The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Bob's World]

"How" the things one does to extend good govnernance to the populace is essential, but that belongs to the executor. What one does requires a degee of management that I feel is currently lacking or misguided in a age where the majority position falling out of Iraq-based experience is to focus on "effectiveness" of governance to solve insurgency.

This is just a tool, some will see utility in it, others won't. For those who get fidgitty when someone deviates from doctrine, here are the key areas where I intentionally ignored the doctrinal approach and why:

1. No friendly vs enemey COGs to be defended and attacked. Instead a recogniation that in true COIN it is a competition to gain the support of a single (though complex, and multi-faceted) populace COG.

2. Doctrine has action officers cook up a random list of CRs that they think are related to the Critical Capbabilities of the COG. I find this illogical. I pick a COG because of the Crtiical Capabilities that come from that COG; but to defeat a COG I must go after its inputs, not its outputs; so my approach is to focus CRs on what the INPUTS are to the COG; or in this case, what are the elements of governance that a government can employ to support its populace. Also for CRs, instead of allowing every task force staff to dream up their own random list, I recommend that you pick one general, acceptable construct. I Chose PMESII for it's wide acceptance and applicability, recognizing that focus comes later in the process, and that CRs merely set the framework.

3. Next, the doctrinal approach comes up with a completely different list of factors from CRs when developing CVs. If all your task forces were on a separate page at CR, they are definitely in separate worlds by the time they all generate their own ideas on what CVs are. IMO this aspect of COG doctrine is why so many dismiss it as an interesting, but largely unhelpful, intellectual process that gives Majors and LTCs something to debate about (for when they get bored debating the definitions of COIN, UW, etc...) So, to me, as I am trying to build a tool to refine my targeting, I see that a CV is a CR that is also vulnerable; so it is a subset of CRs. Each TF should be developing their own lists of CVs from the CR list for each definable populace area in their AOR. Some elements may be common to all, some will be unique. The key is to assess and think about it.

4. The next level of refinement is the HVT. This is where for each of your targeted communities you refine your list of CVs by felshing out specific categories within each of the broad PMESII categories. At this point you will begin to get a pretty good idea as to what type and amounts of funding you will need, and who might be the best providers to do the type of work required.

5. HVIs are the final refinement. This is the list of specific projects. At this point that platoon leader on the ground, or that USAID worker, etc should be able to show how their project maps all the way from HVI-HVT-CV-CR-COG as part of a comprehensive, yet focused scheme of engagement. Assessments must continuously refine this list and prioritize communities and projects for maximum effect.

Its a process. If it helps, use it, if not don't worry about it. If you employ some variant of this and it helps or doesn't, I'd love to hear about it as I continue to refine my thoughts on such things.

[Dayuhan]

5. HVIs are the final refinement. This is the list of specific projects. At this point that platoon leader on the ground, or that USAID worker, etc should be able to show how their project maps all the way from HVI-HVT-CV-CR-COG as part of a comprehensive, yet focused scheme of engagement. Assessments must continuously refine this list and prioritize communities and projects for maximum effect.

Its a process. If it helps, use it, if not don't worry about it. If you employ some variant of this and it helps or doesn't, I'd love to hear about it as I continue to refine my thoughts on such things.

Again, though, where is the host nation government in this process? Is it just US Military, USAID, US Agencies involved?

If the key problem is, say, the lack of a road or a bridge or an irrigation system, it might be possible to address this with a project funded by AID and protected by the military, driven purely by US involvement. Rarely is it so simple. What if your driver of conflict is, for example, conflict over land between a migrant and an indigenous population? Or central government support for a regional governor that a segment of the population considers to be irretrievably hostile to their interests? Or a government's desire to extract resources that a portion of the population regards as theirs? Or a perception that government is taking sides in a longstanding clan or tribal dispute? Or... obviously this could go on and on, but the point is simple: more often than not the problems driving insurgency are not things that one set of Americans can draw up a list of and whistle in a group of American agencies to neatly solve. More often than not elements of host country government will be neck deep in the problem; they may not be at all sympathetic with the solutions we may propose. There may be a number of actors on the ground with conflicting agendas. Some of them may have agendas quite conrary to ours. The idea that "we" - by definition outsiders and not direct parties to the insurgency - can simply walk into a situation, identify "the problem", and develop a program among our agencies to solve it seems to leave out some realities that are almost always present in these situations.

[Bob's World]

Again, though, where is the host nation government in this process? Is it just US Military, USAID, US Agencies involved?

If the key problem is, say, the lack of a road or a bridge or an irrigation system, it might be possible to address this with a project funded by AID and protected by the military, driven purely by US involvement. Rarely is it so simple. What if your driver of conflict is, for example, conflict over land between a migrant and an indigenous population? Or central government support for a regional governor that a segment of the population considers to be irretrievably hostile to their interests? Or a government's desire to extract resources that a portion of the population regards as theirs? Or a perception that government is taking sides in a longstanding clan or tribal dispute? Or... obviously this could go on and on, but the point is simple: more often than not the problems driving insurgency are not things that one set of Americans can draw up a list of and whistle in a group of American agencies to neatly solve. More often than not elements of host country government will be neck deep in the problem; they may not be at all sympathetic with the solutions we may propose. There may be a number of actors on the ground with conflicting agendas. Some of them may have agendas quite conrary to ours. The idea that "we" - by definition outsiders and not direct parties to the insurgency - can simply walk into a situation, identify "the problem", and develop a program among our agencies to solve it seems to leave out some realities that are almost always present in these situations.

HN must be out front. Sorry not to state something so obvious. In fact, best if the HN is doing this all by itself, all the time, and never requiring any outside assistance what so ever.

Which goes to my points that COIN is no more and no less than the continuous process of governance by the HN for its own populace. And only when it loses touch with its duties to its populace does it find itself facing an insurgency. Outside parties come to such troubled states either to protect their interests there (FID) or to create interests there (UW). It is a continuous process in every country, everywhere, everyday. We only notice when it goes kinetic and somehow involves us.

This is why I caution severely any (and this is most) who think they are doing COIN when they go to another's country. To take such a perspective on your role is to set yourself on a course of inappropriate actions and mission creep. And I don't see the fact that one invaded and removed the existing government as an excuse unless you also annexed the country and claimed it as your own and intend to keep it as such. Otherwise, you are back in the FID role again and need to work diligently to not take on too much of the role of the sovereign, nor to create too much of a perception that the new government draws its legitmacy more from you the invader than from the populace of that land. Tricky business all around.

[wm]

I think I understand Bob's World's position about the onus being in the government to provide for its citizens. However, this requirement applies only under certain of the many mythologies that explain the formation of nation states, to my mind most prominently in the social contract myth, like those of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau, so prevalent in the Western world.

Other possible explanations for the origin and function for government exist. One might check out Clifford Geertz' Negara for example. Or the Chinese Legalist position of Han Fei Tzu(not to mention the neo-Confucianism of Chuang Tzu or Lao-Tzu's Taoism) [apologies for not using the latest and greatest transliterations of Chinese names].

And, the Western myths aren't univocal. Revolution against a bad instantiation of the great Leviathan/government is not allowable according to Hobbes, but is according to Locke and, arguably, is required in Rousseau's version.

I see paternalism at work here: telling people what is good for them and then trying to force them to do it. Maybe a better course of action might be generated by first figuring out what the people whose lives we are trying to improve really want to improve those lives. Perhaps that would be a better way to proceed than ramming some external conception of good governance down their throats.

[Bob's World]

I've never recommended paternalism, or controlling of the populace by government, but always that government exists to serve the populace, and that when they are weak in that role discontent will build, particualrly when it manifests in a building sense of injustice or disrespect among a significant (not by size necessarily) segment of the society, who also perceives that they have no legitimate recourse.

Most governments need to take a 12-step program when faced with such blowback from their populace, and step one is to say "Hello, my name is the government of X, and I have a problem." Way to easy to rationalize your problems and blame those around you as you go down in flames...

[Dayuhan]

HN must be out front. Sorry not to state something so obvious. In fact, best if the HN is doing this all by itself, all the time, and never requiring any outside assistance what so ever.

Which goes to my points that COIN is no more and no less than the continuous process of governance by the HN for its own populace.

Having this same discussion on another thread, I guess that's not too unusual.

It may be obvious that the HN government must be out front, but it seems equally obvious to me that if the HN government had the will and capacity to be there, there wouldn't be any need for our presence. If we're in the picture, the HN government probably lacks that will and capacity in the first place.

This is why I caution severely any (and this is most) who think they are doing COIN when they go to another's country. To take such a perspective on your role is to set yourself on a course of inappropriate actions and mission creep. And I don't see the fact that one invaded and removed the existing government as an excuse unless you also annexed the country and claimed it as your own and intend to keep it as such. Otherwise, you are back in the FID role again and need to work diligently to not take on too much of the role of the sovereign, nor to create too much of a perception that the new government draws its legitmacy more from you the invader than from the populace of that land. Tricky business all around.

A very tricky business. In our current case, the perception that the host government draws its legitimacy and existence from us is already there. We choose between trying to take on responsibility ourselves, and possibly undermining the government we wish to succeed, or passing responsibility to a government that often has neither the will nor the capacity to use that responsibility to achieve what we believe to be the necessary goals. It's a thin line to walk and in some cases there may be little or no space between those poles.

[Bob's World]

Having this same discussion on another thread, I guess that's not too unusual.

It may be obvious that the HN government must be out front, but it seems equally obvious to me that if the HN government had the will and capacity to be there, there wouldn't be any need for our presence. If we're in the picture, the HN government probably lacks that will and capacity in the first place.



A very tricky business. In our current case, the perception that the host government draws its legitimacy and existence from us is already there. We choose between trying to take on responsibility ourselves, and possibly undermining the government we wish to succeed, or passing responsibility to a government that often has neither the will nor the capacity to use that responsibility to achieve what we believe to be the necessary goals. It's a thin line to walk and in some cases there may be little or no space between those poles.

As a LT in West Germany, at the end of a 6-week Graf-Hohenfels rotation there would be long lines of tanks and APCs across the motorpool, waiting to get on the washrack so that they could be cleaned and loaded onto the train back to Mannheim.

The warning was always "never cut between the vehicles, either go around, or go over, but never between." Everyone understood the dangers of getting between two such dangerous forces, yet most also rationalized that getting crushed was something that happened to others who weren't nearly as capable of crafty about executing such a maneuver as they were.

Yet every so often another soldier would be crushed or cut in half giving it a go. The benfits were obvious, and the odds low, thought the consequences high.

Nations intervening in the insurgencies of others is very similar in many respects. And I am sure all are quite surprised when the find themselves suddenly, and often fatally, trapped by the decision.

[Dayuhan]

Nations intervening in the insurgencies of others is very similar in many respects. And I am sure all are quite surprised when the find themselves suddenly, and often fatally, trapped by the decision.

This is certainly true, as we learned (one hopes) in the cold war. It's worth noting, though, that our current engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan do not really fall into this category. In neither case did we intervene in the insurgency of another. These were cases where we intervened to remove governments that we found distasteful. In both cases the removal was relatively straightforward; the difficulty came in the aftermath.

Removing a government creates a vacuum, and nature abhors a vacuum, in politics as much as in physics. We built our interventions around the assumption that once national governments acceptable to us and the international community were installed, the vacuum would be filled. That assumption proved overly optimistic. In my view what we see in Iraq and Afghanistan is less insurgency than continued armed competition over the right to fill the vacuum left by the removal of the previous governments. We may have declared that vacuum filled by the installation of the governments that now exist, but that declaration has not halted the competition.

[Bob's World]

These things take time to sort out. I actually was thinking about my poor governance definition when I woke up this morning (I know, sadly this is in fact what I was thinking about as I rolled out of the rack at about 0430 to hit the gym on a Christmas morning...)

I decided to modify the first part of my test. I am keeping "disrespect" and "injustice" as major causal factors of insurgency, but am dropping one I was never really satisfied with of "outrage" and replacing it with "illigitimacy." When a populace feels that it is being disrespected by its governance, receiving injustice from its governance, or that its governance is illigitimate; AND they feel they have no legitimate means of recourse to address the problem; then you have "poor governance" and causation for insurgency.

This is much better.

So, going to Iraq and Afghanistan; our invasions may have done much to address issues in those countries prior in regards to injustice and disrespect; but, and this is the big but, how does one overcome the perceptions of illigitimacy that are the natural side product of any externally driven change of governance?? In the near term, not much.

This is why I think the key to success in Afghanistan lies in the Loya Jirga. While any government enabled by the coalition will lack legitimacy; and any government formed by western-style voting coupled with Afghan-style manipulation will lack legitimacy; the Loya Jirga is well recognized across the populace as legitimate. We must tap into this source of legitimacy to really have a chance to free the government here from the stench of Western illigitimacy.

The issue becomes one of control. Western policy is rooted in exerting control of outcomes (or not recognizing outcomes that are outside that control and contrary to Western desires). This is the catch-22. We cannot enable the legitimacy requried to strike at the roots of the insurgency without first relinquishing control of both the process and the outcomes.

Do we have the moral balls to do the right thing? I don't know. I fear that we don't, but I hope that we do.

[slapout9]

These things take time to sort out. I actually was thinking about my poor governance definition when I woke up this morning (I know, sadly this is in fact what I was thinking about as I rolled out of the rack at about 0430 to hit the gym on a Christmas morning...)

Sounds like good Airborne training to me Merry Xmas.

[Bill Moore]

Bob,

Merry Christmas!

I have been dwelling on the political-military nexux of conflict also, and I'm finding it difficult to identify any motivations for violence that I can't tie to what Thucydides identified as the motivation for war (or conflict): fear, honor, and interest

Ethnic hatred is usually fear, but can touch interests and honor

Economic viability is interest

Disrespect is honor

If a government can address their constituents fears, maintain their honor and look after their varied interests I would call that legitimacy and suspect there would be relative peace. This is not easy, or even possible when there are numerous warring groups with conflicting interests, pride and fear abounds. In this case, the government can't address the issue (I guess you could call it root causes) and it will likely boil over into violence.

I think our challenge is identifying ways to establish relative stability without depending on government legitimacy, but to that will require substantial changes in the international and our system on how we respond (to include forms of what will look like colonialism, redrawing borders, and in extreme cases warring against select populations when it is determined that they are hopefully hostile and it they're a danger to high value national interests).

I'm sure there is a better way to put it, but legitimacy is a complex condition that is constantly shifting and Thucydides seems to me to have captured a lot of it. If he is right, then are situations where we will have to fight, and hoping to obtain peace through digging wells, building schools, etc. will remain a pipe dream.

[Bob's World]

Bob,

Merry Christmas!

I have been dwelling on the political-military nexux of conflict also, and I'm finding it difficult to identify any motivations for violence that I can't tie to what Thucydides identified as the motivation for war (or conflict): fear, honor, and interest

Ethnic hatred is usually fear, but can touch interests and honor

Economic viability is interest

Disrespect is honor

If a government can address their constituents fears, maintain their honor and look after their varied interests I would call that legitimacy and suspect there would be relative peace. This is not easy, or even possible when there are numerous warring groups with conflicting interests, pride and fear abounds. In this case, the government can't address the issue (I guess you could call it root causes) and it will likely boil over into violence.

I think our challenge is identifying ways to establish relative stability without depending on government legitimacy, but to that will require substantial changes in the international and our system on how we respond (to include forms of what will look like colonialism, redrawing borders, and in extreme cases warring against select populations when it is determined that they are hopefully hostile and it they're a danger to high value national interests).

I'm sure there is a better way to put it, but legitimacy is a complex condition that is constantly shifting and Thucydides seems to me to have captured a lot of it. If he is right, then are situations where we will have to fight, and hoping to obtain peace through digging wells, building schools, etc. will remain a pipe dream.

One certainly discounts the importance of Ethnicity and and Honor to one's peril in Afhganistan. And in a recent poll, nearly twice the percentage of Kandahar City cited "Economy" as cited "security" as their number one concern.

The Taliban offer young men a paycheck to fight foreign invaders. That hits all three of Thucydides' points. Any competing coalition plan must do the same.

[John]

Late reply, I have been out of the net. Concur with your comments. However, I submit that careful analysis must be conducted to ensure that we do not misconstrue aims and objectives between political and ideological based insurgencies.

Food for thought perhaps or you may leave you famished.

[jmm99]

Hi John & welcome,

As to this:

However, I submit that careful analysis must be conducted to ensure that we do not misconstrue aims and objectives between political and ideological based insurgencies.

What is your distinction between a politically-based insugency and an ideologically-based insugency ?

Yes, by all means keep the diet you feed me simple - a couple of examples of each would suffice.

Oh, and, another question: Do you feel that distinction is important to the practitioner at the basic local tactical level; and, if so, why ?

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

What is your distinction between a politically-based insugency and an ideologically-based insugency ?

Jmm99, Concur. Isn't politics born of ideology? Wars can only be caused by politics. There are simply no other causes. What the politics is about may differ, but ALL War is ALWAYS political.

[John]

Mike -

Thanks for the comments. Up front...I continue to wrestle with the distinction. Here are a couple of ideological based insurgent group ideas.... arguably religion could enter the discussion. I say the Ku Klux Klan, under the auspices of racism perhaps, but also ideological. Additionally, al Qaeda, depending on distinction, is ideological. Honestly, I believe the distinction, in the context of al Qaeda, is subtle if we agree that their strategic endstate is restoration of the Caliphate. Here is my thought, if one labels AQ, in a broader context as terrorists, than one could argue they are waging a war against governments to expand their ideology. Yet, that ideology is established to restore a political model.

I do believe a distinction must be made if it provides the practitioner a context for interaction with the local populace. Additionally, the distinction allows tactical units to differentiate between who they are "fighting": hardcore insurgents, criminal factions, accidental insurgents, etc.

What say you? I am always eager to explore ideas.

Best
John

[Surferbeetle]

Brother Wilf,

You know my thoughts on CvC, IMHO he focuses exclusively upon only one variable of a multivariate equation, and so I question your CvC inspired assertion that we can reduce the causative reasons for war to just a political variable. In my experience and studies Security and Economics variables are inseparably interrelated with Politics/Governance variables.

Whooptie...let's look further than just my opinion or yours and see if a holistic approach to war is quantifiable/politics can be disaggregated from the data set that describes war.

Political Instability Task Force

Political Instability Task Force (formerly known as State Failure Task Force) was a U.S. government-sponsored research project to build a database on major domestic political conflicts leading to state failures.

The project was begun as an unclassified study that was commissioned to a group of academics (particularly active was the Center for Global Policy at George Mason University) by the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence in response to a request from senior U.S. policy makers in 1994. A similar project (Project Camelot) generated much controversy in the 1960s.

The task force repeated this analysis for global and regional data sets and produced fairly consistent findings. The three statistically significant variables most often associated with political upheavals were:
* regime type,
* international trade and
* infant mortality.

Steve

[William F. Owen]

I do believe a distinction must be made if it provides the practitioner a context for interaction with the local populace. Additionally, the distinction allows tactical units to differentiate between who they are "fighting": hardcore insurgents, criminal factions, accidental insurgents, etc.

What say you? I am always eager to explore ideas.

OK, so why the distinction? How does that distinction help you set forth the policy? I submit that the difference makes no differences when it comes to actions.

There is no such thing as an "accidental guerrilla" - it's an misnomer based on poor understanding and a worse description. They are fighting for a political purpose. They have a political aim that = "you go away and leave us alone." You may not have intended to upset them, but you did. That does not make their actions "accidental," or the fact that they oppose you "accidental". Replace "accidental guerilla" with "Stupid Policy" and we can have sensible discussions.

Yes, your response should be in line with the policy, but your policy can never usefully distinguish between "ideology" and "politics" - eg: go talk to a Right Wing Christian Republican, or a very Left Wing Democrat.

....and the Klu Klux Klan have political objectives, as did Malcolm-X.

[William F. Owen]

Brother Wilf,

You know my thoughts on CvC, IMHO he focuses exclusively upon only one variable of a multivariate equation, and so I question your CvC inspired assertion that we can reduce the causative reasons for war to just a political variable. In my experience and studies Security and Economics variables are inseparably interrelated with Politics/Governance variables.

Brother Beetle,

What is politics? Generally, every political armed group in the world conforms to a CvC trinity of People, Leadership and Armed Force. - so yes,
"Security and Economics variables are inseparably interrelated with Politics/Governance variables" - I agree. It's all politics.
Security is a political condition, just as much as a "social condition." Economies require governments of similar bodies. When those governments fail, so does all else and alternate policies flow in to fill the vacuum.

I think we may be in agreement.

[Surferbeetle]

Brother Beetle,

What is politics? Generally, every political armed group in the world conforms to a CvC trinity of People, Leadership and Armed Force. - so yes,
"Security and Economics variables are inseparably interrelated with Politics/Governance variables" - I agree. It's all politics.
Security is a political condition, just as much as a "social condition." Economies require governments of similar bodies. When those governments fail, so does all else and alternate policies flow in to fill the vacuum.

I think we may be in agreement.

Brother Wilf,

As always, I greatly appreciate the clarifying discussions on CvC and war.

I believe that we are in agreement with respect to the nature of war = man's inhumanity to man. From where I stand and try to describe War it seems to me that it is composed of many different types of warfare methods. I hope that we are in agreement that TTP are types of warfare and infinitely variable, i.e. Conventional, COIN, Financial, Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, etc.

Wikipedia gives us the following definition for Politics

Politics is a process by which groups of people make decisions. The term is generally applied to behavior within civil governments, but politics has been observed in all human group interactions, including corporate, academic and religious institutions. It consists of "social relations involving authority or power"[1] and refers to the regulation of a political unit,[2] and to the methods and tactics used to formulate and apply policy.[3]

However when solving a multivariate equation such as war = politics + economics + security = 1 + 1 + 1 we can not assume that war = politics. In this simple example politics = war - economics - security....

In summary, a politician does not equal a loaf of bread/cake, a secure city block, or a war...

Regards,

Steve