Michael, Michael, Michael...chumming the waters of the Small Wars Journal with your bloody questions!
Ok, as the first shark on the scene, let me just say "YES."
Clausewitz offers much for those who seek to understand warfare; where we get into trouble is when we determine that becuase we are good at Clauswitzian warfare to make every problem warfare and and wage it as such.
The proplem is not CvC, it is our over-application of his teachings to things that (while oft violent) have little to do with warfare at all. Consider this excerpt from a post a made a few minutes ago regarding COIN and Afghanistan.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...-here/#c014650
1. Why are soldiers rather than politicians having these conversations? Insurgency is politics, but it is the type of politics born of the failures of the current crop of politicians, so they pass the problem to the military to solve on their behalf, and the military then (not surprisingly) makes the problem one of war and warfare. Politicians leave warfare to soldiers. (Mission passed, mission solved…)
2. Why politicians remain on their hands: It’s a war now, with a General in charge. Once the General “wins” or “loses” either one, the politicians and diplomats will then be able to get back to doing what they do. This is a natural mindset, but it is equally a crippling one. COIN is a civil emergency for the host nation government; for the intervening government it is best seen little different than our approaches to an Indonesian tsunami or Bangladeshi flood. The military is a wonderful reserve of excess capability and capacity to help a civil government turn the corner on an overwhelming emergency. Last in, first out. Not our emergency and certainly not our “war.”
Best of luck with your blog!
Bob
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