Mike,
You are wise to limit your response.
Read Amidon and you will find the following on page 124:
So I suggest that you ask around to find out the duties of the Executive Assistant to the CJCS to establish how Train is able to use the word ‘we’ in this comments.Admiral Harry D. Train, at that time the Executive Assistant to Admiral Moorer, …
That will solve your problem.
You see Mike, Moorer became CJCS in early July 1970 and as the the POWs were moved on 14 July there is no chance that in the four months prior to the raid going ahead on 21 November 1970 there was no chance that concrete confirmation of the actual presence of US POWs in Son Tay could have been provided.
Where Train is valuable is that in his comment (which some seem as desperate to disregard as Blackburn was with the HUMINT on D-2) he indicated that:
From this can be deduced that (despite the weather issues) there were in fact two sets of photos taken. One on or around the 10th of November with a second set taken ten days later to allow for the comparison Train speaks of.The photography showed the grass had not been walked on in ten days.
Would it be unreasonable to expect Moorer to call for actual proof of POW presence in Son Tay before going to the President seeking final mission approval for the raid on 18 November? In fact Amidon states:
So what (without me reverting to recommend asking a 15 year old) would/could the lack of activity in a POW camp supposedly housing 60 odd POWs mean?The lack of activity at the Son Tay camp was not revealed at this meeting—the President authorized transmission of the “execute” message later that afternoon.
The position of Moorer just gets worse and worse.
May I suggest that you reverse your lawyers ‘cap’ and take a look into where the problems were with the planning of the Son Tay raid. The result may well be very interesting.
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