The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[M.L.]

That is what I was looking for, if I understand it correctly. Operations planning is concerned with Combat but Operational Warfare has two sides so to speak. On one side is the Combat Operation and the other side for lack of a better term I will call Logistics Operation usually on a very large scale. The Logistics side tends to link up to Strategy while the Operation side tends to link down toward the actual Battle. Which is why they call it the bridge between Strategy and Tactics.

Is that about right? Yes,No, I missed the whole thing?

I think you are on the right track. Operational warfare is largely (but not exclusively) concerned with logistics. Operational objectives link both up to strategy and down to tactics.

I go back to my favorite example, which is Operation Michael in 1918. Here is an excerpt from A World Undone by GJ Meyer, which describes the situation after German Storm Troops had successfully broken through the Allied line:

No one including [German Chief of Staff] Ludendorff could have said at that point what the purpose of a continued...advance was supposed to be. His astonishing progress gave rise to a question: progress toward what? What actually was the value of the ground he had taken and the great expanses of territory that lay open in front of him? The absence of an answer exposed the emptiness of the Michael operation... "We tear a hole in the enemy line," Ludendorff had said when challenged, "and everything else follows."

Michael's tactical successes did not give rise to strategic success because the two were not linked. This is because strategy and tactics are not inherently linked by their nature, as Mr. Owen suggests. This is the realm of operational warfare. In this case, had Ludendorff pressed for the French communications hub of Amiens as his operational objective, and been able to reinforce success toward the objective with men and materials (although there were practical problems with the latter), he might have succeeded in splitting the French/British line and pushing the Brits into the sea.

[William F. Owen]

Michael's tactical successes did not give rise to strategic success because the two were not linked.

That is simply not true. King George actually warned his staff that if German success continued, "we may have lost the war."
Luckily the whole offensive was very badly planned in terms of exploitation, and had almost no reserves to replace very high casualties - which is why it failed. Had tactical success, such as that seen in the first 36 hours continued, they would have knocked the UK out of the war.

This is because strategy and tactics are not inherently linked by their nature, as Mr. Owen suggests.

As I suggest? Sorry 800 years of written military thought say they are linked as do 5,000 years of recorded Military History. Your case is based on a 1980s invention of Corps Operations.
They are linked. If not then Strategy is not linked to tactics and tactics does not bear on Policy. If that's the case then the whole conceptual edifice that puts "Operations" between Strategy and tactics falls apart.

In this case, had Ludendorff pressed for the French communications hub of Amiens as his operational objective, and been able to reinforce success toward the objective with men and materials (although there were practical problems with the latter), he might have succeeded in splitting the French/British line and pushing the Brits into the sea.

"Operational Objective"? So basically you mean "objective". Nothing you state there makes the case for an "operational level of war.

This is after the fact justification of the worst sort. The British went on to fight solidly for the "100 days" with nothing even remotely resembling the "Operational Level." You cannot say "oh they had it, but they didn't call it that." In the minds of British Generals and Staffs, there was NO operational level. ...and it worked just fine! The UK did not adopt the Operational Level until well into the 1990's. We even won the Falklands without it!

[M.L.]

I'm going to leave most of your comments alone since we've been there and done that, and I sure no one wants to rehash deeply entrenched positions (least of all me).

That is simply not true. King George actually warned his staff that if German success continued, "we may have lost the war."

King George hardly seems like right fellow to give a professional military appraisal of the situation.

In fact, continued German tactical success paradoxically weakened their position by extending their lines and creating salients without any operational gains. Another case for linking tactics to strategy - failure to do so can turn tactical success into strategic failure.

Luckily the whole offensive was very badly planned in terms of exploitation, and had almost no reserves to replace very high casualties - which is why it failed. Had tactical success, such as that seen in the first 36 hours continued, they would have knocked the UK out of the war.

Sounds like a lack of operational planning to me!

As I suggest? Sorry 800 years of written military thought say they are linked as do 5,000 years of recorded Military History.

Since operational warfare emerged in the Napoleonic wars and came into its own in WWI, it follows that you wouldn't find much written about it. This is like saying "There is NOTHING about this nuclear weapon crap in almost all of recorded military history!" Yeah, well, it's sort of a RECENT concept you see...

"Operational Objective"? So basically you mean "objective".

No, I really do mean operational objective, i.e. an objective reached by a series of tactical actions which produces an operational or strategic effect.

This is after the fact justification of the worst sort.

Some call it history...

[slapout9]

This is like saying "There is NOTHING about this nuclear weapon crap in almost all of recorded military history!" Yeah, well, it's sort of a RECENT concept you see...

Spilled a lot of coffe over that one