The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Cavguy]

One of my CGSC instructors (retired officer) has this book coming out next month. He argues our fixation with Clausewitz is responsible for us becoming strategically muddled.

He's let some of it fly in my classes so far, my opinion is he has created a strawman of Clausewitz and the whole center of gravity concept. He believes the trinity only applied in his era, and is irrelevant.

He advocates a US way of war based on the style most articulated by Sherman, total war and mass destruction to crush the willingness of the targeted society to resist. He figures this historically as 5-18% of the relevant population as KIA. The reason populations should suffer is to humiliate the warrior class and show that they are impotent to protect their society.

Provocative, to say the least. I got into quite a debate with him in class over some of it, and the moral implications therof. The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.

I have paraphrased (perhaps inaccurately) some of the arguments made. Will have to wait for the book to appropriately and fairly respond to the arguments. Recommend Wilf review it for SWJ though.

The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward) (Hardcover)
by Stephen L. Melton
http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Del.../dp/0760337136
Product Description

In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the American military cast about for answers--and, bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz. This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the U.S. faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War--in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great. It should come as no surprise, then, that the military's conceptualization of modern offensive war, as well as its execution, has failed in every real-life test of our day.

This book reveals the failings of the U.S. Army in its adoption of a postmodern “Full Spectrum Operations" doctrine, which codifies Clauswitzian thinking. Such an approach, the author contends, leaves the military without the doctrine, training base, or force structure necessary to win offensive wars in our time. Instead, the author suggests, the army should adopt a new doctrinal framework based on an analysis of the historical record and previously successful American methods of war. A clear and persuasive critique of current operative ideas about warfare, The Clausewitz Delusion lays out a new explanation of victory in war, based on an analysis of wartime casualties and post-conflict governance. It is a book of critical importance to policymakers, statesmen, and military strategists at every level.

[Klugzilla]

It sounds like he is making the typical misinterpretation of the trinity. The trinity is composed of three principal tendencies or forces: hostility, chance, and purpose. These are universal to war and human nature. The "secondary" trinity (military, governement, and people) is often mistaken for what Uncle Carl was actually talking about and may not be applicable to all situations today. Tell him to go back to the pond.

[tequila]

That's an interesting one. The Soviets killed roughly 5-6% of the total population of Afghanistan and drove another 20% into exile in Iran and Pakistan. I'm having a bit of trouble remembering if they were successful, anyone?

[Rex Brynen]

That's an interesting one. The Soviets killed roughly 5-6% of the total population of Afghanistan and drove another 20% into exile in Iran and Pakistan. I'm having a bit of trouble remembering if they were successful, anyone?

I think you're confusing it with the success of the Rwandan government/Interahamwe against the RPF (10%+ of the population killed).

[kowalskil]

That's an interesting one. The Soviets killed roughly 5-6% of the total population of Afghanistan and drove another 20% into exile in Iran and Pakistan. I'm having a bit of trouble remembering if they were successful, anyone?

I do not think they benefitted from that war. In fact, it contributed to the end of the USSR.

Ludwik Kowalski
.

[Bill Moore]

I can't recall the books, but there were two that I recall reading that claimed the insurgents were ready to call it quits due to the brutal and effective tactics the Soviets were employing and this was according to the insurgents themselves. Maybe, or maybe not, I'm simply presenting a counterargument. It was clear that the introduction of the Stinger changed the character of the war in favor of the insurgents.

Oppressive and brutal COIN operations have been proven to work repeatedly, while half stepping has a very bad track record of success. I'm not advocating we forfeit our morals to crush another country's insurgent problem, but to claim that they "can't" kill their way out of the situation is misleading. In most cases they certainly can, but to do so would be a violation of international law and norms, a Pyrrhic victory, so we encourage them to pursue other strategies.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Zenpundit for linking a talk our Wilf gave in May 2011, enjoy:http://zenpundit.com/?p=4288

Scroll down to bottom of the article.

[Bill Moore]

David, thanks for the link, it was an interesting presentation. Although he probably posted in SWJ, I just don't recall seeing it, but his comment that war changes very slowly, but politics change all the time (thus shaping the way the war is fought) was helpful to me in framing the debate.

[tequila]

I can't recall the books, but there were two that I recall reading that claimed the insurgents were ready to call it quits due to the brutal and effective tactics the Soviets were employing and this was according to the insurgents themselves. Maybe, or maybe not, I'm simply presenting a counterargument. It was clear that the introduction of the Stinger changed the character of the war in favor of the insurgents.

Note that the Soviets had already decided to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1985, before the introduction of the Stinger missile. To put it in terms of American politics, they'd already reached their Tet '68 moment and were groping towards "Vietnamization".

[Bill Moore]

tequila, I was aware of that, but I don't think the reason was due to anything like a Tet offensive, but rather a realization that no good was going to come out of a continued occupation. The Soviets didn't suffer any major military defeats prior to 85 that I can recall. People object strongly when I propose we had similiar (far from identical) strategies, and while they didn't call it clear, hold and build, I can interpret their actions as such. They also had pockets of success, just we did.

According to a former KGB agent, the Soviets reportedly reached out the U.S. asking for some relief in Afghanistan, claiming that the West (to include the USSR) faced a common threat from Islamists. If true, they called that one correctly.

[Fuchs]

Note that the Soviets had already decided to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1985, before the introduction of the Stinger missile. To put it in terms of American politics, they'd already reached their Tet '68 moment and were groping towards "Vietnamization".

Did you expect Americans to have ever getting involved much in a conflict before it was too late to be decisive without screwing it up?

[Tom Odom]

He advocates a US way of war based on the style most articulated by Sherman, total war and mass destruction to crush the willingness of the targeted society to resist. He figures this historically as 5-18% of the relevant population as KIA. The reason populations should suffer is to humiliate the warrior class and show that they are impotent to protect their society.

Provocative, to say the least. I got into quite a debate with him in class over some of it, and the moral implications therof. The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.

Neil

I just wonder whether he has ever had the opportunity to see even 5% destruction of a population.

I have seen 10% and could see using the Sherman mantra were we taking on N Korea. But as his book relates to Iraq and Afghanistan, I would point out that the side that did kill 10% of the population, lost the war.

Tom

[John Grenier]

It sounds like he is making the typical misinterpretation of the trinity. The trinity is composed of three principal tendencies or forces: hostility, chance, and purpose. These are universal to war and human nature. The "secondary" trinity (military, governement, and people) is often mistaken for what Uncle Carl was actually talking about and may not be applicable to all situations today. Tell him to go back to the pond.

Klugzilla, paleez!

[Xenophon67]

"However brave a nation may be, however warlike its habits, however intense its hatred of the enemy, however favourable the nature of the country, it is an undeniable fact that a people's war cannot be kept up in an atmosphere too full of danger. If, therefore, its combustible material is to be fanned by any means into a considerable flame it must be at remote points where there is more air, and where it cannot be extinguished by one great blow." Clausewitz, On War, Chapter XXVI

Perhaps the Taliban do not fit exactly into the 'people's war' mold, however, I think this mainly unread chapter holds some weight when discussing the validity of CvC in Afghanistan.

Clearly, the number of dead civilians will not determine victory - absurd. Body counts...attrition...where is Bob McNamara when you need him?

Center of Gravity - elusive no doubt, lost in the fog of war, once 'found' does planning and execution fall victim to friction and the opportunity lost again - perhaps. CoGs do exist, they are viable, yet to muster the resources and especially the will to relentlessly attack them is another matter altogether.

Regardless of the means - the way to reach an end state is to make the 'atmosphere too dangerous' and to take the 'air' away.... Enough with the metaphors.

Population-centric COIN advocates need to rethink the CoG identification of the civilians as the singular source of Taliban power.

However costly (and probably unrealistic) it might be to seal off/control the border- it must be done. Simultaneously, totally eradicate the poppy fields. Then the Taliban are truly without air to breath, the very essence that gives them strength is gone.

"From this it follows that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy, whichever we call it, must always be the aim of warfare." Clausewitz, On War, Chapter 1

Sealing off the border (Algeria-Maurice Line) stops the influx of insurgents, arms and transport of opium. Destruction of the opium eliminates the money to pay the insurgents, buy the arms and bribe officials. Even if this effort is not totally successful it will lead to a culminating point whereby an 'overthrow' can occur, their resources denied to them, their air gone - a dangerous atmosphere indeed.

Victory - well how about after the overthrow an opponent 'pinned' to the ground. Perhaps it is best to talk about management of the conflict, on our terms, in our favor.

Good posts - very thought provoking. I am going back to scour CvC.....

[Schmedlap]

The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.

Given his background and yours (in terms of level of responsibility), does it feel like you're being scolded by a four-year-old? Just curious, because I've always wondered how I would react in a situation like that. Thankfully, it hasn't happened yet.

[Ken White]

One of my CGSC instructors (retired officer)...He advocates a US way of war based on the style most articulated by Sherman, The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it. (emphasis added /kw)

The part in bold, that is. Sounds like an ignorant and unduly arrogant twit I once knew. He's best ignored to the extent possible with an attitude like that. Why on earth would Leavenworth hire people like that to 'instruct' field grades?

As for his premise. There's a time and a place for Sherman rules -- there's also a time an place for a Mosby or a Morgan and several levels in between. Clausewitz did not have all the answers. Neither did John Boyd or Sun Tzu. Subadai for his time may have but he didn't write books about it -- he did it. My suspicion is that S.L. Melton will not have as many answers as the others who did write.

[MikeF]

Provocative, to say the least. I got into quite a debate with him in class over some of it, and the moral implications therof. The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.

That was one of the good things about the Defense Analysis department at NPS. We weren't considered students more like co-equals with different lessons to both teach and learn. The academics taught us the theories, and we confirmed/denied based off our practice. Much better learning environment.

As we studied Rick's Fiasco and other big strategic events going back to the Cuban Missle Crisis, I was struck that President Bush did not have a guy to point to hold responsible for Iraq or the overall GWOT. In our current structure, you have the National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State, DoD, Centcom, CPA, CJSOTF-AP, JSOC, and the MNF-I Commander. Everyone is in charge, but no one is in charge. This structure almost forecast us to muddle through big foreign policy decisions. By 2006, Bush finally had Patraeus to hold responsible for success or failure.

Before we bash Clausewitz, I think we should look at fixing Unity of Command.

v/r

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

And why not even more... lets kill every body. Then we are sure their is no one to interfere.

[William F. Owen]

I have paraphrased (perhaps inaccurately) some of the arguments made. Will have to wait for the book to appropriately and fairly respond to the arguments. Recommend Wilf review it for SWJ though.

Thanks Neil. I'd also suggest some of the bigger dogs in the SWC Pack give it a once over, and Taiko as well. IRRC he is doing his PhD on Clausewitz and is a fellow Clausewitian.
My immeadiate and unfounded reaction is that he has not actually read of understood Clausewitz, but I shall await evidence before passing judgement!

I am actually dealing with a very similar situation here at home, where a respected author has assigned to CvC a whole lot of things he never said or even meant to say. The real issue is usually a poor understanding of CvC rather then CvC being wrong.

Does anyone have a .pdf review copy?

[Cavguy]

I probably shouldn't have included the bit about the personal spat. Direct any inquiries on that to PM or my email. I was in a snarky mood that day, so perhaps being sniped at by the know-it-all young guy didn't sit right to a retired (O-5/O-6?). So blame can rest here as well, but my other instructors seem to handle being challenged on facts a little bit better.

That said, I am not well read (above the surface) on CvC, so I posted it here to see what the reactions were.

A friend on facebook asked the relevant question - "crap, if we kill this guy, we will go over 15 percent..."

I've been mulling over my thoughts on the subject, I haven't really ever denied that under the right conditions the "kill em all" method of COIN is effective, but I also maintain it's irrelevant to the task because we simply won't do it because of the evolution of values related to human rights. It's related to my Lyall/Wilson critique of comparing COIN 1800-1945 to later, because international norms as to what is acceptable (for a liberal democracy) have changed so drastically when compared to the challenges of COIN in the post-cold war world.