The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Tc2642]

Theory abhors a vacuum as much as nature, so newer revisionists have popped up in profusion to fill the void left by the collapse of technocentric theories of war. One philosophy proposes to build a new theory of war around organizational and bureaucratic efficiency. Build two armies, so the proponents argue, one to fight and the other to administer, and the new age of more flexible and adaptive military action will begin. Another group of theorists seeks to twist the facts of history into a pattern that brings us to a fourth generation of warfare, one that makes all Clausewitzian theories of state-on-state warfare obsolete.

I am rather perplexed by this, Clausewitz, never said that 'State on State Warfare' was the be and end all of war theory, neither is 4GW diametrically opposed to Clausewitzian theory, in fact I believe the two theories are rather complementary to each other. Anyone who reads, 'Unrestricted warfare', will see how a state can conduct 4GW against another state.

[Bill Moore]

Tc I have read "Unrestricted Warfare" and concur with your line of thought as far as you expressed it. 4GW can be used to supplement conventional strategies, or used in place of them. I think both the U.S. and USSR employed elements of 4GW against one another, but they were always ready to ramp it up to mutual assured destruction, so in effect the MAD strategy as strange as it sounds had a moderating effect. I think this is where the non-state and state actor employing 4GW differ.

The State actor has centers of gravity that are vulnerable to conventional military attacks, especially by a superior hostile military force. This means State actors will “normally” employ 4GW with a measure of restraint, because they likely do not want to escalate the conflict to the point that they are on the receiving end of conventional military strikes against their security forces and economic infrastructure. Libya was a perfect example of a State employing 4GW that crossed the threshold and was severely punished.

Iran is using 4GW against Israel via a number of surrogate groups. Personally I think Israel is pursuing the wrong strategy to counter it, although there are very few, if any, good options. Maybe the best option is to punish the State sponsoring these attacks? Iran is playing an incredibly dangerous game of brinkmanship with their activities directed against Israel and the U.S., and thumbing their noses at the West with their alleged nuclear program. I won’t discount the complex problems associated with attacking Iran, but allowing a State to play 4GW at an increasingly dangerous level without any response may be more dangerous.

A State actor employing 4GW is worrisome, but they seem to have some constraints, even the extreme ones like Iran. Non State actors on the other hand will employ 4GW tactics/strategy to the extremes possible because they do not have centers of gravity that are vulnerable to conventional military attacks, thus their risk assessment does not persuade them to only push so far then stop. This was validated today with their latest plot uncovered for non-state actors to employ 4GW to murder up to thousands of civilians by blowing up a number of commercial airliners. If a State committed an attack (a crime) like this there would be a very, very severe price to pay, but a non State organization executes an attack like this secure that we can only escalate the conflict so much, and if we escalate carelessly we’ll play into their hands. If we don’t respond we’ll play into their hands. These people won’t hesitate to use WMD against our citizens, and since conventional war fighting theories do not apply against this type of enemy, I would hope MG Scales would be open to additional methods to frame and address the problems we’re facing, which EBO is only an attempt at. It is a far from perfect attempt at doing so, but it does have some merits that should be pursued. None of us can afford the luxury of being myopic in our use of strategies. Very loosely paraphrasing Bruce Lee’s philosophy, he stated that “the usefulness of a cup is its emptiness, so empty your mind of the traditional dogma, so you can learn”. Maybe the paraphrase isn’t even close, but you get my point .

[Tc2642]

None of us can afford the luxury of being myopic in our use of strategies. Very loosely paraphrasing Bruce Lee’s philosophy, he stated that “the usefulness of a cup is its emptiness, so empty your mind of the traditional dogma, so you can learn”. Maybe the paraphrase isn’t even close, but you get my point .

Definitley, I always think that there is a divide between "traditional" camps of thought, usually defined along Clausewitzian lines, and the "non traditional", with the likes of 4GW, netwar, etc. What seems to have happened is that Clausewitizians have seen works like "The Transformation of War" and seeing Creveld's misinterpretation of the "Remarkable Trinity" seem to associate all 4GW theorists as falling into the same trap, and on the other side of the coin, the 4GW theorists seem (in some instances) to have viewed Clausewitz in a far too dogmatic fashion and seemingly state centric (again some Clausewitzians may also be guilty of this fault)

[Strickland]

For the record, Clausewitz defined Absolute War in two ways, one of which was "peoples war," akin to that which he was familiar with in Spain from 1808. Based on this definition, this would mean that Iraq is an absolute war.

[Tc2642]

For the record, Clausewitz defined Absolute War in two ways, one of which was "peoples war," akin to that which he was familiar with in Spain from 1808. Based on this definition, this would mean that Iraq is an absolute war.

The other part of Clausewitz's idea of Absolute war is based in philosophy and pure theory, because Clausewitz used the "absolute" in a Kantian ideal sense of the word, being that in theory there is an ideal absolute but we live in reality and therfore cannot achive this ideal.

There is a good piece by Bruce Fleming which I have recently scanned through called "Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?" which gives a good insight, I have read most of On War but the text can be very confusing and is contradictory in parts, even so I do believe that Clausewitz's theory of war is still unsurpassed and still relevent today.

[Strickland]

I recently attended a lecture by Dr. Sumida (University of Maryland Prof.) concerning Clausewitz's On War. His book, one that he has been working on for 15 years, is due out later this year, and asserts that Peter Paret and Mike Howard were off-base with their assertions in the 1976 translation and accompanying essays. Mike Howard is actually helping him with this work, whicch should be the most definitive study and translation in English yet. The work will teach you how to read Clausewitz, and what it means.

[zenpundit]

should be the most definitive study and translation in English yet. The work will teach you how to read Clausewitz, and what it means

.

There must have been something in the water in Germany to produce such a large body of philosophers whose thinking powers were inverse to their writing skills. Clausewitz is far from the worst in that regard. There's also a few exceptions but those philosophers were also poets.

[Tc2642]

I recently attended a lecture by Dr. Sumida (University of Maryland Prof.) concerning Clausewitz's On War. His book, one that he has been working on for 15 years, is due out later this year, and asserts that Peter Paret and Mike Howard were off-base with their assertions in the 1976 translation and accompanying essays. Mike Howard is actually helping him with this work, which should be the most definitive study and translation in English yet. The work will teach you how to read Clausewitz, and what it means.

Does this mean I will have to spend another two years annotating, underlining and making notes on "On War" again.

Do you know when the new book is out?