"How" the things one does to extend good govnernance to the populace is essential, but that belongs to the executor. What one does requires a degee of management that I feel is currently lacking or misguided in a age where the majority position falling out of Iraq-based experience is to focus on "effectiveness" of governance to solve insurgency.
This is just a tool, some will see utility in it, others won't. For those who get fidgitty when someone deviates from doctrine, here are the key areas where I intentionally ignored the doctrinal approach and why:
1. No friendly vs enemey COGs to be defended and attacked. Instead a recogniation that in true COIN it is a competition to gain the support of a single (though complex, and multi-faceted) populace COG.
2. Doctrine has action officers cook up a random list of CRs that they think are related to the Critical Capbabilities of the COG. I find this illogical. I pick a COG because of the Crtiical Capabilities that come from that COG; but to defeat a COG I must go after its inputs, not its outputs; so my approach is to focus CRs on what the INPUTS are to the COG; or in this case, what are the elements of governance that a government can employ to support its populace. Also for CRs, instead of allowing every task force staff to dream up their own random list, I recommend that you pick one general, acceptable construct. I Chose PMESII for it's wide acceptance and applicability, recognizing that focus comes later in the process, and that CRs merely set the framework.
3. Next, the doctrinal approach comes up with a completely different list of factors from CRs when developing CVs. If all your task forces were on a separate page at CR, they are definitely in separate worlds by the time they all generate their own ideas on what CVs are. IMO this aspect of COG doctrine is why so many dismiss it as an interesting, but largely unhelpful, intellectual process that gives Majors and LTCs something to debate about (for when they get bored debating the definitions of COIN, UW, etc...) So, to me, as I am trying to build a tool to refine my targeting, I see that a CV is a CR that is also vulnerable; so it is a subset of CRs. Each TF should be developing their own lists of CVs from the CR list for each definable populace area in their AOR. Some elements may be common to all, some will be unique. The key is to assess and think about it.
4. The next level of refinement is the HVT. This is where for each of your targeted communities you refine your list of CVs by felshing out specific categories within each of the broad PMESII categories. At this point you will begin to get a pretty good idea as to what type and amounts of funding you will need, and who might be the best providers to do the type of work required.
5. HVIs are the final refinement. This is the list of specific projects. At this point that platoon leader on the ground, or that USAID worker, etc should be able to show how their project maps all the way from HVI-HVT-CV-CR-COG as part of a comprehensive, yet focused scheme of engagement. Assessments must continuously refine this list and prioritize communities and projects for maximum effect.
Its a process. If it helps, use it, if not don't worry about it. If you employ some variant of this and it helps or doesn't, I'd love to hear about it as I continue to refine my thoughts on such things.
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