In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the American military cast about for answers--and, bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz. This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the U.S. faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War--in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great. It should come as no surprise, then, that the military's conceptualization of modern offensive war, as well as its execution, has failed in every real-life test of our day.
Well I'll certainly buy the book, but what is written above is pure garbage.

a.) The US did not "settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz." after Vietnam. CvC wrote about WAR, very little on "WARFARE."

b.) War is very distinct from Warfare. The "Clausewitz Delusion" is almost certainly a product of not having understood Clausewitz. - that's the problem that has afflicted 99% of his critics.

c.) To attribute the US being poor at Warfare to CvC is an argument almost impossible to make, but I'll wait and see.