The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Bob's World]

Its also important, I think, to remember that CvC served and studied warfare in a period of major transition.

Prior to Napoleon tapping into the newly unleashed power of a populace empowered Nation of France; warfare in Europe had largely been a game of chess between Kings; defeat an army or navy, take a capital, make it too expensive and win. The populace did not have a true stake in it. Napoleon understood the power of engaging the populace and used it to dominate the continent. Students of Napoleon tend to focus on Generalship and tactics, but his real edge was the mobilization of a National populace to the cause.

Western warfare was clearly different both before and after Napoleon. Not because of Napoleon, but because of the American and French Revolutions. It shifted the COG from the Army or the Capital to the will of the populace. Prior to this Armys and Capitals were extentions of the King's purse. Empty his purse and win. After, they were capitalized by the collective and willing support of the populace, far deeper pockets than any King possesses.

[Bob's World]

I do not think Germany and Japan were offered "generous" peace terms. Not only were they thoroughly destroyed, they were completely dispossessed of their political systems, much of their economic capacity, and of any territorial or colonial ambitions and claims (some of which are still outstanding). They were then made dependent on the victors for their security and stripped of any autonomous means of waging war. Nor do I think the Civil War ended with the surrender of the rebel armies, but it continued through Reconstruction until finally the Federal Government no longer had the political will to address it, giving birth to the 'Solid South' and systematic segregation. Both Clausewitz and Machiavelli advised against a "generous" peace insofar that the intent of war is to strip the enemy of his will or capacity to fight, and that an enemy wounded, but not killed, will strike you again when the time is right for them to do so ("never do a slight injury to an enemy"). So the intent isn't to find "generous" peace terms, IMO, but terms aligned with the political objectives sought in the first place so that the future behavior of the defeated actor is no longer a threat. Sometimes be 'generous', sometimes be harsh.

Generous is a relative thing.

Both were allowed to self-determine their government.
Both were allowed to remain nations.
Both were rebuilt with Western Capital and protected by Western military power and they recovered.

Brutal in combat, gracious in victory. This was the measure of success for 200 years.

Now with Globalization and the empowering of populaces there is another major change that must be assessed for impact on warfare, lest we piss away more generations of young men chasing the wrong measures of success.

[Ken White]

Both Clausewitz and Machiavelli advised against a "generous" peace insofar that the intent of war is to strip the enemy of his will or capacity to fight, and that an enemy wounded, but not killed, will strike you again when the time is right for them to do so ("never do a slight injury to an enemy").

rode to work on Horses. We don't do that anymore.

Nor do we kill our enemies in the sense you write. The Mothers of America, the Intelligentsia and the chattering classes generally do not approve of that approach today. Unfortunate IMO but that's the way it goes.

Icons die, new ones arise, rules are modified, times change. So do mores...

[Taiko]

I have a question for any students of CvC. CvC lists 6 or 7? ways (6 offensive and 1 defensive) that a military can use to defeat an enemy. One he called "operations against the political object"......what exactly did he mean by that? I don't think he ever brings it up again after listing it.

I would like to have a crack at this one using the Paret/Howard translation if I may. What CvC was referring to with "operations that have direct political repercussions" was the balance of power between the states of Europe. As such, operations were design to "disrupt the opposing alliances, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene etc". The operations are aimed at the opposing policy-makers calculations of probability in terms of the cost and benefits of the outcome of initiating or continuing military action in gaining a political objective, as it was at direct military action and defeating the opponents army.

Its very similar to Sun Tzu's observation that:

The superior military cuts down strategy
Its inferior cuts down alliances
Its inferior cuts down the military
The worst attacks walled cities

From my reading of the text, the passage you refer to specifically looks at how a state can bolster its military capacity via the formation of alliances. This will have a direct effect on the balance of power and would have to be taken into account before the first shot is fired (cutting down strategy). I am not sure why he calls them "operations", unless he was referring to the establishment of military ties with other nations via inter military exchanges. An alternative reading could interpret it to say that after the first shot has been fired, when conducting a campaign you choose who and when you fight carefully in order to defeat the weaker members of an alliance quickly, and propose terms for them to either join you or surrender (cutting down alliances). In many respects you could interpret this as a strategy of attrition (cutting down the military), in so far as you are trying to create a political outcome by first attacking your opponents allies, rather than direct confrontation with the opponents main, and one would assume larger, military (attacking walled cities). If you read some of the examples he gives of Napoleon's campaign he does talk about this particular style of operation. Specifically when Napoleon faces two or more armies fielded by different states. CvC goes into some detail as to which army should be engaged first and uses that passage to argue why. Although I can't cite were they are in the book off the top of my head.

As I stated in a previous post. I think this has direct implication in small wars, the Anbar Uprising is a good example of fostering alliances and using them against your opponent. From how I read it, the fact of the matter is A'Q is dependent on alliances in order to operate and survive. The same could be said of the Taliban and its need for developing military and political alliances with the Afghan population. So I think CvC has a valid point to make at the strategic level in regards to the current conflicts in Iran and Afghanistan, specifically when choosing who and when you fight, how and why. Which is what strategy is all about at the end of the day.

For any nation to defeat the United States, if all they do is occupy DC and defeat our military, they are probably about 20% of the way to their ultimate objective.

Now this is an interesting argument in relation to CvC and his criticism of Napoleon's strategy against Russia. He was very critical in how Napoleon conducted the campaign. Specifically, the push to take the capital without defeating the army, and the subsequent 'asymmetrical campaign' the Russians conducted using both militias and regular army to push Napoleon out of Russia. There are a number of examples within this campaign of how a countries territory can provide the strategic depth to make time a decisive factor in defeating an opponent in my opinion. I think studying that campaign still has value today.

Nor do we kill our enemies in the sense you write. The Mothers of America, the Intelligentsia and the chattering classes generally do not approve of that approach today. Unfortunate IMO but that's the way it goes.

I agree with your point on principle. However, would it be fair to argue that if a conflict has a direct and lasting impact on the civilians quality of life then the situation would be radically different? The Cold War would be a good example in the context of the general US populations acceptance of the need to use or threaten to use force on a large scale. The point being, if the territory of the population is under direct threat then they would expect the government to do whatever it is in their means to safeguard it and the population.

[Ken White]

I agree with your point on principle. However, would it be fair to argue that if a conflict has a direct and lasting impact on the civilians quality of life then the situation would be radically different? The Cold War would be a good example in the context of the general US populations acceptance of the need to use or threaten to use force on a large scale. The point being, if the territory of the population is under direct threat then they would expect the government to do whatever it is in their means to safeguard it and the population.

Not funny 'ha-ha,' funny peculiar -- they're fickle. With respect to your question re: quality of life, I suspect there are many variables and regardless the 1/3 Rule will almost certainly apply.

The cold war was an extremely artificial period in history and little that occurred offers examples of value, not least because most of it is shrouded in myths. For example, many Americans believed that a Nuclear War would likely mean the end of the world as we knew it, thus the issue was not quality of life for many but of life itself, so destroying the USSR first was an acceptable figurative alternative.

However, threatening and actually using force are two different things. My thought is that most in the west are not unwilling (which is not the same as being willing) to use force but are repelled by excessive force. To defeat the enemy, if that is possible, is fine, to humiliate and degrade that defeated enemy is a different thing and that will usually draw the fire of the chatterers et.al.

By the same token, defending the hearth and visiting destruction in a distant land are two different things; as in Bob's World's point on the Stranger versus the Neighbor versus the Son -- all impose different constraints in varying degrees. Kill' em all to safeguard the Clan -- but don't be mean to that poor man who surrendered. Yet and contrarily, people can be vindictive...

All in all, absent specifics, it's quite difficult to predict how a population might react. Even with specifics, they'll fool you often as not. Populations are not only fickle, they aren't very consistent (purposely redundant)...

[slapout9]

I would like to have a crack at this one using the Paret/Howard translation if I may. What CvC was referring to with "operations that have direct political repercussions" was the balance of power between the states of Europe. As such, operations were design to "disrupt the opposing alliances, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene etc". The operations are aimed at the opposing policy-makers calculations of probability in terms of the cost and benefits of the outcome of initiating or continuing military action in gaining a political objective, as it was at direct military action and defeating the opponents army.

You are probably right on this, but I was wondering could he have meant direct operations against sovereign political leaders such as the Strike against Qaddafi of Libya? More or less bypassing the military force and going to the political COG with Military means?

[William F. Owen]

When Grant assumed command of the Union Army, while he understood that it was very important to defeat Lee's Army and also valuable to capture the Confederate Capital, he also instinctively understood that he needed to crush the will of the Confederate populace, so that the entire Confederate nation would know it was defeated once the war was over.

Well that's the medieval way of war. La Grande Chavauche, was riding into the enemies territory and showing complete disregard for the Monarch, by doing or taking what you wanted, and showing the population that you, not the king was in control. Target was the enemy King. I submit the same was true in the South.

In WWI no such effort against the Axis populace was waged, and the peace was onerous, resulting in no resolution at the end of that conflict as dictated by France and England.

Not true. The Allies conducted a catastrophic blockade of Germany which very much contributed to the break down of law and order in 1918. Starving population, forced the leadership to sue for peace. Again, the target is the leadership. The Allied mistake, was no occupation of Berlin, and the creation of the new German Government.

In WWII the war was taken to the people of Japan and Germany. Once their militaries were defeated and capitals captured, their populaces were also fully cognizant of their defeat. Again, coupled with a generous peace, those wars were truly over once over.

That assumes that war is deterministic. Capture captial = sustainable peace. Napoleon captured and burnt Moscow. Did him no good at all. The Sandanista capturing Managua, didn't end the war, or create peace. BTW, the whole Sandanista revolution is text book Clausewitz.

For any nation to defeat the United States, if all they do is occupy DC and defeat our military, they are probably about 20% of the way to their ultimate objective. They must crush the will of the American populace to resist to truly win.

History shows that MOST of the population give up the armed struggle once Government and Army have ceased to represent them/cease to function. Some of the population may continue to fight, but it is almost never decisive by itself. (French resistance - and they had a Government and Army in exile!)

Now, we could have dealt with the Civil Rights movement by targeting senior leadership, locating and breaking up networks, and placing increased security on those individuals and facilities targeted by the "rebels."

No you couldn't. If you had done, you would have created the justification for an armed struggle. Number of US Troops killed by the Civil Rights Movement? Black Panthers? They didn't get very far. Besides, nothing about the US CRM, has ever been shown to me as military problem.

[Taiko]

You are probably right on this, but I was wondering could he have meant direct operations against sovereign political leaders such as the Strike against Qaddafi of Libya? More or less bypassing the military force and going to the political COG with Military means?

In terms of COG in relation to operations with direct political repercussions. CvC argued, for example, that if Napoleon was facing more than one allied army he should direct his military against the best commanders of the allied forces first. He reasoned that the psychological blow to the allies if Napoleon defeated their most competent Generals would have direct impact on the morale of the military, the political calculations of the monarchs, and the cohesion of the alliance, in terms of their continuing capacity to resist (See for example Book 2 Chapter 5 pp: 159-164 of Paret/Howard translation were he deliberates on the various COG that Napoleon could of used, to show how to apply critical analyses to a General's decision making process). Although, CvC use of COG was determined by a number of different factors including political objective (primary), terrain, number and competency of armies etc. I suspect that if the military operation caused a significant effect in disrupting the cohesion/morale of the military and the psychological state of mind of the policy-makers and, in turn, caused them to re-evaluate the probabilities of success and failure then it could be considered a COG. The importance of targeting the military capacity to wage war directly, or the policy-makers calculations of probability in continuing the war in order to achieve the political objective, would be dependent on time, place, and capability. Having said that, I realize that COG is a heavily debated concept within the US military so I'm sure there will be some who disagree with this assessment.

Edit: One of the problems with specifically trying to target the policy-maker as a COG, Qaddafi for example, is that he/she can in may cases be replaced, a standing army can not be replaced as quickly. An alternative argument would be that A'Qs COG, or any insurgency for that matter, is its ideology CvC called it 'popular opinion', not its leadership. The exception being if the policy-maker holds that much power that the regime would collapse if he/she is removed.

[William F. Owen]

I suspect that if the military operation caused a significant effect in disrupting the cohesion/morale of the military and the psychological state of mind of the policy-makers and, in turn, caused them to re-evaluate the probabilities of success and failure then it could be consider a COG.

Don't suspect. It's a fact. That is exactly the aim at the heart of Operations or Campaigning. It works in all forms of warfare - and can be taught in terms of explicit statements and guidance to that effect.

[slapout9]

Now, we could have dealt with the Civil Rights movement by targeting senior leadership, locating and breaking up networks, and placing increased security on those individuals and facilities targeted by the "rebels." Usually if a segment of your populace is so dissatisfied as to take up arms, or apply more peaceful tactics as those encouraged by Gandhi and King, they have some valid points, and those points must be addressed.

That is why on another thread I posted King's letter from a Birmingham jail. In the letter he reveals how he was not afraid of the KKK because they were a minority and he believed that the majority of White People were not racist which is true and something that is usually left out of any discussion of the civil rights movement, just like Obama could not have become President without the White Majority voting for him. It is not politically correct to talk about it but it is a fact and King recognized that and in a since Gandhi recognized that he would win because of the morality and decency of the British people as a whole. That is also why he supported the British during WW2 as he recognized that he could not win with non-violent means against the German Army.

[slapout9]

most trusted Lieutenants to crush the will of the South. Sherman in the South, and Sheridan in Virginia. It worked, and coupled with a generous peace the war was over when it was over.

Ah now Sherman understood SBW.... pure war against the Rich People. He had special maps made based upon the tax rolls of Georgia at the time and his line of march went right through the the richest counties, partly for his resupply needs but mainly to destroy the economic clout of the rich ruling class, IMO that more than anything won the war except maybe burning Atlanta and Vicksburg which was really the same idea as Sherman's just a more confined area(s). It's what I would have been doing to Saudi Arabia after 911 instead of this let's invade every other country except the one that is really the problem.....but I digress sorry CvC.

[KalWa]

Any opinions about Van Creveld's "Transformation of War" vis-a-vis Clausewitz's "On War"?

[William F. Owen]

Any opinions about Van Creveld's "Transformation of War" vis-a-vis Clausewitz's "On War"?

Sadly the only possible explanation is that he never read Clausewitz, or of he did failed to understand it. The 4GW guys have never read Clausewitz either.

Almost 99% of Clausewitz critics have simply never read him, or tried to understand what he says, in an overall context. Thus they takes quotes out of context.

[Ski]

Utterly false. Lind has read Clausewitz in German and thinks very highly of his work.

Sadly the only possible explanation is that he never read Clausewitz, or of he did failed to understand it. The 4GW guys have never read Clausewitz either.

Almost 99% of Clausewitz critics have simply never read him, or tried to understand what he says, in an overall context. Thus they takes quotes out of context.

[William F. Owen]

Utterly false. Lind has read Clausewitz in German and thinks very highly of his work.

Yes, knowing Bill Lind, I can attest he has read Clausewitz, yet he and I have very different understandings of what CvC wrote. 4GW flows from Van Creveld's "non-trinitarian War" thinking - so I find it hard to see how a 4GW thinker would regard Clausewitz in a good light.
Why, if you had deep understanding, or think highly of CvC would you construct 4GW? CvC deals with almost every aspect of the relevant arguments. If someone wants to tell me, that 4GW is "CvC for dummies" I'll think again.

[Taiko]

Any opinions about Van Creveld's "Transformation of War" vis-a-vis Clausewitz's "On War"?

To understand Creveld's work on the 'transformation of war, you should begin with his previous book 'The Rise and Decline of the State'. Creveld's main argument on the transformation of war derives from what I believe to be a false assumption that states are in decline or do not exist. I think it is important to realise that he confuses CvC theory on the nature of war, with his writings on its conduct. They are different. CvC applied his theory on the nature of war to those being fought at the time. They so happened to be inter-state wars. CvC never wrote that this was, is, or will be the only kind of war, far from it. Afterall, he wrote a number of monographs on small wars and lectured about small wars to Prussian staff officers for five years. CvC argued that inter-state war had the potential for being the most violent and comes closest to reaching absolute war. He was correct.

Creveld's critique of CvC and the so called 'post-CvC' warfare comes from his reading on CvC's theory of the conduct of war, not its nature. It is really a straw man argument. CvC wrote that the conduct of war will always correlate with its nature, so of course warfare is going to change, simply because of the subjective characteristics of the actors and the political motivations of the time. Creveld misreads CvC differentiation between the objective nature of war and its subjective characteristics. Confusing what is subjective with what is objective. He then bases his whole argument on the reversal of the pardoxical trinity. Claiming that CvC wrote that the relationship between the people, government and the military is a static one, when in fact CvC wrote that it was always dynamic and in flux. Like a magnet suspended between three magnets. CvC never argued that inter-state war is the only kind of warfare, he simply applied his theory on the nature of war to the wars of his time.

One of the problems with Creveld's work is that a number of other theorists: Mary Kaldor, Rupet Smith, Kaveli Holsti etc all base their criticism of CvC and their arguments on 'post-CvC/post-trinitarian warfare' on Crevelds reading of CvC, not what CvC wrote himself. So Willf is correct, CvC is more often quoted than he is read. The problem is not so much that you can use CvC to argue anything. The important distinction to make is that you can take CvC out of context to argue anything. If you understand CvC theoretical methods it is very easy to indentify those who have taken him out of context to try and support their own argument/agenda.

[jmm99]

My added 2 farthings is that MvC may have been too influenced by the turmoil following WWII and the fall of the various colonial empires. The boundaries of the neo-colonial states were artificialities of the colonial systems. In addition, many of those new governments were frankly not ready to govern. It is one thing to be an insurgent; and quite another thing to be an incumbant.

[max161]

I think it is important to realise that he confuses CvC theory on the nature of war, with his writings on its conduct. They are different. CvC applied his theory on the nature of war to those being fought at the time. They so happened to be inter-state wars. CvC never wrote that this was, is, or will be the only kind of war, far from it. Afterall, he wrote a number of monographs on small wars and lectured about small wars to Prussian staff officers for five years. CvC argued that inter-state war had the potential for being the most violent and comes closest to reaching absolute war. He was correct.

......
One of the problems with Creveld's work is that a number of other theorists: Mary Kaldor, Rupet Smith, Kaveli Holsti etc all base their criticism of CvC and their arguments on 'post-CvC/post-trinitarian warfare' on Crevelds reading of CvC, not what CvC wrote himself. So Willf is correct, CvC is more often quoted than he is read. The problem is not so much that you can use CvC to argue anything. The important distinction to make is that you can take CvC out of context to argue anything. If you understand CvC theoretical methods it is very easy to indentify those who have taken him out of context to try and support their own argument/agenda.

Taiko: That is probably the most brilliantly succinct explanation of the misunderstanding of Clausewitz I have seen. Your words should be repeated at every chance. Thanks for this.

Dave

[MikeF]

To understand Creveld's work on the 'transformation of war, you should begin with his previous book 'The Rise and Decline of the State'. Creveld's main argument on the transformation of war derives from what I believe to be a false assumption that states are in decline or do not exist. I think it is important to realise that he confuses CvC theory on the nature of war, with his writings on its conduct. They are different. CvC applied his theory on the nature of war to those being fought at the time. They so happened to be inter-state wars. CvC never wrote that this was, is, or will be the only kind of war, far from it. Afterall, he wrote a number of monographs on small wars and lectured about small wars to Prussian staff officers for five years. CvC argued that inter-state war had the potential for being the most violent and comes closest to reaching absolute war. He was correct.

Creveld's critique of CvC and the so called 'post-CvC' warfare comes from his reading on CvC's theory of the conduct of war, not its nature. It is really a straw man argument. CvC wrote that the conduct of war will always correlate with its nature, so of course warfare is going to change, simply because of the subjective characteristics of the actors and the political motivations of the time. Creveld misreads CvC differentiation between the objective nature of war and its subjective characteristics. Confusing what is subjective with what is objective. He then bases his whole argument on the reversal of the pardoxical trinity. Claiming that CvC wrote that the relationship between the people, government and the military is a static one, when in fact CvC wrote that it was always dynamic and in flux. Like a magnet suspended between three magnets. CvC never argued that inter-state war is the only kind of warfare, he simply applied his theory on the nature of war to the wars of his time.

One of the problems with Creveld's work is that a number of other theorists: Mary Kaldor, Rupet Smith, Kaveli Holsti etc all base their criticism of CvC and their arguments on 'post-CvC/post-trinitarian warfare' on Crevelds reading of CvC, not what CvC wrote himself. So Willf is correct, CvC is more often quoted than he is read. The problem is not so much that you can use CvC to argue anything. The important distinction to make is that you can take CvC out of context to argue anything. If you understand CvC theoretical methods it is very easy to indentify those who have taken him out of context to try and support their own argument/agenda.

Good post Taiko. I don't understand all of it, but keep writing.

v/r

Mike

[Firn]

I recently studied Clausewitz more closely, especially the chapters which are not very well known. Here is the chapter on "Volksbewaffnung" or "Arming the Nation". This chapter has to been seen as part of the strategic defence integrated in his overall concept of war. Given that the Prussian court and a great part of the establishment feared that arming the people could result in anti-royalist revolutions and Clauswitz pressed for such a strategy one should not be surprise that this influences the way he presents this topic. It didn't certainly prevent Lenin and Mao from learning.

The chapter is here


Given the political background, now wonder he starts like that.

A PEOPLE'S war in civilised Europe is a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. It has its advocates and its opponents: the latter either considering it in a political sense as a revolutionary means, a state of anarchy declared lawful, which is as dangerous as a foreign enemy to social order at home; or on military grounds, conceiving that the result is not commensurate with the expenditure of the nation's strength.

He continues and describes how warfare changed forever with the inclusion of the popular masses:

The first point does not concern us here, for we look upon a people's war merely as a means of fighting, therefore, in its connection with the enemy; but with regard to the latter point, we must observe that a people's war in general is to be regarded as a consequence of the outburst which the military element in our day has made through its old formal limits; as an expansion and strengthening of the whole fermentation-process which we call war.

The requisition system, the immense increase in the size of armies by means of that system, and the general liability to military service, the utilizing militia, are all things which lie in the same direction, if we make the limited military system of former days our starting point; and the levée en masse, or arming of the people, now lies also in the same direction.

If the first named of these new aids to war are the natural and necessary consequences of barriers thrown down; and if they have so enormously increased the power of those who first used them, that the enemy has been carried along in the current, and obliged to adopt them likewise, this will be the case also with people-wars

Then he broadens it and explains why the people's war is a special case:

In the generality of cases, the people who make judicious use of this means, will gain a proportionate superiority over those who despise its use. If this be so, then the only question is whether this modern intensification of the military element is, upon the whole, salutary for the interests of humanity or otherwise,—a question which it would be about as easy to answer as the question of war itself—we leave both to philosophers.

But the opinion may be advanced, that the resources swallowed up in people's wars might be more profitably employed, if used in providing other military means; no very deep investigation, however, is necessary to be convinced that these resources are for the most part not disposable, and cannot be utilized in an arbitrary manner at pleasure. One essential part that is the moral element, is not called into existence until this kind of employment for it arises.

Sic, keep in mind the various guerilla wars as in Spain, Napoleonic Russia, the Sovietunion in WWII, China during and after the WWII and Afghanistan. But so far it can still be still be seen in the prism of the industrial wars (WWI, WWII) to come. But as it is part of the book on defense, it increasingly focuses on the effects of the resistance of the agitated people against an invader.

We therefore do not ask again: how much does the resistance which the whole nation in arms is capable of making, cost that nation? but we ask: what is the effect which such a resistance can produce? What are its conditions, and how is it to be used?

It follows from the very nature of the thing that defensive means thus widely dispersed, are not suited to great blows requiring concentrated action in time and space. Its operation, like the process of evaporation in physical nature, is according to the surface. The greater that surface and the greater the contact with the enemy's army, consequently the more that army spreads itself out, so much the greater will be the effects of arming the nation.

(Spain seems now in his mind)

Like a slow gradual heat, it destroys the foundations of the enemy's army. As it requires time to produce its effects, therefore whilst the hostile elements are working on each other, there is a state of tension which either gradually wears out if the people's war is extinguished at some points, and burns slowly away at others, or leads to a crisis, if the flames of this general conflagration envelop the enemy's army, and compel it to evacuate the country to save itself from utter destruction

A very important part comes than:

In order that this result should be produced by a national war alone, we must suppose either a surface-extent of the dominions invaded, exceeding that of any country in Europe, except Russia, or suppose a disproportion between the strength of the invading army and the extent of the country, such as never occurs in reality.

Therefore, to avoid following a phantom, we must imagine a people-war always in combination, with a war carried on by a regular army, and both carried on according to a plan embracing the operations of the whole.

To which the politcal context - fear of popular revolution, similar the French one - influenced the last sentence is unknown. (As said before, CvC's idea of an militia was considered dangerous by Prussia's ruling class.) It is a very interesting statement and especially interesting when used to analyse the situation in Afghanistan. To which extent the safe tribal areas in Pakistan and the flow of ressources and money substitute the "regular army" is quite a question. Note also that Allies play a very important part in the strategic defense according to other Chapters.

Interestingly Mao warned the guerilla leaders in Latinamerica to accept his specific strategy, which relied to a great deal on the huge and difficult terrain of China and the support of the large rural majority as dogma.

While he limits the power of the unsupported "guerilla war" he then up with this.

The conditions under which alone the people's war can become effective are the following—

1. That the war is carried on in the heart of the country.

2. That it cannot be decided by a single catastrophe.

3. That the theatre of war embraces a considerable extent of country.

4. That the national character is favourable to the measure.

5. That the country is of a broken and difficult nature, either from being mountainous, or by reason of woods and marshes, or from the peculiar mode of cultivation in use.

Whether the population is dense or otherwise, is of little consequence, as there is less likelihood of a want of men than of anything else. Whether the inhabitants are rich or poor is also a point by no means decisive, at least it should not be; but it must be admitted that a poor population accustomed to hard work and privations usually shows itself more vigorous and better suited for war.

Very hard not to think about Afghanistan, or China in WWII, isn't it?

One peculiarity of country which greatly favors the action of war carried on by the people, is the scattered sites of the dwellings of the country people, such as is to be found in many parts of Germany. The country is thus more intersected and covered; the roads are worse, although more numerous; the lodgement of troops is attended with endless difficulties, but especially that peculiarity repeats itself on a small scale, which a people-war possesses on a great scale, namely that the principle of resistance exists everywhere, but is nowhere tangible.

If the inhabitants are collected in villages, the most troublesome have troops quartered on them, or they are plundered as a punishment, and their houses burnt, etc, a system which could not be very easily carried out with a peasant community of Westphalia.

... or Afghanistan

What follows shows that the writer has experienced and studied guerilla war very carefully.

National levies and armed peasantry cannot and should not be employed against the main body of the enemy's army, or even against any considerable corps of the same, they must not attempt to crack the nut, they must only gnaw on the surface and the borders. They should rise in the provinces situated at one of the sides of the theatre of war, and in which the assailant does not appear in force, in order to withdraw these provinces entirely from his influence.

Where no enemy is to be found, there is no want of courage to oppose him, and at the example thus given, the mass of the neighboring population gradually takes fire. Thus the fire spreads as it does in heather, and reaching at last that part of the surface of the soil on which the aggressor is based, it seizes his lines of communication and preys upon the vital thread by which his existence is supported.

Surly on of the most interesting descriptions written on the topic. Take away "National Levies and armed peasantry" and use "Insurgency" and it becomes rather "modern".

I will continue later to comment it.