The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Kiwigrunt]

Show me a nation where the "average soldier" thinks more about military theory than about sex.

Even I think more about (of) sex than about military theory.

You disappoint me...but, are the two not nearly the same thing? link

[William F. Owen]

and why ?

Ends+Means= A Way (Strategy), as written by Slap is wrong. I didn't say MCDP was wrong.

....but,

Strategy, broadly defined, is the process of interrelating ends and means. When we apply this process to a particular set of ends and means, the product — that is, the strategy — is a specific way of using specified means to achieve distinct ends.

is essentially correct. As is,

In the purest sense, the means in war is combat — physically attacking the enemy or defending against his attacks upon us. However, war is not limited to purely military means. In fact, military means are only one element used to implement a national strategy.

Point being, Militaries fight. They break and kill. They should not attempt to be the other instruments of power.

I'm guessing it's "wrong" because it is not found within the "four squares" of CvC.

Sorry but I am the last man to be bound to the purity of the text. I am interested in what CvC taught, not what he wrote in each and every sentence.

[slapout9]

Ends+Means= A Way (Strategy), as written by Slap is wrong. I didn't say MCDP was wrong.

Except Slap didn't say that, the MCDP on Strategy says that.

Slap don't do any Ends,Ways or Means regardless of the order. Slap does Motive, Methods, and Opportunity.

[William F. Owen]

Except Slap didn't say that, the MCDP on Strategy says that.

I said, "as written" in terms of Ends+means = A Way. As far as I can tell MCDP doesn't actually say that either.

[slapout9]

I said, "as written" in terms of Ends+means = A Way. As far as I can tell MCDP doesn't actually say that either.

I was trying to show the doctrinal publication contrast between the usual equation for Strategy. Which is Strategy=Ends+Ways+Means as opposed to the Marine version of Ends+Means= a Way (A Strategy).
It was close enough for Guvmint work IMO.

[jmm99]

Not to turn this into a math discussion, but if math principles are applied, the result is not a simple sum of A + B.

The quote from MCDP 1-1, Strategy, dealing with the inter-relationship of ends and means is this:

Strategy, broadly defined, is the process of interrelating ends and means. When we apply this process to a particular set of ends and means, the product — that is, the strategy — is a specific way of using specified means to achieve distinct ends.

I read that as suggesting a mental process where the set of ends (what policy desires as end goals) is mapped to the set of means (capabilities available), where the mapping link between any given end and given means is the way one uses the means to reach the end.

So, what we are talking about math-wise, is a product - an intersection of two sets (as in this Venn Diagram):



Say A = the set of all means available and B = ends desired.

Some of the means in set A will not be material to any of the ends in set B; those means are excess capabilities in the particular situation.

What are more important are the ends that lie outside of the intersection. For those ends that cannot be linked to existing means, either those ends have to scrapped, or the means have to be expanded, or a combination of both.

BTW: I'm not suggesting that everyone start constructing Venn Diagrams; nor am I suggesting how military strategists should do their job. I am simply stating what the two publications by the Corps mean to me.

----------------------------
As to non-military tasks,

from Wilf
Point being, Militaries fight. They break and kill. They should not attempt to be the other instruments of power.

Sure, as someone on the non-military side of the ledger, I'd be more than happy to do all of "DIE, etc." elements - and get the appropriations that go with them. That is not the reality in the USG.

As it presently stands, US troopers are tasked with many "DIE, etc." tasks; and they perform them if possible. That does not make those tasks "military" ("M").

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

If you want to get mathematical isn't a product(multipication) the result of some arithmetic calculation?

[Ron Humphrey]

I was trying to show the doctrinal publication contrast between the usual equation for Strategy. Which is Strategy=Ends+Ways+Means as opposed to the Marine version of Ends+Means= a Way (A Strategy).
It was close enough for Guvmint work IMO.

but did want to respond to this.

When actually looking at strategy why exactly would one ever limit themselves to only that available at a given time in relation to ends or means.

Both are fluid and in reality shouldn't one be willing to at least in thought exercise expect to plan taking into account unknowns as well as knowns.

This merely meaning that no given strategy is isolated unto itself. There are multiple in multiple areas of discourse, political, military, economic, social, etc.

-

Now back to my corner

[Taiko]

but did want to respond to this.

When actually looking at strategy why exactly would one ever limit themselves to only that available at a given time in relation to ends or means.

Both are fluid and in reality shouldn't one be willing to at least in thought exercise expect to plan taking into account unknowns as well as knowns.

This merely meaning that no given strategy is isolated unto itself. There are multiple in multiple areas of discourse, political, military, economic, social, etc.

-

Now back to my corner

Good point. This goes towards what is the dynamic nature of the trinity during the phases of a war. Prior to roling the iron dice a good strategist should be able to identify all of the primary and secondary regulating principles of the trinity in regards to their own country as well as those of the protagonist(s), and be able to have contingencies in place if the regulating principles shift during the course of the war.

[Polarbear1605]

I would like to get some discussion onthis one.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf
Apparently, its an award winner.

[jmm99]

"D", not "M"; that is, part of the "pollitical struggle", not part of the "military struggle" - both having to be co-ordinated to match the policy goal which underwrites both the political and military as policy's continuations.

I'll give the article's conclusion the Fruit Salad Award of the Year to Date (mixing apples and oranges):

The ten tenets listed below mix thoughts on war, strategy, and bargaining. They will shape the mindset of strategists and prepare them to embrace the principles of BT/NT by being a guide, easing the way, training the judgment, and helping strategists avoid the pitfalls of forgetting that conflict is costly and risky and absolute victory is unrealistic.

1. Many victories have and will be suicide to the victor.

2. War is continuous bargaining through action and words.

3. War is an extension of policy, which subordinates war‟s violence and creativity.

4. Strategy is a continuous process of understanding, shaping, and adapting that uniquely connects force to policy, for a continuing advantage.

5. Strategy must be efficient and tailored and it is formed by asking the right questions.

6. Force is the more costly and risky way to change policy or reallocate resources.

7. Employing less force than is required to win absolutely can be a viable short cut or a possible trap.

8. Words and actions reveal information about you, your enemy, the environment, and the nature and direction of the conflict…so constantly listen and reframe the problem and strategy accordingly.

9. Be persistent in pursuing your interests, but not rigid in pursuing any particular solution.

10. The post conflict leaders must have had a say in the bargain and seat at the table regardless of which side it was on.

Regards

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

Good point. This goes towards what is the dynamic nature of the trinity during the phases of a war. Prior to roling the iron dice a good strategist should be able to identify all of the primary and secondary regulating principles of the trinity in regards to their own country as well as those of the protagonist(s), and be able to have contingencies in place if the regulating principles shift during the course of the war.

Excellent point but how far is this feasible?

[Bob's World]

For those who have not seen it, this presentation on Clausewitz by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II at the US Army War College is a good summary from a guy who's put a lot of thought into the topic.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=otJp3Qt7Vuw

For a very practical guide for looking at "strategy" I have found John Collin's "Military Strategy: Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives to be an excellent guide. He does a good job of breaking things down into practical, digestable chunks. For example, after reading the past page or so of this thread I thought "I wonder what Collins said "strategy" is. He didn't. A book on strategy, and his definition for strategy is " See grand strategy; military strategy; military tactics, operational art; tactics." Each of those, or course branch out as well. As if "strategy" is just a term to describe the trunk of a tree, but that one has to climb up work their way around in the branches to find the specific answers they seek.

I think most are happy to simply walk by the tree, kick the trunk and say "Ah, Clausewitz," or perhaps "Ah, Ends-Ways-Means," and move on. I recommend climbing the tree. Collins is a good guide for that little adventure.

[slapout9]

Here is the Michael Porter (Harvard Business School) definition of Strategy. Strategy has nothing to do with How! It is selecting the Objective (Position) that is unique and sustainable.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ibrxIP0H84M

[M.L.]

but did want to respond to this.

When actually looking at strategy why exactly would one ever limit themselves to only that available at a given time in relation to ends or means.

Both are fluid and in reality shouldn't one be willing to at least in thought exercise expect to plan taking into account unknowns as well as knowns.

This merely meaning that no given strategy is isolated unto itself. There are multiple in multiple areas of discourse, political, military, economic, social, etc.

Strategy is not limited to available ways and means. In fact ways (doctrine) and means (force structure) of military strategy are predicated on the ends (goals) of US national and defense strategies.

Sometimes this system gets out of whack - Iraq, as an example, was an ambitious goal without the ways or means to achieve it (i.e. "You got to war with the Army you have, not the Army you would want to have.) We developed the ways and means over time, and at great expense.

Strategy must balance ends, ways, and means. This includes not only what you have and want now, but in the future.

[slapout9]

Strategy must balance ends, ways, and means. This includes not only what you have and want now, but in the future.

This is where I think we (US) get into trouble. Strategy is about UN-BALANCING the Enemies ends,ways,and means.

[Fuchs]

I disagree, there are many examples where strategy isn't even focused on an enemy (especially non-military strategies).

Besides - what does "UN-BALANCING the Enemies ends,ways,and means." mean at all?

The German strategy for defeating France in 1940 certainly didn't do that, but the success was 100% against France. That strategy was employed boldness to counter superior economic support and it created a scissor-paper situation with the operational success of a decisive battle idea against the long positional warfare idea of the French.

The enemy's ends, way and means weren't unbalanced, but simply countered with custom-designed approaches which were fuelled by desperation.

[slapout9]

The enemy's ends, way and means weren't unbalanced, but simply countered with custom-designed approaches which were fuelled by desperation.

In other words they completely un-balanced the enemy physically and psychologically.

[Fuchs]

Define "un-balance" in this context.

[M.L.]

As I recall, Germany eventually lost WWII.

The victory over France in 1940 was an operational masterpiece, but the Germans, while spectacular operationally and tactically, were horrible strategically - primarily because Hitler fancied himself a strategist when in reality he was nothing of the kind.

Tactics win battles, operations win campaigns, but strategy wins wars. Germany lost the war due to strategic errors, too numerous to list here.