The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Fuchs]

You draw Moltke the Elder, I bring Guderian, Manstein and their whole generation to the table, they spoke regularly about "operativ" in the meaning of "operational".

The operational level was especially helpful as a construct (which are tactics and strategy as well - all mere acoustic words and b/w contrast without the meaning given to it by others than us) during the Interwar Years.

The tactics had evolved and solved the breakthrough problem, but the exploitation of the breakthrough - the whole mobile warfare thing that was supposed to follow - had to be developed during the inter-war years. The acceptance of an operational level of warfare helped greatly in the process.
Those who did not fully embrace or understand it were stuck in short-range stuff, in tactical considerations about defeating the line in depth and the formations deployed in the line (Liddell-Hart, the French, the Italians) while those who embraced the idea that there's something "operativ" above the division tactics (~equivalent of today's large reinforced battalion battle groups) were able to address the real remaining challenge: What to do, that to achieve after a breakthrough - and how?


It's always possible to ignore the value of designations - especially if one doesn't recognize the differences like others do. The differences between leading a company and a corps are large enough to justify a separation. You can discuss against that as much as you want - that merely shows that you don't see the difference.

We could as well fragment the art of war into many more levels - small unit, multiple small units (Coy), combined arms command (mixed Bn / Bn battle group), command of multiple combined arms forces in a formation (Bde or Div), one level higher with integrated aviation support and other specialized assets (Div or Corps), theatre command, military strategy, civilian strategy.

In the end, it's much easier to just fragment it into strategic, operational, tactical and let different manuals for different unit/formation sizes suffice for the subdivisions.

"Operational Level of War" is well understood and until the early 90's "operations"/"operativ" was also well understood because the inflationary use hadn't taken effect yet. It's language, its meaning is shared and understood and it serves the purpose of communication.


A personal crusade should rather be directed against the inflationary use of words which ruins well-defined words such as "kinetic" or "operation".

[William F. Owen]

You draw Moltke the Elder, I bring Guderian, Manstein and their whole generation to the table, they spoke regularly about "operativ" in the meaning of "operational".

Moltke never once interposed the term "Operativ" as a link between Strategy and Tactics. He merely used it in the same way as Hamley, Foch and others.
Guderian and Manstein used the term in the same way. Truppenfuhrung makes not mention of the "Operational Level" and nor do any of Guderian's orders cited in his memoir. They are all issued to levels of command, and were obviously planned as such.

The operational level was especially helpful as a construct during the Interwar Years.

By whom and when?

Explicitly, what do you mean by "operational level?"

[Tukhachevskii]

As I see it we're stuck in a kind of langauge game with different people using different rules. As Wittgenstein said "the meaning of a wrod derives from its usage". Just becasue someone said "operativ" doesn't mean that they understand that word (or its referent, a different kettle of fish, I know) to mean the same as, say, "operatsiia" or "operational". Just because the Ancients used the word Strategos doesn't mean they meant strategy or strategic (even thought that's the root of our current terminology)...startegos actually refered to (the) command(er) of tactical formations not to a level of war. As Peter Winch might argue ...are people acting operationally when they themselves wouldn't know what that was i.e., does operational art exist before or after it is defined and people understand themselves to be doing it? Does the fact that Napoleon is conducting "grand tactics" (the term then in currency) but to us it looks alot like what we now call "operational art" mean he was conducting operational art or was he conducting tactics? The Wehrmacht of the Second World War (as argued by Michael Geyer) was actually applying mechanisation and technology to tactics to create an industrial form of "grand tactics" which they "euphemistically " termed "operativ". If one were to ask them what that term actually meant...what would the answer have been?

[Fuchs]

"operativ" was in everyday use describing plans and actions on army to theatre level. I don't refer to memoirs and especially not to their English translations - I refer to how the word was actually used in the 30's and 40's.

Besides; TF does use the term as well - in the original.

"31. Die Dauer operativer und taktischer Handlungern ist nicht immer im voraus zu übersehen, auch erfolgreiche Gefechte verlaufen oft langsam,"

(~The duration of operational and tactical actions cannot always be anticipated, even successful engagements often develop slowly.)

It took me five second to find this example.

[Pete]

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies published by the U.S. War Department during the late 19th and early 20th centuries uses the word operations as a synonym for "activities," as shown below:

Volume XII - in Three Parts. 1885. (Vol. 12, Chap. 24)
Chapter XXIV - Operations in Northern Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland. Mar 17-Sep 2, 1862.
Part I -- Reports, Mar 17-Jun 25
Part II -- Reports, Jun 26-Sep 2
Part II -- Supplement. 1886.
Part III -- Correspondence

Volume XIII. 1885. (Vol. 13, Chap. 25)
Chapter XXV -- Operations in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, the Indian Territory, and the Department of the Northwest. Apr. 10-Nov. 20, 1862.

Volume XIV. 1885. (Vol. 14, Chap. 26)
Chapter XXVI - Operations on the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia, and Middle and East Florida. Apr 12, 1862-Jun 11, 1863.

Volume XV. 1886. (Vol. 15, Chap. 27)
Chapter XXVII - Operations in West Florida, Southern Alabama, Southern Mississippi (embracing all operations against Vicksburg, May 18-Jul 27, 1862); and Louisiana, May 12, 1862-May 14, 1863; and operations in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, Sep 20,1862-May 14, 1863.

[jmm99]

HT to Pete for going back to the Civil War histories of the later 1800s, which brought to mind Halleck as a US military author of 1860 and earlier.

First this, from NYT of 1863, "REPORT OF MAJ.-GEN. HALLECK.; A Review of the Military Operations of the Past Year. SYNOPSIS OF THE REPORT." (Published: December 12, 1863), which provides some examples of what he meant by operations:

Gen. HALLECK then briefly recounts the minor operations of the Army of the Potomac up to the battle of Rappahannock Station, but gives no new facts. The operations in Western Virginia have been mainly of a defensive character, in repelling raids and breaking up guerrilla bands.

The force in the Department of North Carolina during the past year has been too small for any important operations against the enemy, and has acted mostly on the defensive. But HILL's operations against FOSTER in North Carolina, as well as LONGSTREET's against PECK in Virginia, were entirely unsuccessful.

Gen. GILLMORE's operations before Charleston are recited at some length, with this comment:

"Gen. GILLMORE's operations have been characterized by great professional skill and boldness. He has overcome difficulties almost unknown in modern sieges. Indeed, his operations on Morris Island constitute almost a new era in the science of engineering and gunnery. Since the capture of Forts Wagner and Gregg he has enlarged these works, and established powerful batteries which effectually command Fort Sumter, and can render efficient aid to any naval attack upon Charleston. They also control the entrance to the harbor."

In the Department of the Gulf operations have been generally successful. The preliminary movements to the siege of Port Hudson are given at length. On the 8th of July the place unconditionally surrendered. We captured 6,233 prisoners, 51 pieces of artillery, two steamers, 4,400 pounds of cannon-powder, 5,000 small arms, 150,000 rounds of ammunition, &c. Our loss from the 3d to the 30th of May, including the assault of the 27th, as reported, was about 1,000.

Halleck was a writer (both of things military and things internationally legal). His discussion of operations just before the Civil War is found in Henry Wager Halleck, Military Art and Science, 1860, 449 pages (ca. 10mb download from Google Books), beginning at pdf p.45:

Halleck1860.jpg

but more in depth at pp.51-58 (of pdf) - looks a lot like Jomini.

That is part of Chapter 2, Strategy, so it seems to this reader that Halleck saw operations as a subset of strategy, involving planning and execution of those plans via campaigns in each theatre of operations - as opposed to the larger application of strategy in the theatre of war.

Regards

Mike

[Steve Blair]

When talking about Halleck and others, we need to be very careful that we're not projecting OUR terms and concepts onto their writings. It's quite possible that Halleck simply called movements in the field "operations" without any sort of conception of a "new area of military terminology" (in fact, given the context of the quotes by both Jmm and Pete I'd say that we're likely projecting). Halleck was heavily influenced by Jomini and Napoleon, but I don't recall either of them espousing a specific operational level of warfare. In fact, I'd argue that given the communication limitations that existed during their time such a distinction would be impractical at best.

[Pete]

When talking about Halleck and others, we need to be very careful that we're not projecting OUR terms and concepts onto their writings. It's quite possible that Halleck simply called movements in the field "operations" without any sort of conception of a "new area of military terminology" (in fact, given the context of the quotes by both Jmm and Pete I'd say that we're likely projecting). Halleck was heavily influenced by Jomini and Napoleon, but I don't recall either of them espousing a specific operational level of warfare.

We could debate the intentions of what Clausewitz, Halleck, and various military leaders really meant to say in their writings from now until doomsday. As far as I know the U.S. Army did not define distinct levels of war, tactical and strategic, until the first version of FM 100-5 published shortly before Pearl Harbor (though I admit it may have come somewhat later). As official U.S. Army doctrine the operational level of war dates from 1982.

Right up through the Vietnam conflict the title page of FM 100-5 had the subtitle of Field Service Regulations to show that the new field manual format was replacing (and/or was the equivalent of) the old U.S. Army Bible that had gotten us through the Indian Wars but had proven to be inadequate in 1917-18. In a similar way the Infantry Drill Regulations stopped being a way to fight after WW I and turned into FM 22-5, purely for ceremonial purposes, and the how-to-fight doctrine began appearing in the new FM format.

[jmm99]

Dennis Hart Mahan, Advanced-guard, out-post, and detachment service of troops (1847, rev, 1863; 305 pages) (Google Books, 8mb download), from CHAPTER IX, PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY:

484. Plan of Campaign.—Before undertaking any military operation, great or small, we should first settle down upon some decided end to be gained; determine upon beforehand, as far as practicable, the steps to be taken to attain our object. In one word, we should clearly see what we propose to accomplish, in order that we may not go blindly to work and leave anything to chance. The mental process by which all that is here supposed is elaborated is termed the laying out of the plan of campaign.

Samo as Halleck with more detail (see pages before and after above quoted) - operations, campaigns and planning linked.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

no big deal.

BTW: I'm not contending that Halleck and Mahan were into a "new area of military terminology" - from what I can see (and from Halleck's bibliography in his Strategy chapter - and I positing that everyone who comments on Halleck and Mahan will have at least skimmed through their stategy chapters), they were lifting these concepts from earlier writers.

Regards

Mike