The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Taiko]

In regards to Jim99 point about CG I was not happy with my original conclusions. So I went back to Mao and my trinitarian definition and would like see if my new conclusions makes sense especially in regards to Bob's World points.

In Mao's 'Selected Military Writings' he goes into great detail about how PoW and the general population should be treated. I would argue that in many respects this can be pivotal in winning a revolutionary war. If CvC's trinity cannot account for it then the theory loses its validity in explaining the nature of war in all its variations.

So after some tossing and turning last night I think I have found how the trinity can be used to explain it. Focusing on the first half of the trinity Clausewitz argues that the level and intensity of violence is determined by three intervening variables:

(Violence) purpose, hostile feelings/intentions, chance and probability

I would contend that how you treat PoWs (GC) and the populace (domestic law/custom) can specifically be accounted for in shaping the hostile feelings/intensions that go towards determining the level and intensity of violence. Metz, for example, explains how after 'shock and awe' the proto-insurgencies focused on exacerbating the anger of the population, against the US, by targeting basic infrastructure. They were attempting to shape the level and intensity of the violence via controlling/manipulating the hostile feelings of the Iraqi people.

Another example from the US is the change in how they treated PoW and combatants. As in the case of Mao, this was a major psychological operation that was specifically aimed at the moral of the opponents fighting force and a way to shape the hostile feelings/intentions of it. When the Red army captured enemy soldiers, they "re-educated" them and let them go. In Iraq the same process was implemented in the prisons by the US to "de-radicalize" combatants through the introduction of moderate clerics. In terms of the general population the key to shaping and controlling the hostile feelings/intentions lead to a shift in search and seizure operations to take account of local customs/law. Just as paying compensation was used to pay for damages or the death of a family member using the tribal customs.

Obviously this is just a basic summary. However, I think I have a handle on the first part of the trinity. The second part of the trinity, in relation to how this effects the intervening variables that determine political power I'm still working on. In terms of my explanation for the first part I would appreciate any thoughts from SWC members.

Good point about the Tartar's Jimm99 and the Hussites Wilf. Looks like its back to the drawing board in looking at transnational non-state actors. Although I think the second part of the trinity (politics) government, people, military, will be able to account for it. Its just a matter of finding the write words.

So keep CvC in your rucksack as a good source, but continue to seek other sources to fleshout how something that can appear and act so similar in so many ways can also be so different and require very different approaches; both in general, and certainly by case.
I guess we could say that war is like women. War is war and women are women -- but while the similarities are obvious, it is a foolish man indeed who disregards or disrespects their differences... Either way, us guys are quite likely to make a mess of it.

Well put, the last part made me laugh Although I have been working on a diagram that might have some utility and would mean you need not hump CvC's book around.

[jmm99]

This Wiki, Chinese Civil War, has an interesting set of stats:

KMT Strength

4,300,000 (July 1945)
3,650,000 (June 1948)
1,490,000 (June 1949)

CPC Strength

1,200,000 (July 1945)
2,800,000 (June 1948)
4,000,000 (June 1949)

Just as the radio broacasts of the Truman-Dewey results were my first introduction to politics (where I had an idea of what was going on), the 1948-1949 news broadcasts were the first war results I could intelligently follow.

My recollection includes entire KMT armies switching sides. So, when I saw the Wiki stats, I thought Mao made a lot of converts in a hurry. Was my recollection correct ? Yup, in Google Books, The Chinese Third Revolutionary Civil War, 1945-49, by Christopher Lew, which takes you to p.133. You can scroll up to p.132, where four KMT Armies (5th, 15th, 16th & 20th) defected within a month.

So, looking at the CPC "conversion" program is as or more important than looking at its kill or capture programs - at least for that phase of that armed conflict.

And, the book confirmed my distant recollections. Now, if someone can tell me where I left my vehicle (which one is it ?), I can try to find my way home.

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PS: Even if CvC did not discuss Hussites in particular (Wilf has yet to chime in on that), that would not invaldate application of On War's basic substance to situations involving non-state actors employing irregular combatants. CvC did not claim to write a Bible (or a cookbook), did not claim to have covered all historical examples (see Bk 2.6 On Examples, last two paragraphs), and did not claim a crystal ball to predict the future. To paraphrase Darrow (aka Henry Drummond): On War is a good book, but it is not the only book.

[Taiko]

There is currently an academic proposal outlining a proposal to develop a 'De-sacralising Information Strategy'. As the name suggests the aim is to "articulate, accelerate and intensify doubts and tensions amongst those considering or already associated with Extremists groups". The method being to target 'schismatic asabiyya' by "injecting, and then continuously reinjecting, the most vivid available insiders' awareness of the ugly, decidedly non-sacred realities of groups devoted to religiously inspired violence, into the internal and external conversations of: potential extremists, their extended families, and friends".

If interested please PM me for a copy.