Son Tay raid: stop or go? Vietnam

[Ken White]

Moderator at work

Another thread 'Definition of a Raid' has meandered into a mainly historical discussion of this Vietnam War era POW rescue raid, so I have attempted to separate the two themes and created this new thread.

Original thread 'Definition of a Raid':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=14474

Rule one on raids: they must be based on good intelligence ... unlike Son Tay

I know several folks who went on that soiree and all complained of excessive caution and endless rehearsals (one wag said "... and each was a worse cock up than the one before..."). There was at the time some interesting rumors. One claimed that the move of the Allied prisoners was known and the raid went anyway for psychological purposes. Flaky. Another claimed that the move was known and the Raid went anyway as a diversion for another effort. Also flaky. Truth will be out in AD 2030 or so...

Regardless, while it did not accomplish the nominal mission of freeing prisoners neither did it result in a slew of own casualties. Interestingly, one guy on that Raid, SGM Galen Kittelson was also as An Alamo Scout on the more successful raid which freed hundreds of US PWs from the Japanese Cabanatuan Camp in the Philippines during WW II. Pappy and I were in the same unit when we went to Little Rock to put the kids in school.

You're right on Dieppe. It was always going to be difficult but could have gone much better than it did. One problem with both it and JMM's Marine item is that Amphibious Raids are very prone to interdiction on withdrawal -- you can only do so much on a body of water. I have this vague recollection of reading a Book years ago that discussed it and it was alleged that someone had suggested that the accepted plan was in essence making a frontal assault at the point of heaviest defense and that was the antithesis of the philosophy of a raid...

The fist "Thunder Run" through Baghdad in 2003 was essentially a very successful raid -- the second stayed in town so was not.

[JMA]

Ken,

The Son Tay raid took place November 21, 1970.

The prisoners were moved from that camp in July of that year.

What does that tell you about the quality of the intel?

[Ken White]

The Son Tay raid took place November 21, 1970.
The prisoners were moved from that camp in July of that year.
What does that tell you about the quality of the intel?

What you say is true. What you and I apparently cannot say at this time is whether or not that move was known -- satellites and UAVs are better and more prolific now but they then existed... -- and the 'Raid' allowed to proceed for other reasons. Not saying that was the case, just that whether it was or not is not known to us.

You may assume that it was an intel failure. Could well be, even likely correct. However, having worked in the belly of the beast for a day or two, I've learned to reserve judgement. Folks in the ME and Asia are not the only ones who can makes thing to be not always what they seem...

[JMA]

What you say is true. What you and I apparently cannot say at this time is whether or not that move was known -- satellites and UAVs are better and more prolific now but they then existed... -- and the 'Raid' allowed to proceed for other reasons. Not saying that was the case, just that whether it was or not is not known to us.

You may assume that it was an intel failure. Could well be, even likely correct. However, having worked in the belly of the beast for a day or two, I've learned to reserve judgement. Folks in the ME and Asia are not the only ones who can makes thing to be not always what they seem...

Ken,

Son Tay can most certainly be listed as a raid that failed (to achieve its objective) because of poor intel or the incompetent use of the available intel.

Much has been written about the Son Tay raid the conduct of which by the men on the ground was nearly flawless.

Having been involved in some raid activity myself it is the waiting that gets to you. You want to get it done and over with. Son Tay had a specific weather/moon phase window of opportunity which limited possible action to a few days in each month. They wanted to go in October but were scheduled for November. The prospect of another delay was not what the commanders (and probably the troops) wanted.

Here is the problem: From here

Operation Kingpin, the final phase of the rescue of the POWs at Son Tay, was approved on November 18. The following day Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, the new chairman of the JCS, received information that the POWs had definitely been moved to Dong Hoi. Unfortunately, the planners nixed the idea of moving on Dong Hoi. They felt that the raiders had rehearsed for months for a raid on Son Tay and that shifting camps at the last minute might prove to be disastrous.

Sums it up pretty neatly doesn't it?

What should Moorer have done? Ask any officer cadet and he will tell you that you cancel the Son Tay operation and plan a new one for Dong Hoi.

In fact lets take this further... go ask your grandson or any random kid of say 15 year old and ask him the following:

You have been rehearsing for months to attack a POW camp and free American prisoners there. You find out two days before the raid is to take place that the prisoners had been moved to a new camp. What would you do?

a) Attack the empty camp anyway.
b) Cancel the operation and prepare a new plan to free the POWs from the new camp.

Now one must surely wonder how this guy made it to CJCS?????????????

When imbecilic decisions like this are made at the top of the military it just opens the door for politicians to demand and get oversight of military operations to the micro management levels.

Then of course the spin doctors got hold of it and turned a flawlessly executed yet failed operation into an act of heroism (which it was at operational level) instead of a case stud in the failure of command decision making at the most senior level of the US military (which it most certainly was).

This was a strategic raid and the commanders were able to draw from the best available and have plenty of time to prepare which makes it different from raids conducted on the fly by units engaged on a battlefield.

Simmons was of the best (as once again proven by the Ross Perot funded Iran raid) but if you have an accurate 'weapon' and you don't know how to aim it then failed raids like Son Tay happen. Thank heaven there were no KIA or serious casualties.

[Ken White]

But...

Now one must surely wonder how this guy made it to CJCS?????????????

When imbecilic decisions like this are made at the top of the military it just opens the door for politicians to demand and get oversight of military operations to the micro management levels.

Sort of -- but Moorer wasn't an imbecile. Does that negate your complaint?

May not negate it but it certainly calls your comment into question. The truth is that neither the Wiki, you or I know for sure the 'why' of that decision -- as I said, it'll be released about 2030. Stick around to find out...

This was a strategic raid and the commanders were able to draw from the best available and have plenty of time to prepare which makes it different from raids conducted on the fly by units engaged on a battlefield.

Yes and no. I suggest that it was a tactical raid that got -- wrongly IMO -- elevated to the Strategic plane by the US desire to make some things more important than they really are...

Simmons was of the best (as once again proven by the Ross Perot funded Iran raid) but if you have an accurate 'weapon' and you don't know how to aim it then failed raids like Son Tay happen. Thank heaven there were no KIA or serious casualties.

Simons, not Simmons and having worked for him, he was okay, not the best...

Aside note -- he also made the Cabanatuan Raid.

[JMA]

But...Sort of -- but Moorer wasn't an imbecile. Does that negate your complaint?

May not negate it but it certainly calls your comment into question. The truth is that neither the Wiki, you or I know for sure the 'why' of that decision -- as I said, it'll be released about 2030. Stick around to find out...

I said Moorer was an imbecile? No I did not but he clearly made an imbecilic decision.

One must surely question how this man reached the pinnacle of the US military without it being established that he was unable to make (in this case) an intelligent decision under stress.

This links back to the post by Red Rat in the What Are You Reading Now thread about the book The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make Dumb Decisions

I would welcome a review from him on this book as to any insights he has gleaned from the book as to the military in this regard.

Ken, how did Moorer manage to get to CJCS when his was unable to make a simple decision a 15 year old could make and does this indicate the the joint chiefs are merely rubber stamp yes-men?

Yes and no. I suggest that it was a tactical raid that got -- wrongly IMO -- elevated to the Strategic plane by the US desire to make some things more important than they really are...Simons, not Simmons and having worked for him, he was okay, not the best...

For the OBL strike it was troops from stateside that were used and not those based then in theatre? A pattern here?

Aside note -- he also made the Cabanatuan Raid.

I'll look it up.

[Ken White]

I said Moorer was an imbecile? No I did not but he clearly made an imbecilic decision.

To you it is clear, others without your vast knowledge, experience and inside information do not know enough to make that call...

You may, however, make as many standing broad jumps at possibly wrong conclusions as you wish.

One must surely question how this man reached the pinnacle of the US military without it being established that he was unable to make (in this case) an intelligent decision under stress.

I suspect that he did it like countless others around the world before and since -- by making more, mostly intelligent decisions involving far more persons while under stress than you or I ever had to do. Note also that we do not know that the decision was not intelligent, we only have your assumption based on limited information that it was unitelligent.

Note also that you're basing your possibly fallacious assumption on one incident of which you are but partially aware and informed as opposed to possessing (or citing) more detailed knowledge of his over 40 years of service in which, among other things, he was both CinCPac and CinCLant, two major commands and something no one had ever done before (or since...).

Ken, how did Moorer manage to get to CJCS when his was unable to make a simple decision a 15 year old could make and does this indicate the the joint chiefs are merely rubber stamp yes-men?

The 'how' is discussed above. You do not know that it was a simple decision, it merely suits your purposes to so assume. Been my observation that 15 year olds make a lot of hasty --and bad -- decisions. Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs are like ordinary mortals, some are yes men, some are not. All have far more military experience than you, most good, in more areas of the world and more varied circumstances. Most also have more sense than to leap to judgement based on limited knowledge and most are concerned with far more than minor tactical problems. They can be legitimately accused of being excessively cautious but it must be recalled that they are dual hatted as both the military adviser to the President (not Commanders, they command nothing) AND as guardians of the institutions that are the entire US Armed Forces with worldwide and not just current Theater (or current political administration) concerns. Those are somewhat conflicting roles and the balance is always uneasy.

For the OBL strike it was troops from stateside that were used and not those based then in theatre? A pattern here?

That too is an assumption and not necessarily correct.

However, you raise a good point. The Cabanatuan raid was ordered by the local commander using in-theater troops. There were some unheralded but deep and successful raids in Korea that met those same parameters. Son Tay, OTH was the harbinger of excessive control from Washington and of the use of out of theater forces. That raised those efforts from a military operation to a political action (please note and consider that FACT). As was / is the OBL effort. The OBL thing was a mixed bag, theater wise but was emphatically a Washington orchestration. I suspect little good will come from that trend...

[jcustis]

http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Mag.../1195raid.aspx

Bad News Develops

Bad news developed in Washington when a usually reliable intelligence source in Hanoi stated that the Son Tay prisoners had been moved. Reconnaissance aircraft tried to get last-minute photographs of the camp November 18 but failed. However, another report indicated that the camp was occupied by "someone."

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird was briefed on the possibility that no prisoners were in the camp. General Blackburn and DIA Director Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett recommended the raid proceed, weather permitting. Mr. Laird agreed and so advised the President, who acknowledged that it was worth the risk. The "go" message was sent to General Manor at Takhli.

General Manor laid on the mission for the night of November 20. In the Red River Valley, little cloudiness was expected, as were good visibility and light winds. As the General reported later, "The night of 20/21 November 1970 was the only night for many days before and after that date that launch would have been possible."

Vice Adm. Frederic A. Bardshar aboard USS Oriskany was sent his go-ahead planning message, which said simply, "NCA approval received." The aircrews of fifty-nine strike and support aircraft were briefed but not told why they would be flying over the major North Vietnamese port of Haiphong and dropping only flares, not bombs. They were given permission to fire their Shrike air-to-surface missiles and 20-mm ammunition against any enemy radar-controlled SAM defenses that posed a threat to US forces and to support search-and-rescue missions if anyone were shot down.

Sounds like single-source reporting said one thing, and the planners attempted to verify, but could not, but made heavy decision nonetheless. That's what they get paid to do. It certainly doesn't sound like the information about moved prisoners was as definitive as some articles allege.

It for sure doesn't sound like they were risk averse and wanted to wrap the members of the raid force in pillows. Shudder to think that they would risk casualties or a KIA (here's my not-shocked face...okay, it's gone now).