very much a societal factor and that changes but slowly; the PC factor is partly responsible for the refusal to acknowledge mistakes. The American public is both tolerant (of wrongdoing) and superficially vengeful (of perceived slights and failures) so the message is mixed. The systemic problems are, simply, that a failure in this regard really has very little practical effect on the institution (as opposed to some persons within the institutions) so there is no impetus for the change.

JMA's 'example' of Howard K. Johnson is proof of that. Had the General done what he is quoted as thinking, it would not have affected the debacle that was Viet Nam one iota.

All that said, incremental improvement can be achieved however and there have been many such improvements over my lifetime -- not enough but there is change, it is improvement and it is constant -- albeit far too slow...

Thank you for the thoughtful reply. It is an accurate reply, and true to my eye too. So it distresses me horribly.

JMA talks about moral courage and I wonder if we have managed to construct a system that has effectively squelched it amongst the generals. I don't know how we did it or how we can fix. I read a biography of Terry Allen and after he retired he sold insurance. Chesty Puller worried about making his mortgage payments after he retired. These guys nowadays get hired for who they have on speed dial on their cell phone no matter how bad they may have screwed up. We've gone from producing Pullers and Allens to making stars with no souls.

[Ken White]

JMA talks about moral courage and I wonder if we have managed to construct a system that has effectively squelched it amongst the generals...These guys nowadays get hired for who they have on speed dial on their cell phone no matter how bad they may have screwed up. We've gone from producing Pullers and Allens to making stars with no souls.

What you say is true for IMO (based on knowing many and watching more) about 10-20%; the other 80 plus are as honest as the system will allow and stay quiet, out of politics and don't go to work for the big Contractors. I suspect those percentages about track the numbers in any trade or profession.

I've known and worked for some great GOs and have also been exposed to and worked for far from stellar stars and a couple of absolute crooked losers. The bad ones kowtow to and use the system for personal prestige and gain, the good ones work around it to get things done and keep people alive. There are, fortunately, far more okay and good ones than bad ones...

As an aside, I didn't know Terrible Terry but I did see Puller at work as CO 1st Marines in Korea and as CG 3d Marine Bde at Pendleton. He was okay but no Saint; like all of us, a mixture of good and bad traits. He was IMO a mediocre at best tactician. He was personally brave but he used his decorations to his advantage and he was rough on people that worked for him. Unquestionably good showman, though.

Nobody's perfect. Nobody.

[JMA]

If we're talking about senior officers they're close to the top of that food chain already, no?

In any event my understanding is that the US has problems retaining its mid to senior officers, largely because their employment opportunities outside the military pay much better. Given that the financial incentives toward getting out exceed those for staying in, it's difficult to postulate a craven financial motive for submitting to the eccentricities of civilian supremacy.

I didn't realize you'd raised the issue in an attempt to distract.

Are you suggesting that US military officers lack the moral courage to act on your opinions?

It is possible that they have been so thoroughly trained in the principle of civilian supremacy that they accept it as the lesser of multiple evils, and submit to it.

It is also possible that those who are actually familiar with the goals and constraints in place do not share your opinion of universal incompetence.

Instead of assuming that they haven't the "moral courage" to act on your opinions, why not consider the possibility that they don't share your opinions?

Of course it's possible that you know something they don't. It's also possible that they know things you don't.

I'm sorry you chose to reply in this manner.

You asked a question and I answered it... you then chose to run out a red-herring - which I had anticipated.

If that quote I posted is accurate then my position - that a general who leaves before his 30 years are up stands to take a financial knock in the process - is correct.

[JMA]

JMA talks about moral courage and I wonder if we have managed to construct a system that has effectively squelched it amongst the generals. I don't know how we did it or how we can fix.

Ernest Hemingway wrote:

“Few men are willing to brave the disapproval of their fellows, the censure of their colleagues, the wrath of their society.

Moral courage is a rarer commodity than bravery in battle or great intelligence.

Yet it is the one essential, vital quality of those who seek to change a world which yields most painfully to change.”

And this one:

"Bravery is the quintessence of the soldier... But moral courage - the strength of character to do what one knows Is right regardless of the personal consequences - is the true face of conscience. Sacking your best friend, facing up rather than turning the blind eye, accepting that the principle at stake is more important than your job... Such actions demand moral courage of a high order."
Lieutenant-General Sir James Glover. Soldier and His Conscience. Pavameiers. 9/1981.

And finally:

"Last, but by no means least, courage—moral courage, the courage of one's convictions, the courage to see things through. The world ; is in a constant conspiracy against the brave. It's the age-old struggle--the roar of the crowd on one side and the voice of your; conscience on the other." -Douglas MacArthur

Your question: "... how can we fix?"

It starts with officer selection... the weaknesses in the system have been discussed elsewhere... where it needs to be specifically "tested" for. Doesn't happen anywhere other than by chance.

If you read Antony Beeevor's book: "Inside the British Army" you get a glimpse into the difficulties - the change of 'values' among the recent generation - are causing in the Brit military.

How many of the current US generation are prepared to "... to brave the disapproval of their fellows, the censure of their colleagues, the wrath of their society?"

There's your answer...

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[Gurkha]

I suppose everything is obvious in hindsight but.......I think that at the grand strategic level the mistake the West did was to take on both Iraq & Afghanistan... Bush manipulated the American public into a war on Iraq by creating a brouaha on Islamic & nuc terror. Hell, the public was so scared & enraged they would have even supported a war on Mexico!!. So you hit the Taliban, then invaded Iraq and inoculated the Talibs with driblet force levels and gave 'em time to reorganise, re-equip, recruit & when they were nice n ready you took them on!! Another mistake from the US side was not to get the Indian Army involved : the 2nd largest army, infantry predominant, CI experienced force who were, are & always will be the bulwark against Islamic terror, and who have traditionally fought the Afghans & Pakis from the earliest of times. True it would have been a difficult ask with India's politicians & Paki generals opposing it but in hindsight the involvement of the IA would have substantially enhanced the ability to dominate physically large tracts of land & consequently the population a sine qua non for a successful counter insurgency campaign in a rugged rural setting. See, whenever u deal with monolithic Islamic cultures (as distinct from where they are a minority) please understand that they have a persecution complex ingrained in them.... it seems to them that everybody is out to kill them, defile their books, women, culture... so they keep working themselves into frenzies and literally explode. It was only a question of time before they turned on you even if you did deliver them from Saddam & the Taliban. Unlike the gloomy predictions on this thread, I dont think that the Talibs or the Pakis are going to find it very easy to take over Afghanistan. As for the insurgency campaigns they are like good wines : take a long time to mature... and you remember them for a long time!!