The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Taiko]

"Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power." One wonders what CvC would think of the GCs, other conventions and modern ROEs - which are quite perceptible in our Laws of War. I suspect he might say something along the lines that those constraints would affect the appearence (form as we see it), and impose limitations on its theoretical "growth pattern", but not affect its basic substance - e.g., his survey of European warfare post-Westphalia and pre-Napoleon. He probably would have used different words (I've used a neo-Platonist formula; as I understand it, he was more of a German Romanticist; but I'm no CvC SME).

Not to sure about IL and GC. In terms of the morality of war, CvC was happy to leave it to the philosophers. I suspect as a realists he would of argued that IL and GC are little more than sandcastles that are all to easily washed away by the tides of war (my words not his). So I think you are right in assuming it would not effect its basic substance. However, when you take into account the importance of the population in small wars there is a place for upholding domestic law and GC, if for anything else then to maintain the moral high ground in the propaganda war. I think the US found out the hard way with a certain prison in Iraq that there is strategic capital in the GC. Although as an aside, the reports on A'Q war crimes and atrocities are all but missing from western media. But from all accounts A'Q paid a heavy price for its atrocities in Iraq especially in turning the population against it. So GC and more importantly domestic laws/custom would have to be an important toolkit for COIN. So CvC is limited in this respect. Mao certainly understand the power of the GC and upholding domestic law more so than CvC, in terms of fighting an effective revolutionary war.

In regards to ROE, he would most probably cite Prussia's first experience with Napoleon and warn that when rolling the iron dice we should make sure to understand the war being fought, not mistaking it for what we want it to be, unless we take up a dress rapier against a broadsword and vice versa. This observation is very apt for current circumstances in my opinion.

Next question is also factually-based. In CvC's time, Transnational Violent Non-State Actors were not much of an issue (the transnational anarchists came later). So, that breed of cat was also not within his experience. Hence: I suspect he would have extrapolated from the history known to him. Perhaps looking at the Roman Empire (which he found unique). This seems to be a more important question than the first.

Close, he actually used the example of Tartar tribes as transnatinal non-sate actors.

suggestion being that CvC (in normal German usage) is not limited to putting a round between the other guy's eyes, or him physically dropping his musket. There are other ways to accomplish the same result as kill or capture

Book 1 Chapter 2: Purpose and Means covers a lot of ground in terms of the various aims and effort require to achieve various political effects. But, in many parts of his work he emphasis the importance of combat. "Combat in war is like cash payment in commerce", being the most well known and quoted. In essence CvC produced a combat-centric theory.

[William F. Owen]

Close, he actually used the example of Tartar tribes as transnatinal non-sate actors

CvC was very aware of the Catholic and Protestant "insurgencies" and Wars within Europe, including the Hussites. These are all basically "trans-national" or "non-state".

[Bob's World]

What appears to be emerging from this thread is a reemergence of the concept that war is essentially war, as the ends are similar in populace-based conflict and state-based, and CvC can be applied to both without obvious breakdown of his theory; therefore similar ways and means applied to either will produce similar effects.

I can track along with CvC's theory not being rendered invalid by populace-based conflict; but I believe the leap of logic to concluding also that ways and means that are effective in defeating another state are also effective in resolving a conflict with one's own populace is both too broad, and unsubstantiated by historical fact.

So keep CvC in your rucksack as a good source, but continue to seek other sources to fleshout how something that can appear and act so similar in so many ways can also be so different and require very different approaches; both in general, and certainly by case.

I guess we could say that war is like women. War is war and women are women -- but while the similarities are obvious, it is a foolish man indeed who disregards or disrespects their differences... Either way, us guys are quite likely to make a mess of it.

[William F. Owen]

I can track along with CvC's theory not being rendered invalid by populace-based conflict; but I believe the leap of logic to concluding also that ways and means that are effective in defeating another state are also effective in resolving a conflict with one's own populace is both too broad, and unsubstantiated by historical fact.

What is a "populace based conflict?"

I only ask as all Wars are about political outcomes. It's the authority to which the people defer and obey, which is the issue, not they themselves. That is the same for all human conflict.

In those terms, fighting the Taliban is no different from fighting the Waffen SS. The prize was not the German people, no more than the prize is the "Afghan" people. The prize is someone exercising a useful degree of authority over them.

The nature of the fighting however, may have to be different, for POLITICAL reasons, as Clausewitz explains.

[jmm99]

Just a couple of little points.

from Takio
Close, he actually used the example of Tartar tribes as transnatinal non-sate actors.

Depends on how you translate the Tartar passage from Bk 8.3B:

Die Tatarenschwärme suchen neue Wohnsitze. Sie ziehen mit dem ganzen Volke aus, mit Weib und Kind, sie sind also zahlreich wie verhältnismäßig kein anderes Heer, und ihr Ziel ist Unterwerfung oder Vertreibung des Gegners. Sie würden mit diesen Mitteln bald alles vor sich niederwerfen, ließe sich damit ein hoher Kulturzustand vereinigen.

I'd translate "dem ganzen Volke" as "their entire Nation"; and "Die Tatarenschwärme" as the "The Tartarhordes" (literally, it's "The Tartarswarms"; but the later Tartar political entities usually are called "Hordes" - e.g., the "Golden Horde").

I may be influenced by reading Gabriel's bio of Subotai. The historical facts are that when the Tartars "ziehened aus", they were very much a nation-state (with geographic bounds as they chose to define them; and a clear governance structure). They also a very organized military structure (part and parcel of their government). So, legally, I'd class them as a nation-state (albeit living in tents); and their soldiers as regular combatants (brutal, but regular).

The Germanic tribes who crossed into the Roman Empire seem more akin to Transnational Violent Non-State Actors - not nation-states; and their troops more akin to irregular combatants. Which period of German history you pick makes a difference. The Germanic groups named by Tacitus (ca. 100ce) had defined boundaries, a governance structure, etc. By 400ce, that had been disrupted by pressure from the East, resulting in the Rhine Crossing, etc.

I think Wilf is more factually on point with this:

from Wilf
CvC was very aware of the Catholic and Protestant "insurgencies" and Wars within Europe, including the Hussites. These are all basically "trans-national" or "non-state".

Agreed factually - and good examples of pre-Westphalian non-state actors in armed conflicts. However, did CvC discuss them ? I did a search through the On War I downloaded (Graham trans.); and had no hits for Catholic, Protestant, Hussite or religious. Anyway, if someone could supply a CvC reference to those armed conflicts, if it exists ?

[Taiko]

In regards to Jim99 point about CG I was not happy with my original conclusions. So I went back to Mao and my trinitarian definition and would like see if my new conclusions makes sense especially in regards to Bob's World points.

In Mao's 'Selected Military Writings' he goes into great detail about how PoW and the general population should be treated. I would argue that in many respects this can be pivotal in winning a revolutionary war. If CvC's trinity cannot account for it then the theory loses its validity in explaining the nature of war in all its variations.

So after some tossing and turning last night I think I have found how the trinity can be used to explain it. Focusing on the first half of the trinity Clausewitz argues that the level and intensity of violence is determined by three intervening variables:

(Violence) purpose, hostile feelings/intentions, chance and probability

I would contend that how you treat PoWs (GC) and the populace (domestic law/custom) can specifically be accounted for in shaping the hostile feelings/intensions that go towards determining the level and intensity of violence. Metz, for example, explains how after 'shock and awe' the proto-insurgencies focused on exacerbating the anger of the population, against the US, by targeting basic infrastructure. They were attempting to shape the level and intensity of the violence via controlling/manipulating the hostile feelings of the Iraqi people.

Another example from the US is the change in how they treated PoW and combatants. As in the case of Mao, this was a major psychological operation that was specifically aimed at the moral of the opponents fighting force and a way to shape the hostile feelings/intentions of it. When the Red army captured enemy soldiers, they "re-educated" them and let them go. In Iraq the same process was implemented in the prisons by the US to "de-radicalize" combatants through the introduction of moderate clerics. In terms of the general population the key to shaping and controlling the hostile feelings/intentions lead to a shift in search and seizure operations to take account of local customs/law. Just as paying compensation was used to pay for damages or the death of a family member using the tribal customs.

Obviously this is just a basic summary. However, I think I have a handle on the first part of the trinity. The second part of the trinity, in relation to how this effects the intervening variables that determine political power I'm still working on. In terms of my explanation for the first part I would appreciate any thoughts from SWC members.

Good point about the Tartar's Jimm99 and the Hussites Wilf. Looks like its back to the drawing board in looking at transnational non-state actors. Although I think the second part of the trinity (politics) government, people, military, will be able to account for it. Its just a matter of finding the write words.

So keep CvC in your rucksack as a good source, but continue to seek other sources to fleshout how something that can appear and act so similar in so many ways can also be so different and require very different approaches; both in general, and certainly by case.
I guess we could say that war is like women. War is war and women are women -- but while the similarities are obvious, it is a foolish man indeed who disregards or disrespects their differences... Either way, us guys are quite likely to make a mess of it.

Well put, the last part made me laugh Although I have been working on a diagram that might have some utility and would mean you need not hump CvC's book around.

[jmm99]

This Wiki, Chinese Civil War, has an interesting set of stats:

KMT Strength

4,300,000 (July 1945)
3,650,000 (June 1948)
1,490,000 (June 1949)

CPC Strength

1,200,000 (July 1945)
2,800,000 (June 1948)
4,000,000 (June 1949)

Just as the radio broacasts of the Truman-Dewey results were my first introduction to politics (where I had an idea of what was going on), the 1948-1949 news broadcasts were the first war results I could intelligently follow.

My recollection includes entire KMT armies switching sides. So, when I saw the Wiki stats, I thought Mao made a lot of converts in a hurry. Was my recollection correct ? Yup, in Google Books, The Chinese Third Revolutionary Civil War, 1945-49, by Christopher Lew, which takes you to p.133. You can scroll up to p.132, where four KMT Armies (5th, 15th, 16th & 20th) defected within a month.

So, looking at the CPC "conversion" program is as or more important than looking at its kill or capture programs - at least for that phase of that armed conflict.

And, the book confirmed my distant recollections. Now, if someone can tell me where I left my vehicle (which one is it ?), I can try to find my way home.

-------------------
PS: Even if CvC did not discuss Hussites in particular (Wilf has yet to chime in on that), that would not invaldate application of On War's basic substance to situations involving non-state actors employing irregular combatants. CvC did not claim to write a Bible (or a cookbook), did not claim to have covered all historical examples (see Bk 2.6 On Examples, last two paragraphs), and did not claim a crystal ball to predict the future. To paraphrase Darrow (aka Henry Drummond): On War is a good book, but it is not the only book.

[William F. Owen]

Agreed factually - and good examples of pre-Westphalian non-state actors in armed conflicts. However, did CvC discuss them ? I did a search through the On War I downloaded (Graham trans.); and had no hits for Catholic, Protestant, Hussite or religious. Anyway, if someone could supply a CvC reference to those armed conflicts, if it exists ?

I think CvC just didn't bother. He must have been aware of it, and I think it falls within the construct he uses. Point being, CvC was concerned with War as the use of Armed Force. Rebellions of that time and previously, had to raise and field Armies. That was the Warfare. His observations on War, all still stand.

Modern Insurgencies still do the same thing, in order to become a military threat. If an irregular force cannot be a military threat, it cannot win, unless there are some other powerful circumstances in play (Spain and the Madrid bombing). "Terrorism" has been remarkably indecisive as an instrument of gaining political goal.

[Bob's World]

What is a "populace based conflict?"

I only ask as all Wars are about political outcomes. It's the authority to which the people defer and obey, which is the issue, not they themselves. That is the same for all human conflict.

In those terms, fighting the Taliban is no different from fighting the Waffen SS. The prize was not the German people, no more than the prize is the "Afghan" people. The prize is someone exercising a useful degree of authority over them.

The nature of the fighting however, may have to be different, for POLITICAL reasons, as Clausewitz explains.

This is a phrase I use to differentiate between a state seeking a political objective from another state through war (state-based conflict) and a populace seeking a political objective from its own government through warfare (populace-based conflict)

My position being that how I resolve my differences with my own populace MUST be very different to how I resolve my differences with the government of some other state. I may well want and need to crush the will of the populace of that competitor state in order to defeat their government; but if a government needs to crush the will of its own populace in order to sustain itself in power, that is probably a governemnt that is so failed it needs to be replaced.

Some would quibble that a good COIN effort is only out to crush the will of some narrow segment of the populace...this is a slippery slope. Far better to ensure the dissident populace has a voice and to work to effect changes where appropriate and to keep the COIN as much in the lanes of law enforcement as possible in dealing with the criminal elements of the movement; while bringing the majority of the group back into the fold of good citizenry.

King George could have crushed the American Revolution with few simple reforms and an apology. Instead he sent the most powerful Army and Navy in the world and initiated the demise of his Kingdom. There are lessons to be learned from the mistakes of others.

[William F. Owen]

My position being that how I resolve my differences with my own populace MUST be very different to how I resolve my differences with the government of some other state. I may well want and need to crush the will of the populace of that competitor state in order to defeat their government; but if a government needs to crush the will of its own populace in order to sustain itself in power, that is probably a governemnt that is so failed it needs to be replaced.

...but that's the point. You do not need to crush the will of the people of the opposing state. You merely need to crush the will of their leadership, and/or destroy their military means. The same objective should be central to defeating insurgents, and was to every successful UK COIN campaign.
The COIN failures, (Ireland and Israel/Palestine) left in place a military capability and a functioning leadership - which both went on to create states!

...same with the Americans!

King George could have crushed the American Revolution with few simple reforms and an apology. Instead he sent the most powerful Army and Navy in the world and initiated the demise of his Kingdom. There are lessons to be learned from the mistakes of others.

Not once it became a military problem, and Kings do not apologise! (Passion, reason, chance etc) If they do, they have no political authority! - thinking 1770's, not 2010's.

[slapout9]

I have a question for any students of CvC. CvC lists 6 or 7? ways (6 offensive and 1 defensive) that a military can use to defeat an enemy. One he called "operations against the political object"......what exactly did he mean by that? I don't think he ever brings it up again after listing it.

[Bob's World]

I guess this gets to what has been labeled "The American Way of War" (inaccurately, in my opinion).

When Grant assumed command of the Union Army, while he understood that it was very important to defeat Lee's Army and also valuable to capture the Confederate Capital, he also instinctively understood that he needed to crush the will of the Confederate populace, so that the entire Confederate nation would know it was defeated once the war was over. To that end, he positioned himself with Meade to ensure that Meade did not lose his focus on Lee and Richmond; but launched coordinated efforts under his most trusted Lieutenants to crush the will of the South. Sherman in the South, and Sheridan in Virginia. It worked, and coupled with a generous peace the war was over when it was over.

In WWI no such effort against the Axis populace was waged, and the peace was onerous, resulting in no resolution at the end of that conflict as dictated by France and England.

In WWII the war was taken to the people of Japan and Germany. Once their militaries were defeated and capitals captured, their populaces were also fully cognizant of their defeat. Again, coupled with a generous peace, those wars were truly over once over.

For any nation to defeat the United States, if all they do is occupy DC and defeat our military, they are probably about 20% of the way to their ultimate objective. They must crush the will of the American populace to resist to truly win. On the other hand, we have been able to stabilize the growing dissent born of the racial inequities from the slave heritage of our Black populace by "merely" recognizing that the government was wrong and passing and enforcing laws to bring this disaffected segment of the populace into the fold of good governance. It is an ongoing business, this good governance, one clear metric of that being the response of the Black populace to the election of President Obama. Most white Americans didn't think it was a big deal to elect a black man; but for the Black populace it was this huge indicator of validation and citizenship.

Now, we could have dealt with the Civil Rights movement by targeting senior leadership, locating and breaking up networks, and placing increased security on those individuals and facilities targeted by the "rebels." Usually if a segment of your populace is so dissatisfied as to take up arms, or apply more peaceful tactics as those encouraged by Gandhi and King, they have some valid points, and those points must be addressed.