Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
And so it goes with counterformists.
There are those who desperately want to believe that Moorer got it right in this case.

On the other hand, I'm gratified that Bill Moore and Ken White picked up on my presentation. BTW: Bill expressed one of the thoughts I've had but didn't express: "... perhaps it was better they weren't there, because PW casualties during the raid may have resulted in negative press that undermined the desired strategic message."
Mike, you find and post documents which inform on the subject then go and spoil it by selectively quoting and mixing in your own unsubstantiated conclusions. Just let the facts speak for themselves.

Melvin Laird was less than articulate at times, but, in terms of the Nixon-Kissenger principals re: Vietnam, Laird was relatively straight-forward (e.g., the Cambodia bombing ought to have been made public upfront). I also read his interview with MAJ Mitchell in which he stated what he believed at the time he met with Nixon:
Oh yes, but if he said anything in that interview which casts doubt on what you are trying to sell here it was because it was one of those occasions when Laird was not at his articulate best, yes?

Based on both Amidon and Michell (the latter more detailed at pages 6-7), on 20 Nov, Blackburn, Bennett and Moorer were faced with a non-consensus by the DoD analysts as to whether the POWs were at Son Tay or not. That military trio decided it was more likely than not that the POWs were there. Moorer and Bennett then met with Laird. See also 1988 SOCOM at post end.
Mike, non consensus among intel analysts is a constant. As there was no urgency (other than in the mind of Blackburn) there was no sane reason to proceed with an operation where no POW presence was confirmed.

The docs you cite do not support your position at all (Mitchell makes liberal use of his own interpretation of events which possibly confuses you). Neither does the SOCOM document support your position.

That said you are deliberately ignoring comment from Adm Train relating to what Moorer knew before the op went ahead.

Yes Blackburn and Bennet were part of the whole cock-up but they were subordinates of Moorer. The buck stops with Moorer.

BTW, Moorer was well aware by then of Nixon's position; from Amidon (p.5 pdf) [
Page 6? The document I have numbers from page 119-131

What we do know from Amidon is that Laird did not inform Nixon of the "troublesome" HUMINT. (page 128)

Before Laird went in to see Nixon, he met with Dick Helms. They discussed (1) the Hanoi information; and (2) the most recent POW deaths (the latter detailed in the Laird interview snip above). I've found no details re: the Laird-Helms conversation re: the Hanoi information. So, I can't prove that discussion created or reinforced Laird's belief that the Hanoi information was "inaccurate" and "not believable" - it clearly did not lessen that belief if it already existed.
Laird admits that he did not inform Nixon of the "troublesome" HUMINT (see above). The Helms/ Laird conversation is irrelevant to Moorers lack of moral courage.

BTW: While it may shock some, Presidents (with some exceptions) are not interested in intelligence details - only the adviser's BLUF.
Irrelevant to this issue.

As we know, information + analysis = intelligence. Son Tay definitely suffered from "information paucity" (if that is an "intelligence failure", so be it). In what (if any way) the analysis was faulty has not been laid out in anything I've read. In an low information environment, a single bit of new information easily may be perceived to be great import. It may or may not be of material import to the larger picture.
You don't have to take my word for it but it is safe to assume that if you are going to fly in to North Vietnam to within 23 miles of Hanoi one would like to believe that the INT would be good if not excellent.

The lack of INT confirming the POW presence in this case reflects on Blackburn as much as it asks questions about the competence or otherwise of the Bennett and the DIA... and is something Moorer should have immediately picked up on when he became CJCS in July 1970.

We do have "eyewitness testimony" from a number of Son Tay particupans in 1988 (link to pdf, 93 page transcript):
Read it... what's your point?

BG Blackburn specifically addressed the "no POWs" issue (pp. 78-82) - to my satisfaction; but undoubtedly not to anyone whose position is so far out on the limb as to be unable to come in from the cold.
You're such a push over Mike (if that convinced you of anything).

Note: careful with the side swipes or you will have Ken on your case... then again maybe you won't

A key admission by Blackburn (in the SOCOM doc) you missed (or chose to ignore) was:

"And the sum of the substance was that if we didn't do it now, we would never be able to pull this thing together later on."
This does not give you any inkling as to why he would have found that "troublesome" HUMINT coming in at the last minute to be unconvincing?

To those who are undecided about this mission, ...
No Mike, this is not about the raid it is about Moorer's failure to pull the train's emergency brake when it became clear that nobody was at home.

At possibly the one time in his career when called upon to show moral courage Moorer wimped out and thereby placed the lives soldiers at needless risk.

I ask this hypothetical:

1. The Hanoi information is taken absolutely at face value.

2. The policy for the mission is "if POWs, raid; if no POWs, no raid".

3. Pursuant to that information and policy, the raid is aborted (19 Nov)

4. That same day, the NV move the 10 Catholics (earlier moved out to isolate them) back into the otherwise vacant camp.

Now what flak would have resulted from that "intelligence failure" ?

Regards

Mike
No, no, no, Mike. It is quite obvious that had the (available) INT been properly interpreted as to the likelihood of the presence of POWs at Son Tay the Raid would never have got off the ground.