The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[MattC86]

Grant will likely always be my favorite US General. One of his greatest accomplishments that he receives little credit for is the strategy to target the will of the Southern populace as his main effort (to which he tasked Sherman in Georgia and the Carolinas; and ultimately Sheridan in the Shenandoah to execute), while he supervised Meade in the supporting, but critical effort of defeating Lee's Army and taking Richmond (in that order).

He, IMO, was the first leader to not only understand that merely killing soldiers or capturing capitals was enough in wars between nations, as it had been in the West for generations in wars between Kingdoms.

Pardon my interjection, but I was under the impression that this was not correct - Grant's initial attitude towards Sherman after the latter proposed the March to the Sea was one of trepidation; that Sherman should first destroy Johnston/Hood's army before heading on his swath of destruction, or even head for Mobile. Sherman gradually convinced Grant he could not only pull this off, but the objective Grant really wanted - destruction of the Confederate Army in the West - could be done by Gen. George Thomas' Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga (as indeed happened).

I was similarly under the impression that Grant saw the destruction of Confederate armies as his goal, but that he came to see what Sherman was doing as the flip side of the same coin - that grinding Confederate armies to powder reinforced the helplessness civilians felt in the path of Sherman, and vice versa.

Aside from the torturous history lesson (my apologies if I am wrong), can I ask what is NOT Clausewitzian about Sherman's actions? Just as the Confederates targeted the Union will to continue, Sherman realized he had a golden opportunity to return the favor. His writing is littered with references to destroying the will of the enemy to resist. I feel like the calculated brutality this guy promotes is just another way of achieving victory in the competition of wills. . .he's being Clausewitzian without even realizing it.

Not to mention Sherman's March didn't kill 8-10% or whatever of the population - it burned and stole but did not often rape and murder. That was the intent. Sherman was also not one for pitched battles of annihilation as Grant was. So I don't know where this guy is getting his ideas or his facts, but the whole premise as Cavguy describes it seems absurd.

Matt

[slapout9]

Matt86, you ain't wrong....you be jamming

[Steve Blair]

Granted Civil War history isn't my main field, but the answer isn't as simple as "Sherman had the idea and Grant resisted." And likewise the reverse isn't completely true.

Grant had learned the value, and practicality, of moving through the Southern countryside during the Vicksburg campaign. He also began to understand at that time that the Southern popular will would need to be defeated along with the field armies. But he also understood that Lee's ANV was a physical representation of that will, and that the Army of the Potomac would not likely close with and destroy that army without his physical presence. Actually, both Sherman and Grant were wary of the possibility of moving an entire army through the deep south, but over time both began to see the possibilities of that movement. Grant seems to have grasped the need to carry the war to the deep south first, but Sherman certainly came around quick enough. He was the one who was wary during the Vicksburg campaign of cutting loose from the supply lines and living off the county, but had clearly changed his tune when the Army of Tennessee cut loose through the deep south.

Both Sherman and Grant (and by extension Sheridan and many other senior Union leaders from the Western Theater) grasped the need to shatter Southern popular will and support for the cause. Such a realization seems to have come with slower speed and clarity to those Union commanders who spent most of their time fighting in Virginia.

Sherman's campaign certainly changed to a tune of punishment when they left Georgia and entered South Carolina.

[Firn]

It is pretty hard to create only through Cavguy's post an sensible image of the critic of CvC offered by the lector.

His approval of Sherman and the description of his book seem to indicate that he is somehow irritated by the importance of the foreigner CvC in the military of the USA. The preview on Amazon really sounds like a personal rant, doesn't it?

In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the American military cast about for answers--and, bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz. This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the U.S. faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War--in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great. It should come as no surprise, then, that the military's conceptualization of modern offensive war, as well as its execution, has failed in every real-life test of our day.



This book reveals the failings of the U.S. Army in its adoption of a postmodern “Full Spectrum Operations" doctrine, which codifies Clauswitzian thinking. Such an approach, the author contends, leaves the military without the doctrine, training base, or force structure necessary to win offensive wars in our time. Instead, the author suggests, the army should adopt a new doctrinal framework based on an analysis of the historical record and previously successful American methods of war. A clear and persuasive critique of current operative ideas about warfare, The Clausewitz Delusion lays out a new explanation of victory in war, based on an analysis of wartime casualties and post-conflict governance. It is a book of critical importance to policymakers, statesmen, and military strategists at every level.

Perhaps the digital ink is spent better elsewhere...


Firn

[MattC86]

Granted Civil War history isn't my main field, but the answer isn't as simple as "Sherman had the idea and Grant resisted." And likewise the reverse isn't completely true.

Grant had learned the value, and practicality, of moving through the Southern countryside during the Vicksburg campaign. He also began to understand at that time that the Southern popular will would need to be defeated along with the field armies. But he also understood that Lee's ANV was a physical representation of that will, and that the Army of the Potomac would not likely close with and destroy that army without his physical presence. Actually, both Sherman and Grant were wary of the possibility of moving an entire army through the deep south, but over time both began to see the possibilities of that movement. Grant seems to have grasped the need to carry the war to the deep south first, but Sherman certainly came around quick enough. He was the one who was wary during the Vicksburg campaign of cutting loose from the supply lines and living off the county, but had clearly changed his tune when the Army of Tennessee cut loose through the deep south.

Both Sherman and Grant (and by extension Sheridan and many other senior Union leaders from the Western Theater) grasped the need to shatter Southern popular will and support for the cause. Such a realization seems to have come with slower speed and clarity to those Union commanders who spent most of their time fighting in Virginia.

Sherman's campaign certainly changed to a tune of punishment when they left Georgia and entered South Carolina.

I don't think I suggested (at least I hope I didn't) that Grant opposed it and Sherman won him over - only that he showed some resistance to the grand scale of what Sherman was planning. He worried if it was feasible with Hood maneuvering in Sherman's rear - remember, during the Siege of Vicksburg, he sent Sherman to Jackson to guard against Johnston's possible relief expedition.

No argument with any of what you said, though. I wonder if the phenomenon you notice is the result of minimal contact with the Southern population by officers and men fighting with the Army of the Potomac?

Getting back to the topic at hand, Firn is probably right, it seems a bit premature to judge the entire book and argument based on these snippets, but coming from Cavguy and the publisher's own description at Amazon, it does seem highly suspect.

Matt

[Cavguy]

Apologize I couldn't sketch the arguments in more detail. The presentation lasted an hour and I wasn't taking notes as I was processing what was being said. Some of it may or may not be in his forthcoming book.

I don't think the author is insincere or anyhow prejudiced, he sincerely believes the influence of CvC and the way it was implemented has reduced the effectiveness of the US Army. I am not enough of a CvC/Jomini student yet to really rule on what CvC meant or didn't mean and whether he adequately accounts for CvC's "intent".

My issue was the 5-18% number and the logical implication that successful pacification requires mass murder. Even if effective, it's not a COA that should be considered by the USA.

Niel

[Firn]

My issue was the 5-18% number and the logical implication that successful pacification requires mass murder. Even if effective, it's not a COA that should be considered by the USA.

Niel

You have my respect for stressing that point during the lecture. Such a number may sound pretty understandable and agreeable on paper but as you said it will in practice be very bloody. Killing in the process of the pacification of Afghanistan up to 18% of the population or 8.600.000 humans doesn't seem to fit the purpose of the current mission.

Leaving that aside I guess we will have to wait for that book to see if it provides something useful. The perception so far is not a good one, but it might be overridden by the qualities of the book.


Firn

[Schmedlap]

My issue was the 5-18% number and the logical implication that successful pacification requires mass murder. Even if effective, it's not a COA that should be considered by the USA.

Are you sure that is the logical implication? If it was, then okay, maybe he's crazy.

I suspect that he was looking at cases where that much of the population was killed - in large part because it was a total war - and he then drew a link between that beat down and the willingness to submit. If that was his thought process, then I don't think that the logical implication is a mass murder COA.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Seems you've been living in the deep South too long and have drank up all the Kool Aide.

Grant knew that he had to hit Lee again and again since the ANV was the CoG, not so much Richmond. So he hit him hard at the Wilderness. When the Federals broke off the attack Lee (and many Federal officers) was sure Grant would withdraw. He didn't, he moved to his left. This threw Lee off his game a bit but he rallied well to block Grant at Spotsylvania. So it went until U.S. stole a march on Bobby and crossed the James, but his Corps were slow in taking Petersburg and so the siege began. Grant lost about 55,000 (which were fewer men than the Federals had lost in the three previous years trying to do the same thing) to Lee's 33,000, the key being the Union casualties were a smaller % of overall forces. Since Sherman at the same time was “making Georgia howl” there could be no shifting of Confederate forces between the theaters. Also, when Early threatened Washington Grant failed to react as previous commanders had; which was to withdraw and rush north. He kept focused on Lee.

Grant formulated his strategy based on his greater manpower to make his flanking movements and keeping his supply lines secure. Lee was able to counter since he had the advantage of interior lines, but only because he was obliged to defend Richmond and his supply line to the southwest. Grant had considered going west of Richmond with the same strategy but it would have unacceptably lengthen his supply line. He also factored in the desire that one of his attacks might break through to Richmond. Both Grant and Lee knew that a prolonged siege (whether around Richmond or Petersburg) would end the war in favor of the North.

Agree that neither Grant nor Sherman was a “great captain” per say, but neither was Lee (he was too Virginia centric and at times overly aggressive for the resources available to the CSA). In the aggregate, when one totals Grant's losses from Beaumont to Appomattox he lost fewer men numerically (and effectively won the war in the western theater in 1863) than Lee incurred from Seven Pines to Appomattox. Grant used his obvious superiority in manpower and resources to defeat Lee, like that's a bad thing. Was he supposed to just sit back like all the other AotP commanders before him?

[slapout9]

Apologize I couldn't sketch the arguments in more detail. The presentation lasted an hour and I wasn't taking notes as I was processing what was being said. Some of it may or may not be in his forthcoming book.

I don't think the author is insincere or anyhow prejudiced, he sincerely believes the influence of CvC and the way it was implemented has reduced the effectiveness of the US Army. I am not enough of a CvC/Jomini student yet to really rule on what CvC meant or didn't mean and whether he adequately accounts for CvC's "intent".

My issue was the 5-18% number and the logical implication that successful pacification requires mass murder. Even if effective, it's not a COA that should be considered by the USA.

Niel

Cavguy do you have any class handouts or anything you can post from the class with references? I can't remember where I read it but doing WW2 there were supposedly calculations that we had to be prepared to inflict between 25% to 50% total causalities on Japan in order to get a total surrender, if that is correct the statistic may some merit to it. This is very CvC since he said the main aim is to DISARM the enemy.....if the enemy want wear unifroms but has guns and you intend to disarm them then you will have to kill a lot of so called civilians.

[Cavguy]

Cavguy do you have any class handouts or anything you can post from the class with references? I can't remember where I read it but doing WW2 there were supposedly calculations that we had to be prepared to inflict between 25% to 50% total causalities on Japan in order to get a total surrender, if that is correct the statistic may some merit to it. This is very CvC since he said the main aim is to DISARM the enemy.....if the enemy want wear unifroms but has guns and you intend to disarm them then you will have to kill a lot of so called civilians.

Book is available now, with three positive reviews on Amazon ...

http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Del...8168045&sr=8-1

[Firn]

Cavguy do you have any class handouts or anything you can post from the class with references? I can't remember where I read it but doing WW2 there were supposedly calculations that we had to be prepared to inflict between 25% to 50% total causalities on Japan in order to get a total surrender, if that is correct the statistic may some merit to it. This is very CvC since he said the main aim is to DISARM the enemy.....if the enemy want wear unifroms but has guns and you intend to disarm them then you will have to kill a lot of so called civilians.

Well if we look at both WWI and WWII we see that the death of civilians both can or might not play an important part in the surrender of the enemy. In WWI we had huge internal unrest in all four continental empires - war doesn't stop the political processes, far from it. To a bigger and a smaller degree they decided in concert with other factors the war. Civilian casualities caused by the enemy direct actions were rather small, certainly under 1% for the central empires. However the revolutions and unrests sparked a very bloody civil war in Russia and was followed by the Armenian Genocide.

But the Central Powers asked for peace because they knew that given the increasing inbalance of ressources in the mid or long term their military power would not be sufficient to avoid the destruction of their ability to defend themselves.

In WWII the Sovietunion lost over the duration of the war almost 10% of their civilian population but refused to give up. Given the huge ressources the ability to wage war was intact at every point and was even increasing. Nazi Germany refused to give up until the leader of the regime which held the society in an iron grip shot himself, even if most of the territory was overun, the cities bombed into ruins and the military situation was already hopeless two years earlier. The civilian casualities were great but even percentage wise far smaller than the Soviet ones. France even capitulated with comparable tiny civilian casualities, as did Poland.

So we can see that things depend on huge amount of factors and are impossible to predict. Frankly if the author argues with so high and fixed percentages than he seems to be very naive or not honest. Now I'm almost ready to buy the book the get proven otherwise.


Firn

[Ken White]

Granted Civil War history isn't my main field, but the answer isn't as simple as "Sherman had the idea and Grant resisted." And likewise the reverse isn't completely true.

It was a growing pain sort of thing. Both were fair Generals, neither was great. Thomas and Buford were both better, just not in the right place at the right time.

Any General that says as Grant did "I propose to fight it out on this line if it take all summer" has some problems as a tactician, particularly considering it was said immediately after he got a really bloody nose with 17,000 casualties in The Wilderness and was in process of getting zapped again at Spotsylvania with another 18,000 casualties. His claim to fame is actually that he had more troops to throw away than did his opponents-- and he surely did that.

A strategist he was not. Good writer, though...