The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[nathan3011]

Hey thanks for this i found it a very insightful and interesting read and im in agreement that it was not the reason for today's PC attitude but it could have helped a little bit.

Thanks for this though guys much appreciated and a good read!

[William F. Owen]

Clausewitz is the essential grounding for all modern military thought. It's not as binding as Newtonian physics, but we have nothing else. I concur with the view that Tony Corn has either never read Clausewitz or has failed to discuss and understand what he says, with those who do.

Part of this comes from the increasing confusion caused by the current use of means which have no military purpose. (Building Schools, Aid programs etc) which fall outside the scope of the military instrument and are part of the policy, not the War. A vast amount of what is currently discussed about military thought is not military, or even "Warfare", so folks read Clausewitz and get confused.

Failing to understand Clausewitz is also central to a lot of John Boyd's insights, so again, adhering to one set of faulty argument sets you up for the next error in your OODA loop! - cheap shot, but it was too easy!!

[AmericanPride]

In my understanding, the relevancy of Clausewitz in the contemporary operating environment has not eroded, but instead has moved "downwards" to where tactical decisions have the same political effects and aims of war as a whole. Anthropology in war is nothing new -- IIRC Caesar extensively exploited such knowledge in his conquest of Gaul.

[SWJED]

Hey thanks for this i found it a very insightful and interesting read and im in agreement that it was not the reason for today's PC attitude but it could have helped a little bit.

Thanks for this though guys much appreciated and a good read!

Please do an intro and, per our “house rules”, explain why you found this insightful and interesting... We tend to ask for substance here. Thanks in advance.

[Backwards Observer]

Does the fractious debate on evolutionary theory more-or-less hamstring any effort at describing complex adaptive systems from a human perspective?

Merry Christmas

[Bill Moore]

Does the fractious debate on evolutionary theory more-or-less hamstring any effort at describing complex adaptive systems from a human perspective?

The evolution of warfare is a fact, not a theory. I'm not sure there is any debate on that, and complex adaptive systems are systems that evolve in response to a changing environment, in other words co-evolution.

Previously I have been hard on the readers/followers of Clausewitz, but that was due to their interpretations and blind obedience to what they think Clausewitz meant to say, such as the debate on center of gravities (COG). The COG process normally results in a lot of wasted time that does nothing to address the real problem, but it results in a must have power point slide for most ring knockers and graduates of CGSC. Clausewitz was a trend setter, not a follower. His intellectual insights were far above most, if not all, other military theorists, but his hordes of worshipers do not fall in the same category.

[marct]

Times Online October 26, 2006

Euro pact to fight £5bn carousel fraud
By Michael Herman and agencies

The six biggest EU states have pledged to join forces in the fight against the growing problem of so-called carousel fraud, a multi-billion pound tax scam the Government believes is linked to terrorism.


John Reid, the Home Secretary, said that the agreement was a major step towards a common European response to the fraud that is estimated to cost EU states as much as £55 billion in lost taxes each year. It is the first time the problem has been discussed at such a high level between EU members.

More...

One of my part-time students sent me this link (she is working in the area). Even if the estimates are inflated, it is still an increadible amount of money to be filtered into terrorist coffers.

Marc

[selil]

I've heard it often said that Clausewitz refers to war as inextricably linked to politics and war is a continuation of politics. I can reverse that and say that war is within the spectrum of conflict. Can anybody name a book and chapter where Clausewitz says this explicitly? In book 1, chapter 1 he talks around it, and in my version from Penguin classics Anatol Rapoport discusses it.

The reason being I'm reading Charles Tilly "The Politics of Collective Violence", and he says in Chapter 3 that Clausewitz argued for a segregated (from society) military organization. To me that seems totally counter-intuitive to the themes through out "On War". But, I can't find anything to directly refute it.

Suggestions?

[SteveMetz]

I've heard it often said that Clausewitz refers to war as inextricably linked to politics and war is a continuation of politics. I can reverse that and say that war is within the spectrum of conflict. Can anybody name a book and chapter where Clausewitz says this explicitly? In book 1, chapter 1 he talks around it, and in my version from Penguin classics Anatol Rapoport discusses it.

The reason being I'm reading Charles Tilly "The Politics of Collective Violence", and he says in Chapter 3 that Clausewitz argued for a segregated (from society) military organization. To me that seems totally counter-intuitive to the themes through out "On War". But, I can't find anything to directly refute it.

Suggestions?

I know this isn't really what you were asking, but I'd recommend Tony Echevarria's latest book.

[William F. Owen]

Can anybody name a book and chapter where Clausewitz says this explicitly? In book 1, chapter 1 he talks around it, and in my version from Penguin classics Anatol Rapoport discusses it.

You have the worst translation of Clausewitz ever written. Throw it, and get this one. http://www.amazon.com/War-Carl-von-C.../dp/0691018545

It's the only acceptable version (that I am aware of) for military thought.

[selil]

I know this isn't really what you were asking, but I'd recommend Tony Echevarria's latest book.

You have the worst translation of Clausewitz ever written. Throw it, and get this one. http://www.amazon.com/War-Carl-von-C.../dp/0691018545

It's the only acceptable version (that I am aware of) for military thought.

Purchased them both.

You know I blame SWC for this and especially the absent MarcT. In my last semester of course work and my last 4 credits for my doctorate I could have taken Kayaking or Archery. Instead I'm taking two doctoral level sociology classes on conflict and violence. OH and it's SIX credits so I'm tossing two off the bridge for free! But, I get to read books like "The electric kool-aid acid test".... 32 books in 16 weeks...

[Steve Blair]

You may also want to get your hands on Handel's "Masters of War." He goes into some pretty interesting comparisons of ol' Carl, Sun Tzu, and other "old school" military theorists.

[Rob Thornton]

Sam, I'll see if I can get you close when I get home today. It would not hurt to look up some of the other folks who have spent some time thinking about the nature of war.
Best, Rob

[SteveMetz]

Heck, I'd suggest emailing Tony Echevarria. He's better equipped to answer this than anyone I know with the possible exception of Colin Gray or Chris Bassford.

[Entropy]

Clausewitz and WW IV (PDF File)

Enter Alan Beyerchen, distinguished historian at Ohio State University. He's adopted a fundamentally different approach and by doing so has captured the intellectual high ground in the battle to amend theory in light of modern war's realities: Beyerchen would embrace rather than replace the master. Beyerchen has developed a taxonomy of war in the modern era in terms of four world wars. Each war was shaped by what he calls "amplifying factors." Amplifiers are not "multipliers" or "enablers" in that their influence on the course of war is nonlinear rather than linear; amplifiers don't simply accelerate the trends of the past, they make war different.

For example, World War I was a chemists' war in that the decisive strategic advantage on the battlefield was driven in large measure by new applications of chemistry and chemical engineering. The war should have ended for the Germans in 1915 when their supplies of gunpowder nitrates exhausted. But the synthesis of nitrates by German scientists allowed the war to continue for another three horrific years. World War II was a physicists' war. To paraphrase Churchill, the atom bomb ended the conflict, but exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum in the form of the wireless and radar won it for the allies. "World War III" was the "information researchers'" war, a war in which intelligence and knowledge of the enemy and the ability to fully exploit that knowledge allowed the U.S. to defeat the Soviet Union with relatively small loss of life.

And:

Beyerchen's idea is that the human and social sciences will change Clausewitz's perception of the constancy of the human influence in war. In effect, he argues that we are beginning the tectonic shift into World War IV, the epoch when the controlling amplifier will be human and biological rather than organizational or technological. From his theory we can postulate a new vision of the battlefield, one that shifts from the traditional linear construct to a battlefield that is amoebic in shape; it is distributed, dispersed, nonlinear, and essentially formless in space and unbounded in time. This war and all to follow will be what I would call "psycho-cultural" wars.

On my first read I think it starts of strong, but several of his conclusions have weak foundations and seem to suggest that future war will resemble Iraq and Afghanistan. Overall very thought-provoking and makes me want to read more about this Beyerchen fellow.

[AmericanPride]

I do not think the article addresses whatsoever war as an abstract idea. Yeah, it pays tribute to Clausewitz, but it never really gets to talking about his ideas; so it's really just a different way in which Clausewitz's ideas may be 'expressed' in a particular circumstance.

Certainly, there are obvious cosmetic changes in the how, but I haven't read much convincing evidence in the why. So I'm not sure if I agree with the idea of "amplifiers" as defined by the MG and Beyerchen because they seem to rework the ways in which wars are defined. I think its a mistaken assumption to define wars in the first place by the perceived dominant factor of influence because that introduces a kind of "heirarchy" of eras in which we can say such and such war was different from this other war when it might not really be the case based on the political conditions of the conflict. It also suggests some kind of progression which also might not exist. I further dislike the idea of supposing some kind of "world war" as if any other (or every other) war which could take place at the same time would somehow have the same shape (how much of the proposals would be relevant in a war with North Korea, or a culturally homogeneous society in general? Even in WW2, the Nazis pursued different strategies in the West and East based on political conditions in the same world war). So, for example, while we can find comparison between "WWIV" and Caesar's conquest of Gaul based on the shrewd manipulation of the enemy's culture and identity politics, there's really no political comparison whatsoever and so it's very much difficult to assert at all that the "psycho-cultural war" actually exists as a type of war rather than a specific strategy suitable for specific conditions (which might not always exist). Was there actually any "evolution" between Caesar's day and now in war itself, or are the (perceived) changes simply reflective of the sophistication of warfighting? I think wars should be defined by their political causes, not the strategies employed in them; to do the latter turns the entire equation upside down. Otherwise, we're left with apparently absurd contradictions as to why the Germans, for example, did not capitulate under years of strategic bombing in WW2 but Zanzibar surrendered to the British in 30 minutes of off-shore bombardment some 40 years earlier. How does that fit into the neatly defined so-called phases, progressions, evolutions, and what-have-you of war?

So, I do agree that the MG's conclusions are excellent and thoughtful, but that's only in the context of the present conditions of war and he provided no reason to think that any other war, now or in the future, will take on that same shape.

[William F. Owen]

There are some things in this that I really want to agree with, but the context he presents them in, causes me to be less than enthusiastic.

What I like, if I read it correctly, was the observation the military technology does not progress logically, but is basically the product of opinion, both faulty and accurate. Tanks are not products of physics. They are products of opinion.

Yes, armies would benefit greatly from "better" infantry and tactical forces. Yes a better understanding of the social sciences would help,

BUT...

The whole set up of US and NATO Armies is biased against creating "cross spectrum" tactical excellence as they have somehow elevated the so called "Operational Level" to near G@d like status. - if indeed it exits in the way folks say it do...

Currently, the military thought, so central to the Generals article, is in love with taking the back off the watch, rather than just telling the time.

What is more, when the social scientists turn up and ask, "why do you do this," most military men, will have no idea, as to why they do the things they do, and even when they do, they may well find that the reasoning is faulty. This is not true for all as the CARLS archive so amply shows. Thus I submit there is a limited role for social scientists to analyse the why and how. There is an ample role for the gifted members of the military. The truth really does set you free, but who tells you what is true makes a huge difference.

To take a not so extreme example, how do you practice "COIN" when the enemy is both insurgent, a regular army and special forces? - as in Vietnam. .. or even South Ossetia?

[Ken White]

Certainly, there are obvious cosmetic changes in the how, but I haven't read much convincing evidence in the why.

I didn't see it either; though it should be obvious. The lesser reason is political correctness and the kinder, gentler folks of today (mostly...) compared to their Grandparents. Note that no leading Nation has really started a war since the Argentina bit in the Falklands (and that was an aberration) except the US and just recently, Russia, neither of whom are now or ever have been particularly kind or gentle when provoked. The greater reason is the expense, conventional war in the 20 Century model has gotten too expensive for most nations.

Otherwise, we're left with apparently absurd contradictions as to why the Germans, for example, did not capitulate under years of strategic bombing in WW2 but Zanzibar surrendered to the British in 30 minutes of off-shore bombardment some 40 years earlier. How does that fit into the neatly defined so-called phases, progressions, evolutions, and what-have-you of war?

Uh, because Hitler had a desire to fight on regardless and had a power structure to enforce his views plus a population that was broadly supportive and Khalid had none of those? I'll also point out that both were chemical 'wars' while the later one did transmute to physics as it went on.

So, I do agree that the MG's conclusions are excellent and thoughtful, but that's only in the context of the present conditions of war and he provided no reason to think that any other war, now or in the future, will take on that same shape.

I thought he did -- but was constrained by the fact that as Wilf said:

"Currently, the military thought, so central to the Generals article, is in love with taking the back off the watch, rather than just telling the time.

What is more, when the social scientists turn up and ask, "why do you do this," most military men, will have no idea, as to why they do the things they do, and even when they do, they may well find that the reasoning is faulty. This is not true for all as the CARLS archive so amply shows. Thus I submit there is a limited role for social scientists to analyse the why and how. There is an ample role for the gifted members of the military. The truth really does set you free, but who tells you what is true makes a huge difference.

To take a not so extreme example, how do you practice "COIN" when the enemy is both insurgent, a regular army and special forces? - as in Vietnam. .. or even South Ossetia?"

Trying to categorize warfare and put in a pigeon hole is quite dangerous. Also serves absolutely no useful function that I can see...

[AmericanPride]

because Hitler had a desire to fight on regardless and had a power structure to enforce his views plus a population that was broadly supportive and Khalid had none of those?

Indeed -- and that is my intended point. It's one thing to discuss how this or that war ended, but it really comes down to breaking the enemy's will regardless of how that's accomplished. That's why it irks me every time war is defined by the capabilities or strategies in use rather than the extent the belligerents are willing to pursue their desired objectives. I think it's dangerous intellectually to talk about the nature of war, or the outcome of any war, without first discussing its relationship to politics. Having looked through the article again, what I primarily dispute is (1) defining the wars by the capabilities in use which leads to a faulty, perhaps misleading, conception of war and its future; (2) asserting that "psycho-cultural war" is a kind of war instead of a particular strategy used in specific conditions; and (3) claiming said assertion is a revision of the nature of war itself (even if its an addition to the author's accepted idea of war rather than redefining it) rather than an "expression" of it in particular (political) circumstances which might not exist elsewhere or in the future.

[William F. Owen]

I think it's dangerous intellectually to talk about the nature of war, or the outcome of any war, without first discussing its relationship to politics. Having looked through the article again, what I primarily dispute is (1) defining the wars by the capabilities in use which leads to a faulty, perhaps misleading, conception of war and its future.

I think there are two things in play here and they are not the same thing. Military force is a political or diplomatic tool. Military force is applied as a continuation of politics with an admixture of other means.

The political will to employ and persist with military means is not one that should concern the military. What should concern the military is achieving the outcome the politicians want. (it may include loosing or not winning.) - as soldiers that's none of their business.

The expression of military capability, usually refers to a "want to do." This is not the same as a "can do." My guess is that a lot of folks are very reluctant to discuss why an ACR squadron, for example, cannot perform certain missions they are supposed to.

IMO, we have got to recover the idea that military force is only applied to military problems. Military force is primarily destructive and coercive. Its benefits come from actual or threatened harm. How you apply threaten or apply the harm is basically what defines how you work. Just an opinion, but why make it more complicated?