Son Tay raid: stop or go? Vietnam

[jcustis]

So I suggest major instead of getting picky with me over the available intel why not question how the charade was able to continue after the camp emptied on 14 July up until the actual raid on 21 November.

(Yawn)

I get picky over the available intel because your line of argument through this whole thread has been plain, flat-out, terrible - just terrible. First you started to impugn Adm. Moorer's character by hanging on to a quote that he had been presented with information that the prisoners had definitely been moved. Then when the weakness of that argument was called into question, when it was made apparent to you that the single source of information from the Hanoi informant was just one piece of the puzzle, it seems you went rummaging through the internet and came up with another nugget to support your railings.

And now you seem to be retreating on the conviction of your argument. First it seemed that you were advancing the position that Adm. Moorer lacked moral courage and was therefore a moral coward, and then in your latest posts, you state that he made a bad call. Which is it? If anything, your most cogent thought in this whole discussion is that if the DIA IMINT had been properly interpreted, the raid would have never gotten off the ground. Well shut the front door! Maybe, at the end of the day, DIA is really the agency to lay the blame on.

Bad calls happen in conflict, and no amount of pillows anyone tries to wrap around our warriors can prevent them, but a moral coward?

You'd be hard pressed to find anyone in this forum who would disagree that there are perils to groupthink and hive mind planning, but what we are dealing with now in this sub-thread is the issue of whether there was absolute confirmation that the prisoners were moved, and that the planners knew this but proceeded to recommend a go to civilian leadership nonetheless. You have failed, in my opinion, to do that, but you have certainly nipped and barked as is often your modus operandi. You don't help your argument when you do that...ever.

You've paraded a single quote from a single book (attributable to Train) , and I think jmm99 has already torn your argument apart again. If you are going to rail against something, and certainly against a figure of history, you really ought to read more. If you had bothered to browse Perilous Options, you might have realized that there were indications that activity had picked up between 3 and 13 November, according to the writer's line of discussion about the DIA IMINT analysis. Even Bennett, who briefed Moorer on the "two stacks of evidence", had doubts as time wore on but seemed to decline a distinct opinion because there was a lack of more concrete evidence. I'd nod my head with you if you were making the statement that the compartmentalization of information and groupthink was the most significant lesson to be learned from Son Tay. Where you are losing any audience is when you drift off into attacks against Moorer and essentially call him an imbecile (yes, my impression and not your words) and less decisive than a 15-year old.

Which is it, because you appear to be all over the map. Was he indecisive, a careerist and morally corrupt, or not intelligent enough to be CJCS? The body of evidence, personal recollections given years after the event, and other data tell different people different things. I do not discount Train's quote about the 12-hour information (and I doubt any other folks posting to this thread discount it), but it is still the recollection of a single individual years after the event, and it is from a separate book at that. Those recollections have to be taken into consideration with the larger body of information, and frankly, you could be accused of selectively ignoring data that is counter to your view.

Mike, you find and post documents which inform on the subject then go and spoil it by selectively quoting and mixing in your own unsubstantiated conclusions. Just let the facts speak for themselves.

I presume that if you followed your own advice, you wouldn't have anything to say.

I am reminded of why I tried to stay out of threads where you post. You came in with a very clear mindset, started swirling around and breaking the shop's china when others offered a contrarian point of view (which is fine, by the way), and at the end of things we haven't actually gotten anywhere.

And bristling at Surferbeetle's comments took it to a whole new level. Really?

What this thread definitely highlights is the immutable fact that although we have the freedom to comment on history, we would be wise to be cautious and not let hindsight hamper our analysis of decision-making during volatile times.

[JMA]

(Yawn)

Major, this is the second time you have come out shooting from the hip in response to my postings and embarrassed yourself.

So now you attempt to redeem yourself by attempting to discredit me. If you had read the sources listed by Mike and maybe done a little research for yourself (call it rummaging through the internet if you will) you will have (or should have) realised that the INT was so thin as to the presence of POWs in Son Tay that no responsible commander would have allowed any of his soldiers and airmen to have taken part in such an ill advised and risky operation (possibly the most audacious and potentially risky operation ever undertaken by US forces).

Now how come you failed to identify the critical fact in all this and that being that it was later confirmed that the camp had been vacated on 14 July?

That would have informed you that it was impossible for Moorer to have received confirmation of the actual presence of POWs in the camp prior to seeking final mission approval from the president.

Why too, do you think Moorer elected not to inform the President of the ‘lack of activity’ in the camp?

Do you think Moorer’s actions were those one should be reasonably expect from a CJCS? Clearly not.

Finally your comment about reading Perilous Options (Vandenbroucke’s book) is plain ridiculous. Mike was unable to find it online yet I am supposed to have a copy on my bookshelf??? I thought we had got past the ‘activity’ issue to the point where actual confirmation of POW occupation was needed (as was possible back in May 1970 when there were POWs in the camp).

[jcustis]

Finally your comment about reading Perilous Options (Vandenbroucke’s book) is plain ridiculous. Mike was unable to find it online yet I am supposed to have a copy on my bookshelf??? I thought we had got past the ‘activity’ issue to the point where actual confirmation of POW occupation was needed (as was possible back in May 1970 when there were POWs in the camp).

Uhhh, you could have found the relevant part here: http://books.google.com/books?id=RWn...page&q&f=false.

I believe Mike was referring to the actual interview.

So now you attempt to redeem yourself by attempting to discredit me. If you had read the sources listed by Mike and maybe done a little research for yourself (call it rummaging through the internet if you will) you will have (or should have) realised that the INT was so thin as to the presence of POWs in Son Tay that no responsible commander would have allowed any of his soldiers and airmen to have taken part in such an ill advised and risky operation (possibly the most audacious and potentially risky operation ever undertaken by US forces).

I don't have a desire to discredit you. You do a fine job of that all by yourself.

Your presumption that I would conclude the intelligence to be too thin is pretty sweeping. I think you are overly risk-averse, so I understand how that could frame your views and your opinion of what a responsible commander looks like, but you really shouldn't let your values, opinions, and judgment speak for what posters should or shouldn't be inclined to think.

It would be better to simply say, "I wouldn't have done that," and call it a day. Instead you are just incredulous that others might disagree with you. It's okay, really. it happens often here.

Where at that link do I find the piece about "... there were indications that activity had picked up between 3 and 13 November... "?

C'mon, read the darn thing.

Do you think Moorer’s actions were those one should be reasonably expect from a CJCS? Clearly not.

Which actions? Again, you've been all over the map, so clarify what you are talking about.

Now how come you failed to identify the critical fact in all this and that being that it was later confirmed that the camp had been vacated on 14 July?

That would have informed you that it was impossible for Moorer to have received confirmation of the actual presence of POWs in the camp prior to seeking final mission approval from the president.

What is your definition of confirmation? A POW waving into the night as an SR-71 flew overhead? I for sure am not talking about that level of intel, and I surmise that the planners did not believe they needed that standard to be able to advocate a go for the mission. You may be prescribing that standard here, and that's okay, but the whole point to this discussion is what the planners knew, when they knew it, and what other information impacted in the decision-making process (there was a lot).

I think it's fair to say that there were a significant number of details, decisions and factors impacting on the process at the time, and there is a wide range of potentially contradictory information that exist. I still believe that the planners tried to make conscientious decisions in the process. You don't seem to think so, and again, that's fine, but don't be surprised that you're expected to bring your A-game when making weighty posts like you have, and to defend your point of view with information.

At the end of the day, I don't believe Moorer to be a moral coward, imbecile, or unintelligent, and the contrasting viewpoints in this thread simply demonstrate the beauty of how people can come to different conclusions over the same bit of information.

[JMA]

Uhhh, you could have found the relevant part here: http://books.google.com/books?id=RWn...page&q&f=false.

Where at that link do I find the piece about "... there were indications that activity had picked up between 3 and 13 November... "?

[jmm99]

from JMA
So I suggest that you ask around to find out the duties of the Executive Assistant to the CJCS to establish how Train is able to use the word ‘we’ in this comments.

That will solve your problem.

Unless you are blowing smoke, you have already focused on Train's duties and the evidence that he performed them in the period July-Nov 1970.

1. Spell out Train's duties you believe are material to your position; and

2. The evidence that Train performed them.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

is what I'd like to read. From Vandenbroucke, p.204 snip:

Bk p204.jpg

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Unless you are blowing smoke, you have already focused on Train's duties and the evidence that he performed them in the period July-Nov 1970.

1. Spell out Train's duties you believe are material to your position; and

2. The evidence that Train performed them.

Regards

Mike

No Mike, the onus is not on me for this.

To me it is self evident what the duties of staff officers are having served with a wartime Brigade HQ 30 odd years ago. It appears that you do not understand the function of 'staff'. You then need to read up on it (enough in the public domain) to realise that Adm Train (or whatever his rank was at the time he served on Moorer's staff) could well have been in the loop with the unfolding Son Tay developments. The bottom line is that there is no reason to question the integrity of Train's quoted response in the Vandenbroucke interview.

To support this last sentence of mine I refer to Amidon:

Out-group Stereotypes: The inputs of individuals outside the group are not valued if they do not conform to the group’s view. Although mission planners had repeatedly lamented the lack of HUMINT and the overreliance on technical means, when the HUMINT contradicted their desire to “go,” the HUMINT was ignored. Twenty-six years later, in a 1996 interview, former Secretary of Defense Laird said that when presented with the information from the Hanoi HUMINT source, he did not judge it to be accurate or believable.

In the context of this SWC discussion you (and others) are treating Adm Train in this manner. I note with interest the difference in your handling of the choice items you cherry picked from the various texts you quoted and Train's comments. Would you be happy to just ignore Train's input (for fear of where it will lead) as Moorer/Blackburn/Bennett did with the HUMIT for Son Tay and Browning did with the evidence of two Panzer Divisions around Arnhem?

A case study in group think is developing nicely around this thread and the spirted defense of Moorer. Fascinating.

[JMA]

Methinks you edited and lengthened this post after my first response, no matter...

I don't have a desire to discredit you. You do a fine job of that all by yourself.

Can you hear the one hand clapping?

Your presumption that I would conclude the intelligence to be too thin is pretty sweeping.

I was merely assuming that you had the smarts to know that but... go on prove me wrong then.

I think you are overly risk-averse, ...

Me, risk averse? Got the wrong guy in mind. I can think of a couple of hundred people who would find that pretty funny. Been called a lot of things in my time (both good and bad) but never risk averse.

... so I understand how that could frame your views and your opinion of what a responsible commander looks like, but you really shouldn't let your values, opinions, and judgment speak for what posters should or shouldn't be inclined to think.

You need help again. This time read your own manual FM 6.0 about the difference between taking a calculated risk and a gamble:

2-94. A calculated risk is not the same as a military gamble. A calculated risk is an exposure to chance of injury or loss when the commander can visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or damage to the force, and judges the outcome as worth the cost. Taking a calculated risk is acceptable. A military gamble is a decision in which a commander risks the force without a reasonable level of information about the outcome. In the case of a military gamble, the commander decides based on hope rather than reason. The situations that justify a military gamble occur when defeat or destruction of the friendly force is only a matter of time and the only chance for mission accomplishment or preservation of the force lies in the gamble.

Got the picture now?

It would be better to simply say, "I wouldn't have done that," and call it a day. Instead you are just incredulous that others might disagree with you. It's okay, really. it happens often here.

Incredulous that you and others seem to be so imperceptive so as to fail to pick up on the key aspects of this issue and continue to blindly argue in favour of a man who when his moment came failed to make the most simple decision. (This is why I referred to the book; The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make Dumb Decisions)

Officers are (or should be) judged on their ability to apply good judgement and display a keen ability to quickly and accurately grasp the critical elements of a given situation. Not too much of that around here sadly.

Which actions? Again, you've been all over the map, so clarify what you are talking about.

If you have been reading this thread you will know what actions I have commented on.

What is your definition of confirmation? A POW waving into the night as an SR-71 flew overhead?

Silly.

I for sure am not talking about that level of intel, and I surmise that the planners did not believe they needed that standard to be able to advocate a go for the mission.

Here you surmise in favour of three people (Moorer/Blackburn/Bennett) who got it badly wrong. What was the standard they applied in May 1970 when the reached the decision that 61 POWs were in Son Tay?

You seem unable to grasp that after the operational planning got under way and picked up momentum (like with Market Garden) the boot moved to the wrong foot in that the INTEL people had to prove the camp was empty rather than merely cast reasonable doubt as to a POW presence (which given the location of Son Tay and all the related risks) which would have led to an abort.

You may be prescribing that standard here, and that's okay, but the whole point to this discussion is what the planners knew, when they knew it, and what other information impacted in the decision-making process (there was a lot).

And the bad news is that Adm Train (the man whose testimony you all want to just go away) indicates what they knew and when they knew it.

I think it's fair to say that there were a significant number of details, decisions and factors impacting on the process at the time, and there is a wide range of potentially contradictory information that exist.

I'm sure you think that but I'm not sure you could support that with any concrete facts, could you?

I still believe that the planners tried to make conscientious decisions in the process. You don't seem to think so, and again, that's fine, but don't be surprised that you're expected to bring your A-game when making weighty posts like you have, and to defend your point of view with information.

I seldom enter the fray if I don't have the ammunition to support my case. I stated that Moorer made an imbecilic decision (along the lines of The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make Dumb Decisions) which could be explained by his being newly appointed, the Peter Principle kicking in or a range of other reasons.

At the end of the day, I don't believe Moorer to be a moral coward, imbecile, or unintelligent, and the contrasting viewpoints in this thread simply demonstrate the beauty of how people can come to different conclusions over the same bit of information.

You don't believe or you don't want to believe? Now your problem would come if you were asked to substantiate that.

[jcustis]

What is your definition of confirmation? A POW waving into the night as an SR-71 flew overhead?

Silly.

I was being flippant to make a point, but are you going to answer the question? It was still directed at you and was not rhetorical.

What standard do you believe they should have used to achieve confirmation or denial? A single source HUMINT report? A knock at the front gate?

And don't reply with, "well, the intel should have been better than what they had," because that's just moving the goal posts in circles. We know they should have had better intel, and there hasn't been anyone in this thread who has said otherwise.

Quote:
At the end of the day, I don't believe Moorer to be a moral coward, imbecile, or unintelligent, and the contrasting viewpoints in this thread simply demonstrate the beauty of how people can come to different conclusions over the same bit of information.

You don't believe or you don't want to believe?

You really don't have any idea how this discourse is supposed to work right now, do you? You are just talking in circles at this point.

I...don't...believe...Moorer...to...be...a...moral...coward...imbecil e...or..unintelligent.

Now your problem would come if you were asked to substantiate that.

I don't need to. I have substantiated it already, at least the reason why I come to that conclusion.

I put the Vandenbroucke material on the end of spoon for you. Did you even read it and find the reference to the point made about the 3-13 November activity?

[jmm99]

I called; you didn't show the cards - end game.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

I called; you didn't show the cards - end game.

Regards

Mike

I was supposed to produce the transcript of Vandenbroucke's interview with Train?

You're joking right?

[JMA]

What standard do you believe they should have used to achieve confirmation or denial? A single source HUMINT report? A knock at the front gate?

You are being silly again.

My standard is unimportant... and your demand for such is an attempt to draw that into the discussion is just a red herring.

The simple fact is that after 14 July 1970 for the four months and one week until the raid went ahead on 21 November 1970 no INTEL was produced to prove the camp was still occupied by US POWs. In other words no confirmatory INTEL.

In fact the evidence of a POW presence had deteriorated to so tenuous a level that Pres Nixon was deliberately deceived by not being informed of either the lack of activity in the camp nor the HUMINT report that the POWs had been moved.

To help you obtain a simple grasp of the Son Tay issue I suggest you read Amidon's document. You really need to attempt to approach this in an investigative and enquiring manner rather than mere resort to high school debating tactics driven by a desire to be blindly loyal to a man who screwed up big time.

[jmm99]

p.65 (p.64 is unavailable from Google)

p65.jpg

Best I can do given attachment limits (enlarge your view to 150% or so).

and p.66

p66.jpg

and p.67

p67.jpg

Regards

Mike