Reply With QuoteHat tip to Zenpundit for linking a talk our Wilf gave in May 2011, enjoy:http://zenpundit.com/?p=4288
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Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the
Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army
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Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army
by Christopher Otero
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One of the most intellectually challenging moments in the United States Command and General Staff College is when after 10 years of serving in an Army at War you are finally introduced to the two major theorists of modern warfare, Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl Von Clausewitz. Both are considered to be the most prominent theorists of the western way of warfare and the question that often gets framed by our instructors is which of these two best inform your understanding of modern war? Do you consider yourself Jominian or Clausewitzian in your outlook?
Download the Full Article:Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army
MAJ Christopher Otero, USA, is an active duty military intelligence officer who has served multiple tours in Afghanistan and Iraq at the Battalion, Brigade Combat Team, and Division level. MAJ Otero is currently attending the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not reflect the position of the United States Army or the Department of Defense.
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Wilf Owen on Britain, Israel and the use of force
Hat tip to Zenpundit for linking a talk our Wilf gave in May 2011, enjoy:http://zenpundit.com/?p=4288
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davidbfpo
David, thanks for the link, it was an interesting presentation. Although he probably posted in SWJ, I just don't recall seeing it, but his comment that war changes very slowly, but politics change all the time (thus shaping the way the war is fought) was helpful to me in framing the debate.
Cog
Just a fledgling but did he not just id the COG as attrition of x percent of the population. Upon attaining said attrition the will of the enemy will be broken.
And Punitive campaigns are not Sherman's (American) strategy its Rome's strategery.
As for external actors modifying a people. Isnt that what conquerors do. I am pretty sure as you all have said post mcarthur japan, post Iskander iraq hell Istanbul now Constantinople Constantinople is now Istanbul
May the right ways find the right ends(ours). And politically total war is a high state of war That table sets itself. If the cold war went hot we woulda seen total war. It has to be costly for the people to find it necessary.
Note that the Soviets had already decided to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1985, before the introduction of the Stinger missile. To put it in terms of American politics, they'd already reached their Tet '68 moment and were groping towards "Vietnamization".Originally Posted by Bill Moore
tequila, I was aware of that, but I don't think the reason was due to anything like a Tet offensive, but rather a realization that no good was going to come out of a continued occupation. The Soviets didn't suffer any major military defeats prior to 85 that I can recall. People object strongly when I propose we had similiar (far from identical) strategies, and while they didn't call it clear, hold and build, I can interpret their actions as such. They also had pockets of success, just we did.
According to a former KGB agent, the Soviets reportedly reached out the U.S. asking for some relief in Afghanistan, claiming that the West (to include the USSR) faced a common threat from Islamists. If true, they called that one correctly.
Last edited by Bill Moore; 09-01-2011 at 09:42 AM.
Did you expect Americans to have ever getting involved much in a conflict before it was too late to be decisive without screwing it up?
Clausewitz and the Non-State Actor: A Contemporary Application of the Paradoxical Tri
Clausewitz and the Non-State Actor: A Contemporary Application of the Paradoxical Trinity to Countering Terrorism
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Hare Clausewitz Answers Your Questions
From The Children's Illustrated Clausewitz;
from start:
to end:Guten Morgen, class. This week, we will be talking about the theory of war. We will be talking about how we define and classify the art of war and the science of war, and how we develop and study and analyze the theory of war. You must please listen very carefully to be sure that you understand. Some of this is quite hard to explain. ...
Not a bad question, kid; not a bad question at all.
-What are ‘resources?’
Your resources are made up of your fighting forces – your men – and the country, the land and the people and things on it. In war, the result is never final. Things can always change. And things are different in theory than they are in reality. Yes, Otter?
-What’s ‘theory’ mean?
Regards
Mike
That basically accords with Soviet/Russian doctrine too. Strategy and Operations refered to territorial/geographic expressions within which even an Army or frnt level action was considered tactics whe in contact. I find that Soviet doctrine was much more rigourous in its conceptual usage. Though over-reliance on concepts warps reality knowing what they mean can be an important part of the cognitive cement that binds armies together (unlike SOD! which I think no-one understands outsdie the small psuedo-intelletucal beret wearers who formulated it).
What counts is the utility of the word.
To have a special word makes only sense if its content is distinct from the content of an alternative word.
The challenges faced by a modern corps commander or his WW2 equivalent, an army commander, are different than the challenges faced by a brigade commander.
Logistics play a greater role, fixed values become variables (such as through the ability to influence the theatre air war), geography and time are to be considered on another level. An army commander concerns himself with the question where to cross a river and what to do next, while a brigade commander is concerned with how to cross the river and how to get his folks over it in time to proceed.
You cannot expect much success if you take the classic tactics of a battalion and simply interpolate to Corps level. You need different stuff, and said different stuff should be identified with a different term.
I don't care much whether you call it "grand tactics", "operational art" or differently, but "operational art" happens to be the widespread term for it and this makes it first choice for communication. The choice has been made already, so there's little to gain by discussing language since the differences warrant a different term as laid out before.
Carl von Clausewitz, Meet Albert Einstein and Max Planck
Carl von Clausewitz, Meet Albert Einstein and Max Planck
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Jomini's view on the role of intelligence is prescriptive. In Jomini's, The Art of War, Article XLII, he discusses the role of intelligence. According to Jomini, "one of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war is to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the proceedings." Jomini, is specifically talking about the critical importance of analyzing your adversary's relative strengths and weaknesses in order to gain an advantage.
**The views expressed in this are those of MAJ Rizzuto, Command and General Staff College, and do not reflect the official policy of the Department of the Army, DoD or the US Government. **
Sounds nice, but Marshal Suvorov didn't care about this and never lost a battle.
Besides, research has revealed that we humans are idiots. We stick to our first impression, and info that arrives later only reinforces said impression - even if it's factually in conflict. This kind of undermines whatever sense a huge analytical effort makes in theory.
Sumida's Syllabus
Sumida wrote his book, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to "On War" (2008); book review by Janeen Klinger, Professor of Political Science, US Army War College.
Sumida's 2002 (pre-book) syllabus for his Clausewitz course, requires besides "On War" (P & H version), these refs:
Guy Claxton, Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind: How Intelligence Increases When You Think Less (New York: Harper Collins, 1997). A biography of my brain written by Claxton with my full tortoise-like co-operation.
Jon Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997; paperback 1999).
Jon Sumida, “The Relationship between History and Theory in On War: the Clausewitzian Ideal and Its Implications,” Journal of Military History, 65 (April 2001): 333-54. Re this article, you might want to look at Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War," International Security, 17:3 (Winter, 1992), pp. 59-90.
For anyone who is interested enough to actually work through this syllabus, Strassler's redo in The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, will probably be useful for review of basic power concepts.
Regards
Mike
And, to square the circle,
Hare Clausewitz Answers Your Questions:
From The Children's Illustrated Clausewitz.
Regards
Mike
Give Carl von Clausewitz and the Center of Gravity a Divorce
Give Carl von Clausewitz and the Center of Gravity a Divorce
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The Continuing Irrelevance of Clausewitz
The Continuing Irrelevance of Clausewitz
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The Clausewitz Homepage
The Clausewitz Homepage
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After the Divorce: Clausewitz and the Center of Gravity
After the Divorce: Clausewitz and the Center of Gravity
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