The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Sargent]

I learned the "operational level" of warfare via a simple explanation using logistics. It made the point very clear: At the strategic level, you have the goods being produced and shipped in their masses from the factories and the homeland to the theatre. At the tactical level (which can reach as high up as the "army" -- basically, the tactical level is the fighting force), you have units making use of these goods. How they exist at the strategic level is of no use to the tactical level, so the operational level is the point at which those large parcels of goods are taken apart and reassembled into new packages that make sense for utilization on the battlefield.

This logic can be applied in all military matters. The strategy which guides a war or military action is of no use to the operating units. It must be broken down into campaigns and operations and so forth, which can be put into action by those forces. So, for the Americans, the strategic level is DC, the operational level is the -COM (CENTCOM, PACCOM, etc.) and the tactical level are the guys in country.

I think the problem arises because "operational" has a variety of uses. Let's call it the "transitional" level of warfare. This sort of thinking may seem irrelevant for most, but without this separate level the US military, in all of this overlarge glory, does not work effectively.

What I find interesting about Owen's argument against the operational level of warfare is that England was the operational level of the Allied invasion of Western Europe. An essential strategy along with the means (masses of troops and goods) were funnelled into England over the course of years and prepared for deployment to and effective use upon the battlefield. This came in the form of developing the invasion and campaign plans, the training and organization of the troops and units, and the preparation of the supplies. It is simply unthinkable to conclude that something very different from either strategy or tactics did not occur during this process.

By the way, I highly recommend the Navy War College's JMO core course to give a good sense of the existence of this space in warfare. It kills the students, because it's very work intensive, but as a "tourist" I enjoyed it very much. of course, the students thought I was a bit looney for literally begging the powers that be to let me sit in - it was a quick and dirty way for me to accomplish some dissertation research -- besides, as a civilian it's a rarefied area you can't usually access, so to me it was all exciting. Anyway, I believe they put the syllabus online.

Jill

[M.L.]

I learned the "operational level" of warfare via a simple explanation using logistics. It made the point very clear: At the strategic level, you have the goods being produced and shipped in their masses from the factories and the homeland to the theatre. At the tactical level (which can reach as high up as the "army" -- basically, the tactical level is the fighting force), you have units making use of these goods. How they exist at the strategic level is of no use to the tactical level, so the operational level is the point at which those large parcels of goods are taken apart and reassembled into new packages that make sense for utilization on the battlefield.

This logic can be applied in all military matters. The strategy which guides a war or military action is of no use to the operating units. It must be broken down into campaigns and operations and so forth, which can be put into action by those forces. So, for the Americans, the strategic level is DC, the operational level is the -COM (CENTCOM, PACCOM, etc.) and the tactical level are the guys in country.

I think the problem arises because "operational" has a variety of uses. Let's call it the "transitional" level of warfare. This sort of thinking may seem irrelevant for most, but without this separate level the US military, in all of this overlarge glory, does not work effectively.

What I find interesting about Owen's argument against the operational level of warfare is that England was the operational level of the Allied invasion of Western Europe. An essential strategy along with the means (masses of troops and goods) were funnelled into England over the course of years and prepared for deployment to and effective use upon the battlefield. This came in the form of developing the invasion and campaign plans, the training and organization of the troops and units, and the preparation of the supplies. It is simply unthinkable to conclude that something very different from either strategy or tactics did not occur during this process.

By the way, I highly recommend the Navy War College's JMO core course to give a good sense of the existence of this space in warfare. It kills the students, because it's very work intensive, but as a "tourist" I enjoyed it very much. of course, the students thought I was a bit looney for literally begging the powers that be to let me sit in - it was a quick and dirty way for me to accomplish some dissertation research -- besides, as a civilian it's a rarefied area you can't usually access, so to me it was all exciting. Anyway, I believe they put the syllabus online.

Jill

Well said. I'd also add that operational warfare is tough because:

1. It links strategy to tactics, and therefore has elements of both. There is a temptation to lump it into one bucket or the other.

2. It is dynamic. What level of command plans at the operational level can change depending on the operation.

3. It isn't always there. A single aircraft performing an air strike to kill Saddam Hussein is a tactical action with a strategic effect. There is no need for operational planning (though one might argue that such a strike is part of an operational campaign).

[jmm99]

You asked a question and I answered it.

As to this:

from Wilf

Quote:

1) Strategists generally insist that their art includes not only the traditional military element of power but also other elements of power like politics and economics. Most would also accept a peacetime as well as a wartime role for strategy.

2) With increased inclusiveness the word strategy became available outside the military context and is now used in a variety of disciplines ranging from business to medicine and even sports.

Sorry, this is garbage.

you'll have to argue that out with COL Bartholomees at the War College.

One simply has to wonder how poor old CvC and Jomini (and Mahan, Halleck and Bigelow) managed to deal with strategy and tactics sans benefit of an operational level of war (operational warfare).

Please excuse - I have to get back to my hamsters (upcoming hamster races and hamster jousts post Boxing Day, you know) to get from them a quick rundown on operational art from a hamster's viewpoint.

Regards

Mike

[Infanteer]

I continue to follow this; despite some "thread fencing" which tends to detract from things, it is still an interesting and useful thread - if anything it presents a dialectic of operational theory to help us to determine what is useful and what is not.

I don't think anyone disputes that there is an "operational" aspect in warfare - all sides have acknowledged that it:

a. exists
b. exists to provide some link from strategy to tactics.

Thus "operational warfare" is the aspect of warfare concerned with this mechanism and "operational art" is the application of it. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think all sides agree to this.

Where we seem to get off the rails is, at least as this thread goes, is that it isn't very well defined.

Fuchs labels it as a form of "high tactics". Brigade/Division and up.

M.L., however, provided the following (which was useful):

Well said. I'd also add that operational warfare is tough because:

1. It links strategy to tactics, and therefore has elements of both. There is a temptation to lump it into one bucket or the other.

2. It is dynamic. What level of command plans at the operational level can change depending on the operation.

3. It isn't always there. A single aircraft performing an air strike to kill Saddam Hussein is a tactical action with a strategic effect. There is no need for operational planning (though one might argue that such a strike is part of an operational campaign).

Points 2 and 3 seem to refute Fuchs' definition. Points 2 and 3 also point to an ambiguous nature of "operational warfare"; it fluctuates in who is applying it and it isn't always a factor in an operation. If I may, let me pose the following two questions for everyone as a way of focusing the discussion onto something to help us better define it and, perhaps, break some of the deadlock:

1. Is a commander of a field force always applying tactics? Is the CFLCC in the run-up to Desert Storm? How about VII Corps Commander? How about a company commander?

2. Is a commander of a field force always applying the operational art? Is the CFLCC in the run-up to Desert Storm? How about the VII Corps Commander? How about a company commander?

[William F. Owen]

Well said. I'd also add that operational warfare is tough because:

1. It links strategy to tactics, and therefore has elements of both. There is a temptation to lump it into one bucket or the other.

2. It is dynamic. What level of command plans at the operational level can change depending on the operation.

3. It isn't always there. A single aircraft performing an air strike to kill Saddam Hussein is a tactical action with a strategic effect. There is no need for operational planning (though one might argue that such a strike is part of an operational campaign).

OK, apologies that I missed this (HT to Infanteer)

1. Why is a link between strategy and tactics needed? The link is obvious and enduring. There is no link between Policy and Strategy.

2. So one day a level of command will not be working at the operational level and the next it will? Does this apply to all levels of command? If not, which ones does it apply to?

3. Broadly concur. To me an air strike to kill Saddam is a tactical action that supports the policy and is thus part of the strategy.

So essentially this link between Strategy and Tactics is dynamic both to the level of command and is sometimes is not required to link the two. So I would now ask, what purpose does it fulfil when it is present?