The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[M.L.]

It could also lead one to give great credence to this comment by WilF:""Your case is based on a 1980s invention of Corps Operations."" While I realize that is not strictly true it is FACT that all those operational art concepts were in existence and were used prior to the introduction of the operational level concept to the US.

Couldn't agree more. However, you will note a common theme throughout my posts that the operational level existed since Napoleon; it just wasn't labeled as such. The terminology wasn't introduced until the 1980s, but the concepts have been around for a while.

Mr. Owen's argument is largely based on the absence of operational-level terminology from the historical record. My counter-argument is that the words matter very little since the ideas were there. As a demonstration, I repeat my previous observation:

The word "strategy" appears exactly once in The History of the Peloponnesian War. Yet, this is one of the most influential books on strategy ever written, and is required reading in most strategic studies programs. Similarly, the absence of the words "operational warfare" from history doesn't really tell us that much. As I have said before, it is better to focus on ideas rather than words.

[Ken White]

Couldn't agree more. However, you will note a common theme throughout my posts that the operational level existed since Napoleon; it just wasn't labeled as such. The terminology wasn't introduced until the 1980s, but the concepts have been around for a while.

I think you just reinforced my point. We have a terminology (not totally a concept) introduced about 30 years ago and it has already permeated the Army and use of the concepts have filtered down by your own admission to BCT level -- and folks tell me that it also appears at Bn level -- the mis-application you wrote of earlier...

Mr. Owen's argument is largely based on the absence of operational-level terminology from the historical record. My counter-argument is that the words matter very little since the ideas were there...

True and, IMO, an esoteric argument between two hard heads -- no insult intended, I also fit that description, just not into fighting this particular issue -- my concern is rather with the appropriate application versus inappropriate use of ANY military technique.

The Operational Level as holy grail is blatant misuse. Operational art is a concept, it has applicability in some cases, none in others. Its use in the wrong situation is at least wasteful and time consuming for little to no benefit and at worst is going to get people killed unnecessarily.

As the Actress said to the Bishop, it's not what you have, it's how you use it...

[Chris jM]

To rudely interject into this debate with a straw-man argument of my own...

How about viewing this argument as a framework whereby government policy is set/translated into the levels discussed:

- Strategic Policy (how AfPak is to be shaped IOT disrupt violent extremism, deny AfPak to AQ and stabilise the Pak nuclear capability)
- Operational/ Theatre-level Policy (conduct a COIN-based campaign around the key pop centres while conducting FID IOT achieve transfer)
- Tactical Policy (ROEs/ Clear-Hold-Build process/ priorities on minimising civ and FF cas)

Military forces are only ever able to operate tactically, but the tactical effects can be in support of either strategic, operational or tactical policy depending on their employment, task, etc.

Viewing the three 'levels' of war as distinct elements of policy-making, rather than a physical level in which one functions, seems to be an elegant solution to some of the points either side of the debate.

[M.L.]

To rudely interject into this debate with a straw-man argument of my own...

How about viewing this argument as a framework whereby government policy is set/translated into the levels discussed:

- Strategic Policy (how AfPak is to be shaped IOT disrupt violent extremism, deny AfPak to AQ and stabilise the Pak nuclear capability)
- Operational/ Theatre-level Policy (conduct a COIN-based campaign around the key pop centres while conducting FID IOT achieve transfer)
- Tactical Policy (ROEs/ Clear-Hold-Build process/ priorities on minimising civ and FF cas)

Military forces are only ever able to operate tactically, but the tactical effects can be in support of either strategic, operational or tactical policy depending on their employment, task, etc.

Viewing the three 'levels' of war as distinct elements of policy-making, rather than a physical level in which one functions, seems to be an elegant solution to some of the points either side of the debate.

An excellent observation. The idea of stratified levels of war is probably inappropriate. Instead, we could imagine each of these concepts as spheres existing within the larger sphere of policy.

Your observation above tracks with Clausewitz, "War is a continuation of policy by other means." All actions in war must ultimately serve political objectives...even tactical actions.

[M.L.]

... my concern is rather with the appropriate application versus inappropriate use of ANY military technique.

The Operational Level as holy grail is blatant misuse. Operational art is a concept, it has applicability in some cases, none in others. Its use in the wrong situation is at least wasteful and time consuming for little to no benefit and at worst is going to get people killed unnecessarily.

No argument here. The misuse of concepts is rampant (center of gravity comes to mind in the US system). My argument with Mr. Owen is with the existence of operational warfare. The fact that the concepts are misunderstood and/or badly applied is a related but separate issue. Just because something is misused doesn't make that something inherently bad.

[Ken White]

Just because something is misused doesn't make that something inherently bad.

Too many year in and watching the critter that is the US Army lead me to take strong exception. If something can be misused, it will be. Murphy rules, particularly in combat.

That is particularly true in the structured, heirarchial military environment. The solution is to, when misuse is detected, rapidly examine the issue and institute corrective measures. The US Army does not do that at all well. It is too bureaucratic to spot misuse until it is thoroughly embedded in the muscle memory of the organism; It is loth to take corrective measures because that means one GO would have to publicly criticize -- even if indirectly -- others, an absolute no-no; and / or admit that the 'system had erred -- another no-no; and lastly, the pet corrective measure is to punish everyone by introducing even more bureaucratic rules.

Ponder reflective belts in a combat zone. For that matter, ponder reflective belts in an Armed Force not in combat. Some dubious implications there...

Ergo, it is imperative that the potential for misuse be thoroughly understood and steps to mitigate the potential disasters be takenbefore a program is introduced. That really was not done with 100-5 (either edition of profound -- if different * -- impact). Unfortunately, it is rarely done with much of anything in the Army...

The US Army does not do take steps to preclude misuse of doctrine, equipment or ideas, either -- it is too eager to be seen as an intellectual catchment that is the equal of the vales of academe (scary thought, that...) and to be 'professional' in all things. That factor plus the too rapid turnover of senior personnel into too many quite different jobs and overlapping bosses and subordinates which creates short term-ism and 'my watch-itis' preclude sensible assessment of potential unintended consequences.

Someday, when you're old and gray, recall that some old Dude on an internet message board said "Mark my words, the proliferation and misuse of SAMS and Staffs as well as the Operational Level of War theme will each in their own way cause grave problems for the Army and that last will likely result in unnecessary deaths."

Laugh now -- but recall later...

* Also ponder those significant differences within six short years of 'immutable' Doctrine with a capital 'D.'

[M.L.]

Too many year in and watching the critter that is the US Army lead me to take strong exception. If something can be misused, it will be....

Perhaps this is true. However, it seems that it would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to build a body of doctrine which would be impossible to misuse. It is hard to think of a concept which hasn't been misinterpreted, misrepresented, misused, or even abused at one time or another.

Humans are imperfect creations which give rise to imperfect ideas and actions. Armies are made from humans, ergo....

We're probably stuck trying to do the best we can with the best ideas we can think of. And although I agree with you that the Army has its share of morons masquerading as leaders, it is as much a commentary on American society as it is the institution.

In short, I largely agree with your formulation of the problem, however, the solution seems to me to border on impossible.

[Ken White]

...it is as much a commentary on American society as it is the institution.

Armies represent the society from which they come...

In short, I largely agree with your formulation of the problem, however, the solution seems to me to border on impossible.

Given the current attitudes and culture, you're correct. However, there is a solution. Required is raising the standards for entry, officer and enlisted. Yes, that means fewer people in the active Army and thus a major strategic (and operational...) recast away from big Organizations and mass to flexible organizations and agility. We should allow the ArNG to be larger than the active Army with effectively current standards for available mass when required. Most importantly, we must significantly improve training, particularly initial entry training (also both officer and enlisted...). We train now better than ever but it's still just a bit above marginal...

All that must lead to fostering innovation and initiative as opposed to the current largely unintended but highly effective stifling of those traits. That will be difficult, American society's risk aversion has migrated into uniform.

However, those fixes will be for naught lacking a major revamp of the personnel system. The 1919 Per System with Congressionally mandated add-ons in the interest of 'fairness' are a major part of the problem. Trying to stick round pegs in square holes, the HRC goal, is a big part of that misuse problem...

The Per mavens will fight any change tooth and nail -- it'll make their job far more difficult. The senior Generals will not change it, the current system worked for them so any reform -- sorely needed -- will have to start at the bottom and work upward.

My belief is that Congress in the next few years will largely be receptive to logical changes. That window should be used.

I've spent many years frothing about our wasted potential -- but it's still there, it just needs to be unleashed (an advised term...).

[Pete]

... it just needs to be unleashed (an advised term...).

Watch out, Ken might be about to cry "Havoc" and let slip the beagles of Fayetteville.

[wm]

it seems that it would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to build a body of doctrine which would be impossible to misuse. It is hard to think of a concept which hasn't been misinterpreted, misrepresented, misused, or even abused at one time or another.

I propose that misuse of doctrine is not quite as significant a problem as abuse of it. Instantiating the apparent truth of the Bentham quotation in M.L.'s signature block, I propose two ways that doctrine is abused:

1. Unthinking application of doctrinal "school solutions" to solve operational problems I do not mean problems at the operational level of war. I do mean problems we encounter while trying to conduct any operation(the second definition for operation found in my earlier post of J Pub 1-02 definitions). Doctrine is a guide to help one formulate a solution for problems, not a canned set of solutions.

2. Trying to be too fine-grained when defining doctrinal terminology. In Chapter 3 of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle cautions the reader as follows:

We must not expect more precision than the subject-matter admits. . . . Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. . . . We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.

Expecting doctrine to provide an all-inclusive list of necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of any given term is actually a variation on the first instance of abuse, one which I would describe as solving problems by definition. This often works just fine in mathematics and theoretical physics, but not so well when we are contemplating the actions of those finitely rational creatures with feet of clay that we call human beings.

[M.L.]

I propose that misuse of doctrine is not quite as significant a problem as abuse of it. Instantiating the apparent truth of the Bentham quotation in M.L.'s signature block, I propose two ways that doctrine is abused:

1. Unthinking application of doctrinal "school solutions" to solve operational problems I do not mean problems at the operational level of war. I do mean problems we encounter while trying to conduct any operation(the second definition for operation found in my earlier post of J Pub 1-02 definitions). Doctrine is a guide to help one formulate a solution for problems, not a canned set of solutions.

2. Trying to be too fine-grained when defining doctrinal terminology. In Chapter 3 of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle cautions the reader as follows:

Expecting doctrine to provide an all-inclusive list of necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of any given term is actually a variation on the first instance of abuse, one which I would describe as solving problems by definition. This often works just fine in mathematics and theoretical physics, but not so well when we are contemplating the actions of those finitely rational creatures with feet of clay that we call human beings.

Fair criticisms. As you point out, the nature of doctrine is less a problem than the application of it. The villain here may be planning, or the application of doctrine to a given problem. The whole idea of "planning" in a military sense is formulating a solution for a given problem from beginning to end before any action has been taken. While this idea is useful for simple problems, it is less useful for complex problems.

The Cynefin framework is a useful tool for categorizing problems (http://www.slideshare.net/kdelarue/k...3-presentation).



You will see that simple and complicated problems lend themselves to the sort of planning espoused by many military professionals: sense the problem, categorize/analyze it, and apply the appropriate doctrinal solution based on previous analysis/categorization. Unfortunately, most military problems are not simple or complicated, but trend toward complex. In the case of complex problems, "planning" as we know it is less useful than acting, making sense of the response, then adapting. Obviously, a dogmatic adherence to doctrine precludes this sort of adaptive process.