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Thread: The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

  1. #181
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Also, due to the nature of his writings, one learns much more about what he was thinking than about what he ultimately concluded. It is a view of his journey, and to quote out of context something said in a written muse is unlikely to convey what he ultimately came to believe on a topic.
    Robert C. Jones
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    That is my major concern at the moment when writing my thesis. I can generally see when some one has taken CvC out of context. For example, Jim99 back on page 2 has taken CvC out of context by quoting a phrase from his logical line of inquiry, without realizing that CvC disputes this assumption in his material line of inquiry. Unless you know the Kantian theoretical method of inquiry then a lot of CvC work seems to be contradicting itself and is easily quoted out of context. Moltke and Ludendorf are prime examples. In most of the books I've read about CvC the writer generally argues that Book 1 is a guide to Books 2-8. However, I'm of the impression that Books 2-8 can show how CvC arrived at his conclusions in Book 1. To use a mathematical analogy, Book 1 is the answer, Books 2-8 is the equations he used to get to that answer. Although that is a fairly tenuous position.
    Last edited by Taiko; 07-18-2009 at 02:53 PM.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default CvC Acid Test

    There is pretty simple test to apply to CvC. What did he actually say or imply, that misleads us about the enduring nature of war? What?

    His observations apply just as well to the FARC in Colombia, or Hezbollah in the Lebanon, as they do the City States of Greece, or Soviet Russia.

    My use and referencing of CvC is simply based on the fact that we have no one who has ever provided better insights. Is it perfect? No, but there simply is nothing else. Clausewitz is to War, what Newton was/is to Physics. Was Newton perfect? Was he always? No, but who did it better?
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    Quote Originally Posted by Taiko View Post
    Unless you know the Kantian theoretical method of inquiry then a lot of CvC work seems to be contradicting itself and is easily quoted out of context. Moltke and Ludendorf are prime examples.
    Foch has a similar weakness, in that while is observations about the conduct of operations are generally sound, his writings on the Nature of Modern War quotes CvC, but then seem to go off into a world their own, where quotes are used as selective evidence.

    In most of the books I've read about CvC the writer generally argues that Book 1 is a guide to Books 2-8. However, I'm of the impression that Books 2-8 can show how CvC arrived at his conclusions in Book 1. To use a mathematical analogy, Book 1 is the answer, Books 2-8 is the equations he used to get to that answer. Although that is a fairly tenuous position.
    That maybe annoyingly insightful. I'll now have to spend the evening testing that that hypothesis. Stand by for PM, so as we do not bore the Hitsonim.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  5. #185
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    I've no problem with Carl. He thought about his experiences and wrote about what he thought. There is solid value there.

    I do sometimes scratch my head a bit at those who attribute perhaps a bit too much to his writings. But then, I was the kid in 12th grade lit class who thought it was a bunch of silly BS as we sat around discussing all of the different hidden meanings the Mr. Melville had supposedly written into Moby Dick. Sometimes I think we can overthink a good thing and take it places the author never intended, which is fine, so long as one recognizes that they have left the original and are merely using it as a base of intellectual operations to explore new territory.

    As to CvC; War and politics; and War between sovereign states vice war within sovereign states: I have a thought.

    Many on this site share the position that "war is war." That is fine, they may be correct, but I disagree. I find it to be a dangerously simplistic position that contributes significantly to being overly threat focused in a populace-based conflict, and years of frustrating failure in stabilizing a country.

    We all recognize that Politics between sovereign states is a very different thing than politics within sovereign states. They have to be, the relationships and equities are very different things, and to approach either the same as the other is to fail in both.

    The applies to warfare. As an extension of politics, warfare within a state, within a populace, is a very different thing that warfare between states and between populaces. Sure there are many similarities in how it looks on the surface; but the underlying relationships, motivations, etc are very, very different.

    If I get in a dispute with a stranger and punch him the results and follow-on consequences are very different than if I get in a dispute with my neighbor and punch him, or if I get in a dispute with my son and punch him. We all understand this; yet when it becomes warfare many set this understanding aside and believe that a combatant is a combatant, yet every action carries very different consequences. Now sometimes the neighbor conflict occurs. Sometimes that young man you've raised steps up to challenge the old man. These things happen. It's life. Sometimes a populace steps up to challenge the established governance as well.

    All must be dealt with, but all require a very different approach if one is to avoid the pitfalls of so many nations that have gone before us treating all as if they are one and the same.
    Last edited by Bob's World; 07-19-2009 at 01:53 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    But then, I was the kid in 12th grade lit class who thought it was a bunch of silly BS as we sat around discussing all of the different hidden meanings the Mr. Melville had supposedly written into Moby Dick.
    Well, I was the kid staring out of the window, thinking what a crock, Melville was. I absolutely concur with your position. Maintaining a realistic and thus somewhat sceptical view is inherently useful.
    Many on this site share the position that "war is war." That is fine, they may be correct, but I disagree. I find it to be a dangerously simplistic position that contributes significantly to being overly threat focused in a populace-based conflict, and years of frustrating failure in stabilizing a country.
    ...but that's not what "War is War" is meant to convey. It has nothing to do with being threat focussed. It is to do with the enduring nature of war - but I personally am threat focussed.
    We all recognize that Politics between sovereign states is a very different thing than politics within sovereign states. They have to be, the relationships and equities are very different things, and to approach either the same as the other is to fail in both.
    How so? Pashtuns in A'Stan, and Pashtuns in Pakistan. Communists in North Vietnam, and Communists in South Vietnam. Nazis in Austria, and Nazis in Croatia.
    The applies to warfare. As an extension of politics, warfare within a state, within a populace, is a very different thing that warfare between states and between populaces. Sure there are many similarities in how it looks on the surface; but the underlying relationships, motivations, etc are very, very different.
    OK, so how do you differentiate between a Civil War and an Insurgency, in a way that usefully aids our understanding?
    All must be dealt with, but all require a very different approach if one is to avoid the pitfalls of so many nations that have gone before us treating all as if they are one and the same.
    So the need for differing approaches is defined by something other than the effect of the political outcome? Hafez Assad, had not problem levelling Hama, to resolve his "internal dispute" with the Muslim Brotherhood.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  7. #187
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    When I say poilitcs between vs within, I mean more how a national leader approaches problems with the leaders and populaces of another country are far different than how he approaches problems with leaders and the populace of our own country. The difference between foreign policy and domestic policy. Same degree applies to the difference between foreign war and domestic war.

    As to civil war, which I was not referring to at all, it is as close to "hybrid warfare" as any I have seen (certainly the example always tossed out of Hezbollah using missiles to frustrate the IDF recently is NOT hybrid at all) as it mixes components of both state-based warfare and populace-based warfare. But that is a separate book unto itself to explore that line of thought...

    No I mean the differnce between an insurgency and a declared war between two nations. That and no more. Very different. For the lead squad on the ground they may look very similar; but they are not, and while that lead squad may well be doing much of the same things both to secure itself and to accomplish their mission; the nuances of the difference are critical for successful results; and the consequences of ignoring them are the difference between resolving the problem and turning it into a festering sore that never heals.
    Last edited by Bob's World; 07-19-2009 at 03:20 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Default Clausewitz does not have all the answers

    But I believe that by studying Clausewitz we can better understand the nature of war and through thorough study (along with Sun Tzu and other great theorists) we can develop plans to deal with complex problems - however, we must understand that we might not get it right the first time! Clausewitz does not pretend to give us the answers but his real goal was to help guide students of war (and human nature) to develop the "inward eye" or coup d'oiel that would combine experience with the study of theory to allow planners and more importantly commanders to cut through the fog and friction of war, while lacking perfect clarity of information, to exercise good military (and political) judgment to deal with war.

    However, it is our Jominian quest to find the perfect checklist to solve every problem that causes us to misread, misquote (or quote out of context) and misunderstand Clausewitz and the importance of his work that remains of value today and as long as there is the human element in war (passion, hate, greed; rational control; and chance - which I suggest transcends whatever label of war we want to put on it - Major Combat Operations or Maneuver Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, or Irregular Warfare).

    Again the answers are not in O War or in the Art of War (Sun Tzu's and certainly not Jomini') but the "answers" can be discerned through study and experience.
    David S. Maxwell
    "Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    When I say poilitcs between vs within, I mean more how a national leader approaches problems with the leaders and populaces of another country are far different than how he approaches problems with leaders and the populace of our own country. The difference between foreign policy and domestic policy. Same degree applies to the difference between foreign war and domestic war.
    OK. That's an interesting basis for a discussion, as in Domestic v Foreign. Of course a great many "domestic" insurgencies, have an international dimension.
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    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by max161 View Post
    However, it is our Jominian quest to find the perfect checklist to solve every problem that causes us to misread, misquote (or quote out of context) and misunderstand Clausewitz and the importance of his work that remains of value today and as long as there is the human element in war (passion, hate, greed; rational control; and chance - which I suggest transcends whatever label of war we want to put on it - Major Combat Operations or Maneuver Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, or Irregular Warfare).
    Excellent observation. Never really read Jomini in any detail, and never felt I had to, for just the reason you outline.

    However, I am currently reading Vauban's treatise on Siegecraft, which is really good example of solid tactical writing, in a "here's how you do it," way that makes very good sense, because with a specific context you can give specific advice, complete with "common errors made when conducting a siege" - Gold dust.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Default Slap ....

    re:
    So was 911 a crime or an act of war? Can it be both at the same time?
    Yes (both) and yes.

    ----------------------
    PS: Taiko

    re:
    For example, Jim99 back on page 2 has taken CvC out of context by quoting a phrase from his logical line of inquiry, without realizing that CvC disputes this assumption in his material line of inquiry.
    Can't find a post on page 2 where I quote CvC; are you referring to this post on page 3 ? I've no desire to argue with you about what I said (I'll stand by it); but you confused me as to what your reference was.
    Last edited by jmm99; 07-19-2009 at 08:12 PM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Excellent observation. Never really read Jomini in any detail, and never felt I had to, for just the reason you outline.

    However, I am currently reading Vauban's treatise on Siegecraft, which is really good example of solid tactical writing, in a "here's how you do it," way that makes very good sense, because with a specific context you can give specific advice, complete with "common errors made when conducting a siege" - Gold dust.
    Wilf, do you have a full title for the Vauban's book?

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    It is best to consult insurgents themselves as to whether or not Clausewitz does apply to insurgency.

    The following is from Vietnamese General Truong Chinh's PRIMER FOR REVOLT (edited by Bernard Fall). It contains the answers that many seek.

    l. Politics and military action -- Then two questions are closely related: "War is a continuation of politics." ( Marx). The politics of our Democratic Republic are hampered by the French colonialists; we must therefore act militarily to overcome the obstacles they have put in our way, so that our politics can be carried out successfully. Military action is a measure by which politics are executed. '' War is a means of politics. "War is the continuation of politics by other means." (Clausewitz).

    This is why military action can only succeed when politics are correct. And conversely, politics cannot be fulfilled without the success of military action. When military action is successful the aim of war is also realized. After a war comes to an end, politics continue to be carried out by other, more moderate means. That is the relation between military affairs and politics.

    Those who rely only on politics often do not realize the important role of armed force in history, do not realize that sometimes armed force must be used to fight the internal enemy or external aggressors. Internally, such people often accept reconciliation contrary to principle. In foreign relations, they are liable to surrender, or make diplomatic concessions. Again, those who have a tendency only to rely on military action are inclined to militarism. They tend to believe that everything can be settled by armed force; they do not apply political mobilization, are unwilling to give explanations and to convince people; they even use threats, or bring pressure to bear on the people.

    Or, fighting spiritedly, they neglect political work; they do not seek ways of building ties of affection between officers and men, do not act in such a way that the army and the people can wholeheartedly help one another; and they neglect propaganda directed to the breaking of the morale of the enemy troops. Such people know only how to fight; they fail to consolidate the National United Front, fail to seek new allies outside the country, and neglect the study of the internal and world situation, which is indispensable to the development of correct internal and foreign policies.
    -------------------------------------------------------------
    Bernard Fall wrote in a footnote regarding the above paragraph.

    "This paragraph is perhaps the most important in the whole book, for it points directly to the present deficiencies in Western operations in South VietNam, with their overemphasis on military technology and their lack of a valid political rationale. e.g., strategic hamlets are a technique, not an ideology."

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    Quote Originally Posted by War Hammer View Post
    It is best to consult insurgents themselves as to whether or not Clausewitz does apply to insurgency.

    The following is from Vietnamese General Truong Chinh's PRIMER FOR REVOLT (edited by Bernard Fall). It contains the answers that many seek.

    l. Politics and military action -- Then two questions are closely related: "War is a continuation of politics." ( Marx). The politics of our Democratic Republic are hampered by the French colonialists; we must therefore act militarily to overcome the obstacles they have put in our way, so that our politics can be carried out successfully. Military action is a measure by which politics are executed. '' War is a means of politics. "War is the continuation of politics by other means." (Clausewitz).

    This is why military action can only succeed when politics are correct. And conversely, politics cannot be fulfilled without the success of military action. When military action is successful the aim of war is also realized. After a war comes to an end, politics continue to be carried out by other, more moderate means. That is the relation between military affairs and politics.

    Those who rely only on politics often do not realize the important role of armed force in history, do not realize that sometimes armed force must be used to fight the internal enemy or external aggressors. Internally, such people often accept reconciliation contrary to principle. In foreign relations, they are liable to surrender, or make diplomatic concessions. Again, those who have a tendency only to rely on military action are inclined to militarism. They tend to believe that everything can be settled by armed force; they do not apply political mobilization, are unwilling to give explanations and to convince people; they even use threats, or bring pressure to bear on the people.

    Or, fighting spiritedly, they neglect political work; they do not seek ways of building ties of affection between officers and men, do not act in such a way that the army and the people can wholeheartedly help one another; and they neglect propaganda directed to the breaking of the morale of the enemy troops. Such people know only how to fight; they fail to consolidate the National United Front, fail to seek new allies outside the country, and neglect the study of the internal and world situation, which is indispensable to the development of correct internal and foreign policies.
    -------------------------------------------------------------
    Bernard Fall wrote in a footnote regarding the above paragraph.

    "This paragraph is perhaps the most important in the whole book, for it points directly to the present deficiencies in Western operations in South VietNam, with their overemphasis on military technology and their lack of a valid political rationale. e.g., strategic hamlets are a technique, not an ideology."

    War Hammer, I think that is one of most outstanding posts ever put up here. Well Done!

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Wilf, do you have a full title for the Vauban's book?
    "A Manual of Siege craft and Fortification" - Sebastien Leprestre De Vauban
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    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by War Hammer View Post
    It is best to consult insurgents themselves as to whether or not Clausewitz does apply to insurgency.
    Clausewitz's observations apply to all organised forms of violence for political ends. He is not giving instruction. He is making an observation. Mao was heavily influenced by, Clausewitz as was Marx. Communist and "Revolutionary" writings, are all using Clausewitz and is gets dumbed down for the peasants to understand.
    Again, those who have a tendency only to rely on military action are inclined to militarism. They tend to believe that everything can be settled by armed force; they do not apply political mobilization, are unwilling to give explanations and to convince people; they even use threats, or bring pressure to bear on the people.
    This is near enough a direct quote from Mao, and PU-29, the field regulations of the Soviet Army, makes the same point quite clearly. The Communists needed to argue this to make their case, that all military action was essentially progressing "Wars of liberation." They keep stating it, not because it was insightful, but because most of them did not understand it, where as it was central to colonialist and bourgeois use of military force - eg: Look at the British and French Empires.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    We all recognize that Politics between sovereign states is a very different thing than politics within sovereign states. They have to be, the relationships and equities are very different things, and to approach either the same as the other is to fail in both.
    Hans Morgenthau would disagree. On topic, this was the point CvC was making with his trinitarian definition, especially the subjective characteristics: the government, the military, and the people. These three intervening variables contribute to the dynamic relationship that goes towards understanding political power and how policy is made. Neo-classical realist theory has done some major work on looking at the relationship between the government, the military and the people in respect to foreign and domestic policy. I would argue that at the domestic level, the relationship is no different, in terms of the pushing and pulling of all three characteristics in determining political power and its relationship to public policy, especially when dealing with an internal insurgency. Mao uses CvC's trinitarian definition of the people, the government, and the military, in his 'Selected Military Writings', to work out his three phases of revolutionary war. Each of these characteristics feature heavily in determining when one moves from one phase to the next. Just as Lenin used CvC trinitarian definition in understanding the roles of the subjective characteristics of politics and how they shape internal revolutionary wars.

    After reading up on FID and SFA, I think I understand the point you are making Bob's World. Its an important one in relationship to the limits of CvC because in developing his theory he took military preparations: arming, training etc as a given. In terms of understanding and implementing FID and SFA this is clearly not the case. So there is a major hole in my thesis that I needs to work on in regards to understanding the role of the military outside of combat. Although, FID and SFA from what I can understand of it, is in many respect, directed towards combat. All the same, thanks for the heads up.

    My apologies Jim99 I did mean your post on page three. There is little to debate. If you used that passage to support any argument, you will be criticised for taking it out of context.

    Thank you for the reference War Hammer. I've got most of Giap's work but this fleshes it out a bit more.
    Last edited by Taiko; 07-20-2009 at 10:16 AM.

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    Council Member max161's Avatar
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    Default The Paradoxical Trinity is not literally the People, Military, and Government

    Quote Originally Posted by Taiko View Post
    On topic, this was the point CvC was making with his trinitarian definition, especially the subjective characteristics: the government, the military, and the people. These three intervening variables contribute to the dynamic relationship that goes towards understanding political power and how policy is made.

    This is one of the problems with reading Clausewitz. His work gets reduced to sound bites. I think you have to put the people, military and the government in context (On War, page 89, Howard and Paret translation). We should pay close attention to his words.

    "War is more that a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the gvien case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendancies always make war a paradoxical trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject tot reason alone.

    The first of the three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope of which courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of the government alone.

    These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rotted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between would conflict with reality to such an extent that for reason alone it would be totally useless.

    Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets."

    This is the problem (and beauty and value) in reading Clausewitz. Our tendency to believe that he was only talking about state on state warfare in his theory misses the point that he was really concerned with a theory of war that transcended a nice neat description. His final analogy in the quote above is perhaps his last laugh for us. As we think he espoused the concrete theory of war we should try to suspend an object on a string between three magnets and see what happens. The interplay of primordial violence, hatred and enmity or the blind natural forces with chance and probability and the creative spirit with policy and reason makes warfare a complex undertaking and this true chameleon exists in whatever form of warfare we want to call it from Major Combat Operations or Maneuver Warfare to Irregular or Hybrid War. The object among the magnets never stops moving, it never remains in the same position, its position is constantly changing much like the character and form of war. These "tendencies" and the interplay between them must be examined when looking at the kind of wars in which we find ourselves and they exist in every form of conflict in some form or another. And of course if one is missing ( as in reason or rational control)then there is no moderating factor and the relationship is very out of balance which can be found in such places where tragic atrocities have occurred (e.g., Rwanda, Sudan, etc). But the last laugh is that there is in fact no simple template for war. There is no simple relationship between the people, military, and government and like Sun Tzu said - war is a matter of life and death for the state and therefore it must be studied. We would do well to study Clausewitz and Sun Tzu well but what they really wanted us to do is study the nature of war as well as the evolving forms and characteristics of war that we see and think we will see in the future and try to understand that the interplay of these tendencies must be examined and understood in order to develop political and military strategies in which to achieve our aims.

    I think his last laugh is that in the end you cannot develop a concrete theory of war that applies to all wars past, present, and future because just like the object suspended between the magnets even when there appears to be no movement for a period of time one slight shift will cause it to get out of balance and continue to shake and shudder as the random interplay of energy and magnetic force acts on the object. The nature of war has never changed but the characteristics and forms surely do. We must continue to study.
    David S. Maxwell
    "Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence

  19. #199
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    I agree. Refer back to post 57:

    (Violence) purpose, hostile feelings/intentions, chance and probability-Policy-(Politics) government, military, people.

    War is not an isolated phenomena. As such, violence is a dependent variable and policy is the independent variable. The level and intensity of Violence is determined by three intervening variables, that are objective, in so far as they are always present in war. Policy itself is decided by political power which, in turn, is made up of three intervening variables whose characteristics are subjective. Meaning they are determined by time and place. However, Policy is not a tyrant. To avoid the charge of political determinism within the theory, Clausewitz argued that while politics exerts a subordinating influence over war for the purpose of realising its goals, its influence runs up against, and is in turn reduced or elevated by, the play of chance and the force of hostile feelings and intensions. In addition, the influence of policy is also limited by the subjective characteristics of the institutions and representative bodies, that call it into being, that is to say, the political process of policy-making which is subject to time and place.

    The reason I have highlighted the secondary trinity (government, people and military) is because this is the part of the CvC tripartite definition which has come under heavy criticism by Kaldor, Van Creveld, Holsti, Smith etc., who argue that we are in a post-trinitarian security environment, which is incorrect.
    Last edited by Taiko; 07-20-2009 at 11:02 AM.

  20. #200
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    Default We are in Violent Agreement!

    Quote Originally Posted by Taiko View Post

    The reason I have highlighted the secondary trinity (government, people and military) is because this is the part of the CvC tripartite definition which has come under heavy criticism by Kaldor, Van Creveld, Holsti, Smith etc., who argue that we are in a post-trinitarian security environment, which is incorrect.
    I could not agree more that it is wrong to think that we are in a post trinitarian security environment. It is as if we have found something new in thinking that war has shifted from state to state to war only among the people. I get tired of people making the choice between enemy centric and population centric warfare. There is always both. The chart I see in briefing slides that makes me chuckle is when defining Irregular Warfare they depict the "secondary trinity" (I like that) and then show a shift from Military and government to emphasis on military and people. To me this shows a classic misunderstanding to the paradoxical trinity and what Clausewitz intended for us to see.
    David S. Maxwell
    "Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence

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