The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Cavguy]

Having Mr. Melton as my tactics instructor the past year -

His main point is that none of the Iraq governance/occupation debacle should have been a mystery. We planned for 3 years prior to 1945 how we would govern Germany, and it paid off, with similar planning for Japan. If we had started with our 1945 governance regs/books we would have been better off.

He notes that before a country can be effectively occupied its will must be broken, and that our decisive/CoG effort against the Iraqi military failed to break the will of the population prior to occupation.

Thus he advocates an attritional campaign prior to any occupation operation. He does not advocate attrition in all things, but cites "maneuver warfare" as appropriate for limited and raiding war, not occupation war because it does not break the will of the populace to carry the fight.

A simplified version of his book.

[William F. Owen]

His main point is that none of the Iraq governance/occupation debacle should have been a mystery. We planned for 3 years prior to 1945 how we would govern Germany, and it paid off, with similar planning for Japan. If we had started with our 1945 governance regs/books we would have been better off.

Strongly concur. So would Carl.

He notes that before a country can be effectively occupied its will must be broken, and that our decisive/CoG effort against the Iraqi military failed to break the will of the population prior to occupation.

Same again.

Thus he advocates an attritional campaign prior to any occupation operation. He does not advocate attrition in all things, but cites "maneuver warfare" as appropriate for limited and raiding war, not occupation war because it does not break the will of the populace to carry the fight.

As there is no functional difference between "attrition" and "manoeuvre" I can't see the issue here. For example, raiding is aimed at causing attrition.

[Bob's World]

We also went into Germany expecting the German people to fight us for every inch of ground; whereas we went into Iraq expecting to be greeted like the the guys who liberated Paris. Query: Did we have master plan for rebuilding France?? I suspect we didn't.

Most problems in life are foreseeable if you have your eyes open and are looking at things with a clear perspective. On Iraq, there was no room for clear perspectives, those voices where shouted down, ignored, or simply mowed over. (Speaking from one working on the Army staff during the period that the concept of going into Iraq first came up and watching in shocked amazement as it developed...)

[slapout9]

Sherman, was my kind of General wherever he could he made War against Rich civilians which was the real key to victory. He understood it is about breaking the will of the State no so much about breaking the will of the Army. He destroyed the Civilian Infrastructure (he choose CvC type 2 War) that caused the Government, the People and the Army to ALL collapse, because the Civilian Infrastructure of Food,Weapons,Recruits is the real key to most Wars IMO............And Karl Marx wrote about this as a reporter in London before it happened, he actually said that Georgia was the Center of Gravity along with about 300,000 rich slave owners. Economic analysis is vastly underrated as a Strategic and Criminal analysis tool IMO. OK I am done now

[slapout9]

Interesting way to do COIN with the idea of establishing Economic Advantage.


http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/alex-de...y-on-the-cheap

[Dayuhan]

His main point is that none of the Iraq governance/occupation debacle should have been a mystery. We planned for 3 years prior to 1945 how we would govern Germany, and it paid off, with similar planning for Japan. If we had started with our 1945 governance regs/books we would have been better off.

He notes that before a country can be effectively occupied its will must be broken, and that our decisive/CoG effort against the Iraqi military failed to break the will of the population prior to occupation.

Certainly the planning for the governance and occupation of Iraq was woefully inadequate and based on some astonishingly inappropriate assumptions... but comparisons to Germany and Japan are unlikely to be useful. The same qualities that made Germany and Japan formidable opponents in war made them excellent candidates for organized reconstruction; likewise the same qualities that made Iraq such a failure at war made it an extremely poor candidate. The obvious difference - the extreme ethnic and sectarian divisions and the hostility produced by extended and brutal minority rule - is only the most obvious of many.

I suspect that failure to break the will of the population to resist our occupation was less an issue than our failure to accurately assess the will of the various sectors of the populace to kill each other.