Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
Have to disagree with JMA on this one, it was the right decision to execute.
That's fine Bill.

Then maybe the scenario should have run something like this:

* CJCS approaches Laird - tells him the evidence is that the camp is empty and insists that the Son Tay raid is aborted and a new 'live' target selected.

* Laird then says (something like this): "Admiral, I apologise if you thought the mission was to effect the release of POWs. The real mission is to send a clear mission to the North Vietnamese government that we can strike anywhere at any time with a side benefit that the POWs, their families and other troops will get a lift by knowing that we will try to rescue them."

* The CJCS would then reply (something like this): "Well then Mr Secretary the risk to our troops will be minimal and the chance of 'success' remains above 95%."

* As the CJCS is leaving Laird would say (something like this): "Oh Admiral, I don't think we should trouble Col Simons with what we have discussed. As far a she and his men are concerned they should believe the camp is occupied."

* CJCS: "Yes, Mister Secretary."


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Here's an extract of an interview between Mitchell and the lying *'# Laird:

6. Question: Did you know at anytime prior to the Raid that no POWs were at Son Tay?

Answer: No. All the intelligence we had indicated that POWs were at the camp. I had been involved in this intelligence collection for quite some time and I had seen several other camps which we had been looking at for a long time. Son Tay gave no indication that POWs were not there. We knew the camp was active and had been for several years. The decision to execute was based on this intelligence. However, we knew that there was a possibility that no POWs were there. After all, we had no hard evidence of their presence, only indications from camps known to house POWs that were similar to the conditions and activity found at Son Tay. The raid force knew of this possibility also. Do you understand? I know what you are asking. The Hanoi information was simply not believable.

7. Question: Did you brief the President on the Hanoi source information?

Answer: No. The decision to go had already been made. Do you understand? I believed the information to be inaccurate. I informed the President about new information concerning the deaths of additional POWs being held. The CIA passed that as many as 10 more POWs had died in captivity.
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