I have a question for any students of CvC. CvC lists 6 or 7? ways (6 offensive and 1 defensive) that a military can use to defeat an enemy. One he called "operations against the political object"......what exactly did he mean by that? I don't think he ever brings it up again after listing it.
I would like to have a crack at this one using the Paret/Howard translation if I may. What CvC was referring to with "operations that have direct political repercussions" was the balance of power between the states of Europe. As such, operations were design to "disrupt the opposing alliances, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene etc". The operations are aimed at the opposing policy-makers calculations of probability in terms of the cost and benefits of the outcome of initiating or continuing military action in gaining a political objective, as it was at direct military action and defeating the opponents army.Originally Posted by slapout9
Its very similar to Sun Tzu's observation that:
The superior military cuts down strategy
Its inferior cuts down alliances
Its inferior cuts down the military
The worst attacks walled cities
From my reading of the text, the passage you refer to specifically looks at how a state can bolster its military capacity via the formation of alliances. This will have a direct effect on the balance of power and would have to be taken into account before the first shot is fired (cutting down strategy). I am not sure why he calls them "operations", unless he was referring to the establishment of military ties with other nations via inter military exchanges. An alternative reading could interpret it to say that after the first shot has been fired, when conducting a campaign you choose who and when you fight carefully in order to defeat the weaker members of an alliance quickly, and propose terms for them to either join you or surrender (cutting down alliances). In many respects you could interpret this as a strategy of attrition (cutting down the military), in so far as you are trying to create a political outcome by first attacking your opponents allies, rather than direct confrontation with the opponents main, and one would assume larger, military (attacking walled cities). If you read some of the examples he gives of Napoleon's campaign he does talk about this particular style of operation. Specifically when Napoleon faces two or more armies fielded by different states. CvC goes into some detail as to which army should be engaged first and uses that passage to argue why. Although I can't cite were they are in the book off the top of my head.
As I stated in a previous post. I think this has direct implication in small wars, the Anbar Uprising is a good example of fostering alliances and using them against your opponent. From how I read it, the fact of the matter is A'Q is dependent on alliances in order to operate and survive. The same could be said of the Taliban and its need for developing military and political alliances with the Afghan population. So I think CvC has a valid point to make at the strategic level in regards to the current conflicts in Iran and Afghanistan, specifically when choosing who and when you fight, how and why. Which is what strategy is all about at the end of the day.
Now this is an interesting argument in relation to CvC and his criticism of Napoleon's strategy against Russia. He was very critical in how Napoleon conducted the campaign. Specifically, the push to take the capital without defeating the army, and the subsequent 'asymmetrical campaign' the Russians conducted using both militias and regular army to push Napoleon out of Russia. There are a number of examples within this campaign of how a countries territory can provide the strategic depth to make time a decisive factor in defeating an opponent in my opinion. I think studying that campaign still has value today.For any nation to defeat the United States, if all they do is occupy DC and defeat our military, they are probably about 20% of the way to their ultimate objective.
I agree with your point on principle. However, would it be fair to argue that if a conflict has a direct and lasting impact on the civilians quality of life then the situation would be radically different? The Cold War would be a good example in the context of the general US populations acceptance of the need to use or threaten to use force on a large scale. The point being, if the territory of the population is under direct threat then they would expect the government to do whatever it is in their means to safeguard it and the population.Nor do we kill our enemies in the sense you write. The Mothers of America, the Intelligentsia and the chattering classes generally do not approve of that approach today. Unfortunate IMO but that's the way it goes.
Last edited by Taiko; 07-22-2009 at 11:09 PM.
Populations are funny.
Not funny 'ha-ha,' funny peculiar -- they're fickle. With respect to your question re: quality of life, I suspect there are many variables and regardless the 1/3 Rule will almost certainly apply.
The cold war was an extremely artificial period in history and little that occurred offers examples of value, not least because most of it is shrouded in myths. For example, many Americans believed that a Nuclear War would likely mean the end of the world as we knew it, thus the issue was not quality of life for many but of life itself, so destroying the USSR first was an acceptable figurative alternative.
However, threatening and actually using force are two different things. My thought is that most in the west are not unwilling (which is not the same as being willing) to use force but are repelled by excessive force. To defeat the enemy, if that is possible, is fine, to humiliate and degrade that defeated enemy is a different thing and that will usually draw the fire of the chatterers et.al.
By the same token, defending the hearth and visiting destruction in a distant land are two different things; as in Bob's World's point on the Stranger versus the Neighbor versus the Son -- all impose different constraints in varying degrees. Kill' em all to safeguard the Clan -- but don't be mean to that poor man who surrendered. Yet and contrarily, people can be vindictive...
All in all, absent specifics, it's quite difficult to predict how a population might react. Even with specifics, they'll fool you often as not. Populations are not only fickle, they aren't very consistent (purposely redundant)...
You are probably right on this, but I was wondering could he have meant direct operations against sovereign political leaders such as the Strike against Qaddafi of Libya? More or less bypassing the military force and going to the political COG with Military means?
In terms of COG in relation to operations with direct political repercussions. CvC argued, for example, that if Napoleon was facing more than one allied army he should direct his military against the best commanders of the allied forces first. He reasoned that the psychological blow to the allies if Napoleon defeated their most competent Generals would have direct impact on the morale of the military, the political calculations of the monarchs, and the cohesion of the alliance, in terms of their continuing capacity to resist (See for example Book 2 Chapter 5 pp: 159-164 of Paret/Howard translation were he deliberates on the various COG that Napoleon could of used, to show how to apply critical analyses to a General's decision making process). Although, CvC use of COG was determined by a number of different factors including political objective (primary), terrain, number and competency of armies etc. I suspect that if the military operation caused a significant effect in disrupting the cohesion/morale of the military and the psychological state of mind of the policy-makers and, in turn, caused them to re-evaluate the probabilities of success and failure then it could be considered a COG. The importance of targeting the military capacity to wage war directly, or the policy-makers calculations of probability in continuing the war in order to achieve the political objective, would be dependent on time, place, and capability. Having said that, I realize that COG is a heavily debated concept within the US military so I'm sure there will be some who disagree with this assessment.
Edit: One of the problems with specifically trying to target the policy-maker as a COG, Qaddafi for example, is that he/she can in may cases be replaced, a standing army can not be replaced as quickly. An alternative argument would be that A'Qs COG, or any insurgency for that matter, is its ideology CvC called it 'popular opinion', not its leadership. The exception being if the policy-maker holds that much power that the regime would collapse if he/she is removed.
Last edited by Taiko; 07-23-2009 at 08:24 AM.
Don't suspect. It's a fact. That is exactly the aim at the heart of Operations or Campaigning. It works in all forms of warfare - and can be taught in terms of explicit statements and guidance to that effect.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Posting Permissions
Reply With Quote
Bookmarks