The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Dayuhan]

His main point is that none of the Iraq governance/occupation debacle should have been a mystery. We planned for 3 years prior to 1945 how we would govern Germany, and it paid off, with similar planning for Japan. If we had started with our 1945 governance regs/books we would have been better off.

He notes that before a country can be effectively occupied its will must be broken, and that our decisive/CoG effort against the Iraqi military failed to break the will of the population prior to occupation.

Certainly the planning for the governance and occupation of Iraq was woefully inadequate and based on some astonishingly inappropriate assumptions... but comparisons to Germany and Japan are unlikely to be useful. The same qualities that made Germany and Japan formidable opponents in war made them excellent candidates for organized reconstruction; likewise the same qualities that made Iraq such a failure at war made it an extremely poor candidate. The obvious difference - the extreme ethnic and sectarian divisions and the hostility produced by extended and brutal minority rule - is only the most obvious of many.

I suspect that failure to break the will of the population to resist our occupation was less an issue than our failure to accurately assess the will of the various sectors of the populace to kill each other.

[jmm99]

We first look to LTG Kiszerly's comments in regard to a portion of the historical development from Jomini to Fuller (the former with little substantial impact on the latter). We then will look to Jomini's Art of War taken as a whole, in its view of strategy and tactics.

1. Historical View of LTG Kiszely

Here we follow the development and expansion of Jomini's concept of "grand tactics" (which we will then show is something of a red herring in this particular historical kettle of fish). So, we proceed to John Kiszely, Thinking about the Operational Level (2005; HT to ML), pp.38-39 (pp. 1-2 pdf; emphasis added and paragraphs subdivided for ease of reading in this post and references to the endnotes, included here as subquotes):

A level between the tactical and strategic had also been identified by Baron Jomini, writing in the 1830s: a level he termed grand tactics. Jomini was much admired and quoted by many British military writers, such as E. B. Hamley, so that Jomini’s concept of ‘grand tactics’ was well known to the military establishment: for example, at the Staff College where Hamley was the commandant from 1870 to 1878. An instructor there at the end of the nineteenth century was the military historian, Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, who developed his own ideas of ‘grand tactics’ which he defined as ‘the higher art’ of generalship, ‘those stratagems, manoeuvres and devices by which victories are won’.[4]

4. Brian Holden Reid, Studies in British Military Thought. Debates with Fuller and Liddel Hart,(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), p.67 & 70.

But the greatest development of thinking in Britain about this level resulted from the work of J. F. C. Fuller. He, too, used the term grand tactics, which, in his 1926 book, The Foundations of the Science of War, he described as ‘the plan of the war or campaign…[which] secures military action by converging all means of waging war towards gaining a decision’. [5]

5. J. F. C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, (London: Hutchinson, 1926) pp 107-108.

He subsequently defined grand tactics as ‘the organization and distribution of the fighting forces themselves in order to accomplish the grand strategic plan, or idea’, [6] which is a long way from Jomini’s rather prosaic concept [7] and comes close indeed to our definition of the operational level today.

6. Holden Reid, op cit, p.65. See Chapter 5 ‘Fuller and the Operational Level’.

7. ‘Grand tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map.’ Baron Jomini, The Art of War, (London: Greenhill Books, 1996), p.69. According to Holden Reid, Jomini’s influence on Fuller was ‘negligible’, op cit, p.66.

Grand tactics, as defined by Jomini (as opposed to Henderson's and Fuller's later extensions), was based on tactical combinations, which linked tactics to operations and campaigns. Since the latter were expressly part of Jomini's strategy construct, it is true that grand tactics linked tactics and starategy. But, grand tactics were not part of operations and campaigns in Jomini's construct of the "art of war".

2. Summary of Jomin's Construct

Jomini's "The Art of War" is sometimes translated as "Summary of the Art of War". The original French ("Précis") may translate better to "handbook" than "summary"; but this relatively slim book was indeed a "summary" of Jomini's military studies and experiences as a staff officer expressed in prior multiple volumes.

The 1862 West Point Preface recommends starting with "Strategy" (Chap III) and then proceeding through the following chapters before returning to Chaps I and II. The first two chapters are concerned with the political and moral aspects of war (more akin to Policy/Politik and National Security Strategy, though those terms absent from Jomini - so also "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" are absent).

Following the advice from That Place on the Hudson, we will start with Chap III, entitled "Strategy" and subtitled "Definition of Strategy and the Fundamental Principle of War", which begins::

The art of war, independently of its political and moral relations, consists of five principal parts, viz: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Tactics of the different arms, and the Art of the Engineer. We will treat of the first three branches, and begin by defining them. In order to do this, we will follow the order of procedure of a general when war is first declared, who commences with the points of the highest importance, as a plan of campaign, and afterwards descends to the necessary details. Tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, and ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the formation and handling of a great army. (p.59)

We will follow Jomini's structure in his presentation of the first three "principal parts" of war, Strategy, Grand Tactics and Logistics. We continue with what the "strategic general" does first:

We will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of its commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the character of the war: then he must carefully study the theater of war, and select the most suitable base of operations, taking into consideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies. (p.59)

Jomini then continues with this simplified model war with introduction of a number of "terms of art" that are later much more fully described (pp.60-61). He then lists 13 points that are embraced by strategy (pp.61-62), which define the limits of his purely strategical construct. He also lists "other operations of a mixed nature" (river crossings through winter quarters) "the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy." (p.62). He also lists the 8 general objects of Grand Tactics (pp.62-63), after reiterating the differences between Strategy, Grand Tactics and Logistics:

The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different formations of troops for attack, constitute Grand Tactics. Logistics is the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the execution of strategical and tactical enterprises.

To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contra-distinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; Logistics brings the troops to this point; Grand Tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops. (p.62)

This introduction ends with the "Fundamental Principle of War" (pp.63-64) - basically: git thar firstest with the mostest.

The remainder of Chap III is captioned "Of Strategic Operations" (p.65) and is following by Arts. XVI-XXIX, which are expressly concerned witn operations.

Chap IV is titled "Grand Tactics and Battles" and continues in more specifics in Chap VII, “Of the Formation of Troops for Battle, and the Separate or Combined Use of the Three Arms"; again defining Grand Tactics:

Grand Tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles, as well as during their progress, The guiding principle in tactical combinations, as in those of startegy, is to bring the mass of the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that point the possession of which promises the most important results. (p.161)

Chap V is titled "Of Several Mixed Operations, Which Are in Character Partly Strategical and Partly Tactical".

The foregoing establishes that Jomini separated Strategy (including Operations) from Tactics (where Grand Tactics consisted of tactical combinations); knew Mixed Operations (Strategical-Tactical); and knew Logistics which supported both Strategy and Tactics depending on the context. His "operational art" (which was well developed in his system) was part of his strategical construct, except in a limited number of "Mixed Operations" (where "the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy"; see p.62).

Regards

Mike

[wm]

The villain here may be planning, or the application of doctrine to a given problem. The whole idea of "planning" in a military sense is formulating a solution for a given problem from beginning to end before any action has been taken.

I submit that one ought not to apply doctrine to solve a problem. Rather one ought to use doctrine as a way of informing one's thinking about a problem. However, doctrine ("what is taught" as Wilf so often reminds us) is only part of what one ought to apply to gain better understanding. Doctrine is that subcategory of the realm of common sense that is unique, in this case, to military knowledge. We each have a host of other pieces of knowledge, AKA common sense, from other frames of reference that should also be brought to bear.

Contrary to the assertion in the second sentence above, planning is not creating "a soup to nuts" (my paraphrase of "from beginning to end") solution to a problem. Instead, planning identifies a number of alternative steps that may make sense to start resolving a problem, based on one's current understanding of that problem. One is unlikely to have perfect understanding of a problem; and problems tend not to be static (that is, they morph as they are addressed--a variation on Heisenberg's discovery that to measure is to distort). Therefore, good planning includes the understanding that what is proposed is only a first approximation of the early steps in a way ahead. Additionally, good execution recognizes that any plan has limitations.

The Cynefin framework is a useful tool for categorizing problems (http://www.slideshare.net/kdelarue/k...3-presentation).



You will see that simple and complicated problems lend themselves to the sort of planning espoused by many military professionals: sense the problem, categorize/analyze it, and apply the appropriate doctrinal solution*based on previous analysis/categorization. Unfortunately, most military problems are not simple or complicated, but trend toward complex. In the case of complex problems, "planning" as we know it is less useful than acting, making sense of the response, then adapting. Obviously, a dogmatic adherence to doctrine precludes this sort of adaptive process.

*emphasis added by WM.

The quoted post included a very nice four-fold division (Bentham must be spinning his grave) of the problem set. However, it relies on a presumption that the relationship known as cause and effect holds--a premise that David Hume, among others, would contest vigorously. Additionally, by the very simplistic assertions, it seems to imply a one-to one mapping between effects and causes. I submit that generally a given problem had a multiple reasons for arising and that its resolution will also require multiple, and quite different, efforts. And, again, the bolded text points to the wrong way to apply doctrine IMHO.

[M.L.]

I submit that one ought not to apply doctrine to solve a problem. Rather one ought to use doctrine as a way of informing one's thinking about a problem....

Contrary to the assertion in the second sentence above, planning is not creating "a soup to nuts" (my paraphrase of "from beginning to end") solution to a problem....

The quoted post included a very nice four-fold division (Bentham must be spinning his grave) of the problem set. However, it relies on a presumption that the relationship known as cause and effect holds--a premise that David Hume, among others, would contest vigorously...

Just to be clear, I wasn't advocating the use of doctrine or planning as I articulated it. I was actually trying to point out how these concepts are commonly misused.

Also, there are systems in which cause/effect is not only straightforward, but predictable. However, these are usually mechanical, and to a lesser extent, biological systems. Hume wrote specifically about human rationality and knowledge, i.e. sociocultural (human) systems. These systems, Hume would agree, rarely display cause and effect as such. In fact, Dr. Russ Ackoff contended that there was no such thing in sociocultural systems due to the presence of choice (free will). Instead, he suggested the human systems consist of actions (no cause necessary), reactions ("effect" where an action is both necessary and sufficient), and response (where an action is necessary but not sufficient, however, someone chooses to act).

I would also contend that there is more to a complex or chaotic system than perceptions of cause and effect, namely emergence, co-evolution, etc...

Just wanted to clarify my own position on the matter...

[M.L.]

Well, I couldn't just let this thread die a graceful death. So, as my latest inflammatory comment, I offer yet more evidence that the consideration of resources is central to strategy.

Robert H. Kohn writes the following in the most recent issue of Army History (http://www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/AH78%28W%29.pdf):

The challenge to military professionalism in the twenty-first century lies in three interconnected areas. The first is intellectual: the ability to wage war successfully in a variety of circumstances without wasting the ives of soldiers or their equipment and supplies (which are always limited, even for a superpower at the zenith of its relative strength).

Later in the article, Kohn explicitly states that this is a strategy issue:

A failure in the first area—strategy—is obviously the most dangerous.

This seems to validate the Ends/Ways/Means construct (where Mean=Resources) as previously discussed.

Happy New Year all.

[slapout9]

In fact, Dr. Russ Ackoff contended that there was no such thing in sociocultural systems due to the presence of choice (free will). Instead, he suggested the human systems consist of actions (no cause necessary), reactions ("effect" where an action is both necessary and sufficient), and response (where an action is necessary but not sufficient, however, someone chooses to act).

While I am a fan of Dr. Ackoff the free will concept is pretty questionable. People are conditioned through Religion,Education,Family,etc. to the point that I would say free will is a pretty rare thing.

[slapout9]

This seems to validate the Ends/Ways/Means construct (where Mean=Resources) as previously discussed.

Happy New Year all.

Of course it means that. We even have ways and means committees in Congress which is why it will never change. However I do think CvC meant Fighting (tactics) when he talked means, at least that is my understanding.

[Infanteer]

Agreed with Slapout - I just reread the first 3 books of On War and I see "Means" as the application of violence through the engagement to meet the strategy.

Resources seemed to be lumped in with the preparation of forces for the fight, lying outside of the Ends-Ways-Means construct.

That being said, Ends-Ways-Means is simply a tool as Clausewitz saw it. You can define a new Ends-Ways-Means tool that includes resources, but some would say you're muddying the waters of essential definitions.

[M.L.]

Gents,

I'd refer you back to our German friend Fuchs who aptly pointed out that the German word used in on war has a dual meaning of both methods and tools (resources). Furthermore, you'll note that CvC uses the word in both these contexts in On War. The modern construct delineates these two concepts into separate concepts for clarity. So, the modern ends/ways/means is in keeping with CvC's idea, just not his phraseology.

[Bob's World]

Speaking of "Ends-Ways-Means", someone help me understand this as it applies to AFPAK.

When I go to what the President of the United States says the "Ends" are, he says quite clearly that it is:

“To disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”

As to "Ways" we have the ISAF Mission:

"In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population."

As to "Means", we have ISAF itself.

I guess my question is, in what universe do the Ways laid out in the ISAF mission lead to the Ends laid out by the President of the US??

[M.L.]

I guess my question is, in what universe do the Ways laid out in the ISAF mission lead to the Ends laid out by the President of the US??

Aha. Now THAT is a fantastic question, which goes right to the heart of the "strategy" in Af/Pak.

As I have often said, strategy is complex, but at its heart is the ends/ways/means equation. Achieving political ends with the military methods and resources available. All three must be linked and balanced.

I'd say the fact that your question must be asked is an indicator of a major strategic shortcoming.

[jmm99]

I thought you were familiar with that universe - The White House, specifically the Office of the Press Secretary (For Immediate Release, December 01, 2009), Fact Sheet: The Way Forward in Afghanistan:

OUR MISSION: The President’s speech reaffirms the March 2009 core goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan. To do so, we and our allies will surge our forces, targeting elements of the insurgency and securing key population centers, training Afghan forces, transferring responsibility to a capable Afghan partner, and increasing our partnership with Pakistanis who are facing the same threats. ... [etc., etc.]

No mention of drones, direct actions or of any "attack plan" (except by AQ vs US) in this one or in this one, The Way Forward in Afghanistan.

Welcome to the wonderful universe of politics and policy.

Regards

Mike

PS: You know better than I that the stated end is being furthered by a continuation of OEF (e.g., drones, direct actions), divorced from ISAF.

[Pete]

Perching on the western edge of the Missouri River, Fort Leavenworth had been the home of the Infantry and Cavalry School since 1881. The initial purpose of the school was to train lieutenants for duties in units larger than companies. By 1893, the school’s curriculum had expanded to a two-year program taught by seven academic departments within what was now called the General Service and Staff College. The Department of Military Art taught classes in international law and military history, and the faculty used map problems to teach strategy and grand tactics at the corps, division and brigade levels. [italics added]

Almost as though by serendipity the other day SWJ Blog had an entry about Major General Fox Connor, the chief of operations of the AEF during the First World War. The quotation above is from an AUSA Land Power monogaph on General Connor by Major Ed Cox, who recently published a full-length biography of Connor.

My reason for posting is that in its context "grand tactics" in the above excerpt might be construed as being a sort of operational level of warfare. I'm ambivalent about this debate -- I really don't give a damn whether the U.S. Army has two or three levels of warfare, provided of course that the job gets done.

The 2001 version of Field Manual 3-0 had a really incoherent explanation of what the operational level was. I got the distinct impression when I read it that Fort Leavenworth tried to include all of the comments it had received on DA Form 2028 from the staff review of the draft manual -- hence what may have once been a useful definition of the operational level in the draft was rambling and all over the map in the published version. (If Fort Leavenworth won't defend its own version why should any of us care?) I haven't seen the current version of the manual and don't know how it defines the operational level or how useful that description is.

[jmm99]

From the 2008 FM 3-0 (3 page snip of 6-1 thru 6-3 attached) at p. 6-1, para 6.3:

The levels of war define and clarify the relationship between strategy, operational approach, and tactical actions (See figure 6-1, page 6-2). The levels have no finite limits or boundaries. They correlate to specific levels of responsibility and planning. They help organize thought and approaches to a problem. .....

Cheers

Mike

[Pete]

I'd say the fact that your question must be asked is an indicator of a major strategic shortcoming.

I doubt there is any formal mechanism that compels policy-makers at the national level to formally notify the Pentagon of every shift in foreign policy -- for that matter, nothing requires the White House press secretary to clear his statements in advance with DoD before they're announced to the public. It goes back to the extent to which different parts of the government are on the same sheet of music. President Obama didn't want an unseemingly abrupt withdrawal frm Afghanistan, but he didn't want to have the surge either. This disconnect between the Pentagon and White House has been known for months.

[slapout9]

“To disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”

See that is exactly what I am talking about....that statement guarantees TOTAL Strategic failure! Al Qaeda is NOT a country, when you think in terms of countries you will loose.....they just move to Yeman(kant spelt stuff two gud)or anyplace else thay can find a support group.

[Xenophon67]

"However brave a nation may be, however warlike its habits, however intense its hatred of the enemy, however favourable the nature of the country, it is an undeniable fact that a people's war cannot be kept up in an atmosphere too full of danger. If, therefore, its combustible material is to be fanned by any means into a considerable flame it must be at remote points where there is more air, and where it cannot be extinguished by one great blow." Clausewitz, On War, Chapter XXVI

Perhaps the Taliban do not fit exactly into the 'people's war' mold, however, I think this mainly unread chapter holds some weight when discussing the validity of CvC in Afghanistan.

Clearly, the number of dead civilians will not determine victory - absurd. Body counts...attrition...where is Bob McNamara when you need him?

Center of Gravity - elusive no doubt, lost in the fog of war, once 'found' does planning and execution fall victim to friction and the opportunity lost again - perhaps. CoGs do exist, they are viable, yet to muster the resources and especially the will to relentlessly attack them is another matter altogether.

Regardless of the means - the way to reach an end state is to make the 'atmosphere too dangerous' and to take the 'air' away.... Enough with the metaphors.

Population-centric COIN advocates need to rethink the CoG identification of the civilians as the singular source of Taliban power.

However costly (and probably unrealistic) it might be to seal off/control the border- it must be done. Simultaneously, totally eradicate the poppy fields. Then the Taliban are truly without air to breath, the very essence that gives them strength is gone.

"From this it follows that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy, whichever we call it, must always be the aim of warfare." Clausewitz, On War, Chapter 1

Sealing off the border (Algeria-Maurice Line) stops the influx of insurgents, arms and transport of opium. Destruction of the opium eliminates the money to pay the insurgents, buy the arms and bribe officials. Even if this effort is not totally successful it will lead to a culminating point whereby an 'overthrow' can occur, their resources denied to them, their air gone - a dangerous atmosphere indeed.

Victory - well how about after the overthrow an opponent 'pinned' to the ground. Perhaps it is best to talk about management of the conflict, on our terms, in our favor.

Good posts - very thought provoking. I am going back to scour CvC.....

[kowalskil]

That's an interesting one. The Soviets killed roughly 5-6% of the total population of Afghanistan and drove another 20% into exile in Iran and Pakistan. I'm having a bit of trouble remembering if they were successful, anyone?

I do not think they benefitted from that war. In fact, it contributed to the end of the USSR.

Ludwik Kowalski
.

[Bill Moore]

I can't recall the books, but there were two that I recall reading that claimed the insurgents were ready to call it quits due to the brutal and effective tactics the Soviets were employing and this was according to the insurgents themselves. Maybe, or maybe not, I'm simply presenting a counterargument. It was clear that the introduction of the Stinger changed the character of the war in favor of the insurgents.

Oppressive and brutal COIN operations have been proven to work repeatedly, while half stepping has a very bad track record of success. I'm not advocating we forfeit our morals to crush another country's insurgent problem, but to claim that they "can't" kill their way out of the situation is misleading. In most cases they certainly can, but to do so would be a violation of international law and norms, a Pyrrhic victory, so we encourage them to pursue other strategies.

[SWJ Blog]

From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War

Entry Excerpt:

From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War
by Tony Corn

Download the Full Article: From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War

A decade after 9/11, the absurdity of the U.S. grand strategy in the Long War is never better illustrated than by the fact that Washington currently spends $ 100 billion dollars a year in Afghanistan chasing a grand total of 100 Al Qaeda fighters (one billion per terrorist). If there is only one reason to rediscover Liddell Hart today, it is because, as Sir Ernest Rutherford famously said in a different context: “We are running out of money, gentlemen. It’s time to start thinking.”

Download the Full Article: From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War

Dr. Tony Corn taught European Studies at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute in Washington DC.



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