The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Bob's World]

Speaking of "Ends-Ways-Means", someone help me understand this as it applies to AFPAK.

When I go to what the President of the United States says the "Ends" are, he says quite clearly that it is:

“To disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”

As to "Ways" we have the ISAF Mission:

"In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population."

As to "Means", we have ISAF itself.

I guess my question is, in what universe do the Ways laid out in the ISAF mission lead to the Ends laid out by the President of the US??

[M.L.]

I guess my question is, in what universe do the Ways laid out in the ISAF mission lead to the Ends laid out by the President of the US??

Aha. Now THAT is a fantastic question, which goes right to the heart of the "strategy" in Af/Pak.

As I have often said, strategy is complex, but at its heart is the ends/ways/means equation. Achieving political ends with the military methods and resources available. All three must be linked and balanced.

I'd say the fact that your question must be asked is an indicator of a major strategic shortcoming.

[Pete]

Perching on the western edge of the Missouri River, Fort Leavenworth had been the home of the Infantry and Cavalry School since 1881. The initial purpose of the school was to train lieutenants for duties in units larger than companies. By 1893, the school’s curriculum had expanded to a two-year program taught by seven academic departments within what was now called the General Service and Staff College. The Department of Military Art taught classes in international law and military history, and the faculty used map problems to teach strategy and grand tactics at the corps, division and brigade levels. [italics added]

Almost as though by serendipity the other day SWJ Blog had an entry about Major General Fox Connor, the chief of operations of the AEF during the First World War. The quotation above is from an AUSA Land Power monogaph on General Connor by Major Ed Cox, who recently published a full-length biography of Connor.

My reason for posting is that in its context "grand tactics" in the above excerpt might be construed as being a sort of operational level of warfare. I'm ambivalent about this debate -- I really don't give a damn whether the U.S. Army has two or three levels of warfare, provided of course that the job gets done.

The 2001 version of Field Manual 3-0 had a really incoherent explanation of what the operational level was. I got the distinct impression when I read it that Fort Leavenworth tried to include all of the comments it had received on DA Form 2028 from the staff review of the draft manual -- hence what may have once been a useful definition of the operational level in the draft was rambling and all over the map in the published version. (If Fort Leavenworth won't defend its own version why should any of us care?) I haven't seen the current version of the manual and don't know how it defines the operational level or how useful that description is.

[jmm99]

From the 2008 FM 3-0 (3 page snip of 6-1 thru 6-3 attached) at p. 6-1, para 6.3:

The levels of war define and clarify the relationship between strategy, operational approach, and tactical actions (See figure 6-1, page 6-2). The levels have no finite limits or boundaries. They correlate to specific levels of responsibility and planning. They help organize thought and approaches to a problem. .....

Cheers

Mike

[Pete]

I'd say the fact that your question must be asked is an indicator of a major strategic shortcoming.

I doubt there is any formal mechanism that compels policy-makers at the national level to formally notify the Pentagon of every shift in foreign policy -- for that matter, nothing requires the White House press secretary to clear his statements in advance with DoD before they're announced to the public. It goes back to the extent to which different parts of the government are on the same sheet of music. President Obama didn't want an unseemingly abrupt withdrawal frm Afghanistan, but he didn't want to have the surge either. This disconnect between the Pentagon and White House has been known for months.

[jmm99]

I thought you were familiar with that universe - The White House, specifically the Office of the Press Secretary (For Immediate Release, December 01, 2009), Fact Sheet: The Way Forward in Afghanistan:

OUR MISSION: The President’s speech reaffirms the March 2009 core goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan. To do so, we and our allies will surge our forces, targeting elements of the insurgency and securing key population centers, training Afghan forces, transferring responsibility to a capable Afghan partner, and increasing our partnership with Pakistanis who are facing the same threats. ... [etc., etc.]

No mention of drones, direct actions or of any "attack plan" (except by AQ vs US) in this one or in this one, The Way Forward in Afghanistan.

Welcome to the wonderful universe of politics and policy.

Regards

Mike

PS: You know better than I that the stated end is being furthered by a continuation of OEF (e.g., drones, direct actions), divorced from ISAF.

[slapout9]

“To disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”

See that is exactly what I am talking about....that statement guarantees TOTAL Strategic failure! Al Qaeda is NOT a country, when you think in terms of countries you will loose.....they just move to Yeman(kant spelt stuff two gud)or anyplace else thay can find a support group.

[jmm99]

From The Children's Illustrated Clausewitz;

from start:

Guten Morgen, class. This week, we will be talking about the theory of war. We will be talking about how we define and classify the art of war and the science of war, and how we develop and study and analyze the theory of war. You must please listen very carefully to be sure that you understand. Some of this is quite hard to explain. ...

to end:

-What are ‘resources?’

Your resources are made up of your fighting forces – your men – and the country, the land and the people and things on it. In war, the result is never final. Things can always change. And things are different in theory than they are in reality. Yes, Otter?

-What’s ‘theory’ mean?

Not a bad question, kid; not a bad question at all.

Regards

Mike