The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[PhilR]

Outstanding post from Zenpundit on the weakness of the historic analysis method. Which goes to the very heart of this thread,few facts,many assumptions and opinions.

http://zenpundit.com/

If CvC came back from the grave he would be laughing at a lot of people. I will stick with Systems Analysis.

I think that most historians (good ones, at least) would be the first to acknowledge that what they produce is not some absolute "truth", but an interpretation of events based on the sources available. That is why history is part of the liberal arts.

I'm struck by your reference to "systems analysis" because, as far as i can discern, systems analysis, when applied to the human dimension in conflict (which is what really matters) relies on what I would consider as "history." Cause and effect, and other relationships, unless observed in real time, need to reference to the past to make any sense. Our ideas of how people with react to anything that is done to them (outside of direct physical effect), is all guesswork. We derive what we think will happen based on what has happened in similar situations. This can be applied to models or other operations research. Unless it applies to just physical issues, what I see as systems analysis of conflict, is really just translating history into standardized, if not quantitative, form.

I agree that Clausewitz would be laughing because, if you read Book Two of On War he pushes something called “critical analysis” of historical events as the best way, outside of actual experience, to learn about conflict. Jon Sumida, in his recent book Decoding Clausewitz (2008) provides a better explanation than I can in this short space (you can get a good idea from his recent article in Army History "The Clausewitz Problem" pg 17 Fall 2009. Its 8 mb; you have download the whole magazine: http://www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/AH73(W).pdf)).

Building off of some of Robert Jones’ points, I think there is something to be said about the difference between Clausewitz’s contemporary conception of People’s War, and what we are wrestling with in Insurgency. I believe that when Clausewitz described the “trinity” of emotion, chance and reason, he was thinking of how all three of those variables existed within each opponent. Thus, in effect, each opponent, with its own unique balance of the trinity, was attempting to bend the will of the other (through violence or threat of violence). I think this applies in an insurgency—each side, Gov and its supporters vs. Insurgents, and their supporters, reflects a certain balance of emotion, chance and reason.

In Clausewitz’s day, these variables were defined by the state: thus the equations of emotion=people, chance=military, and reason=political leadership/government. I think Clausewitz equated “People’s War” with a rebalancing of these elements based on using guerilla or irregular methods against an attacker—but the idea remained that the people, the military and the government were tied together in common cause against an external foe.

Today, however, we are thinking in terms of two rival political leaderships: insurgent and government, and two rival military forces: irregular and regular, with the people reduced to being the “objective” or the “terrain” being fought over. I am struck that we no longer can conceive of a people opposing us. Somehow, either insurgents or other political and military entities rise to oppose our actions—not as an expression of popular will, but in spite of it. Thus we feel if we can just shield (protect) the people from the depredations of the insurgents, the “popular will” will naturally fall our way. There’s a sense, dangerous in my mind, that, if given a fair chance, we will always get support. I don’t think that is a safe assumption. There are areas where we will go and governments we may seek to support, where the people will oppose us, regardless of how secure we can make them.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

[slapout9]

I'm struck by your reference to "systems analysis" because, as far as i can discern, systems analysis, when applied to the human dimension in conflict (which is what really matters) relies on what I would consider as "history." Cause and effect, and other relationships, unless observed in real time, need to reference to the past to make any sense. Our ideas of how people with react to anything that is done to them (outside of direct physical effect), is all guesswork. We derive what we think will happen based on what has happened in similar situations. This can be applied to models or other operations research. Unless it applies to just physical issues, what I see as systems analysis of conflict, is really just translating history into standardized, if not quantitative, form.


Phil Ridderhof USMC

Hi Phil,

1-I highlighted part of your response because that is the whole point of systems analysis. And eventually SBW (Systems Based Warfare) Stay in the predictable physical realm or it is all a chance. Sherman was a master at it, he focused the physical processing parts of the human support system in order to affect the physical human population. By denying them the physical resources of survival he eventually affected there human mental process to the point where they changed there mind about fighting, if they didn't change their mind, over time they would be so physically weakened they would no longer be relevant.

2-I had already downloaded the history magazine because of the Pershing missile article. I crawled all over that thing as a kid and personally saw much of what happened in the article and yes it was one of the best war systems ever made. Pershing 1 had more to do with us surviving the Cuban Missile Crisis then most folks will ever know.

3-I will read the CvC article and let you know what I think. Check your PM when you get a chance.

[slapout9]

Hi Phil,


3-I will read the CvC article and let you know what I think. Check your PM when you get a chance.

PhilR, I read ,actually re-read the article last night and he makes some good points, especially his method that critical analysis should start with Verifiable Historic Fact. In the case of CvC what are the facts? We know his book On War was never completely finished, We know his Wife left a warning note with the manuscript saying it may be nothing but "A Great Mass". We know there are some problems with translation(s) of the manusacript.

So my conclusions are:
1-There is NO book On War, there is an unedited manuscript.

2-That On War should be retitled "Thoughts On War" by CvC. They were his written expressions of his unfinished thinking about War! As to his final theory we will never truly know.

3-That doesn't mean that there is not great value in studying his "Thoughts On War" and discussing them.

This is my analysis of the greatest crime since Jack The Ripper.......the crime of the book that was never a book.

[Bob's World]

.

Today, however, we are thinking in terms of two rival political leaderships: insurgent and government, and two rival military forces: irregular and regular, with the people reduced to being the “objective” or the “terrain” being fought over. I am struck that we no longer can conceive of a people opposing us. Somehow, either insurgents or other political and military entities rise to oppose our actions—not as an expression of popular will, but in spite of it. Thus we feel if we can just shield (protect) the people from the depredations of the insurgents, the “popular will” will naturally fall our way. There’s a sense, dangerous in my mind, that, if given a fair chance, we will always get support. I don’t think that is a safe assumption. There are areas where we will go and governments we may seek to support, where the people will oppose us, regardless of how secure we can make them.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

The first being that the outside party is never actually conducting COIN themselves, that COIN and Insurgency are internal business, and much more a family dispute over governance than they are warfare, regardless of how violent that squabble may become (you can't truely hate someone you don't love, so family squabbles can be the worst kind).

So as an insurgent emerges from the populace to compete with the current government for the support of the same, it very much is a tug of war, with the support of the populace being the ultimate prize, and also the COG. A shared COG to be competed for, rather than respective friendly and enemy COGs to be either defeated or defended ala CvC. This is why I say that insurgency really isn't warfare regardless of how violent, and that to apply rules/principles of warfare rather than understanding and addressing root causes and employing that understanding in ones competition for the support of the populace is likely to lead to a tragic, hard to reach, and temporary in duration, solution.

As an outside party to such a competition, one is either trying to gain inroads with a land and people to serve your own national (or if a non-state actor like AQ, organizational) interests, you are conducting what US doctrine describes as "unconventional warfare." If, on the other hand, you already have a stake in this land/populace through the current government, you are likely to come in on their side in an attempt to sustain that status quo. In US doctrine we call this 'foreign internal defense'. To assume that you as the outsider are conducting COIN is the fastest way to get yourself into all kinds of inappropriate roles and develop no end to crazy mission creep. Just not a good idea, and yet, according to our NEW COIN doctirne, that is what we are doing. Bad bit of doctrine, IMHO.

So, while CvC is good knowledge (Scientia) to have, I always believe that understanding (Intelectus) trumps knowledge on just about everything except a standardized test. This is no standardized test.

[Bob's World]

OK, hopefully this is readable. The text hits some points I believe to be important, but the chart is how I see insurgency in relation to peace in every nation.

Most of us are fortunate to live in states that are happily bumping around somewhere down in the "Peace" bubble of phase 0 pre-insurgency. As the government becomes more out of touch with its populace, or the governance becomes "poor", the populace will trend up the curved line to the right. Now, an insurgent leader can artificially prevent it from trending up as well as right by choosing a non-violent approach. Also, a government can suppress violence as well and be horribly "poor". But once those artificial constraints are removed (If Dr. King had be replaced by a Black Panther-type leader; or the example of Tito and the former Yugoslavia), the populace will pop up to its natural state of violence on the curve above.

Important to always understand that the insurgent will flow back and forth between phases throughout his campaign, and even by region; also that he can win in any phase.

Equally important, is that in this model the role of the military is not to "defeat" the insurgent, nor to "create effective governmental services". No, the military is callled in as the populace moves up the curve thru the nexus of acceptable violence into phase I insurgency. Kitson would probably call this the transition from Subversion to Insurgency. That's fine, so long as one understands that they are merely two stages of the same thing, with the same root causes that must be addressed. So the military mission is not to achieve Nirvana, but to merely apply what force and governance assistance necessary to move the populace back down the curve into phase 0. This may require a bit of a nudge straight down, but not all the way to the floor, and only so far as necessary to allow one to begin pushing it to the left, and bringing in more foreign civil and HN capacity to move it left as well.

Many historic COIN "victories" merely crush the insurgent straight down. Removing the capacity for violence without addressing the root causes of poor governance. I call this "counterinsurgent" rather than "counterinsurgency" operations. Once that artifical constraint, usually a military boot, is removed from the populaces neck, they ALWAYS go right back to their natural state.

[Bob's World]

Ok, too small, hope this is better:

[jmm99]

As to this:

from BW
As an outside party to such a competition, one is either trying to gain inroads with a land and people to serve your own national (or if a non-state actor like AQ, organizational) interests, you are conducting what US doctrine describes as "unconventional warfare." If, on the other hand, you already have a stake in this land/populace through the current government, you are likely to come in on their side in an attempt to sustain that status quo. In US doctrine we call this 'foreign internal defense'. To assume that you as the outsider are conducting COIN is the fastest way to get yourself into all kinds of inappropriate roles and develop no end to crazy mission creep. Just not a good idea, and yet, according to our NEW COIN doctirne, that is what we are doing. Bad bit of doctrine, IMHO.

the non-italicised text includes two, more-limited (in terms of force size) military operations - traditional SF missions. Both are pretty well-defined in legal and military doctrines.

The italicised text refers to "COIN", but is part of a larger picture where the Assisting Nation takes a substantial combatant role on behalf of the Host Nation. That could be against a threat solely internal to the HN (e.g., pure "COIN"); a threat external to the HN (e.g., the Korean War, although it did have some minor Com "insurgencies" in the South); or threats both internal and external (e.g., Vietnam).

Regardless of the specific threat, introduction of substantial combatant forces by the AN changes its role into that of a "Power" in an "armed conflict", which may be "of an international character" or "not of an international character" (see, Common Articles 2 and 3 of the GCs). In more classical terms, the AN may be consided a co-belligerent or a military ally (depending on the formality and intent of the AN-HN relationship - briefly see Wiki: Co-belligerence).

Most of these rather badly-defined "armed conflicts" (which are certainly subject to mission creep) are further muddied by the presence of "irregular combatants". The status of "irregular combatants" in US legal doctrine (and military doctrine, for that matter) is also not well defined. E.g., the contradictions in how the Gitmo detainees should be handled.

Like it or not, these badly-defined "armed conflicts" involve a substantial political element. I'd say it goes too far to say:

from BW
So as an insurgent emerges from the populace to compete with the current government for the support of the same, it very much is a tug of war, with the support of the populace being the ultimate prize, and also the COG. A shared COG to be competed for, rather than respective friendly and enemy COGs to be either defeated or defended ala CvC. This is why I say that insurgency really isn't warfare regardless of how violent, and that to apply rules/principles of warfare rather than understanding and addressing root causes and employing that understanding in ones competition for the support of the populace is likely to lead to a tragic, hard to reach, and temporary in duration, solution.

since they are clearly "armed conflicts"; but the political elements (including subversion and infiltration) permeate them.

It is an interesting academic point as to whether or not CvC dealt with these situations, or what CvC would say of them if he were posting here. That being said, it is more important for the US to assess its future role in military operations that go beyond the traditional limits of UW and FID, but which are short of conventional nation-state vs nation-state warfare.

A good starting framework is from Bill Moore, Be flexible, be realistic. We need some national policy parameters on when and how we become engaged in these "unconventional" armed conflicts.

We also need sound legal doctrine and military doctrine on irregular combatants - both those against us and those on our side. That would be the subject matter for another thread.

PS: As I typed this, BW added his chart - so again, my chart (says the same things more generally):

Politics-Military Struggles.jpg

Great minds, etc. - or more simply, two nutty lawyers.

Regards to all

Mike

[Bob's World]

Mike,

All good thoughts. I do think one of the critical distinctions is identifying if the conflict is internal to the state, or between states (and one's role as an intervening party does not affect the answer to that analysis).

Fact is, that if your son gets angry and frustrated and punches you in the nose, you would be a total fool if you respsonded in the same way if a guy down at the corner bar gets angry and frustrated and punches you in the nose. Conflict within the family must be resolved differently than conflict between families. Even if in both cases you had to act out physically to stop the initial violence.

And, BTW, a father in that situation who blames the entire episode on his son, and does nothing to understand and address his own failures that helped bring them to the point, deserves the lousy results he is sure to reap. Same goes for governments.

Similarly, if that father is smaller, weaker, less intelligent than that son, and he goes and gets his big strong friend from down the street to come over and kick his son's ass for him, he pretty much deserves what he gets as well, and may well wonder why that "friend" starts taking over his house in general, and why is son may fear the friend, but despises him more than ever. Again, same goes for governments.

[slapout9]

Fact is, that if your son gets angry and frustrated and punches you in the nose, you would be a total fool if you respsonded in the same way if a guy down at the corner bar gets angry and frustrated and punches you in the nose. Conflict within the family must be resolved differently than conflict between families. Even if in both cases you had to act out physically to stop the initial violence.

BW,since you brought up the family Men in A'stan we got some real winners over there. They beat their women,rape their kids and screw their goats and cows and we are going to protect them from the Taliban and AQ? We should arm the women and kids and tell em to establish justice. Put cows and sheep in the barn until it's over. Been talking to some LE vets from there and those men need some Snoop Dog Fatherhood classes more than anything.

[jmm99]

Your family parables would seem valid for cases closer to the left region of both of our charts - where there is a chance at "family reconciliation", or at least "family stabilization".

As the situation gets less familial (moving further right on the charts), we get into more of each side considering the other as a Cuckoo bird invading the nest. As in nature, that is likely to lead to an arms race among Brood Parasites. I can't recall that discussion in CvC.

I expect that Mao-Chiang and Giap-Diem fit more in the Cuckoo Bird category - whatever "brotherly love" that existed between those couples disappeared early in the game.

Best

Mike

[Bill Moore]

posted by Bob,

The first being that the outside party is never actually conducting COIN themselves, that COIN and Insurgency are internal business, and much more a family dispute over governance than they are warfare

I have to disagree, and I think this particular stream of thought confuses COIN and FID. In Iraq and Afghanistan we may have been outsiders, but we were also the occupying power/government, so the insurgency was directed at us, and now we have governments that are to varying degrees recognized as a combination of legitimate and puppet governments. If we over throw a regime and occupy a country, then IMO your argument that we can't conduct COIN falls flat. We weren't invited in by either government, we came in and stood up the governments.

As for COIN not being warfare, I disagree, you're making two arguments that IMO don't ring true. First you're arguing that if there is a common center of gravity (the populace), then it can't be warfare? First, the populace is not necessarily a COG, but rather a means. The populace is more of an objective than a COG, and you can have warfare over a common objective such as land. Your second argument appears to be that non-state actors can't conduct warfare in their own backyard? An insurgency is clearly political warfare, the use of violence to influence the political system. Let's not forget that non-state actors like AQ, the Catholic Church, and multinationals and State actors can support insurgencies as a form of proxy warfare. The AQ in Afghanistan is not exactly the home team, so while the Hatfields and McCoy's squables exist, that is not the full picture.

Equally important, is that in this model the role of the military is not to "defeat" the insurgent, nor to "create effective governmental services". No, the military is callled in as the populace moves up the curve thru the nexus of acceptable violence into phase I insurgency. Kitson would probably call this the transition from Subversion to Insurgency.

I would argue that when we talk about transitions, we're thinking conventionally and assuming sequenced phases. Subversion doesn't transition, it is constant and much like armed action can support the narrative, it can also support the subversive effort. Not all subversion is violence free (regardless of what the book states). What is the role of the military? One of its roles is to clearly put pressure on the fielded guerrillas and provide security to the populace (maybe to protect them, or in the case where they just won't like the counterinsurgent to oppress them) to allow the political process to unfold. I think you would agree that if there is no political process, then the insurgency won't be defeated, but if the military is skilled enough they may be able to suppress it.

Posted by Jmm,

they are clearly "armed conflicts"; but the political elements (including subversion and infiltration) permeate them.

We also need sound legal doctrine and military doctrine on irregular combatants - both those against us and those on our side. That would be the subject matter for another thread.

We're thinking a like, and we don't have the doctrine or body of law to deal with these challenges. It is a huge shortfall, and while we still win every battle, we may not be winning the political fight at the grass roots level. If we allow the military leadership to frame the problem as a military problem, then they'll think success on the battlefield should equate to overall success, thus are understandably frustrated when that isn't the case. We don't do subversion and infiltration, we only do armed warfare, so the bad actors have a lot freedom of movement to maneuver against our efforts in subtle, yet very effective ways.

Addition:

I wanted to add I like your chart as far as it goes, but I would caution that a political struggle doesn't always reside within the rule of law, nor does political warfare need to always be violent, it may just be setting the stage for violence in the future (gradually radicalizing segments of the population for example).

[MikeF]

I have to disagree, and I think this particular stream of thought confuses COIN and FID. In Iraq and Afghanistan we may have been outsiders, but we were also the occupying power/government, so the insurgency was directed at us, and now we have governments that are to varying degrees recognized as a combination of legitimate and puppet governments. If we over throw a regime and occupy a country, then IMO your argument that we can't conduct COIN falls flat. We weren't invited in by either government, we came in and stood up the governments.

We've discussed insurgency as a domestic violence incident in another thread (can't remember which one), but I do like the analogy. In the case of Iraq and A'stan, we came in as the police trying to break up the fight. However, we did a poor job of occupying/governing, and that's a big deal. IF we had properly planned/conducted PH IV operations, then we might not have ended up with such degree of messes. It's like the crazy sisters antagonizing the angry wife realized that we weren't going to intervene, and they burned the house down to spite the husband.

[MikeF]

I wanted to add I like your chart as far as it goes, but I would caution that a political struggle doesn't always reside within the rule of law, nor does political warfare need to always be violent, it may just be setting the stage for violence in the future (gradually radicalizing segments of the population for example).

Bill,

I would categorize these cases (Mike's Transition Zones) as Phase Zero of Mao's Three Phase Protracted War. Bob's World summarized it that there are always low-level insurgencies in democratic nation-states. Back to the family dispute, it's the constantly nagging mother-in-law. In the bar, it's the guy with short man's syndrome who grows big and tries to antagonize after a few beers.

[Bob's World]

Focus on the populace, not the leaders. No matter how extreme the opposing leaders may be, you are still competing for the support of your own populace, and that is family. Sometimes certain members just need to be divorced or excommunicated. But it's still family.

Or, just apply CvC and treat insurgency like war and use the military to kill enough of the populace to gain their obedience and support. This is the COA most often applied by governments, and I just don't see that it ever produces more than a temporary lull in the fighting, and a temporary extention of their flawed reign of power.

I realize I may be totally F'd up on this, but I don't think that I am and am open to good arguments and historical examples; recognizing that all historical examples must be tailored for the modern information age of today that renders many TTPs used to "separate the insurgent from the populace" largely obsolete. Greater burden today for governments to actually govern, this is the price of an empowered populace.

[wm]

I think I have to agree witjh Bill Moore's post, especially in regards to the issue of complexity. The bottom line, as Bill Moore pointed out, is that this isn't easy and it isn't a one size fits all solution. An appeal to CvC as "THE" answer is just another effort to find that silver bullet that does not exist.

JMM cited a couple of 20th Century examples of "mixed bag" efforts. Despite being enjoined by Zenpundit to eschew the historical method, I'd like to suggest that we look at the American Revolution for another example of those complexities. That struggle was actually several struggles between a number of entities with a number of different goals. In some cases the colonists were the good guys; in others, the bad guys. The French and Spanish, as well Native Americans from nations that included the Oneida and Tuscaroroa tribes of the Iroquois Federation and the Catawbas of the Carolinas, may be viewed as an intervening force supporting the insurrection. Forces deployed by George III from various German principalities like Hesse-Kassel, Anhalt-Zerbst, Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel, and Ansbach-Bayreuth, not to mention members of the remaining tribes of the Iroquois Confederacy and the Cherokees in the South, may be considered COIN assistance to the forces of England trying to quell the insurrection. The loyalties of colonists themselves were fairly divided. Check out the events in what is now Westchester County, NY or the backwoods of South Carolina for some horrendous tales of inhumane treatment by civilian adherents to both sides of the conflict.

[PhilR]

The first being that the outside party is never actually conducting COIN themselves, that COIN and Insurgency are internal business, and much more a family dispute over governance than they are warfare, regardless of how violent that squabble may become (you can't truely hate someone you don't love, so family squabbles can be the worst kind).

So as an insurgent emerges from the populace to compete with the current government for the support of the same, it very much is a tug of war, with the support of the populace being the ultimate prize, and also the COG. A shared COG to be competed for, rather than respective friendly and enemy COGs to be either defeated or defended ala CvC. This is why I say that insurgency really isn't warfare regardless of how violent, and that to apply rules/principles of warfare rather than understanding and addressing root causes and employing that understanding in ones competition for the support of the populace is likely to lead to a tragic, hard to reach, and temporary in duration, solution.

As an outside party to such a competition, one is either trying to gain inroads with a land and people to serve your own national (or if a non-state actor like AQ, organizational) interests, you are conducting what US doctrine describes as "unconventional warfare." If, on the other hand, you already have a stake in this land/populace through the current government, you are likely to come in on their side in an attempt to sustain that status quo. In US doctrine we call this 'foreign internal defense'. To assume that you as the outsider are conducting COIN is the fastest way to get yourself into all kinds of inappropriate roles and develop no end to crazy mission creep. Just not a good idea, and yet, according to our NEW COIN doctirne, that is what we are doing. Bad bit of doctrine, IMHO.

So, while CvC is good knowledge (Scientia) to have, I always believe that understanding (Intelectus) trumps knowledge on just about everything except a standardized test. This is no standardized test.

There are parts here I agree with and parts I don’t agree with. To start with the last first, I don’t think that Clausewitz would ever assert that reading his book gives an understanding of any conflict. However, I think it does provide a good lens through which to view that conflict and help gain understanding. Not everything in On War is still directly relevant. However, I think that enough is too still prompt useful discussion, analysis, and synthesis. I’ll just admit that each time I re-read parts of On War, I come away with new considerations on how it a specific conflict may be working out and what its character may be. (And to Slapout’s previous point about On War not being complete, part of Sumida’s argument in Decoding Clausewitz is that we have misread the order and dates of the various notes he left and that it was, in fact, a nearly complete and whole work. And just to be clear, I like a lot of what Sumida has written, but I’m not as convinced as he is that he has THE definitive interpretation. For anyone interested, I’d recommend Peter Paret’s biographical Clausewitz and the State—and you will be surprised how much of his life and thought was caught up in “irregular” conflict).

More to the point of the above comments on the difference between COIN as an internal struggle and the different “chemistry” when it involves outsiders—such as us in Afghanistan—I think that is a critical difference. Thinking back on my Clausewitz, we mostly think of Insurgents as being on the strategic offensive because the government represents the “status quo.” I would offer that when outsiders are involved the insurgents are on the strategic defensive. They have a negative aim. They do not have provide positive rule or economic benefits. They do not need to defeat or destroy the government or our security forces in the field. They just need to deny us enough success so that we go home. They will not be ultimately successful in replacing the existing government until the external forces are gone. The insurgency meets Clausewitz’s definition for a defense—it is using time in order to position itself for a counterstroke. In effect, the insurgency has a negative aim. They don’t have to “play to win” like the government and its allies—they just need to play to “not lose.”

This gets to successful insurgent endgame. I’d submit that most successful insurgencies end with the insurgent forces acting very much like the security forces they are facing—taking them on openly in the field, or else the threat and exhaustion results in security forces either melting away or changing sides enmasse. This is in some sense a validation of Mao’s progression of stages. For an insurgency to become what it was fighting against, the legitimate governing authority, then it will start to take on those attributes (and those vulnerabilities?).

Looking to Afghanistan specifically, I’d say that the approaches we are seeing that recommend basing our strategy on local initiatives and tribes (One Tribe at a Time, etc.), are a form of fighting an insurgency with an insurgency. While this is attractive, in effect, we would also not be struggling to defeat the Insurgent, but just to provide a rival insurgent force that would never allow them to win. I think that the tribal approaches will just result in a steady state of chaos. If we remove our security umbrella from such a solution—a patchwork of loosely held together areas—then they will be vulnerable to being picked off, one by one, in fairly conventional manner (which is how I believe the Taliban came to power in the first place). Thus while I think the “bottom up”, or tribal, or federal, approach is also an endstate that will require us to maintain a security guarantee for a long while.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

[Bob's World]

More to the point of the above comments on the difference between COIN as an internal struggle and the different “chemistry” when it involves outsiders—such as us in Afghanistan—I think that is a critical difference. Thinking back on my Clausewitz, we mostly think of Insurgents as being on the strategic offensive because the government represents the “status quo.” I would offer that when outsiders are involved the insurgents are on the strategic defensive. They have a negative aim. They do not have provide positive rule or economic benefits. They do not need to defeat or destroy the government or our security forces in the field. They just need to deny us enough success so that we go home. They will not be ultimately successful in replacing the existing government until the external forces are gone. The insurgency meets Clausewitz’s definition for a defense—it is using time in order to position itself for a counterstroke. In effect, the insurgency has a negative aim. They don’t have to “play to win” like the government and its allies—they just need to play to “not lose.”

Point 1: What you are describing here is not the insurgent vs. the Counterinsurgent; but rather the insurgent vs. the FID force. This would essentially be a branch operations for the insurgent. His goal is to win the tug of war with the COIN force for support of the populace, and ultimate governance of the same. Then in comes this external party to support the government (I.e., COIN force) just as he is starting to have success. So now he must implement this branch plan to either defeat, or simply outlast, the FID force so that he can get back to the business of winning the tug of war. Ironically, an overly aggressive FID force (like the US tends to be) actually highlights to the local populace and the world the weakness of the COIN force and also tends to rob them of their legitimacy in the eyes of the populace as they tend to look like puppets of the FID force.
This gets to successful insurgent endgame. I’d submit that most successful insurgencies end with the insurgent forces acting very much like the security forces they are facing—taking them on openly in the field, or else the threat and exhaustion results in security forces either melting away or changing sides enmasse. This is in some sense a validation of Mao’s progression of stages. For an insurgency to become what it was fighting against, the legitimate governing authority, then it will start to take on those attributes (and those vulnerabilities?).

Point 2: Mao's model, that I borrowed to shape the phases on my model, was definitely designed originally with the belief as you presribe above that one must work their way to phase three and win the conventional fight to prevail. History shows us that "perfect" Maoist insurgency is rare, but the Vietnamese and Chinese held to the model and did build to conventional capacity to end thier respective conflicts successfully. Key is that the insurgent can win, or lose, in any phase, and can flow back and forth for years in route to that end.

Looking to Afghanistan specifically, I’d say that the approaches we are seeing that recommend basing our strategy on local initiatives and tribes (One Tribe at a Time, etc.), are a form of fighting an insurgency with an insurgency. While this is attractive, in effect, we would also not be struggling to defeat the Insurgent, but just to provide a rival insurgent force that would never allow them to win. I think that the tribal approaches will just result in a steady state of chaos. If we remove our security umbrella from such a solution—a patchwork of loosely held together areas—then they will be vulnerable to being picked off, one by one, in fairly conventional manner (which is how I believe the Taliban came to power in the first place). Thus while I think the “bottom up”, or tribal, or federal, approach is also an endstate that will require us to maintain a security guarantee for a long while.

Point 3: I believe you are too focused on "government" (formal constitutional organized, centrally controlled, etc) with "governance." As Westerners my opinion is that we are just too sanitized if you will, on this point. When a state rejects our Western constructs of Westphalian-based government we quickly label them a "failed" or "failing state" This is really, sadly, Western bias at its worst. The fact is that many regions of the world have little cultural and historical connection to Western forms of governance other than the fact that a bunch of white guys forced them to adopt it at gunpoint in the name of Civilization and Colonization. Now when they reject our "gift" of Westphalian constructs we label them as failures becasue our system doesn't snap in well with other forms of governance. In Afhanistan the informal system of Governance has far greater history of acceptance and functionality than the Westphalian, centralized program we are trying to implement out of Kabul. IMO we are far more likely to create chaos trying to force a centralized system than we are by recognizing and supporting they system they already have. The key is to connect the two in such a fashion as to allow this country to hold to what works, while moving forward with new tools that ideally overcome the downsides of that historic system.
Phil Ridderhof USMC

Hopefully this helps

[Firn]

FID is defined as "Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."

Counterinsurgency is defined as “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”

(both taken from JP 1-02 DoD Dictionary of Military and associated terms)

I'm not too happy about the definition of FID, as it has a political slant (to free and to protect) which leaves out too much. Perhaps it just a way to paint a policy in a positive colour and it sounds nicer than a more wide definition. While to helps to have a coined term to address a specific situation we should not forget that there can be many shades in the circumstances while supporting a ally (state, entity, nation, insurgent) against a foe (other state, nation, ethnic (religious, cultural) group, insurgent). We have many levels of interacting politics and differing motives, purposes and wills. The danger in creating a strict concept coupled by a specific term is that it can narrow down the vision. But if it is understood rightly as a part of the whole it can be helpful.

I will continue later...


Firn

[Bob's World]

I'm not too happy about the definition of FID, as it has a political slant (to free and to protect) which leaves out too much. Perhaps it just a way to paint a policy in a positive colour and it sounds nicer than a more wide definition. While to helps to have a coined term to address a specific situation we should not forget that there can be many shades in the circumstances while supporting a ally (state, entity, nation, insurgent) against a foe (other state, nation, ethnic (religious, cultural) group, insurgent). We have many levels of interacting politics and differing motives, purposes and wills. The danger in creating a strict concept coupled by a specific term is that it can narrow down the vision. But if it is understood rightly as a part of the whole it can be helpful.

I will continue later...


Firn

I won't argue that "FID" is a perfect construct as currently defined and employed, only that it is the best we have. We can add "IDAD" to it and it gets better. When we start adding new concepts like "SFA" and "IW" to patch gaps and bridge seams, it just starts to turn into a crazy quilt.

I told my senior leadership, that when it came to the defining and discussing of these critical concepts we were like property owners who each own 100 acres of land, but that because of a bad survey are uncertain as to exactly where the porperty line is. So, instead of enjoying the 99.99 acres we each own free and clear of any debate, we instead mortgage the same to the hilt to hire lawyers and argue over the 18" of dirt in between that we can't agree on. Sillyness.

So, I have decided to not engage in those type of Reindeer games, and instead focus on broad constructs that are more helpful.

An element of a state that acts out illegally to change or overthrow the sitting government, or break a piece of the state off as a new state is conducting insurgency. Tune up the words as you wish.

The sitting government opposing this illegal action is conducting COIN.

An outside party, state or non-state, who acts to aid the insurgent in his efforts is conducting Unconventional Warfare.

An outside party, state or non-state, who acts to aid the sitting government is conducting FID.

What do you call any actions between these two outside parties? Well, for 60-odd years between the Soviets and the West we called it a "Cold War." For the past 8-odd years between AQ and the West we call it a "Global War on Terrorism."

The key to understanding is not the nuances of the dozens of essentially similar definitions, but instead to understand these 4 primary roles in insurgency, and who is in which role, and how to best enable or frustrate their efforts depending on your interests in the whole thing.

Just how I look at it. I've participated in many of the debates over the 18" of proverbial dirt between these definitions with the best of them, and I'm done. It's just not that helpful.

[slapout9]

The key to understanding is not the nuances of the dozens of essentially similar definitions, but instead to understand these 4 primary roles in insurgency, and who is in which role, and how to best enable or frustrate their efforts depending on your interests in the whole thing.

Now that is Strategy!