The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[M.L.]

I submit that one ought not to apply doctrine to solve a problem. Rather one ought to use doctrine as a way of informing one's thinking about a problem....

Contrary to the assertion in the second sentence above, planning is not creating "a soup to nuts" (my paraphrase of "from beginning to end") solution to a problem....

The quoted post included a very nice four-fold division (Bentham must be spinning his grave) of the problem set. However, it relies on a presumption that the relationship known as cause and effect holds--a premise that David Hume, among others, would contest vigorously...

Just to be clear, I wasn't advocating the use of doctrine or planning as I articulated it. I was actually trying to point out how these concepts are commonly misused.

Also, there are systems in which cause/effect is not only straightforward, but predictable. However, these are usually mechanical, and to a lesser extent, biological systems. Hume wrote specifically about human rationality and knowledge, i.e. sociocultural (human) systems. These systems, Hume would agree, rarely display cause and effect as such. In fact, Dr. Russ Ackoff contended that there was no such thing in sociocultural systems due to the presence of choice (free will). Instead, he suggested the human systems consist of actions (no cause necessary), reactions ("effect" where an action is both necessary and sufficient), and response (where an action is necessary but not sufficient, however, someone chooses to act).

I would also contend that there is more to a complex or chaotic system than perceptions of cause and effect, namely emergence, co-evolution, etc...

Just wanted to clarify my own position on the matter...

[M.L.]

Well, I couldn't just let this thread die a graceful death. So, as my latest inflammatory comment, I offer yet more evidence that the consideration of resources is central to strategy.

Robert H. Kohn writes the following in the most recent issue of Army History (http://www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/AH78%28W%29.pdf):

The challenge to military professionalism in the twenty-first century lies in three interconnected areas. The first is intellectual: the ability to wage war successfully in a variety of circumstances without wasting the ives of soldiers or their equipment and supplies (which are always limited, even for a superpower at the zenith of its relative strength).

Later in the article, Kohn explicitly states that this is a strategy issue:

A failure in the first area—strategy—is obviously the most dangerous.

This seems to validate the Ends/Ways/Means construct (where Mean=Resources) as previously discussed.

Happy New Year all.

[slapout9]

This seems to validate the Ends/Ways/Means construct (where Mean=Resources) as previously discussed.

Happy New Year all.

Of course it means that. We even have ways and means committees in Congress which is why it will never change. However I do think CvC meant Fighting (tactics) when he talked means, at least that is my understanding.

[Infanteer]

Agreed with Slapout - I just reread the first 3 books of On War and I see "Means" as the application of violence through the engagement to meet the strategy.

Resources seemed to be lumped in with the preparation of forces for the fight, lying outside of the Ends-Ways-Means construct.

That being said, Ends-Ways-Means is simply a tool as Clausewitz saw it. You can define a new Ends-Ways-Means tool that includes resources, but some would say you're muddying the waters of essential definitions.

[M.L.]

Gents,

I'd refer you back to our German friend Fuchs who aptly pointed out that the German word used in on war has a dual meaning of both methods and tools (resources). Furthermore, you'll note that CvC uses the word in both these contexts in On War. The modern construct delineates these two concepts into separate concepts for clarity. So, the modern ends/ways/means is in keeping with CvC's idea, just not his phraseology.

[Bob's World]

Speaking of "Ends-Ways-Means", someone help me understand this as it applies to AFPAK.

When I go to what the President of the United States says the "Ends" are, he says quite clearly that it is:

“To disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”

As to "Ways" we have the ISAF Mission:

"In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population."

As to "Means", we have ISAF itself.

I guess my question is, in what universe do the Ways laid out in the ISAF mission lead to the Ends laid out by the President of the US??

[M.L.]

I guess my question is, in what universe do the Ways laid out in the ISAF mission lead to the Ends laid out by the President of the US??

Aha. Now THAT is a fantastic question, which goes right to the heart of the "strategy" in Af/Pak.

As I have often said, strategy is complex, but at its heart is the ends/ways/means equation. Achieving political ends with the military methods and resources available. All three must be linked and balanced.

I'd say the fact that your question must be asked is an indicator of a major strategic shortcoming.

[jmm99]

I thought you were familiar with that universe - The White House, specifically the Office of the Press Secretary (For Immediate Release, December 01, 2009), Fact Sheet: The Way Forward in Afghanistan:

OUR MISSION: The President’s speech reaffirms the March 2009 core goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan. To do so, we and our allies will surge our forces, targeting elements of the insurgency and securing key population centers, training Afghan forces, transferring responsibility to a capable Afghan partner, and increasing our partnership with Pakistanis who are facing the same threats. ... [etc., etc.]

No mention of drones, direct actions or of any "attack plan" (except by AQ vs US) in this one or in this one, The Way Forward in Afghanistan.

Welcome to the wonderful universe of politics and policy.

Regards

Mike

PS: You know better than I that the stated end is being furthered by a continuation of OEF (e.g., drones, direct actions), divorced from ISAF.

[slapout9]

“To disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”

See that is exactly what I am talking about....that statement guarantees TOTAL Strategic failure! Al Qaeda is NOT a country, when you think in terms of countries you will loose.....they just move to Yeman(kant spelt stuff two gud)or anyplace else thay can find a support group.

[slapout9]

In fact, Dr. Russ Ackoff contended that there was no such thing in sociocultural systems due to the presence of choice (free will). Instead, he suggested the human systems consist of actions (no cause necessary), reactions ("effect" where an action is both necessary and sufficient), and response (where an action is necessary but not sufficient, however, someone chooses to act).

While I am a fan of Dr. Ackoff the free will concept is pretty questionable. People are conditioned through Religion,Education,Family,etc. to the point that I would say free will is a pretty rare thing.