Page 2 of 4 FirstFirst 1234 LastLast
Results 21 to 40 of 74

Thread: Son Tay raid: stop or go? Vietnam

  1. #21
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    [B]Frying Adm. Moorer is NOT justified by the facts. He acted in accord with the NCA policy setting the strategic basis for the mission. That NCA policy happened in this instance to be sound.
    ... and so the Moorer defense team rests it case.

    (Those who want to believe that will do so without even bothering to read your sources. Blind loyalty can be taken for granted in many cases.)

    Where in any of the quotes you provided did it prove that Moorer acted in accordance with the applicable NCA policy and if so how does absolve him from his duty as the top advisor to the White House and his duty of care towards his troops?

    The key to the Amidon article was the confirmation from Admiral Train, Executive Assistant to Admiral Moorer:

    In a 1993 book, Admiral Train admitted: “Twelve hours before the raid we had fairly high confidence that [Son Tay] was empty. The photography showed the grass had not been walked on in ten days. On the basis of the photographic evidence alone we knew that it was empty.”
    Moorer, at the interface between the Pentagon and the White House, failed to display the moral courage to tell he White House that the camp was empty and to insist that the raid was called off. Moorer has no place to hide, the man was a moral coward.

    I hope this matter is now settled (which it will be all other than for the blindly loyal).

    Blackburn and Bennet should of course not be allowed to get off scott free either.

    And as far as the White House one (sadly) expects no better from politicians.

    Another very tragic aspect to this is that the very same Groupthink which had led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco was still alive and well in the US system.

    The Son Tay Raid together with the Bay of Pigs and Operation Eagles Claw (and others) should be studied in detail at staff colleges around the world as case studies in command disfunction at the highest levels.

  2. #22
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    As always your research skills, speed and thoroughness are amazing and laudable.

    Thus I laud...

    I agree with your conclusion re: Moorer with the added note that Moorer, like every other CJCS was NOT in the chain of command. The CJCS is an adviser, of course his recommendations have weight but in the end the Chain was and is President - SecDef - overseas commander. In this case, as your research shows, the decision was in essence political and was by the President. Counter recommendations by the CJCS may or may not have affected that -- with Nixon, my bet would be no. Every former Lieutenant Commander relishes a chance to overrule a four star...
    Ken, you didn't bother to read that stuff did you?

  3. #23
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default The Mayaguez Incident

    Link to the Mayaguez Incident.


    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mayaguez_incident

  4. #24
    Council Member Stan's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    Estonia
    Posts
    3,817

    Default

    JMA,
    Actually, it has been studied and pounded to death in the form of thesis material in almost all the NCO academies and CGSCs since Christ was a Corporal in the Corps

    However, it seems this was a war of politics where political expediency took priority over military necessity. (Go Figure)

    In my feeble and near ancient military hindsight, moral courage of even king kong would not have changed Nixon's mind yet alone the American public bent on getting out of Vietnam.

    How foxtrotingly strange that a shoe repair shop owner would be responsible for expanding Armistice Day to celebrate all 24.9 million veterans, but a decorated flag officer's opinion meant little

    Happy belated Vet's Day you old pirate

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    The Son Tay Raid together with the Bay of Pigs and Operation Eagles Claw (and others) should be studied in detail at staff colleges around the world as case studies in command disfunction at the highest levels.
    EDIT: BTW, it's still known today as Operation Ivory Coast - and decades later another botched political load of Bravo Sierra !
    Last edited by Stan; 11-12-2011 at 03:34 PM.
    If you want to blend in, take the bus

  5. #25
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Link to the Mayaguez Incident.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mayaguez_incident
    Never heard of that one, thank you.

    Summed up well with this I believe:

    Vice Admiral George P. Steele, the Seventh Fleet commander later stated that: "The sad part of the Mayaguez is that we had sufficient force coming up with the Seventh Fleet, after it had been turned around from the evacuation of Vietnam stand down, to seize Southern Cambodia. I begged for another day or two, rather than commit forces piecemeal as we did .... The idea that we could use U.S. Air Force air police and Air Force helicopters as an assault force appears to me as ridiculous today as it did then."

  6. #26
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer" he said.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Moorer has no place to hide, the man was a moral coward.
    Misperception based sweeping judgements a specialty?
    I hope this matter is now settled (which it will be all other than for the blindly loyal).
    We knew it was settled in your mind before this sub thread gathered steam. No one had any idea of changing that. -- or any desire to do so.

    The intent was merely to set the record straight for observers and not let ignorance, misperceptions and / or bias rule. That's been done.
    Another very tragic aspect to this is that the very same Groupthink which had led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco was still alive and well in the US system.
    Sadly, that factor still exists here and elsewhere in the world. Thank you for finally acknowledging that there is indeed such a politically induced and bureaucratic phenomenon and that it does significantly affect military operations. That principle is correct even if you did, as often occurs, get the specifics rather badly wrong on this particular incident.

  7. #27
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Stan View Post
    JMA,
    Actually, it has been studied and pounded to death in the form of thesis material in almost all the NCO academies and CGSCs since Christ was a Corporal in the Corps

    However, it seems this was a war of politics where political expediency took priority over military necessity. (Go Figure)

    In my feeble and near ancient military hindsight, moral courage of even king kong would not have changed Nixon's mind yet alone the American public bent on getting out of Vietnam.

    How foxtrotingly strange that a shoe repair shop owner would be responsible for expanding Armistice Day to celebrate all 24.9 million veterans, but a decorated flag officer's opinion meant little

    Happy belated Vet's Day you old pirate

    EDIT: BTW, it's still known today as Operation Ivory Coast - and decades later another botched political load of Bravo Sierra !
    Stan, I was in London late September for the RLI 50 year reunion and remembrance service and just last week-end attended the (Rhodesian) SAS Remembrance service here in Durban. This week end we fit in with the general Armistice Day proceedings in our areas.

    As I age these moments become more poignant as one considers the fallen and their families. In our case it all happened 40 odd years ago. It doesn't get any easier.

    Together then one more time:

    They went with songs to the battle, they were young.
    Straight of limb, true of eyes, steady and aglow.
    They were staunch to the end against odds uncounted,
    They fell with their faces to the foe.

    They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old:
    Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
    At the going down of the sun and in the morning,
    We will remember them.
    Right... back to business then. Let no officer, no matter how senior be allowed to be frivolous with soldiers lives and get away with it (that includes protecting the lives of their soldiers from the idiot ideas of politicians as well).

    Happy Vet's day to you and your fellow Congo vets, I bet you all still miss the place
    Last edited by JMA; 11-12-2011 at 04:31 PM.

  8. #28
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Thank you for finally acknowledging that there is indeed such a politically induced and bureaucratic phenomenon and that it does significantly affect military operations. That principle is correct even if you did, as often occurs, get the specifics rather badly wrong on this particular incident.
    Two comments on this then I'll let you have the last word.

    Moorer was at the civil/military interface in this instance. He was in a position to put in the block but he failed in this duty to the military to do so. I would like to believe that this was caused by a (hitherto undetected) lack of moral courage rather than through craven fawning submission to his political masters.

    You are in denial Ken. They knew that the camp was empty at least 12 hours before the raid. They could have and should have aborted the mission. Moorer should have put in that block. The buck must stop with Moorer.

    Over to you.

  9. #29
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,169

    Default

    Mike,

    I want to second Ken's comments, great job on the Son Tay Raid research. I sat through a couple of briefs on the tactical operation presented by those who were actually on the raid, but your quick summary was the best I have seen on the strategy aspect.

    I think President Nixon got it right, and it didn't matter strategically if the POWs weren't there. This is hard for me to say, but perhaps it was better they weren't there, because PW casualties during the raid may have resulted in negative press that undermined the desired strategic message. If I recall correctly Pres Nixon immediately made a public announcement after the raid was executed (what we would now call strategic communications), so it seems the messaging may have been the primary goal all along, and based on what I read the raid had a positive impact in influencing NV behavior and boosting the morale of our PWs (and higher morale increases survival rates in capativity, when one loses hope they lose the will to live).

    Have to disagree with JMA on this one, it was the right decision to execute.

  10. #30
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Have to disagree with JMA on this one, it was the right decision to execute.
    That's fine Bill.

    Then maybe the scenario should have run something like this:

    * CJCS approaches Laird - tells him the evidence is that the camp is empty and insists that the Son Tay raid is aborted and a new 'live' target selected.

    * Laird then says (something like this): "Admiral, I apologise if you thought the mission was to effect the release of POWs. The real mission is to send a clear mission to the North Vietnamese government that we can strike anywhere at any time with a side benefit that the POWs, their families and other troops will get a lift by knowing that we will try to rescue them."

    * The CJCS would then reply (something like this): "Well then Mr Secretary the risk to our troops will be minimal and the chance of 'success' remains above 95%."

    * As the CJCS is leaving Laird would say (something like this): "Oh Admiral, I don't think we should trouble Col Simons with what we have discussed. As far a she and his men are concerned they should believe the camp is occupied."

    * CJCS: "Yes, Mister Secretary."


    ==========================

    Here's an extract of an interview between Mitchell and the lying *'# Laird:

    6. Question: Did you know at anytime prior to the Raid that no POWs were at Son Tay?

    Answer: No. All the intelligence we had indicated that POWs were at the camp. I had been involved in this intelligence collection for quite some time and I had seen several other camps which we had been looking at for a long time. Son Tay gave no indication that POWs were not there. We knew the camp was active and had been for several years. The decision to execute was based on this intelligence. However, we knew that there was a possibility that no POWs were there. After all, we had no hard evidence of their presence, only indications from camps known to house POWs that were similar to the conditions and activity found at Son Tay. The raid force knew of this possibility also. Do you understand? I know what you are asking. The Hanoi information was simply not believable.

    7. Question: Did you brief the President on the Hanoi source information?

    Answer: No. The decision to go had already been made. Do you understand? I believed the information to be inaccurate. I informed the President about new information concerning the deaths of additional POWs being held. The CIA passed that as many as 10 more POWs had died in captivity.
    *

  11. #31
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Pfft, invent your own thread, guys!
    Take it easy Fuchs... this is a discussion about 'when is a raid not a raid?'

    It is when a a propaganda stunt is dressed up as a raid to confuse the North Vietnamese and concoct a message for POW and local consumption... and then everyone gets medals

  12. #32
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,315

    Default Son Tay raid: stop or go?

    Another thread 'Definition of a Raid' has meandered into a mainly historical discussion of this Vietnam War era POW rescue raid, so I have attempted to separate the two themes and created this new thread.

    Original thread 'Definition of a Raid':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=14474
    davidbfpo

  13. #33
    Council Member
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    4,021

    Default Some "jurors" cannot be convinced ...

    And so it goes with counterformists.

    On the other hand, I'm gratified that Bill Moore and Ken White picked up on my presentation. BTW: Bill expressed one of the thoughts I've had but didn't express: "... perhaps it was better they weren't there, because PW casualties during the raid may have resulted in negative press that undermined the desired strategic message."

    Melvin Laird was less than articulate at times, but, in terms of the Nixon-Kissenger principals re: Vietnam, Laird was relatively straight-forward (e.g., the Cambodia bombing ought to have been made public upfront). I also read his interview with MAJ Mitchell in which he stated what he believed at the time he met with Nixon:

    from JMA's snip of interview
    ... Do you understand? I know what you are asking. The Hanoi information was simply not believable.
    ....
    Do you understand? I believed the information to be inaccurate. I informed the President about new information concerning the deaths of additional POWs being held. The CIA passed that as many as 10 more POWs had died in captivity.
    Based on both Amidon and Michell (the latter more detailed at pages 6-7), on 20 Nov, Blackburn, Bennett and Moorer were faced with a non-consensus by the DoD analysts as to whether the POWs were at Son Tay or not. That military trio decided it was more likely than not that the POWs were there. Moorer and Bennett then met with Laird. See also 1988 SOCOM at post end.

    BTW, Moorer was well aware by then of Nixon's position; from Amidon (p.5 pdf)

    “When [Admiral Moorer] mentioned that the mission would be canceled if there was any sign that the enemy was aware of the objective, Nixon protested: ‘Damn, Tom, let’s not let that happen. I want this thing to go.’”[29]

    29. Vandenbroucke, p. 63.
    Before Laird went in to see Nixon, he met with Dick Helms. They discussed (1) the Hanoi information; and (2) the most recent POW deaths (the latter detailed in the Laird interview snip above). I've found no details re: the Laird-Helms conversation re: the Hanoi information. So, I can't prove that discussion created or reinforced Laird's belief that the Hanoi information was "inaccurate" and "not believable" - it clearly did not lessen that belief if it already existed.

    BTW: While it may shock some, Presidents (with some exceptions) are not interested in intelligence details - only the adviser's BLUF.

    As we know, information + analysis = intelligence. Son Tay definitely suffered from "information paucity" (if that is an "intelligence failure", so be it). In what (if any way) the analysis was faulty has not been laid out in anything I've read. In an low information environment, a single bit of new information easily may be perceived to be great import. It may or may not be of material import to the larger picture.

    We do have "eyewitness testimony" from a number of Son Tay particupans in 1988 (link to pdf, 93 page transcript):

    SON TAY RAID PANEL DISCUSSION
    USSOCOM COMMANDERS CONFERENCE
    MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA
    29 MARCH 1988

    Participants:
    Lieutenant General LeRoy J. Manor, USAF (ret)
    Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn, USA (ret)
    Colonel Elliott P. Sydnor, USA (ret)
    Colonel John V. Allison, USAF (ret)
    Colonel Richard A. Dutton, USAF (ret)
    Introduction by General James J. Lindsay
    Moderator: Colonel Wayne E. Long, SOJ3-S
    BG Blackburn specifically addressed the "no POWs" issue (pp. 78-82) - to my satisfaction; but undoubtedly not to anyone whose position is so far out on the limb as to be unable to come in from the cold.

    To those who are undecided about this mission, I ask this hypothetical:

    1. The Hanoi information is taken absolutely at face value.

    2. The policy for the mission is "if POWs, raid; if no POWs, no raid".

    3. Pursuant to that information and policy, the raid is aborted (19 Nov)

    4. That same day, the NV move the 10 Catholics (earlier moved out to isolate them) back into the otherwise vacant camp.

    Now what flak would have resulted from that "intelligence failure" ?

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 11-13-2011 at 12:40 AM.

  14. #34
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Posts
    1,111

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    On the other hand, I'm gratified that Bill Moore and Ken White picked up on my presentation. BTW: Bill expressed one of the thoughts I've had but didn't express: "... perhaps it was better they weren't there, because PW casualties during the raid may have resulted in negative press that undermined the desired strategic message."
    Mike,

    I always appreciate/admire your analytical skills and efforts, and this latest effort is once again excellent.

    Commanders on and off the battlefield do find it useful to demonstrate to opponents that they are able to act with impunity at a time and place of their choosing. Perhaps it's a base hit, perhaps it's a home run, the important thing for a commander is to keep slugging at a ferocious pace, or in a cunning manner, or both.

    Although I am not in agreement with the outcome of JMA's analysis regarding ADM Moore's character, I do find it interesting and instructive to consider JMA's visceral reaction. It makes me think about the necessary skill sets selected for when serving at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels (a gauntlet inhabited by both Darwin and Sun Tzu ). I suspect that JMA was very successful tactically and that his unit would have been a valuable place to learn tactics.

    As long as we are working on a number of topics simultaneously...if you get a chance, perhaps some of your skills would be available for an analysis of the options available to France at the Future of European Stability or the EUCOM Economic Analysis - Part I thread?
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 11-13-2011 at 02:59 AM.
    Sapere Aude

  15. #35
    Council Member
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    4,021

    Default Hey Steve,

    I'm also gratified to receive a positive comment from you.

    I'd suspect you're on target here:

    from SB
    I suspect that JMA was very successful tactically and that his unit would have been a valuable place to learn tactics.
    based on the conversations I had with JMA re: the Rules of Land Warfare.

    Critique of tactics (outside of the courtroom) is not one of my strong suites; so also, neither is economics:

    from SB
    As long as we are working on a number of topics simultaneously...if you get a chance, perhaps some of your skills would be available for an analysis of the options available to France at the Future of European Stability or the EUCOM Economic Analysis - Part I thread?
    You should be a Civil Affairs recruiter

    Yup, I took Econ 101-103 (basic 1st year; and managed As); but I also had a roommate for a year who wrote his Master's thesis on the French Economic Plans of the 60s (in French) and was working on a PhD in the same topic (he later switched to law and did well there). So, this old country boy knows his own limitations.

    My primary interests here are ROEs and HVTs. Son Tay fits into that subject matter - from viewpoints other than the purely legal, which is a welcome switch.

    Regards

    Mike

    Lest one figures the roommate was a drudge, he was a German-American who more than matched me each nite in pitchers of dark. We thought we were pretty good until we ran into a friendly bunch of Aussies. Those guys are very simply outstanding.

  16. #36
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    And so it goes with counterformists.
    There are those who desperately want to believe that Moorer got it right in this case.

    On the other hand, I'm gratified that Bill Moore and Ken White picked up on my presentation. BTW: Bill expressed one of the thoughts I've had but didn't express: "... perhaps it was better they weren't there, because PW casualties during the raid may have resulted in negative press that undermined the desired strategic message."
    Mike, you find and post documents which inform on the subject then go and spoil it by selectively quoting and mixing in your own unsubstantiated conclusions. Just let the facts speak for themselves.

    Melvin Laird was less than articulate at times, but, in terms of the Nixon-Kissenger principals re: Vietnam, Laird was relatively straight-forward (e.g., the Cambodia bombing ought to have been made public upfront). I also read his interview with MAJ Mitchell in which he stated what he believed at the time he met with Nixon:
    Oh yes, but if he said anything in that interview which casts doubt on what you are trying to sell here it was because it was one of those occasions when Laird was not at his articulate best, yes?

    Based on both Amidon and Michell (the latter more detailed at pages 6-7), on 20 Nov, Blackburn, Bennett and Moorer were faced with a non-consensus by the DoD analysts as to whether the POWs were at Son Tay or not. That military trio decided it was more likely than not that the POWs were there. Moorer and Bennett then met with Laird. See also 1988 SOCOM at post end.
    Mike, non consensus among intel analysts is a constant. As there was no urgency (other than in the mind of Blackburn) there was no sane reason to proceed with an operation where no POW presence was confirmed.

    The docs you cite do not support your position at all (Mitchell makes liberal use of his own interpretation of events which possibly confuses you). Neither does the SOCOM document support your position.

    That said you are deliberately ignoring comment from Adm Train relating to what Moorer knew before the op went ahead.

    Yes Blackburn and Bennet were part of the whole cock-up but they were subordinates of Moorer. The buck stops with Moorer.

    BTW, Moorer was well aware by then of Nixon's position; from Amidon (p.5 pdf) [
    Page 6? The document I have numbers from page 119-131

    What we do know from Amidon is that Laird did not inform Nixon of the "troublesome" HUMINT. (page 128)

    Before Laird went in to see Nixon, he met with Dick Helms. They discussed (1) the Hanoi information; and (2) the most recent POW deaths (the latter detailed in the Laird interview snip above). I've found no details re: the Laird-Helms conversation re: the Hanoi information. So, I can't prove that discussion created or reinforced Laird's belief that the Hanoi information was "inaccurate" and "not believable" - it clearly did not lessen that belief if it already existed.
    Laird admits that he did not inform Nixon of the "troublesome" HUMINT (see above). The Helms/ Laird conversation is irrelevant to Moorers lack of moral courage.

    BTW: While it may shock some, Presidents (with some exceptions) are not interested in intelligence details - only the adviser's BLUF.
    Irrelevant to this issue.

    As we know, information + analysis = intelligence. Son Tay definitely suffered from "information paucity" (if that is an "intelligence failure", so be it). In what (if any way) the analysis was faulty has not been laid out in anything I've read. In an low information environment, a single bit of new information easily may be perceived to be great import. It may or may not be of material import to the larger picture.
    You don't have to take my word for it but it is safe to assume that if you are going to fly in to North Vietnam to within 23 miles of Hanoi one would like to believe that the INT would be good if not excellent.

    The lack of INT confirming the POW presence in this case reflects on Blackburn as much as it asks questions about the competence or otherwise of the Bennett and the DIA... and is something Moorer should have immediately picked up on when he became CJCS in July 1970.

    We do have "eyewitness testimony" from a number of Son Tay particupans in 1988 (link to pdf, 93 page transcript):
    Read it... what's your point?

    BG Blackburn specifically addressed the "no POWs" issue (pp. 78-82) - to my satisfaction; but undoubtedly not to anyone whose position is so far out on the limb as to be unable to come in from the cold.
    You're such a push over Mike (if that convinced you of anything).

    Note: careful with the side swipes or you will have Ken on your case... then again maybe you won't

    A key admission by Blackburn (in the SOCOM doc) you missed (or chose to ignore) was:

    "And the sum of the substance was that if we didn't do it now, we would never be able to pull this thing together later on."
    This does not give you any inkling as to why he would have found that "troublesome" HUMINT coming in at the last minute to be unconvincing?

    To those who are undecided about this mission, ...
    No Mike, this is not about the raid it is about Moorer's failure to pull the train's emergency brake when it became clear that nobody was at home.

    At possibly the one time in his career when called upon to show moral courage Moorer wimped out and thereby placed the lives soldiers at needless risk.

    I ask this hypothetical:

    1. The Hanoi information is taken absolutely at face value.

    2. The policy for the mission is "if POWs, raid; if no POWs, no raid".

    3. Pursuant to that information and policy, the raid is aborted (19 Nov)

    4. That same day, the NV move the 10 Catholics (earlier moved out to isolate them) back into the otherwise vacant camp.

    Now what flak would have resulted from that "intelligence failure" ?

    Regards

    Mike
    No, no, no, Mike. It is quite obvious that had the (available) INT been properly interpreted as to the likelihood of the presence of POWs at Son Tay the Raid would never have got off the ground.

  17. #37
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    Although I am not in agreement with the outcome of JMA's analysis regarding ADM Moore's character, I do find it interesting and instructive to consider JMA's visceral reaction. It makes me think about the necessary skill sets selected for when serving at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels (a gauntlet inhabited by both Darwin and Sun Tzu ). I suspect that JMA was very successful tactically and that his unit would have been a valuable place to learn tactics.
    What would you be knowing about strategy then?

  18. #38
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Posts
    1,111

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    What would you be knowing about strategy then?
    ...can't resist...about as much as you?
    Sapere Aude

  19. #39
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    ...can't resist...about as much as you?
    I can't remember making a personal observation about you? Did I?

  20. #40
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Posts
    1,111

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    I can't remember making a personal observation about you? Did I?
    No, and my answer was not one either.

    The bulk of my work has been small team work and I do not buy into the false hierarchy of strategy>operations>tactics in terms of social standing.

    Walking a mile in the shoes of others....I suspect that you and I are not aware of the context and nuances involved in the formulation of the Admiral's decision. We are also aware that POW's and fellow soldiers want to know that they (and theirs) are not going to be left out in the wind with no concern as to their welfare.

    Not to put too fine a point on it but, as you know better than I most probably, battlefields are tough places where tough calls are made and horrible things regularly happen. The Admiral made a tough call, and from this armchair it appears to have been the right one.
    Sapere Aude

Similar Threads

  1. COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)
    By Steve Blair in forum Futurists & Theorists
    Replies: 1062
    Last Post: 02-22-2018, 08:14 PM
  2. Vietnam Veterans Day
    By JMA in forum Historians
    Replies: 16
    Last Post: 04-18-2012, 12:06 PM
  3. Son Tay Raid MH-53M Pave Low IV Retired
    By SWJED in forum Historians
    Replies: 0
    Last Post: 07-09-2008, 03:44 PM

Tags for this Thread

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •