The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[PhilR]

The first being that the outside party is never actually conducting COIN themselves, that COIN and Insurgency are internal business, and much more a family dispute over governance than they are warfare, regardless of how violent that squabble may become (you can't truely hate someone you don't love, so family squabbles can be the worst kind).

So as an insurgent emerges from the populace to compete with the current government for the support of the same, it very much is a tug of war, with the support of the populace being the ultimate prize, and also the COG. A shared COG to be competed for, rather than respective friendly and enemy COGs to be either defeated or defended ala CvC. This is why I say that insurgency really isn't warfare regardless of how violent, and that to apply rules/principles of warfare rather than understanding and addressing root causes and employing that understanding in ones competition for the support of the populace is likely to lead to a tragic, hard to reach, and temporary in duration, solution.

As an outside party to such a competition, one is either trying to gain inroads with a land and people to serve your own national (or if a non-state actor like AQ, organizational) interests, you are conducting what US doctrine describes as "unconventional warfare." If, on the other hand, you already have a stake in this land/populace through the current government, you are likely to come in on their side in an attempt to sustain that status quo. In US doctrine we call this 'foreign internal defense'. To assume that you as the outsider are conducting COIN is the fastest way to get yourself into all kinds of inappropriate roles and develop no end to crazy mission creep. Just not a good idea, and yet, according to our NEW COIN doctirne, that is what we are doing. Bad bit of doctrine, IMHO.

So, while CvC is good knowledge (Scientia) to have, I always believe that understanding (Intelectus) trumps knowledge on just about everything except a standardized test. This is no standardized test.

There are parts here I agree with and parts I don’t agree with. To start with the last first, I don’t think that Clausewitz would ever assert that reading his book gives an understanding of any conflict. However, I think it does provide a good lens through which to view that conflict and help gain understanding. Not everything in On War is still directly relevant. However, I think that enough is too still prompt useful discussion, analysis, and synthesis. I’ll just admit that each time I re-read parts of On War, I come away with new considerations on how it a specific conflict may be working out and what its character may be. (And to Slapout’s previous point about On War not being complete, part of Sumida’s argument in Decoding Clausewitz is that we have misread the order and dates of the various notes he left and that it was, in fact, a nearly complete and whole work. And just to be clear, I like a lot of what Sumida has written, but I’m not as convinced as he is that he has THE definitive interpretation. For anyone interested, I’d recommend Peter Paret’s biographical Clausewitz and the State—and you will be surprised how much of his life and thought was caught up in “irregular” conflict).

More to the point of the above comments on the difference between COIN as an internal struggle and the different “chemistry” when it involves outsiders—such as us in Afghanistan—I think that is a critical difference. Thinking back on my Clausewitz, we mostly think of Insurgents as being on the strategic offensive because the government represents the “status quo.” I would offer that when outsiders are involved the insurgents are on the strategic defensive. They have a negative aim. They do not have provide positive rule or economic benefits. They do not need to defeat or destroy the government or our security forces in the field. They just need to deny us enough success so that we go home. They will not be ultimately successful in replacing the existing government until the external forces are gone. The insurgency meets Clausewitz’s definition for a defense—it is using time in order to position itself for a counterstroke. In effect, the insurgency has a negative aim. They don’t have to “play to win” like the government and its allies—they just need to play to “not lose.”

This gets to successful insurgent endgame. I’d submit that most successful insurgencies end with the insurgent forces acting very much like the security forces they are facing—taking them on openly in the field, or else the threat and exhaustion results in security forces either melting away or changing sides enmasse. This is in some sense a validation of Mao’s progression of stages. For an insurgency to become what it was fighting against, the legitimate governing authority, then it will start to take on those attributes (and those vulnerabilities?).

Looking to Afghanistan specifically, I’d say that the approaches we are seeing that recommend basing our strategy on local initiatives and tribes (One Tribe at a Time, etc.), are a form of fighting an insurgency with an insurgency. While this is attractive, in effect, we would also not be struggling to defeat the Insurgent, but just to provide a rival insurgent force that would never allow them to win. I think that the tribal approaches will just result in a steady state of chaos. If we remove our security umbrella from such a solution—a patchwork of loosely held together areas—then they will be vulnerable to being picked off, one by one, in fairly conventional manner (which is how I believe the Taliban came to power in the first place). Thus while I think the “bottom up”, or tribal, or federal, approach is also an endstate that will require us to maintain a security guarantee for a long while.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

[Bob's World]

More to the point of the above comments on the difference between COIN as an internal struggle and the different “chemistry” when it involves outsiders—such as us in Afghanistan—I think that is a critical difference. Thinking back on my Clausewitz, we mostly think of Insurgents as being on the strategic offensive because the government represents the “status quo.” I would offer that when outsiders are involved the insurgents are on the strategic defensive. They have a negative aim. They do not have provide positive rule or economic benefits. They do not need to defeat or destroy the government or our security forces in the field. They just need to deny us enough success so that we go home. They will not be ultimately successful in replacing the existing government until the external forces are gone. The insurgency meets Clausewitz’s definition for a defense—it is using time in order to position itself for a counterstroke. In effect, the insurgency has a negative aim. They don’t have to “play to win” like the government and its allies—they just need to play to “not lose.”

Point 1: What you are describing here is not the insurgent vs. the Counterinsurgent; but rather the insurgent vs. the FID force. This would essentially be a branch operations for the insurgent. His goal is to win the tug of war with the COIN force for support of the populace, and ultimate governance of the same. Then in comes this external party to support the government (I.e., COIN force) just as he is starting to have success. So now he must implement this branch plan to either defeat, or simply outlast, the FID force so that he can get back to the business of winning the tug of war. Ironically, an overly aggressive FID force (like the US tends to be) actually highlights to the local populace and the world the weakness of the COIN force and also tends to rob them of their legitimacy in the eyes of the populace as they tend to look like puppets of the FID force.
This gets to successful insurgent endgame. I’d submit that most successful insurgencies end with the insurgent forces acting very much like the security forces they are facing—taking them on openly in the field, or else the threat and exhaustion results in security forces either melting away or changing sides enmasse. This is in some sense a validation of Mao’s progression of stages. For an insurgency to become what it was fighting against, the legitimate governing authority, then it will start to take on those attributes (and those vulnerabilities?).

Point 2: Mao's model, that I borrowed to shape the phases on my model, was definitely designed originally with the belief as you presribe above that one must work their way to phase three and win the conventional fight to prevail. History shows us that "perfect" Maoist insurgency is rare, but the Vietnamese and Chinese held to the model and did build to conventional capacity to end thier respective conflicts successfully. Key is that the insurgent can win, or lose, in any phase, and can flow back and forth for years in route to that end.

Looking to Afghanistan specifically, I’d say that the approaches we are seeing that recommend basing our strategy on local initiatives and tribes (One Tribe at a Time, etc.), are a form of fighting an insurgency with an insurgency. While this is attractive, in effect, we would also not be struggling to defeat the Insurgent, but just to provide a rival insurgent force that would never allow them to win. I think that the tribal approaches will just result in a steady state of chaos. If we remove our security umbrella from such a solution—a patchwork of loosely held together areas—then they will be vulnerable to being picked off, one by one, in fairly conventional manner (which is how I believe the Taliban came to power in the first place). Thus while I think the “bottom up”, or tribal, or federal, approach is also an endstate that will require us to maintain a security guarantee for a long while.

Point 3: I believe you are too focused on "government" (formal constitutional organized, centrally controlled, etc) with "governance." As Westerners my opinion is that we are just too sanitized if you will, on this point. When a state rejects our Western constructs of Westphalian-based government we quickly label them a "failed" or "failing state" This is really, sadly, Western bias at its worst. The fact is that many regions of the world have little cultural and historical connection to Western forms of governance other than the fact that a bunch of white guys forced them to adopt it at gunpoint in the name of Civilization and Colonization. Now when they reject our "gift" of Westphalian constructs we label them as failures becasue our system doesn't snap in well with other forms of governance. In Afhanistan the informal system of Governance has far greater history of acceptance and functionality than the Westphalian, centralized program we are trying to implement out of Kabul. IMO we are far more likely to create chaos trying to force a centralized system than we are by recognizing and supporting they system they already have. The key is to connect the two in such a fashion as to allow this country to hold to what works, while moving forward with new tools that ideally overcome the downsides of that historic system.
Phil Ridderhof USMC

Hopefully this helps

[Firn]

FID is defined as "Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."

Counterinsurgency is defined as “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”

(both taken from JP 1-02 DoD Dictionary of Military and associated terms)

I'm not too happy about the definition of FID, as it has a political slant (to free and to protect) which leaves out too much. Perhaps it just a way to paint a policy in a positive colour and it sounds nicer than a more wide definition. While to helps to have a coined term to address a specific situation we should not forget that there can be many shades in the circumstances while supporting a ally (state, entity, nation, insurgent) against a foe (other state, nation, ethnic (religious, cultural) group, insurgent). We have many levels of interacting politics and differing motives, purposes and wills. The danger in creating a strict concept coupled by a specific term is that it can narrow down the vision. But if it is understood rightly as a part of the whole it can be helpful.

I will continue later...


Firn

[Bob's World]

I'm not too happy about the definition of FID, as it has a political slant (to free and to protect) which leaves out too much. Perhaps it just a way to paint a policy in a positive colour and it sounds nicer than a more wide definition. While to helps to have a coined term to address a specific situation we should not forget that there can be many shades in the circumstances while supporting a ally (state, entity, nation, insurgent) against a foe (other state, nation, ethnic (religious, cultural) group, insurgent). We have many levels of interacting politics and differing motives, purposes and wills. The danger in creating a strict concept coupled by a specific term is that it can narrow down the vision. But if it is understood rightly as a part of the whole it can be helpful.

I will continue later...


Firn

I won't argue that "FID" is a perfect construct as currently defined and employed, only that it is the best we have. We can add "IDAD" to it and it gets better. When we start adding new concepts like "SFA" and "IW" to patch gaps and bridge seams, it just starts to turn into a crazy quilt.

I told my senior leadership, that when it came to the defining and discussing of these critical concepts we were like property owners who each own 100 acres of land, but that because of a bad survey are uncertain as to exactly where the porperty line is. So, instead of enjoying the 99.99 acres we each own free and clear of any debate, we instead mortgage the same to the hilt to hire lawyers and argue over the 18" of dirt in between that we can't agree on. Sillyness.

So, I have decided to not engage in those type of Reindeer games, and instead focus on broad constructs that are more helpful.

An element of a state that acts out illegally to change or overthrow the sitting government, or break a piece of the state off as a new state is conducting insurgency. Tune up the words as you wish.

The sitting government opposing this illegal action is conducting COIN.

An outside party, state or non-state, who acts to aid the insurgent in his efforts is conducting Unconventional Warfare.

An outside party, state or non-state, who acts to aid the sitting government is conducting FID.

What do you call any actions between these two outside parties? Well, for 60-odd years between the Soviets and the West we called it a "Cold War." For the past 8-odd years between AQ and the West we call it a "Global War on Terrorism."

The key to understanding is not the nuances of the dozens of essentially similar definitions, but instead to understand these 4 primary roles in insurgency, and who is in which role, and how to best enable or frustrate their efforts depending on your interests in the whole thing.

Just how I look at it. I've participated in many of the debates over the 18" of proverbial dirt between these definitions with the best of them, and I'm done. It's just not that helpful.

[slapout9]

The key to understanding is not the nuances of the dozens of essentially similar definitions, but instead to understand these 4 primary roles in insurgency, and who is in which role, and how to best enable or frustrate their efforts depending on your interests in the whole thing.

Now that is Strategy!

[PhilR]

In reply to Bob's World:

Point 1: What you are describing here is not the insurgent vs. the Counterinsurgent; but rather the insurgent vs. the FID force. This would essentially be a branch operations for the insurgent. His goal is to win the tug of war with the COIN force for support of the populace, and ultimate governance of the same. Then in comes this external party to support the government (I.e., COIN force) just as he is starting to have success. So now he must implement this branch plan to either defeat, or simply outlast, the FID force so that he can get back to the business of winning the tug of war. Ironically, an overly aggressive FID force (like the US tends to be) actually highlights to the local populace and the world the weakness of the COIN force and also tends to rob them of their legitimacy in the eyes of the populace as they tend to look like puppets of the FID force.

I agree. While fighting the FID force is ultimately a branch, it is a necessary branch. The insurgent has to get the FID force out of the picture. This does not necessarily mean directly taking it on or defeating it--there are many methods to get a foreign power out of a counterinsurgency. Exhaustion is one. Ultimate lack of confidence in the host government is another. I don't think a FID force can necessarily provide success for the present authority, but it can prevent total failure while it is engaged. I also agree that the more load the FID force takes on, the more chance the host government will look ineffective in comparison. There is a paradox there.

Point 2: Mao's model, that I borrowed to shape the phases on my model, was definitely designed originally with the belief as you presribe above that one must work their way to phase three and win the conventional fight to prevail. History shows us that "perfect" Maoist insurgency is rare, but the Vietnamese and Chinese held to the model and did build to conventional capacity to end thier respective conflicts successfully. Key is that the insurgent can win, or lose, in any phase, and can flow back and forth for years in route to that end.

I agree here also. If the insurgent can win or lose in any phase, then the government can also win or lose in any phase. I think it’s important to highlight that the "cost" of winning for an insurgent is to then bear the same burdens as the existing government. In the end, the insurgents' goal is to become the legitimate authority. In that regard, they then are subject to the same vulnerabilities as the government. If both we and the Taliban take a tribal approach, then are we really competing governing entities fighting one another? It is insurgency or civil war along tribal lines?

Point 3: I believe you are too focused on "government" (formal constitutional organized, centrally controlled, etc) with "governance." As Westerners my opinion is that we are just too sanitized if you will, on this point. When a state rejects our Western constructs of Westphalian-based government we quickly label them a "failed" or "failing state" This is really, sadly, Western bias at its worst. The fact is that many regions of the world have little cultural and historical connection to Western forms of governance other than the fact that a bunch of white guys forced them to adopt it at gunpoint in the name of Civilization and Colonization. Now when they reject our "gift" of Westphalian constructs we label them as failures becasue our system doesn't snap in well with other forms of governance. In Afhanistan the informal system of Governance has far greater history of acceptance and functionality than the Westphalian, centralized program we are trying to implement out of Kabul. IMO we are far more likely to create chaos trying to force a centralized system than we are by recognizing and supporting they system they already have. The key is to connect the two in such a fashion as to allow this country to hold to what works, while moving forward with new tools that ideally overcome the downsides of that historic system.

I agree to a point. I was probably too strong in my verbiage of extended chaos. I agree that it is better for governance to develop that has the best chance of success in that society and culture. If that is to be the case, it is the fundamental starting point for the counterinsurgents' efforts. If they are trying to enact a government that will not work, then they will inevitably fail. I am curious of this means that if the Taliban propose to rule Afghanistan as a centralized state, then they are also ultimately doomed to failure? Is there a certain strength to a repressive regime that our preferred COIN approach does not allow for?

In this vein, I have a different concept of "Westphalian." It is not so much the internal make up of the state (centralized vs, decentralized, government vs. tribal, etc.), but the idea of sovereignty. What we are primarily interested in is that there is a responsible authority in Afghanistan who can prevent it from being a haven for transnational bad actors. If that can be accomplished with a loose federation of tribes, then so be it. Once again, that political endstate needs to be at the forefront of our strategy to engage.

I will state that I believe that a loose type of governance is good in a vacuum, but it also tempts outside actors (state and non-state) to involve themselves in internal power struggles--and make it more likely that these struggles become violent. I still think that it will require an external security guarantee to prevent a resurgent Taliban or other outside intervention.

[Bob's World]

There are no easy answers, and certainly implementing any of those is harder still.

One of my beef's with COIN is that it tends to enable the policy types to sit back and wring their hands over how much it costs, how long it will take, how many causualites will be incurred, etc for the military to SOLVE the problem so that they can get back to policy work again. IMHO this is completely, negligently, backwards thinking. All the military can do when it goes out to conduct FID to assist the COIN forces of a foreign ally are to help shape conditions that allow the polciy types to identify, address and repair the failures of local/national governance in the COIN force that created the condtions that are the ripe soil that insurgency grows in (and we all know what fertalizes those seeds, the blood of all swept up in the second order effects of those govenrmental failures), moving the bubble down the curve on my chart from ph 1/2 down toward ph 0, to shape conditions so that the policy guys can actually solve the insurgency.

Right now there should be a giant pair of vice grips on Mr. Karzai's nether regions, with the collective providers of surge forces demanding that he hold a Loya Jirga to address poor governance in Afghanistan. Then, and here is the hard part, those same external policy types need to STFU and allow self-determination to take place, and accept what the people, the leaders, the culture, and the process of Afghanistan comes up with. We must relinquish our efforts to control the outcome if we want to craft an enduring solution for the Afghan populace. Then simply recognize and work with whoever ends up in power. This is populace-centric COIN. Its a strategic concept (One paper here on SWJ, and another in World Politics Review for those interested). Still wrestling with the tactics of 'population-centric COIN". It seems to mean many things to many people.

[Firn]

There are no easy answers, and certainly implementing any of those is harder still.

One of my beef's with COIN is that it tends to enable the policy types to sit back and wring their hands over how much it costs, how long it will take, how many causualites will be incurred, etc for the military to SOLVE the problem so that they can get back to policy work again. IMHO this is completely, negligently, backwards thinking. All the military can do when it goes out to conduct FID to assist the COIN forces of a foreign ally are to help shape conditions that allow the polciy types to identify, address and repair the failures of local/national governance in the COIN force that created the condtions that are the ripe soil that insurgency grows in (and we all know what fertalizes those seeds, the blood of all swept up in the second order effects of those govenrmental failures), moving the bubble down the curve on my chart from ph 1/2 down toward ph 0, to shape conditions so that the policy guys can actually solve the insurgency.

So for the (Afghan) government fighting the insurgency is the continuation of politik (polity, politics, policy) with the addition/intermixture of other means? A continuation of polity, poltitics and policy which ougth to detract the (fertile) soil on which the insurgency grows and the led out the water in which it lives, coupled with the (direct) fight against it? Efforts supported by Western nations to fulfill their political goals. Goals which have been questioned at home and worldwide for some time now. The (strategic, economical, ..) costs and risks of which should match the importance of the goals relative to the purpose of the same states.

Firn


I will address the specifics of the other raised (and interesting) points later.

[jmm99]

Part of this discussion is losing me. So, a couple of serious questions:

1. Who are these "policy types" who can "identify, address and repair the failures of local/national governance" ?

2. Have the "policy guys" (whoever they are) actually solved any insurgency; if so, where and when ?

Sorry to be dull, but I need some context to understand this.

Mike

[Bob's World]

Part of this discussion is losing me. So, a couple of serious questions:

1. Who are these "policy types" who can "identify, address and repair the failures of local/national governance" ?

2. Have the "policy guys" (whoever they are) actually solved any insurgency; if so, where and when ?

Sorry to be dull, but I need some context to understand this.

Mike

when has a military operation ever resolved an insurgency.

By policy types I mean the national governmental leadership. Karazai, for example, has the insurgency in Afghanistan to either win or lose, the military forces in that country can merely set the conditions..

Similar for the larger GWOT it is incumbent upon the national govenmental leadership of the US to address and change our policy approach to the governemnts and populaces of the middle east to win or lose that event. Bin laden is a SYMPTOM of a much larger problem, a man for his times, if you will. The military can go out and attack that symptiom, but if the larger policy issue is not addressed new men will emerge to pick up that bright burning torch.