Green on Blue: causes and responses (merged thread)

[TheCurmudgeon]

That the soldier’s power exceeds any rule does not render him powerful but, rather, destroys him. Being “above the law” drains the soldier of his defining principles. At times, he might feel he is passively witnessing the person he has become: his hands, signaling arbitrarily “go ahead,” “wait over there,” “shut up,” “show me this,” “show me that”; his voice uttering words: “I don’t care, your permit has expired,” “have a good day,” “where do you think you’re going?”

http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.4/o...occupation.php

A bit of a two way street ... How do we prepare the average general purpose Soldier for this level of power ....

[Fuchs]

http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.4/o...occupation.php

A bit of a two way street ... How do we prepare the average general purpose Soldier for this level of power ....

Judging by anecdotal evidence about American policemen and anecdotal personal experience with airport security, I wouldn't exactly suspect a grand spring of great trainers for that in the U.S..

[Ken White]

Unfortunately, they are rarely allowed to train others because we are wedded to the foolish myth that anyone / everyone can do anything / everything and to the equally foolish dream that people must move about frequently and go to new jobs so they are more qualified to do more things...

Thoise two fallacies have ruined US police practices, are almost directly reponsible for the flaws in airport screening and have harmed the Armed forces of the US -- all significantly.

Curmudgeon:

You avoid having to do that if at all possible because that is not s GP task for the GPF. It's a highly specialized task that requires specialized training and selective assignments -- anathema to the US Army...

You could also re-define "average" -- or realize that many members of that 'average' cohort are more competent than their nominal superiors.

[carl]

Judging by anecdotal evidence about American policemen and anecdotal personal experience with airport security, I wouldn't exactly suspect a grand spring of great trainers for that in the U.S..

The behavior of TSA people at airports in the US varies radically. Denver is great and has been for years. Atlanta TSA inspires dark thoughts of retribution and D.C. seemed to vary. That can't be just random. It has to be the result of the leaders in the various places and maybe a culture that gets established, all things that are within the control of the powers that be, if they care about it, as Ken says.

Same thing with cops. It depends fully upon the leadership and the culture that gets established. And that can change, and change fairly quickly once the right people are put in charge and given support.

This is an aside but we thought that a lot depends, or seemed to, upon how quick backup can get there. If you are a stater in Montana at 0300 40 miles from anywhere, you are a lot less likely to be needlessly aggressive than if you are an LAPD guy on the city street at 0300. In one case backup may arrive in 20 to 40 minutes in the other it may arrive in 1 or 2. That makes a difference.

[carl]

A thought occurred to me relating to this subject and I will present in full expectation that it will be torn apart but I'll do it anyway. Because I'm far away and trons, even hostile ones, can't hurt me.

I think you can look at part of the success of our efforts in Iraq (such as they were) as being due to AQI behaving very badly and convincing the Sunni tribes through that bad behavior the we were the better choice since one had to be made. They pissed off the people more than we did and the people turned on them and they were almost completely suppressed, at least for a time.

You can look at our experience in Afghanistan in a similar way, except we are AQI so to speak. We have behaved badly over the past 11 years and the Afghans, as evidenced by these murders, are turning on us. They may not like Taliban & Co much but they like our presence even less than the resources we bring to keep Taliban & Co out. It seems that a significant proportion of them may be more willing to take their chances with Taliban & Co without us than to tolerate us hanging around any more.

The point of my observation is that AQI lost in Iraq because they made the very great error of pissing off the people more than their opponents. We have made the exact same mistake in Afghanistan and may get chased out by Afghan gov forces (in effect) because of it.

I now stand ready for my point to be brutally refuted.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I would like to offer three ideas for consideration.

First, reduce or limit the number of general purpose forces working directly with ANSF.

Second, create a Cultural Liaison Officer who is imbedded in units working directly with ANSF. Their job is to observe and identify potential cultural issues that could fester and explode into violence. There would be one on the ISAF side and one on the ANSF side. The would consult together and make recommendations for interventions.

Third, institute a Sulha style conflict resolution system. The Sulha’s task is to facilitate transformation of the disputants’ as well as their clans from a desire for revenge (with its potential implication of endless blood revenge cycles) to a willingness to forgive, binding all disputants, for all generations, past, present, and future. The Sulha is based on a mix of mediation and arbitration applications performed interchangeably by a Sulha committee ( Jaha) composed of community dignitaries—men with standing and clout. On the “mediation side,” Sulha strives to reconcile differences between the disputants’; on the “arbitration side,” the decision of the Jaha is final and binding. (Pely, D. (2010). Honor: The Sulha's main dispute resolution tool. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 28(1), 67-81. doi:10.1002/crq.20013) The intent would be to arbitrate disputes in a system that would be acceptable to the Afghans.

The overall intent would be to identify problems at the unit level and resolve disputes there. Where this is not possible the alternative would be to personnel actions to separate the ISAF or ANSF personnel who are most antagonizing the situation.

[TheCurmudgeon]

A thought occurred to me relating to this subject and I will present in full expectation that it will be torn apart but I'll do it anyway. Because I'm far away and trons, even hostile ones, can't hurt me.

I think you can look at part of the success of our efforts in Iraq (such as they were) as being due to AQI behaving very badly and convincing the Sunni tribes through that bad behavior the we were the better choice since one had to be made. They pissed off the people more than we did and the people turned on them and they were almost completely suppressed, at least for a time.

You can look at our experience in Afghanistan in a similar way, except we are AQI so to speak. We have behaved badly over the past 11 years and the Afghans, as evidenced by these murders, are turning on us. They may not like Taliban & Co much but they like our presence even less than the resources we bring to keep Taliban & Co out. It seems that a significant proportion of them may be more willing to take their chances with Taliban & Co without us than to tolerate us hanging around any more.

The point of my observation is that AQI lost in Iraq because they made the very great error of pissing off the people more than their opponents. We have made the exact same mistake in Afghanistan and may get chased out by Afghan gov forces (in effect) because of it.

I now stand ready for my point to be brutally refuted.

Carl,

While I think there were additional consideration in what happened in Iraq, particularly the willingness of the Sunni’s to work with us instead of in parallel to us, the imputes for the actions of the Sunni’s was certainly AQI’s lack of understanding of their target audience.

[Fuchs]

First, reduce or limit the number of general purpose forces working directly with ANSF.

In my experience the difference between "general purpose" troops and specialists is often only one of paperwork and a course.

I wouldn't be satisfied by such a criterion.


Instead, one might create a list of units that worked fine and the time periods thereof.
Next, look up personnel files to identify people who experienced these good practices for long enough, finally check them with an interview. Said interview might be in a bar with some cool beer - a more promising environment than some sterile interviewer's desk.

[TheCurmudgeon]

In my experience the difference between "general purpose" troops and specialists is often only one of paperwork and a course.

I wouldn't be satisfied by such a criterion.

I agree, it is a vaguely defined term, and not all units are the same. I guess I would like to see more mature, experienced forces working with the ANSF.

Instead, one might create a list of units that worked fine and the time periods thereof.
Next, look up personnel files to identify people who experienced these good practices for long enough, finally check them with an interview. Said interview might be in a bar with some cool beer - a more promising environment than some sterile interviewer's desk.

I think you just described the SF selection system

[Fuchs]

Top U.S. General: We Don’t Know Why Afghan Troops Are Killing Us

By Spencer Ackerman
August 23, 2012

General John Allen, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said he still doesn’t know why at least 10 NATO troops have died in the last two weeks at the hands of the Afghan forces they mentor. He suspects it may have something to do with asking those Afghans to perform dangerous operations during the recent Muslim holy month. Maybe.

If that doesn’t sound like a positive sign for the decade-long war — after all, the entire American strategy now depends on turning security over to the Afghans — Allen wasn’t in a mood to sugar-coat Afghanistan. In what may have been the bluntest press conference delivered by a top commander since the U.S. went to war in 2001, Allen told Pentagon reporters he expected Afghanistan will still suffer from “violence” after U.S. combat ends in 2014; that Hamid Karzai’s government has to act “now” to govern parts of the country that NATO has taken from the Taliban; and that a reduction in violence in the country since last year “may not be statistically significant.”

(...)

[Ken White]

Ascribing western thought processes to either Afghans or Arabs is likely to provide an incorrect assessment of the 'problem.'

People who regard personal or family honor -- or the display of the concept -- as more important than communal factors are going to react to different stimuli than will those who espouse a communitarian outlook as is common in the west.

We were no uglier in Afghanistan than we were in Iraq -- in fact, due to sheer numbers and locales, one could make the case that we were and are less 'ugly' (whatever that means) -- It's just that not only are the denizens of either nation Western, Afghans aren't Arabs.

[Ken White]

Instead, one might create a list of units that worked fine and the time periods thereof.
Next, look up personnel files to identify people who experienced these good practices for long enough, finally check them with an interview. Said interview might be in a bar with some cool beer - a more promising environment than some sterile interviewer's desk.

Marines. too. It worked quite well.

Regrettably, as Curmudgeon said, that has some relationship to SF selection -- not much but some -- and the larger Army has been forced to avoid such a sensible process as it would be 'unfair' and not 'objective' as the Congress of the US has told DoD their Officer selection processes must be. That destructive fallacy is now migrating to the NCO Corps and the prognosis ain't good...

Can't officially compare units, either -- that might introduce an 'elitist' tendency which is anathema to the social engineers.

[Ken White]

I agree, it is a vaguely defined term, and not all units are the same. I guess I would like to see more mature, experienced forces working with the ANSF.

I think you just described SF.

Always use the right tool for the job, horses for courses and all that...

[carl]

I would like to offer three ideas for consideration.

The first idea is great. And if we reduced all forces to the point where we could support them via means other than through Karachi, that would kill two birds with one stone.

For the second, would the cultural liaison officers have any real authority to actually do something or be limited to advice only? Also, isn't that the job of the small unit leadership in any case?

For the third, sounds good to me but how would you do it with all the personnel and unit turbulence and movement on our side?

[carl]

Fuchs:

The article you cited said the GEN Allen didn't know why the Afghan gov people were shooting our people. We've been there eleven years and he's guessing about fasting during daylight hours having something to do with it. An article linked to that one said GEN Allen is leaving and his replacement will be the FIFTH overall commander in 4 years. The top job over there seems to be turning into another ticket to be punched on the climb up the career ladder.

I have concluded that we have the best machines, but at least at the top, we don't have the best men. They do-that is if you judge the best men by if they win or not, not by how likely they are to slit your throat.

[carl]

Ascribing western thought processes to either Afghans or Arabs is likely to provide an incorrect assessment of the 'problem.'

People who regard personal or family honor -- or the display of the concept -- as more important than communal factors are going to react to different stimuli than will those who espouse a communitarian outlook as is common in the west.

We were no uglier in Afghanistan than we were in Iraq -- in fact, due to sheer numbers and locales, one could make the case that we were and are less 'ugly' (whatever that means) -- It's just that not only are the denizens of either nation Western, Afghans aren't Arabs.

Could that view of honor vs communitarian values be ascribed to the view of 18th and 19th century Southerners vs Northerners in the US?

We may not be any uglier in Afghanistan that we were in Iraq but the results of that are turning out to be much more important in Afghanistan. We have handled cultural differences before over hundreds of years. We don't seem to be doing so good a job anymore. And it seems from what I've read, the kinds of things that are setting these guys off are the kinds of things that set most people off, Western or Eastern.

[TheCurmudgeon]

For the second, would the cultural liaison officers have any real authority to actually do something or be limited to advice only? Also, isn't that the job of the small unit leadership in any case?

I would have them assigned to the Battalion attached to the Platoon. They would have whatever authority the BN CDR gave them. I would probably have them report to the BN CSM, but I am not totally convinced that is the best way to go.

First line supervisors are the wrong person for this job. They are too close the the Soldiers involved and will take sides. This needs to be a "disinterested" party who observes and consults with his opposite number. He should have cultural training and preferably language ability. I would like him to be a senior NCO (E-7 or above).

[davidbfpo]

I have merged two threads, the new 'Green-on Blue - Is our cultural ignorance killing us ... literally' and the older thread 'What causes some in the ANSF to kill ISAF?'.

Stats: x17 posts, 2415 views and x79 posts with 2151 views.

The title has become 'Green on Blue: causes and responses' (merged thread).

[Ken White]

Could that view of honor vs communitarian values be ascribed to the view of 18th and 19th century Southerners vs Northerners in the US?

Absolutely. Still somewhat true today.

Fortunately...

We may not be any uglier in Afghanistan that we were in Iraq but the results of that are turning out to be much more important in Afghanistan...

That's your assessment. Mine differs, it's not an ounce more important, it just has a different effect due to the cultural difference.

We have handled cultural differences before over hundreds of years. We don't seem to be doing so good a job anymore.

Again our assessments differ, my reading of history says that we have done far from a good job at that. Certainly Metacom, Thayandanega, Osceola, Sitting Bull, Emiliano Aguinaldo and Pancho Villa didn't think so. In my travels here and there from 1947 forward, I found that most of the folks with whom I had contact were very polite but in real serious conversation would point out that they didn't believe we got along at all well with their nation or culture...

I've been in virtually all Asian nations, a couple on the other continents and throughout the ME. I can't think of a single nation where, once you break past the politeness barrier (Most other cultures are more polite than Americans IMO) a majority of people would agree we get along with other cultures all that well.

And it seems from what I've read, the kinds of things that are setting these guys off are the kinds of things that set most people off, Western or Eastern.

What one reads -- and infers -- versus what happens on the ground often differ significantly.

However, could it be that the 'set-off' factors are or certainly may be the same but the fact that the reaction is different in Afghanistan is the crux of the problem?

[carl]

Ken:

Well if the North-South divide between a concept of honor and communitarian values could be bridged so as to allow for a pre and post Civil War Army that wasn't riven by a huge number of murders done by Southerners to Northerners, I don't see that as the persuasive explanation for all these murders.

There is a matter of degree of course but in our history we have worked successfully with people from radically different cultures who worked as closely or more closely with our forces as do the ANSF people without, to my knowledge, these types of murders being committed at such rates. I am thinking of things like the KATUSAs, all the many Indian scout and auxiliary units during the course of expansion in North America, and the Philippine Scout and Constabulary units. We have even successfully worked with Muslim men from a culture just as prickly if not more so than the Afghans, those being the Moro members of the Philippine Constabulary.

I agree that many people from other nations, when pressed, will say they don't like the Yanks much, even those working with us as allies. But that degree of dislike doesn't lead to murder on such a rate. This is something that I don't believe has a precedent, though my historical knowledge is limited.

Whether this is more or less important than problems in Iraq or if it is only the effect is different isn't the important thing in my mind. The important thing is that these killings may result in us getting bounced out of there much sooner and in a much more confused way than we are planning on. Maybe not of course, but I think that is more than possible edging into probable territory.

That reaction to set off factors may be different in Afghanistan than elsewhere is a very good point. But we have been there for 11 years. We should know how things differ and make or have made changes in order to allow for those differences. However, judging by the number of murders and their increasing frequency, we haven't. I don't think things had to come to this point. But they have and I don't think much, if anything can be done about it.