The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Michael C]

Last time I posted a thread on this forum, the response was fantastic. Though I asked a simple, yet innocuous question (who believes war is war) the responses were awesome and got into the issues of defining war, war's nature and the character of war/insurgency/civil wars etc.

Since I am continuing the series on my blog, I want to ask a corollary question. I have found time and again that the far and away master of military theory is Carl von Clausewitz. Many commentors on this forum love Clausewitz, I know that. My question is, does Clausewitz have too much influence?

Here are my two last posts on the "war is war" topic. The first is "War is War is Clausewitz" and the second is "Killing, Fighting, Death, Destruction War is War"

I also want to thank everyone who commented on the last post I put up. I am working on a personal definition of war, and many of the comments had new and original ideas I hadn't heard.

[Bob's World]

Michael, Michael, Michael...chumming the waters of the Small Wars Journal with your bloody questions!

Ok, as the first shark on the scene, let me just say "YES."

Clausewitz offers much for those who seek to understand warfare; where we get into trouble is when we determine that becuase we are good at Clauswitzian warfare to make every problem warfare and and wage it as such.

The proplem is not CvC, it is our over-application of his teachings to things that (while oft violent) have little to do with warfare at all. Consider this excerpt from a post a made a few minutes ago regarding COIN and Afghanistan.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...-here/#c014650

1. Why are soldiers rather than politicians having these conversations? Insurgency is politics, but it is the type of politics born of the failures of the current crop of politicians, so they pass the problem to the military to solve on their behalf, and the military then (not surprisingly) makes the problem one of war and warfare. Politicians leave warfare to soldiers. (Mission passed, mission solved…)

2. Why politicians remain on their hands: It’s a war now, with a General in charge. Once the General “wins” or “loses” either one, the politicians and diplomats will then be able to get back to doing what they do. This is a natural mindset, but it is equally a crippling one. COIN is a civil emergency for the host nation government; for the intervening government it is best seen little different than our approaches to an Indonesian tsunami or Bangladeshi flood. The military is a wonderful reserve of excess capability and capacity to help a civil government turn the corner on an overwhelming emergency. Last in, first out. Not our emergency and certainly not our “war.”


Best of luck with your blog!

Bob

[slapout9]

CvC was half right in his definition of War. I use the SBW definition. It is the use of Force or Fraud to achieve the objective. Fraud can be thought of as Subversion or Psychological Warfare combined with or substituted for Physical Warfare.

[J Wolfsberger]

My question is, does Clausewitz have too much influence?

Drop thermonuclear questions much?

I think both too much and not enough.

Too much in the sense that, as Bob points out, CvC wasn't addressing the elements of conflict that lie more in the area of political and social relationships and maneuvering. (For that, see Machiavelli.)

Not enough in the sense that the principles he was developing (remember that Vom Kriege was an incomplete first draft published after his death) haven't really changed.

As an example, I don't think CvC helps arrive at an understanding of the Anbar Awakening. The Prince, on the other hand, helps a great deal

[Firn]

Drop thermonuclear questions much?

I think both too much and not enough.

Too much in the sense that, as Bob points out, CvC wasn't addressing the elements of conflict that lie more in the area of political and social relationships and maneuvering. (For that, see Machiavelli.)

As an example, I don't think CvC helps arrive at an understanding of the Anbar Awakening. The Prince, on the other hand, helps a great deal

His most important point in this regard might indeed be that as war is the continuation of Politik (polity, politics, policy) with the inter-mixtion of other means one should also take a good hard look at that pesky Politik. Fighting a war does not mean politik stops and other means disappear. In this case a good reading of him should open minds and ways and not close them down. It is quite ironic that the man which blasted others for trying to ignore the political context of military problems should be a problem in this regard.

Given that the inner tendency of war tends to spiral out of control, as he observed, to heavy military means might not be in the interest of a country which wants to limit violence to be able to withdraw while reaching most of it's political objectives. As usual doing the right thing in this difficult context was the hard part. In Anbar it seemed to work.

Firn

[M.L.]

Michael C-

I posted this on your blog, but here are my thoughts:

Two points. You said on your blog:

"The most common definition of war--Clausewitz’ definition--is that war is the continuation of politics by other means. War has two parts: the political and the violent. His definition doesn’t specify which should be primary--the politics or the violence--but from what I understand, he views politics, or grand strategy, as the most important factor in war."

First, Clausewitz defined war as "an act of violence to compel the enemy to do our will" He also said that warfare has three elements, not two. Those elements are policy (or the nation), violence (or the military) and the people. He said these three elements were a "paradoxical trinity" and that a theory which ignores any of the three isn't much of a theory. Clausewitz said any one of them might be the most important at any given time, but that they all play a part.

Second point. Clausewitz first defined war (as stated above) within the context of "total war." In other words, what is the true, unconstrained nature of war? It is violence and death to the last man. However, he later defines war as a "a continuation of policy" as an acknowledgment that war always serves a political objective, and is therefore constrained. Clausewitz stated that defining the political objective was the first and most important question to be answered before starting a war, however, that doesn't mean that politics is the most important part of the "paradoxical trinity."

So, back to the central question, what is the nature of war? Its pure nature is violence and death to the last man. However, we constrain war to serve political objectives. Discussions of armed social science, ROE, et. al, are questions of how far we constrain war to meet political ends.

[Michael C]

I have gone away from using/reading forums, but one of the best parts of discussion boards like this is using them as a sounding board for one's ideas. So thanks again everyone for the comments.

@Bob-I'll agree that Clausewitz himself isn't the problem. Like all philosophies or dogmas that are overused, the founder is often not the problem so much as the disciples who put too much faith into one solution. And I agree that our political system way too often passes the buck to the military, then lets them fail in situations that are politically impossible, or at least really, really difficult.

@Slapout- I plan to use that definition of warfare in a future post on defining war(fare). I hadn't heard it before the last post, and I think it raises interesting problems and arguments.

@J Wolfsberger- I mentioned that On War was unfinished at CvC's death, and I think that fact is undermentioned when it comes to CvC.

@ML- I got your comment but haven't responded to it. As I cautioned in the CvC post, I am no expert on CvC. While I bemoan the simplification of CvC's ideas in the post, I also participate and simplify his ideas for our readership. Thanks for the clarification and I will try to incorporate that into anything I write on Clausewitz in the future.

[Global Scout]

I'm a big advocate for expanding our view and doctrine for conflict, but to be frank I have been very disappointed with all the new ideas since 9/11 that have gotten us no where (it takes a network to defeat a network, human terrain, you have to change their political system, we have to develop their economy, then they'll stop fighting, etc.). All of these views and many more have simply distracted us from our objective of defeating the enemy.

We tend to hold up several of these ideas as validated principles for COIN and small wars, even though we continue to suffer set back after set back when employing them. I don't alway agree with Wilf, but I do agree there have been very few great military theorists since Clausewitz.

[William F. Owen]

I don't alway agree with Wilf, but I do agree there have been very few great military theorists since Clausewitz.

If Wilf gave that impression, then he was having one of his less useful days....

Actually I would submit though CvC is the Gold Standard, there are others of notable merit, but you have to be pretty widely read to make an effective judgement.

What tends to set the high standard amongst most of the useful theorists, is that they all start from Clausewitz, or come back to him eventually. The test is when you have to translate the THEORY into PRACTICE. Clausewitz's guidance on critical analysis still provides one of the best routes to do that. - IMO.

[Firn]

@ML- I got your comment but haven't responded to it. As I cautioned in the CvC post, I am no expert on CvC. While I bemoan the simplification of CvC's ideas in the post, I also participate and simplify his ideas for our readership. Thanks for the clarification and I will try to incorporate that into anything I write on Clausewitz in the future.

After reading your first blog post I have to agree. M.L gave a pretty good quick primer. Perhaps you should go to the www.clausewitz.com page and read some of the introductionary stuff before going further.

"War is the continuation of Politik (polity, politics, policy) with [the inter-mixtion] of other means" is a very subtle description. Economy, Culture, Technology, Religion do all shape both politics and military matters in many many ways but only through political (and social) intercourse will the military means be organized and inter-mixed. War has especially due to those specific military means it's own ruleset or grammar, but not his own logic. That social and human logic permeates all human existence.

[Taiko]

Some helpful tips for reading CvC:

1. Understand that his work was unfinished. He had discovered the theory that war is a continuation of politics rather late in his life and was in the process of rewriting his thesis when he died.

2. Make a clear distinguishment between what CvC wrote about 'war' and 'warfare'. CvC's writing on 'war' is universal and still relevant today. CvC's writing on 'warfare' is context specific and subject to time and space. Hence, war never changes, but warfare constantly changes with time and space. If we do not learn to adapt to those changes then we will surely be at a disadvantage in shaping the conflict environment.

3. Be very weary of what 'commentators' say about CvC. He is subject to constant misinterpretation and can be taken grossly out of context. Detractors such as Martin Van Creveld are a classic example. CvC advocates are also guilty of taking what CvC wrote out of context with Helmuth von Moltke being another classic example.

4. As per usual, one reading of CvC is simply not enough to understand how he interposes an ideal of war and warfare with the reality of war and warfare. To fully appreciate CvC, and ensure that you do not misinterpret what he has writen, you will need to understand the theoretical methodology of the time. For this Kant is your best starting point.

Good luck with unraveling the mind of the best western militery theorists of all time.

[H. Nelson]

There was a reason Clausewitz wanted his papers burned at his death. 'On War' was an unfinished, poorly thought out, self-contradictory notebook of thoughts.

Sun Tzu is far superior, and if you add him to Boyd you get Maneuver Warfare Theory. I am pretty sure the marines have a statue of Boyd, but I doubt they have one of Clausewitz.

If Clausewitz ever added real value to warefare, it was to frame it as a science. Other than that, he just advanced a murderous and tedious type of fighting that had large consequences in WWI.

Cheers,

H.

http://onparadox.blogspot.com/

[William F. Owen]

There was a reason Clausewitz wanted his papers burned at his death. 'On War' was an unfinished, poorly thought out, self-contradictory notebook of thoughts.

Basically you've clearly never read Clausewitz. Yes it's complicated. Study of War and Warfare requires effort and guidance from those who have.

Sun Tzu is far superior, and if you add him to Boyd you get Maneuver Warfare Theory. I am pretty sure the marines have a statue of Boyd, but I doubt they have one of Clausewitz.

Sun Tzu is not superior. Let me guess, you've read the Griffiths translation, and you thing Sun-Tzu wrote the "Art of War?"
Boyd? Give me break! A man who didn't know a lot about military history, left almost no writings, and a faith based following based on poor understanding of warfare and War. For a very grass roots intro, try this. Plus, search for Boyd in the forums.

If Clausewitz ever added real value to warefare, it was to frame it as a science. Other than that, he just advanced a murderous and tedious type of fighting that had large consequences in WWI.

Rubbish. That is completely wrong, and utterly without evidence. You need to have some understanding of a subject before you start pontificating.

[Taiko]

This reminds me of an anecdote from On War:

A colleague wrote to CvC wanting advice on the final exam he was drafting for junior officers. The questions set for the exam included a number of different operations and tactical maneuvers, and the officers had to write which one they thought was best. In responding to the colleague’s letter CvC wrote that he could not answer the question because the examiner did not provide the policy context from which the officers could draw their answers from.

In my opinion it seems you are both arguing past each other in a theoretical vacuum. If you both used the context of policy, and historical examples, there would be cases were you are both right and wrong. Policy will always determine the ways, ends and means at the start of a conflict, however, that does not necessarily mean policy is always the sole arbiter throughout the various phases of war. This is the paradox of the trinity.

ML wrote:

Means are resources, not methods.

If we are viewing this from a strictly CvC perspective, in On War he takes "war preparation", that is logistics and resources as a given. Hence, means are considered tactics/methods of employing violence.

ML wrote:


"Containment" is a strategic end state.

The policy, or end state, was to 'contain' the USSR from expanding into America's sphere of influence. The strategies for achieving 'containment' ranged from Eisenhower's 'massive retaliation', to Kennedy's 'flexible response' and Reagan's 'star wars'/'national missile defense system'.

H.Nelson wrote:

There was a reason Clausewitz wanted his papers burned at his death. 'On War' was an unfinished, poorly thought out, self-contradictory notebook of thoughts. Sun Tzu is far superior, and if you add him to Boyd you get Maneuver Warfare Theory. I am pretty sure the marines have a statue of Boyd, but I doubt they have one of Clausewitz.

Very entertaining indeed and welcome. Pray tell, do you know the difference between war and warfare? There is an old saying that ignorance in bliss, however, when it comes to strategy ignorance gets people killed.