The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[M.L.]

... my concern is rather with the appropriate application versus inappropriate use of ANY military technique.

The Operational Level as holy grail is blatant misuse. Operational art is a concept, it has applicability in some cases, none in others. Its use in the wrong situation is at least wasteful and time consuming for little to no benefit and at worst is going to get people killed unnecessarily.

No argument here. The misuse of concepts is rampant (center of gravity comes to mind in the US system). My argument with Mr. Owen is with the existence of operational warfare. The fact that the concepts are misunderstood and/or badly applied is a related but separate issue. Just because something is misused doesn't make that something inherently bad.

[Ken White]

Just because something is misused doesn't make that something inherently bad.

Too many year in and watching the critter that is the US Army lead me to take strong exception. If something can be misused, it will be. Murphy rules, particularly in combat.

That is particularly true in the structured, heirarchial military environment. The solution is to, when misuse is detected, rapidly examine the issue and institute corrective measures. The US Army does not do that at all well. It is too bureaucratic to spot misuse until it is thoroughly embedded in the muscle memory of the organism; It is loth to take corrective measures because that means one GO would have to publicly criticize -- even if indirectly -- others, an absolute no-no; and / or admit that the 'system had erred -- another no-no; and lastly, the pet corrective measure is to punish everyone by introducing even more bureaucratic rules.

Ponder reflective belts in a combat zone. For that matter, ponder reflective belts in an Armed Force not in combat. Some dubious implications there...

Ergo, it is imperative that the potential for misuse be thoroughly understood and steps to mitigate the potential disasters be takenbefore a program is introduced. That really was not done with 100-5 (either edition of profound -- if different * -- impact). Unfortunately, it is rarely done with much of anything in the Army...

The US Army does not do take steps to preclude misuse of doctrine, equipment or ideas, either -- it is too eager to be seen as an intellectual catchment that is the equal of the vales of academe (scary thought, that...) and to be 'professional' in all things. That factor plus the too rapid turnover of senior personnel into too many quite different jobs and overlapping bosses and subordinates which creates short term-ism and 'my watch-itis' preclude sensible assessment of potential unintended consequences.

Someday, when you're old and gray, recall that some old Dude on an internet message board said "Mark my words, the proliferation and misuse of SAMS and Staffs as well as the Operational Level of War theme will each in their own way cause grave problems for the Army and that last will likely result in unnecessary deaths."

Laugh now -- but recall later...

* Also ponder those significant differences within six short years of 'immutable' Doctrine with a capital 'D.'

[M.L.]

Too many year in and watching the critter that is the US Army lead me to take strong exception. If something can be misused, it will be....

Perhaps this is true. However, it seems that it would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to build a body of doctrine which would be impossible to misuse. It is hard to think of a concept which hasn't been misinterpreted, misrepresented, misused, or even abused at one time or another.

Humans are imperfect creations which give rise to imperfect ideas and actions. Armies are made from humans, ergo....

We're probably stuck trying to do the best we can with the best ideas we can think of. And although I agree with you that the Army has its share of morons masquerading as leaders, it is as much a commentary on American society as it is the institution.

In short, I largely agree with your formulation of the problem, however, the solution seems to me to border on impossible.

[Ken White]

...it is as much a commentary on American society as it is the institution.

Armies represent the society from which they come...

In short, I largely agree with your formulation of the problem, however, the solution seems to me to border on impossible.

Given the current attitudes and culture, you're correct. However, there is a solution. Required is raising the standards for entry, officer and enlisted. Yes, that means fewer people in the active Army and thus a major strategic (and operational...) recast away from big Organizations and mass to flexible organizations and agility. We should allow the ArNG to be larger than the active Army with effectively current standards for available mass when required. Most importantly, we must significantly improve training, particularly initial entry training (also both officer and enlisted...). We train now better than ever but it's still just a bit above marginal...

All that must lead to fostering innovation and initiative as opposed to the current largely unintended but highly effective stifling of those traits. That will be difficult, American society's risk aversion has migrated into uniform.

However, those fixes will be for naught lacking a major revamp of the personnel system. The 1919 Per System with Congressionally mandated add-ons in the interest of 'fairness' are a major part of the problem. Trying to stick round pegs in square holes, the HRC goal, is a big part of that misuse problem...

The Per mavens will fight any change tooth and nail -- it'll make their job far more difficult. The senior Generals will not change it, the current system worked for them so any reform -- sorely needed -- will have to start at the bottom and work upward.

My belief is that Congress in the next few years will largely be receptive to logical changes. That window should be used.

I've spent many years frothing about our wasted potential -- but it's still there, it just needs to be unleashed (an advised term...).

[Pete]

... it just needs to be unleashed (an advised term...).

Watch out, Ken might be about to cry "Havoc" and let slip the beagles of Fayetteville.

[wm]

it seems that it would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to build a body of doctrine which would be impossible to misuse. It is hard to think of a concept which hasn't been misinterpreted, misrepresented, misused, or even abused at one time or another.

I propose that misuse of doctrine is not quite as significant a problem as abuse of it. Instantiating the apparent truth of the Bentham quotation in M.L.'s signature block, I propose two ways that doctrine is abused:

1. Unthinking application of doctrinal "school solutions" to solve operational problems I do not mean problems at the operational level of war. I do mean problems we encounter while trying to conduct any operation(the second definition for operation found in my earlier post of J Pub 1-02 definitions). Doctrine is a guide to help one formulate a solution for problems, not a canned set of solutions.

2. Trying to be too fine-grained when defining doctrinal terminology. In Chapter 3 of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle cautions the reader as follows:

We must not expect more precision than the subject-matter admits. . . . Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. . . . We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.

Expecting doctrine to provide an all-inclusive list of necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of any given term is actually a variation on the first instance of abuse, one which I would describe as solving problems by definition. This often works just fine in mathematics and theoretical physics, but not so well when we are contemplating the actions of those finitely rational creatures with feet of clay that we call human beings.

[M.L.]

I propose that misuse of doctrine is not quite as significant a problem as abuse of it. Instantiating the apparent truth of the Bentham quotation in M.L.'s signature block, I propose two ways that doctrine is abused:

1. Unthinking application of doctrinal "school solutions" to solve operational problems I do not mean problems at the operational level of war. I do mean problems we encounter while trying to conduct any operation(the second definition for operation found in my earlier post of J Pub 1-02 definitions). Doctrine is a guide to help one formulate a solution for problems, not a canned set of solutions.

2. Trying to be too fine-grained when defining doctrinal terminology. In Chapter 3 of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle cautions the reader as follows:

Expecting doctrine to provide an all-inclusive list of necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of any given term is actually a variation on the first instance of abuse, one which I would describe as solving problems by definition. This often works just fine in mathematics and theoretical physics, but not so well when we are contemplating the actions of those finitely rational creatures with feet of clay that we call human beings.

Fair criticisms. As you point out, the nature of doctrine is less a problem than the application of it. The villain here may be planning, or the application of doctrine to a given problem. The whole idea of "planning" in a military sense is formulating a solution for a given problem from beginning to end before any action has been taken. While this idea is useful for simple problems, it is less useful for complex problems.

The Cynefin framework is a useful tool for categorizing problems (http://www.slideshare.net/kdelarue/k...3-presentation).



You will see that simple and complicated problems lend themselves to the sort of planning espoused by many military professionals: sense the problem, categorize/analyze it, and apply the appropriate doctrinal solution based on previous analysis/categorization. Unfortunately, most military problems are not simple or complicated, but trend toward complex. In the case of complex problems, "planning" as we know it is less useful than acting, making sense of the response, then adapting. Obviously, a dogmatic adherence to doctrine precludes this sort of adaptive process.

[wm]

The villain here may be planning, or the application of doctrine to a given problem. The whole idea of "planning" in a military sense is formulating a solution for a given problem from beginning to end before any action has been taken.

I submit that one ought not to apply doctrine to solve a problem. Rather one ought to use doctrine as a way of informing one's thinking about a problem. However, doctrine ("what is taught" as Wilf so often reminds us) is only part of what one ought to apply to gain better understanding. Doctrine is that subcategory of the realm of common sense that is unique, in this case, to military knowledge. We each have a host of other pieces of knowledge, AKA common sense, from other frames of reference that should also be brought to bear.

Contrary to the assertion in the second sentence above, planning is not creating "a soup to nuts" (my paraphrase of "from beginning to end") solution to a problem. Instead, planning identifies a number of alternative steps that may make sense to start resolving a problem, based on one's current understanding of that problem. One is unlikely to have perfect understanding of a problem; and problems tend not to be static (that is, they morph as they are addressed--a variation on Heisenberg's discovery that to measure is to distort). Therefore, good planning includes the understanding that what is proposed is only a first approximation of the early steps in a way ahead. Additionally, good execution recognizes that any plan has limitations.

The Cynefin framework is a useful tool for categorizing problems (http://www.slideshare.net/kdelarue/k...3-presentation).



You will see that simple and complicated problems lend themselves to the sort of planning espoused by many military professionals: sense the problem, categorize/analyze it, and apply the appropriate doctrinal solution*based on previous analysis/categorization. Unfortunately, most military problems are not simple or complicated, but trend toward complex. In the case of complex problems, "planning" as we know it is less useful than acting, making sense of the response, then adapting. Obviously, a dogmatic adherence to doctrine precludes this sort of adaptive process.

*emphasis added by WM.

The quoted post included a very nice four-fold division (Bentham must be spinning his grave) of the problem set. However, it relies on a presumption that the relationship known as cause and effect holds--a premise that David Hume, among others, would contest vigorously. Additionally, by the very simplistic assertions, it seems to imply a one-to one mapping between effects and causes. I submit that generally a given problem had a multiple reasons for arising and that its resolution will also require multiple, and quite different, efforts. And, again, the bolded text points to the wrong way to apply doctrine IMHO.

[M.L.]

I submit that one ought not to apply doctrine to solve a problem. Rather one ought to use doctrine as a way of informing one's thinking about a problem....

Contrary to the assertion in the second sentence above, planning is not creating "a soup to nuts" (my paraphrase of "from beginning to end") solution to a problem....

The quoted post included a very nice four-fold division (Bentham must be spinning his grave) of the problem set. However, it relies on a presumption that the relationship known as cause and effect holds--a premise that David Hume, among others, would contest vigorously...

Just to be clear, I wasn't advocating the use of doctrine or planning as I articulated it. I was actually trying to point out how these concepts are commonly misused.

Also, there are systems in which cause/effect is not only straightforward, but predictable. However, these are usually mechanical, and to a lesser extent, biological systems. Hume wrote specifically about human rationality and knowledge, i.e. sociocultural (human) systems. These systems, Hume would agree, rarely display cause and effect as such. In fact, Dr. Russ Ackoff contended that there was no such thing in sociocultural systems due to the presence of choice (free will). Instead, he suggested the human systems consist of actions (no cause necessary), reactions ("effect" where an action is both necessary and sufficient), and response (where an action is necessary but not sufficient, however, someone chooses to act).

I would also contend that there is more to a complex or chaotic system than perceptions of cause and effect, namely emergence, co-evolution, etc...

Just wanted to clarify my own position on the matter...