The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Martin]

What do you think about Jomini then?

[Steve Blair]

What do you think about Jomini then?

I think Jomini focused more on the "meat" of conflict as opposed to the theoretical grounding behind it. His decisive battle concept has to a degree (in my view, anyhow) hindered intellectual development on the part of some writers and military leaders. The first sections of "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" has some interesting observations regarding the differences between the two theorists, and I tend to agree with the author in many areas. Jomini seemed to focus more on Napoleonic events while Clausewitz was trying to look beyond that and explain a much larger event.

[Jrizzuto77]

Jomini's view on the role of intelligence is prescriptive. In Jomini's, The Art of War, Article XLII, he discusses the role of intelligence. According to Jomini, "one of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war is to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the proceedings." Jomini, is specifically talking about the critical importance of analyzing your adversary's relative strengths and weaknesses in order to gain an advantage.
**The views expressed in this are those of MAJ Rizzuto, Command and General Staff College, and do not reflect the official policy of the Department of the Army, DoD or the US Government. **

[Fuchs]

Jomini's view on the role of intelligence is prescriptive. In Jomini's, The Art of War, Article XLII, he discusses the role of intelligence. According to Jomini, "one of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war is to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the proceedings." Jomini, is specifically talking about the critical importance of analyzing your adversary's relative strengths and weaknesses in order to gain an advantage.

Sounds nice, but Marshal Suvorov didn't care about this and never lost a battle.

Besides, research has revealed that we humans are idiots. We stick to our first impression, and info that arrives later only reinforces said impression - even if it's factually in conflict. This kind of undermines whatever sense a huge analytical effort makes in theory.

[jmm99]

Sumida wrote his book, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to "On War" (2008); book review by Janeen Klinger, Professor of Political Science, US Army War College.

Sumida's 2002 (pre-book) syllabus for his Clausewitz course, requires besides "On War" (P & H version), these refs:

Guy Claxton, Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind: How Intelligence Increases When You Think Less (New York: Harper Collins, 1997). A biography of my brain written by Claxton with my full tortoise-like co-operation.

Jon Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997; paperback 1999).

Jon Sumida, “The Relationship between History and Theory in On War: the Clausewitzian Ideal and Its Implications,” Journal of Military History, 65 (April 2001): 333-54. Re this article, you might want to look at Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War," International Security, 17:3 (Winter, 1992), pp. 59-90.

For anyone who is interested enough to actually work through this syllabus, Strassler's redo in The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, will probably be useful for review of basic power concepts.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

Hare Clausewitz Answers Your Questions:



From The Children's Illustrated Clausewitz.

Regards

Mike