Son Tay raid: stop or go? Vietnam

[JMA]

No, and my answer was not one either.

Could have fooled me.

The bulk of my work has been small team work and I do not buy into the false hierarchy of strategy>operations>tactics in terms of social standing.

'in terms of social standing' ? No idea what you mean.

Walking a mile in the shoes of others....I suspect that you and I are not aware of the context and nuances involved in the formulation of the Admiral's decision.

Your man Colin Powell once said:

Great leaders are almost always great simplifiers, who can cut through argument, debate and doubt, to offer a solution everybody can understand.

In other words cut through the crap and get to the crux of the matter. Moorer should have done this, he failed.

You are talking about the CJCS, he should be a quite exceptional person and not unable to make even the most basic decision.

We are also aware that POW's and fellow soldiers want to know that they (and theirs) are not going to be left out in the wind with no concern as to their welfare.

You do the best you can to bring them home. In the case of Son Tay it was merely a gesture. It also blew any chance of actually bringing any POWs home as the North Vietnamese they were moved beyond reach. Asl any POW would they have preferred a handful being brought home or just a token gesture?

Not to put too fine a point on it but, as you know better than I most probably, battlefields are tough places where tough calls are made and horrible things regularly happen. The Admiral made a tough call, and from this armchair it appears to have been the right one.

The Admiral was also in an armchair... a comfortable one in Washington. He can claim no excuse like the fog of war etc etc. He made a bad call and has no excuses.

[jmm99]

JMA: Train is the only point I'll respond to.

You (and everyone else) know what facts I'm relying on, what inferences I draw from those facts, and the ultimate conclusions I reach from those inferences.

I did do an online search last nite re: then (1970) Capt. Harry Train - retired an O-10 - and found little online about his tour with Moorer; and nothing to show that he was in or out of the decision-making loops in 1970. Mitchell does not mention him at all; nor does Blackburn.

Train's 1993 comment is phrased in terms of "we". Who was the "we" ? Moorer and Train ? Train and his code clerk ? The salient factual question is what did Train know, what did he communicate to Moorer, and vice versa (and exactly when in 1970 did all that occur). That question is particularly important if Train in Nov 1970 firmly believed that the raid should be aborted.

Amidon's Train quote (p.8 pdf; below separating the quote from Amidon's comments) is from Vanderbrache's book (based on an interview with Train, which I couldn't find online):

Self-Censorship: Individuals with dissenting views remain silent, driven by a desire to remain a “team player” or a fear of losing influence.

In a 1993 book, Admiral Train admitted: “Twelve hours before the raid we had fairly high confidence that [Son Tay] was empty. The photography showed the grass had not been walked on in ten days. On the basis of the photographic evidence alone we knew that it was empty.”[42]

42. Vandenbroucke, pp. 65-66.

Despite being personally confident that the camp was empty, a four-star flag officer [JMM: Train was an O-6 then] remained either silent or chose not to forcefully argue his case.

If someone has more information on Train's actual role in the Son Tay mission, I'm more than willing to look at it.

The same goes for more information re: the Laird-Helms discussion (just before Laird saw Nixon) re: the Hanoi source.

Regards

Mike

[jcustis]

So I suggest major instead of getting picky with me over the available intel why not question how the charade was able to continue after the camp emptied on 14 July up until the actual raid on 21 November.

(Yawn)

I get picky over the available intel because your line of argument through this whole thread has been plain, flat-out, terrible - just terrible. First you started to impugn Adm. Moorer's character by hanging on to a quote that he had been presented with information that the prisoners had definitely been moved. Then when the weakness of that argument was called into question, when it was made apparent to you that the single source of information from the Hanoi informant was just one piece of the puzzle, it seems you went rummaging through the internet and came up with another nugget to support your railings.

And now you seem to be retreating on the conviction of your argument. First it seemed that you were advancing the position that Adm. Moorer lacked moral courage and was therefore a moral coward, and then in your latest posts, you state that he made a bad call. Which is it? If anything, your most cogent thought in this whole discussion is that if the DIA IMINT had been properly interpreted, the raid would have never gotten off the ground. Well shut the front door! Maybe, at the end of the day, DIA is really the agency to lay the blame on.

Bad calls happen in conflict, and no amount of pillows anyone tries to wrap around our warriors can prevent them, but a moral coward?

You'd be hard pressed to find anyone in this forum who would disagree that there are perils to groupthink and hive mind planning, but what we are dealing with now in this sub-thread is the issue of whether there was absolute confirmation that the prisoners were moved, and that the planners knew this but proceeded to recommend a go to civilian leadership nonetheless. You have failed, in my opinion, to do that, but you have certainly nipped and barked as is often your modus operandi. You don't help your argument when you do that...ever.

You've paraded a single quote from a single book (attributable to Train) , and I think jmm99 has already torn your argument apart again. If you are going to rail against something, and certainly against a figure of history, you really ought to read more. If you had bothered to browse Perilous Options, you might have realized that there were indications that activity had picked up between 3 and 13 November, according to the writer's line of discussion about the DIA IMINT analysis. Even Bennett, who briefed Moorer on the "two stacks of evidence", had doubts as time wore on but seemed to decline a distinct opinion because there was a lack of more concrete evidence. I'd nod my head with you if you were making the statement that the compartmentalization of information and groupthink was the most significant lesson to be learned from Son Tay. Where you are losing any audience is when you drift off into attacks against Moorer and essentially call him an imbecile (yes, my impression and not your words) and less decisive than a 15-year old.

Which is it, because you appear to be all over the map. Was he indecisive, a careerist and morally corrupt, or not intelligent enough to be CJCS? The body of evidence, personal recollections given years after the event, and other data tell different people different things. I do not discount Train's quote about the 12-hour information (and I doubt any other folks posting to this thread discount it), but it is still the recollection of a single individual years after the event, and it is from a separate book at that. Those recollections have to be taken into consideration with the larger body of information, and frankly, you could be accused of selectively ignoring data that is counter to your view.

Mike, you find and post documents which inform on the subject then go and spoil it by selectively quoting and mixing in your own unsubstantiated conclusions. Just let the facts speak for themselves.

I presume that if you followed your own advice, you wouldn't have anything to say.

I am reminded of why I tried to stay out of threads where you post. You came in with a very clear mindset, started swirling around and breaking the shop's china when others offered a contrarian point of view (which is fine, by the way), and at the end of things we haven't actually gotten anywhere.

And bristling at Surferbeetle's comments took it to a whole new level. Really?

What this thread definitely highlights is the immutable fact that although we have the freedom to comment on history, we would be wise to be cautious and not let hindsight hamper our analysis of decision-making during volatile times.

[JMA]

(Yawn)

Major, this is the second time you have come out shooting from the hip in response to my postings and embarrassed yourself.

So now you attempt to redeem yourself by attempting to discredit me. If you had read the sources listed by Mike and maybe done a little research for yourself (call it rummaging through the internet if you will) you will have (or should have) realised that the INT was so thin as to the presence of POWs in Son Tay that no responsible commander would have allowed any of his soldiers and airmen to have taken part in such an ill advised and risky operation (possibly the most audacious and potentially risky operation ever undertaken by US forces).

Now how come you failed to identify the critical fact in all this and that being that it was later confirmed that the camp had been vacated on 14 July?

That would have informed you that it was impossible for Moorer to have received confirmation of the actual presence of POWs in the camp prior to seeking final mission approval from the president.

Why too, do you think Moorer elected not to inform the President of the ‘lack of activity’ in the camp?

Do you think Moorer’s actions were those one should be reasonably expect from a CJCS? Clearly not.

Finally your comment about reading Perilous Options (Vandenbroucke’s book) is plain ridiculous. Mike was unable to find it online yet I am supposed to have a copy on my bookshelf??? I thought we had got past the ‘activity’ issue to the point where actual confirmation of POW occupation was needed (as was possible back in May 1970 when there were POWs in the camp).

[jcustis]

Finally your comment about reading Perilous Options (Vandenbroucke’s book) is plain ridiculous. Mike was unable to find it online yet I am supposed to have a copy on my bookshelf??? I thought we had got past the ‘activity’ issue to the point where actual confirmation of POW occupation was needed (as was possible back in May 1970 when there were POWs in the camp).

Uhhh, you could have found the relevant part here: http://books.google.com/books?id=RWn...page&q&f=false.

I believe Mike was referring to the actual interview.

So now you attempt to redeem yourself by attempting to discredit me. If you had read the sources listed by Mike and maybe done a little research for yourself (call it rummaging through the internet if you will) you will have (or should have) realised that the INT was so thin as to the presence of POWs in Son Tay that no responsible commander would have allowed any of his soldiers and airmen to have taken part in such an ill advised and risky operation (possibly the most audacious and potentially risky operation ever undertaken by US forces).

I don't have a desire to discredit you. You do a fine job of that all by yourself.

Your presumption that I would conclude the intelligence to be too thin is pretty sweeping. I think you are overly risk-averse, so I understand how that could frame your views and your opinion of what a responsible commander looks like, but you really shouldn't let your values, opinions, and judgment speak for what posters should or shouldn't be inclined to think.

It would be better to simply say, "I wouldn't have done that," and call it a day. Instead you are just incredulous that others might disagree with you. It's okay, really. it happens often here.

Where at that link do I find the piece about "... there were indications that activity had picked up between 3 and 13 November... "?

C'mon, read the darn thing.

Do you think Moorer’s actions were those one should be reasonably expect from a CJCS? Clearly not.

Which actions? Again, you've been all over the map, so clarify what you are talking about.

Now how come you failed to identify the critical fact in all this and that being that it was later confirmed that the camp had been vacated on 14 July?

That would have informed you that it was impossible for Moorer to have received confirmation of the actual presence of POWs in the camp prior to seeking final mission approval from the president.

What is your definition of confirmation? A POW waving into the night as an SR-71 flew overhead? I for sure am not talking about that level of intel, and I surmise that the planners did not believe they needed that standard to be able to advocate a go for the mission. You may be prescribing that standard here, and that's okay, but the whole point to this discussion is what the planners knew, when they knew it, and what other information impacted in the decision-making process (there was a lot).

I think it's fair to say that there were a significant number of details, decisions and factors impacting on the process at the time, and there is a wide range of potentially contradictory information that exist. I still believe that the planners tried to make conscientious decisions in the process. You don't seem to think so, and again, that's fine, but don't be surprised that you're expected to bring your A-game when making weighty posts like you have, and to defend your point of view with information.

At the end of the day, I don't believe Moorer to be a moral coward, imbecile, or unintelligent, and the contrasting viewpoints in this thread simply demonstrate the beauty of how people can come to different conclusions over the same bit of information.

[JMA]

Uhhh, you could have found the relevant part here: http://books.google.com/books?id=RWn...page&q&f=false.

Where at that link do I find the piece about "... there were indications that activity had picked up between 3 and 13 November... "?

[jmm99]

from JMA
So I suggest that you ask around to find out the duties of the Executive Assistant to the CJCS to establish how Train is able to use the word ‘we’ in this comments.

That will solve your problem.

Unless you are blowing smoke, you have already focused on Train's duties and the evidence that he performed them in the period July-Nov 1970.

1. Spell out Train's duties you believe are material to your position; and

2. The evidence that Train performed them.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Methinks you edited and lengthened this post after my first response, no matter...

I don't have a desire to discredit you. You do a fine job of that all by yourself.

Can you hear the one hand clapping?

Your presumption that I would conclude the intelligence to be too thin is pretty sweeping.

I was merely assuming that you had the smarts to know that but... go on prove me wrong then.

I think you are overly risk-averse, ...

Me, risk averse? Got the wrong guy in mind. I can think of a couple of hundred people who would find that pretty funny. Been called a lot of things in my time (both good and bad) but never risk averse.

... so I understand how that could frame your views and your opinion of what a responsible commander looks like, but you really shouldn't let your values, opinions, and judgment speak for what posters should or shouldn't be inclined to think.

You need help again. This time read your own manual FM 6.0 about the difference between taking a calculated risk and a gamble:

2-94. A calculated risk is not the same as a military gamble. A calculated risk is an exposure to chance of injury or loss when the commander can visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or damage to the force, and judges the outcome as worth the cost. Taking a calculated risk is acceptable. A military gamble is a decision in which a commander risks the force without a reasonable level of information about the outcome. In the case of a military gamble, the commander decides based on hope rather than reason. The situations that justify a military gamble occur when defeat or destruction of the friendly force is only a matter of time and the only chance for mission accomplishment or preservation of the force lies in the gamble.

Got the picture now?

It would be better to simply say, "I wouldn't have done that," and call it a day. Instead you are just incredulous that others might disagree with you. It's okay, really. it happens often here.

Incredulous that you and others seem to be so imperceptive so as to fail to pick up on the key aspects of this issue and continue to blindly argue in favour of a man who when his moment came failed to make the most simple decision. (This is why I referred to the book; The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make Dumb Decisions)

Officers are (or should be) judged on their ability to apply good judgement and display a keen ability to quickly and accurately grasp the critical elements of a given situation. Not too much of that around here sadly.

Which actions? Again, you've been all over the map, so clarify what you are talking about.

If you have been reading this thread you will know what actions I have commented on.

What is your definition of confirmation? A POW waving into the night as an SR-71 flew overhead?

Silly.

I for sure am not talking about that level of intel, and I surmise that the planners did not believe they needed that standard to be able to advocate a go for the mission.

Here you surmise in favour of three people (Moorer/Blackburn/Bennett) who got it badly wrong. What was the standard they applied in May 1970 when the reached the decision that 61 POWs were in Son Tay?

You seem unable to grasp that after the operational planning got under way and picked up momentum (like with Market Garden) the boot moved to the wrong foot in that the INTEL people had to prove the camp was empty rather than merely cast reasonable doubt as to a POW presence (which given the location of Son Tay and all the related risks) which would have led to an abort.

You may be prescribing that standard here, and that's okay, but the whole point to this discussion is what the planners knew, when they knew it, and what other information impacted in the decision-making process (there was a lot).

And the bad news is that Adm Train (the man whose testimony you all want to just go away) indicates what they knew and when they knew it.

I think it's fair to say that there were a significant number of details, decisions and factors impacting on the process at the time, and there is a wide range of potentially contradictory information that exist.

I'm sure you think that but I'm not sure you could support that with any concrete facts, could you?

I still believe that the planners tried to make conscientious decisions in the process. You don't seem to think so, and again, that's fine, but don't be surprised that you're expected to bring your A-game when making weighty posts like you have, and to defend your point of view with information.

I seldom enter the fray if I don't have the ammunition to support my case. I stated that Moorer made an imbecilic decision (along the lines of The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make Dumb Decisions) which could be explained by his being newly appointed, the Peter Principle kicking in or a range of other reasons.

At the end of the day, I don't believe Moorer to be a moral coward, imbecile, or unintelligent, and the contrasting viewpoints in this thread simply demonstrate the beauty of how people can come to different conclusions over the same bit of information.

You don't believe or you don't want to believe? Now your problem would come if you were asked to substantiate that.

[jcustis]

What is your definition of confirmation? A POW waving into the night as an SR-71 flew overhead?

Silly.

I was being flippant to make a point, but are you going to answer the question? It was still directed at you and was not rhetorical.

What standard do you believe they should have used to achieve confirmation or denial? A single source HUMINT report? A knock at the front gate?

And don't reply with, "well, the intel should have been better than what they had," because that's just moving the goal posts in circles. We know they should have had better intel, and there hasn't been anyone in this thread who has said otherwise.

Quote:
At the end of the day, I don't believe Moorer to be a moral coward, imbecile, or unintelligent, and the contrasting viewpoints in this thread simply demonstrate the beauty of how people can come to different conclusions over the same bit of information.

You don't believe or you don't want to believe?

You really don't have any idea how this discourse is supposed to work right now, do you? You are just talking in circles at this point.

I...don't...believe...Moorer...to...be...a...moral...coward...imbecil e...or..unintelligent.

Now your problem would come if you were asked to substantiate that.

I don't need to. I have substantiated it already, at least the reason why I come to that conclusion.

I put the Vandenbroucke material on the end of spoon for you. Did you even read it and find the reference to the point made about the 3-13 November activity?

[JMA]

JMA: Train is the only point I'll respond to.

Mike,

You are wise to limit your response.

Read Amidon and you will find the following on page 124:

Admiral Harry D. Train, at that time the Executive Assistant to Admiral Moorer, …

So I suggest that you ask around to find out the duties of the Executive Assistant to the CJCS to establish how Train is able to use the word ‘we’ in this comments.

That will solve your problem.

You see Mike, Moorer became CJCS in early July 1970 and as the the POWs were moved on 14 July there is no chance that in the four months prior to the raid going ahead on 21 November 1970 there was no chance that concrete confirmation of the actual presence of US POWs in Son Tay could have been provided.

Where Train is valuable is that in his comment (which some seem as desperate to disregard as Blackburn was with the HUMINT on D-2) he indicated that:

The photography showed the grass had not been walked on in ten days.

From this can be deduced that (despite the weather issues) there were in fact two sets of photos taken. One on or around the 10th of November with a second set taken ten days later to allow for the comparison Train speaks of.

Would it be unreasonable to expect Moorer to call for actual proof of POW presence in Son Tay before going to the President seeking final mission approval for the raid on 18 November? In fact Amidon states:

The lack of activity at the Son Tay camp was not revealed at this meeting—the President authorized transmission of the “execute” message later that afternoon.

So what (without me reverting to recommend asking a 15 year old) would/could the lack of activity in a POW camp supposedly housing 60 odd POWs mean?

The position of Moorer just gets worse and worse.

May I suggest that you reverse your lawyers ‘cap’ and take a look into where the problems were with the planning of the Son Tay raid. The result may well be very interesting.