If infrastructure and social well-being is decisive in Iraq as a component of the military strategy, I think that's a situation unique to the country (and region) in general and the conflict specifically. Iraq has few sources of natural wealth and resources, except oil, and so the state itself becomes the primary patron of the citizenry. Add into the mix the complexity of religious, ethnic, and tribal relations without any real unifying identity or ideology, and the only effective means of management is state power; whether that's a reliance on violence (i.e. Saddam), institution-building, or some kind of combination of both. But even while the lack of infrastructure or employment may encourage, for example, a professional soldier with no other opportunities to "work" for the insurgency, that does not suggest the same motivation is applicable to other elements of the insurgency, much less to other wars in general.

The political will to employ and persist with military means is not one that should concern the military. What should concern the military is achieving the outcome the politicians want. (it may include loosing or not winning.) - as soldiers that's none of their business.
I agree for the most part in that military planners should not be concerned with politics at home; but the enemy's politics is fair game. I should have clarified that in my previous statement. Understanding why the enemy fights clarifies how (and to what extent) he fights. So, as for the article, categorizing a war by how it was, or should be, fought is not very useful whatsoever without the "why". Why is the "psycho-cultural war" concept useful if the conditions in which its applicable are not universal?