And so it goes with counterformists.
On the other hand, I'm gratified that Bill Moore and Ken White picked up on my presentation. BTW: Bill expressed one of the thoughts I've had but didn't express: "... perhaps it was better they weren't there, because PW casualties during the raid may have resulted in negative press that undermined the desired strategic message."
Melvin Laird was less than articulate at times, but, in terms of the Nixon-Kissenger principals re: Vietnam, Laird was relatively straight-forward (e.g., the Cambodia bombing ought to have been made public upfront). I also read his interview with MAJ Mitchell in which he stated what he believed at the time he met with Nixon:
Based on both Amidon and Michell (the latter more detailed at pages 6-7), on 20 Nov, Blackburn, Bennett and Moorer were faced with a non-consensus by the DoD analysts as to whether the POWs were at Son Tay or not. That military trio decided it was more likely than not that the POWs were there. Moorer and Bennett then met with Laird. See also 1988 SOCOM at post end.from JMA's snip of interview
... Do you understand? I know what you are asking. The Hanoi information was simply not believable.
....
Do you understand? I believed the information to be inaccurate. I informed the President about new information concerning the deaths of additional POWs being held. The CIA passed that as many as 10 more POWs had died in captivity.
BTW, Moorer was well aware by then of Nixon's position; from Amidon (p.5 pdf)
Before Laird went in to see Nixon, he met with Dick Helms. They discussed (1) the Hanoi information; and (2) the most recent POW deaths (the latter detailed in the Laird interview snip above). I've found no details re: the Laird-Helms conversation re: the Hanoi information. So, I can't prove that discussion created or reinforced Laird's belief that the Hanoi information was "inaccurate" and "not believable" - it clearly did not lessen that belief if it already existed.“When [Admiral Moorer] mentioned that the mission would be canceled if there was any sign that the enemy was aware of the objective, Nixon protested: ‘Damn, Tom, let’s not let that happen. I want this thing to go.’”[29]
29. Vandenbroucke, p. 63.
BTW: While it may shock some, Presidents (with some exceptions) are not interested in intelligence details - only the adviser's BLUF.
As we know, information + analysis = intelligence. Son Tay definitely suffered from "information paucity" (if that is an "intelligence failure", so be it). In what (if any way) the analysis was faulty has not been laid out in anything I've read. In an low information environment, a single bit of new information easily may be perceived to be great import. It may or may not be of material import to the larger picture.
We do have "eyewitness testimony" from a number of Son Tay particupans in 1988 (link to pdf, 93 page transcript):
BG Blackburn specifically addressed the "no POWs" issue (pp. 78-82) - to my satisfaction; but undoubtedly not to anyone whose position is so far out on the limb as to be unable to come in from the cold.SON TAY RAID PANEL DISCUSSION
USSOCOM COMMANDERS CONFERENCE
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA
29 MARCH 1988
Participants:
Lieutenant General LeRoy J. Manor, USAF (ret)
Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn, USA (ret)
Colonel Elliott P. Sydnor, USA (ret)
Colonel John V. Allison, USAF (ret)
Colonel Richard A. Dutton, USAF (ret)
Introduction by General James J. Lindsay
Moderator: Colonel Wayne E. Long, SOJ3-S
To those who are undecided about this mission, I ask this hypothetical:
1. The Hanoi information is taken absolutely at face value.
2. The policy for the mission is "if POWs, raid; if no POWs, no raid".
3. Pursuant to that information and policy, the raid is aborted (19 Nov)
4. That same day, the NV move the 10 Catholics (earlier moved out to isolate them) back into the otherwise vacant camp.
Now what flak would have resulted from that "intelligence failure" ?
Regards
Mike
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